Author Archives: IrvineRenter

Federal Reserve Policy Fails to Meet Its Goals to Save Real Estate Values

Do policy makers at the Federal Reserve really believe their policies will work, or are they just doing whatever they can to save the banks at the expense of everyone else?

Irvine Home Address … 5242 ROYALE Ave Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price …… $640,000

You take it on the run baby

If that's the way you want it baby

Then I don't want you around

I don't believe it

Not for a minute

You're under the gun so you take it on the run

You're thinking up your white lies

You're putting on your bedroom eyes

You say you're coming home but you won't say when

But I can feel it coming

If you leave tonight keep running

And you need never look back again

REO Speedwaagon — Take It On the Run

Most of the policy decisions coming out of the Federal Reserve appear as if they are making it up as they go. During 2008 and 2009, some of the emergency lending windows opened at the Fed likely saved the economy from total collapse; however, many of the policy decisions have not been as successful, and the attempt to re-inflate the housing bubble to save bank balance sheets is failing as house prices roll over despite historically low interest rates.

Are the Fed's Honchos Simpletons, Or Are They Just Taking Orders?

(November 1, 2010) — Charles Hugh Smith

Without exception the Fed's policies are pernicious failures; either they are exceptionally thickheaded, or they are just taking orders.

At the risk of boring you with material you already know well, let's quickly cover the Fed's policies and stated goals since the Global Financial Meltdown of late 2008.

The Fed's supposed goal is "get the economy on its feet again" by stabilizing employment and prices. At the risk of sounding naive, we can paraphrase all the Fed's statements thusly: "We're trying to help everyone in the U.S. by fighting this recession."

Sounds noble enough, so let's look at what the Fed has actually done in the real world.

1. The Fed has injected "liquidity" into the banking sector, enabling banks to borrow essentially unlimited sums at essentially zero interest–the infamous ZIRP (zero-interest rate policy).

2. The Fed has pushed down mortgage rates by buying over 10% of all outstanding mortgages in the U.S.–all the toxic garbage loans which the banks were desperate to get off their crippled balance sheets.

3. The Fed has pushed down yields on U.S. Treasury bonds ("monetizing" this newly issued debt) by buying hundreds of billions of dollars of bonds itself.

Much has been made of the latest round of quantitative easing (a fancy term for printing money). That particular policy has caused concerns that inflation is right around the corner. i do believe inflation is going to occur at some point, but not until the Federal Reserve has printed enough money to compensate for the debt destruction that is occurring in residential and commercial loans. The debt creation during the bubble was extremely inflationary as all this new debt inflated massive real estate bubbles in both sectors; however, since the official government compilation of inflation does not include those asset prices, it went unnoticed by the Federal Reserve.

Now that the residential and commercial real estate bubbles are deflating, debt destruction is causing widespread deflation far in excess of the official government measures. This deflation is what is ravaging our economy. Quantitative easing is one method of combating deflation. Basically, you print money to make up for that which was destroyed. To the degree the two cancel each other out, neither deflation or inflation results. Unfortunately, in the real world, the Federal Reserve generally errors to the side of printing which will cause significant inflation once the deflation ceases and the economy improves.

Here is what each program was intended to do:

1. ZIRP and unlimited liquidity was intended to enable the banks to "earn their way back to solvency" by giving them free money which they could then loan out at much higher rates. The difference between zero (their cost) and the interest rate they charged borrowers (such as those wonderful 19% credit cards) was pure profit, courtesy of the Federal Reserve.

This is also theft from savers. The free market would place a value on stored financial reserves, but the Federal Reserve usurps the free market and diverts the return on savings away from savers to the member banks. The inflation that comes at the end of the cycle is a second form of theft from savers we will see when interest rates go back up.

2. The purchase of $1.2 trillion in mortgage-backed securities was intended to stabilize housing and real estate prices at far above their "natural" level set by "organic" supply and demand; in essence, the goal was to stop market prices from "reverting to the mean," i.e. returning to historical trendlines which are roughly equivialent to pre-bubble valuations circa 1997-98.

This was intended to stop the implosion of banks' balance sheets as their assets–all those mortgage-backed securities and derivatives they own–kept falling in value.

It was also intended to stabilize real estate prices so banks could slowly sell off the millions of foreclosed (REO) and defaulted homes they hold in the "shadow inventory" at prices far above where organic supply and demand would let them settle.

We have certainly seen the result of this policy here in Irvine. Our real estate prices have remained elevated far above their natural market levels. Banks are still hoping to unload their shadow inventory when demand increases as the economy improves. I believe we will see the collapse of the real estate cartel and lower prices in Orange County over the next several years.

On the other hand, markets like Las Vegas have over-corrected. Prices there are back at mid 90s levels, and they are likely to stay there for the foreseeable future. The Federal Reserves policy goals have been a failure in Las Vegas.

In the bigger picture, Las Vegas is actually a success of the free market whereas Orange County is a failure. When prices bottom in Las Vegas, the entire housing stock will be affordable, and as normal appreciation resumes, people will again build equity while enjoying the economic stimulus of low housing costs. Contrast that to Orange County where we will likely see slowly grinding downward pricing, no equity, and a moribund economy because so much of the local incomes are going toward debt service. Which market is a success and which is a failure?

As a side benefit, keeping home prices inflated far above their real value would also allow the Fed to dump its own portfolio of $1.2 trillion mortgage-backed securities without suffering catastrophic losses.

Lastly, the goal was to lower the cost of mortgages to such ridiculously low levels that otherwise prudent citizens might be seduced into buying a house "because rates are so low." (Never mind what happens if the house falls another 40% in value over the next few years.)

I freely admit that the low interest rates are certainly enticing me to buy cashflow properties. Of course, I don't believe those properties will fall 40% more in value, and frankly, even if they did, I wouldn't care because i bought them for their current cashflow not their resale value.

The idea was to encourage rampant home buying (for speculation or long-term ownership, it didn't matter) to prop up the market with "demand," even if that "demand" was driven by the low cost of borrowing rather than organic demand based on the need for shelter. (Please recall that there are 19 million vacant dwellings in the U.S. now.)

3. The outright purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds was intended to drop the yield on newly issued bonds to keep the cost of borrowing trillions of dollars for "fiscal stimulus" down so the potential future cost of all the trillions of dollars in new Federal debt would be masked from a credulous citizenry who care more about their entitlements than what happens to their kids and grandkids.

The lack of consideration for future generations is one of the features of the housing bubble I find most distasteful. The generation of owners who still have artificial equity do so at the expense of the next generation who must grossly overpay for housing. It is a transfer of wealth from the young to the old that rivals social security.

4. All the policies led to super-low yields on low-risk investments so that "cash is trash;" that created a powerful incentive to put capital into risk assets such as stocks, commodities and real estate. By explicitly pushing free money and zero-interest rates, the Fed made it impossible to earn any yield on low-risk assets; thus they have been explicitly pushing capital and borrowed money into the "risk trade": emerging markets, commodities, and stocks.

The goal here is to create a new "wealth effect": if another bubble is inflated in stocks and commodities, then owners of capital will feel wealthier and as a result, they will start spending more.

Right now, nobody is penalized for tucking away cash in their mattress.

Are the Fed's honchos really such knuckleheads that they don't know most Americans have no financial assets to boost in a new bubble?

Source: Wealth, Income, and Power.

The top-earning 20 percent of Americans — those making more than $100,000 each year — received 49.4 percent of all income generated in the U.S., compared with the 3.4 percent earned by those below the poverty line.

U.S. median household income fell 3 percent in 2009 to $50,221, the second straight annual drop, the Census Bureau said.

One Year Later, No Sign of Improvement in America's Income Inequality Problem:

Income inequality has grown massively since 2000. According to Harvard Magazine, 66% of 2001-2007's income growth went to the top 1% of Americans, while the other 99% of the population got a measly 6% increase.

The Top 5 percent in income earners — those households earning $210,000 or more — account for about one-third of consumer outlays, including spending on goods and services, interest payments on consumer debt and cash gifts, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Moody’s Analytics.

The Fed's central idea was to create a "trickle down" of wealth as a new stock and commodity bubble increased the financial wealth of the top 10%. That idea has demonstrably failed; could the Fed's economic geniuses really be so stupid as to trust in the long-discredited "trickle down" theory that enriching the top tranch will actually benefit the bottom 90%?

What the author fails to recognize is that financial assets are not required to inflate a housing bubble. Copious amounts of debt are all that's required. The middle class proved they could inflate a massive housing bubble and consume any wealth it created by mortgage equity withdrawal.

5. All the policies were designed to flood the economy with new "free" money, thereby sparking inflation and a new round of consumption that would inject "growth" into the economy.

In other words, the "problem" is perceived as sagging asset prices (real estate and the worthless mortgages written on homes that have lost 50% of their value) which have impoverished homeowners and impaired banks' assets.

The Fed's "solution" is to reinflate the housing bubble (or stabilize its collapse) and push investors and speculators alike into risk assets, in the hopes that a new asset bubble somewhere will boost assets enough to create a "feel good" wealth effect which will trigger massive new consumer spending and repair banks' balance sheets with higher asset valuations.

The concept that asset prices are depressed is part of the problem with banks and the Federal Reserve. Most real estate markets — Las Vegas excluded — are not depressed and undervalued even with the dramatic price declines we have seen so far. Prices were previously elevated beyond their fundamental value, and the crash is a return to stable valuation metrics. This conceptual confusion is why the policies of the Federal Reserve have failed.

Put another way, here are the Fed's goals stripped of niceties:

1. Revoke the business cycle–no recessions allowed. In the normal business cycle of classical Capitalism (as opposed to the crony Capitalism we have today), then expansion of credit/debt and rising assets leads to mal-investment and rampant speculation: overbuilding, overcapacity, over-indebtedness and leveraged bets that misprice risk.

Which is precisely what occurred in the 1995-2000 stock market bubble and the 2002-2007 housing/real estate bubble: mal-investment, over-indebtedness, overbuilding and mispricing of risk on a grand, unprecedented scale.

In the normal scheme of things, all this bad debt would be written off and the assets would be sold/liquidated. Holders of those assets and the debt based on those assets would both suffer losses or even be wiped out. All the overbuilt properties and overcapacity would be sold for pennies on the dollar, and the liabilities (debt) wiped off the balance sheet along with all the inflated assets.

That is a great description of how free markets are supposed to work. Recessions are how free markets purge their excesses. Foolish business plans and excessively leveraged speculative bets are wiped out and capital is redistributed to where it can be used more efficiently. Keeping capital tied up in unproductive assets hinders economic growth and creates the malaise we experience today.

There is no other way to clear the market for future growth. Yet the Fed has pursued a "solution" that violates all the principles of Capitalism: to reinflate asset bubbles or keep them artificially high by injecting more credit/debt into the system.

In other words, if you can't service your current debt and you're insolvent because your assets have declined, then the Fed's "solution" is to give you free money to roll over into a bigger debt load and boost the risk-asset trade so the assets on your books will rise again, "solving" your insolvency.

Do you see the foolishness of this approach? You can't borrow your way out of debt.

Does anyone at the Fed really believe this will work , or are they just thick? Or even worse, are they just lackeys taking orders from Wall Street and the Financial Power Elites?

You cannot eliminate the consequences of speculative bad bets and over-indebtedness with more debt and more speculation, yet that is precisely the intent of all the Fed's policies.

The Fed's unprecedented purchase of mortgages and Treasury debt have indeed reinflated the stock and housing bubbles to a limited degree, but most of that free money has flowed into emerging markets and commodities, which are now in their own massive bubbles.

In yet another pernicious consequence, the Fed's bumbling attempts to create inflation in the U.S. have failed–the inflation is raging in China. And as inflation rages there, then the cost of Chinese goods in the U.S. will rise.

Is there any possible way to fail more spectacularly that the Fed? Instead of sparking "good inflation" in the U.S. which they presumed (thickheadedly) would boost wages along with prices, thus enabling debt-serfs to pay down their debts with "cheaper" money, they have sparked runaway asset bubbles in commodities and "bad" inflation in China, which means the cost of goods the debt-serfs need to survive is skyrocketing while their wages and income stagnate.

In other words, the policies of the Fed have completely backfired in terms of "helping" 90% of the citizenry. The "wealth effect" of rising stock prices failed to boost the spirits and balance sheets of the bottom 90% who have essentially no financial capital, average incomes have declined in the recession and yet prices for commodities are climbing.

The Fed's policies have created the worst-case scenario for the average American household: stagnant income and rising prices of essentials. The problem is demand is falling along with net incomes, not the supply of new debt. By raising the costs of commodities, the Fed is actually reducing the net disposable income of households: the reverse of the "wealth effect."

Rather than allow the economy to clear out bad debt and re-set asset prices that would enable organic growth, the Fed has tried to inflate new asset bubbles to save the Financial Power Elites from suffering the losses resulting from the last two bubbles popping.

I have stated on many occasions that I believe the end game is price inflation without wage inflation that will cause a decline in our standard of living. Everyone who is bullish on real estate believes inflation is coming and it will push real estate prices higher. The Federal Reserve's printing money will eventually ignite inflation. I agree with the bulls on that point; however, the inflation in prices will not be accompanied by inflation in wages, something required for house prices to go up. How does the Federal Reserve create wage inflation with chronic high unemployment? They can't. That is why house prices will not be going up any time soon.

It's as if the fever the patient needs to wipe out a deadly infection has been suppressed by the Fed, creating the illusion of "health" even as the infection destroys the patient from within.

2. "Save" Wall Street, the banks, the nation's Financial Power Elites and the nation's homeowners by blowing new asset bubbles with massive injections of free money and the bogus "demand" created by the Fed's own purchases. The dynamic has already been explained above: cover the losses of the last bubble imploding by blowing an even bigger bubble now that boosts the asset side of balance sheets.

Do the Fed's honchos really think there is another end-game here other than the collapse of their latest ZIRP-QE2-driven asset bubbles? Could they really be so blind, so stupid, so misinformed, so ignorant of reality and history, as to believe their policies will actually work?

Are they so detached from reality that they fail to see their policies are backfiring, further impoverishing most of the citizenry as they set up the inevitable collapse of the banks they have tried so hard to save?

Are they really simpletons, or are they just taking orders from the Financial Elites who have the most to lose when the whole sagging sandcastle finally collapses into the waves?

I think they really believe their policies will work. I also think they are mistaken.

Personally, I plan to load up on 4% debt to buy cashflow properties. If I am paying 4% in an inflationary environment where inflation exceeds 4%, I am paying back the debt with dollars declining in value at a rate higher than my interest rate. in other words, they will be paying me to keep the debt alive. This works great for cashflow properties, but not so well for speculative bets on price appreciation because higher inflation — absent wage inflation — and higher interest rates makes borrowing more expensive and reduces loan balances which hinders appreciation.

Cashflow will be the only way to make money in real estate for the next decade or more just like it was in the 90s.

Thinking up their white lies

I've often wondered what long term loan owners tell their families when they finally implode. How do people explain to their friends and relatives that they borrowed more than double what they paid for their house years ago, blew the money, and then lost their family home? It must be an interesting yarn.

  • The owners of today's featured property paid $438,000 on 12/18/2000. They used a $365,000 first mortgage, a $36,500 second mortgage, and a $36,500 down payment.
  • On 2/20/2003 they refinanced the first mortgage for $322,700. For the first two years, they were going the right direction, but then they tasted a bit of kool aid, and everything went poorly from this point forward.
  • On 5/28/2003 they obtained a HELOC for $30,000.
  • On 12/30/2003 they refinanced with a $359,400 first mortgage.
  • On 3/17/2004 they got a HELOC for $115,000.
  • On 7/28/2004 they refinanced with a $376,800 first mortgage and went Ponzi.
  • On 1/25/2005 they refinanced the first mortgage for $524,000.
  • On 5/31/2006 they refinanced with a $640,000 Option ARM with a 1% teaser rate.
  • On 6/11/2007 they refinanced with a $656,000 first mortgage and a $40,000 stand-alone second.
  • Total property debt is $696,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $294,500 including their down payment.
  • Total squatting time is 18 months.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 07/01/2010

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 07/15/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

Seriously, how do people explain this behavior? Is it possible to dodge the question at family gatherings?

Irvine Home Address … 5242 ROYALE Ave Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price … $640,000

Home Purchase Price … $438,000

Home Purchase Date …. 12/18/2000

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $163,600

Percent Change ………. 37.4%

Annual Appreciation … 3.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$640,000 ………. Asking Price

$128,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

4.29% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$512,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$122,018 ………. Income Requirement

$2,531 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$555 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$53 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$0 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,139 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$417 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$700 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$198 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$80 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$2,299 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$6,400 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$6,400 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,120 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$128,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$145,920 ………. Total Cash Costs

$35,200 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$181,120 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 5242 ROYALE Ave Irvine, CA 92604

——————————————————————————

Beds: : 4

Baths: : 3

Sq. Ft.: : 2011

$0,318

Lot Size: : 6,000 Sq. Ft.

Property Type:: Residential, Single Family

Style:: One Level, Ranch

View:: Faces Northeast

Year Built: : 1969

Community: : El Camino Real

MLS#: : P758091

Source: : CARETS

——————————————————————————

Charming 4 bedroom 3 bath home in the Ranch. Tastefully updated and well maintained. Granite counters in kitchen and bathrooms. Laminate flooring, crown molding, plantation shutters in kitchen, living room and family room. Dual pane windows. Mahogany front door. 2 car garage. Backyard has a pool, patio with awning, and gazebo. No HOA dues.

I hope you have enjoyed this week, and thank you for reading the Irvine Housing Blog: astutely observing the Irvine home market and combating California Kool-Aid since 2006.

Have a great weekend,

Irvine Renter

Flipping Las Vegas

This post on Las Vegas will only be on the IHB for one day. It's a secret revealed only to regular IHB readers.

Irvine Home Address … 7677 ALEXANDER HILLS ST, LAS VEGAS, 89139

Resale Home Price …… $135,900

Listen, do you want to know a secret?

Do you promise not to tell, whoa, oh

Closer, let me whisper in your ear

Say the words you long to hear

Beatles — Do You Want to Know a Secret

As most of you know, I have formed an investment fund to acquire auction properties and flip them for profit. I have been very busy since mid-September when I turned my attention from raising money to actually doing the work. I have been intentionally mum on the blog about this endeavor; although, I will feature properties I acquire there from time to time in the future. Quite honestly, I don't want to attract too much attention to this opportunity for fear of competitors entering the market and driving down the margins. Due to that concern, this post will only appear on the IHB today, and tomorrow morning, it will be taken down. I want to inform my regular readers, who are most of my investors, without giving opportunity for potential competitors to review days later.

I would also like to start by saying the two properties I am featuring today are not typical. These were both outstanding deals for different reasons. The typical margins I am obtaining are about half as large. That being said, both of these properties are in escrow, so I have good reason to believe the margins presented are real. There is still a chance that either or both will fall out of escrow, but Alexander Hills is scheduled to close on November 18. When it does close, I will no longer be able to accept new investors into the fund.

Home Address … 7677 ALEXANDER HILLS ST, LAS VEGAS, 89139

Resale Home Price … $135,900

Home Purchase Price … $86,000

Home Purchase Date …. 9/24/2010

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $41,746

Percent Change ………. 48.5%

Annual Appreciation … 308.5%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$135,900 ………. Asking Price

$4,757 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

4.23% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$131,144 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$25,725 ………. Income Requirement

$644 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$118 ………. Property Tax

$11 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$280 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$1,053 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$58 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$181 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$7 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$17 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$838 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$1,359 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$1,359 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$1,311 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$4,757 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$8,786 ………. Total Cash Costs

$12,800 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$21,586 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 7677 ALEXANDER HILLS ST, LAS VEGAS, 89139

——————————————————————————

Beds: 3

Baths: 2 F 1 H

Home size: 1502

Lot Size: 0.15

Year Built: 2003

——————————————————————————

Clean, beautiful 2-story home situated in the gated community of Lamplight Cottages. Desirable floor plan with 3 bedrooms, 2-1/2 baths. Open kitchen with a built-in island, granite countertops, built-in microwave, custom cabinetry, and tile floors. Living Room and stairs have dark chocolate hardwood floors and dramatic vaulted ceilings. Great Community with Pool, Clubhouse and lush green park. This home is owned by equity seller and available for quick close.

Bullish on Las Vegas's low end properties

Everyone is worried that Las Vegas prices will never bottom. In my opinion, properties in this price range are already there. The higher price ranges, like the second property I am going to show you, still has air to deflate, but the properties under $150,000 are not going to go much lower if at all.

I say that for one simple reason: prices are very affordable. Look at the income requirement on this house. With current interest rates this detached single-family house is affordable to someone making $25,725. That is a full-time single breadwinner making $12.86 per hour, or two breadwinners making that combined. That is affordability.

Further, the cost of ownership is much lower than comparable rents:

10483 CAROLINE ROSE ST 1,095
10439 MORNING SORROW ST 1,095
7570 GRASSY BANK ST 1,195
6191 BROKEN SLATE WY 1,100
8432 RAVENCREST ST 1,300
8225 GOLDEN FLOWERS ST 1,200

This property should rent for about $1,200 per month, making it a good cashflow rental property even at full retail cost (these properties have tremendous cashflow value at auction prices).

The combination of excellent affordability and the huge savings on the cost of ownership versus rental is prompting every renter with good credit to buy. The large positive cashflow is causing many cashflow investors to buy these properties both at auction and on the MLS. Between the local owner occupants and the outside cashflow investors, there is real demand at these price points.

I know I plan to buy several just like this one.

Selling to the tenant

The second property I have in escrow is a good deal that became a great deal because I sold it to the tenant.

Whenever I bid on an auction property, I always include a renovaton budget, and if the property is occupied, I budget cash-for-keys to pay the occupants to leave without trashing the house. In cases like this one where I was able to sell the property to the renter that lived there, I avoid both of those costs, and the savings falls to the bottom line.

Home Address … 7888 SPINDRIFT COVE ST, LAS VEGAS, NV 89139-6109

Resale Home Price … $295,900

Home Purchase Price … $201,700

Home Purchase Date …. 10/4/2010

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $76,446

Percent Change ………. 37.9%

Annual Appreciation … 253.5%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$295,900 ………. Asking Price

$10,357 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

4.23% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$285,544 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$56,013 ………. Income Requirement

$1,401 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$256 ………. Property Tax

$25 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$280 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$1,962 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$126 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$395 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$16 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$37 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$1,494 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$2,959 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$2,959 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$2,855 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$10,357 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$19,130 ………. Total Cash Costs

$22,900 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$42,030 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 7888 SPINDRIFT COVE ST, LAS VEGAS, NV 89139-6109

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 3 F

Home size: 3314

Year Built: 2001

——————————————————————————

This is a non-MLS sale, so there is no property description nor is there a link to

I think properties at this price point in Las Vegas still have some air in them. Of the properties I have purchased for the fund, the ones in this price range offer the greatest potential margins because so few auction buyers have the cash to trade these. Higher margins means it is easier for a flipper to lower price to move the property if necessary. That in turn means that prices for these will likely head lower. Further, the price-to-rent ratio is not good at these higher price points:

7871 SPINDRIFT COVE ST 1,850
7831 ABALONE BAY ST 1,850

Cashflow investors will not be attracted to these properties, so it is up to owner-occupants to clean up this mess. There is much more supply than there are buyers ready, willing, and able to absorb it. Prices in this range will fall.

But that is the risk of being a flipper. Catching falling knives offers great margins to those with the dexterity to juggle. Also, the margins provide more room for error or later price reductions.

Investor site up soon

I want to thank all the investors for their patience while I prepare the website to report on all the fund's properties. My attention has been on acquiring and processing these properties so far, but developing the investor website for reporting is now my priority. I have developed the report which will serve as a template, and I have the accounting system in place to track the details of the individual properties. You will be receiving an email from me soon with details on how to access the member's site. If you want to see the PDF reports on these properties, I have those available for your review. Email me and I will send them to you. The website will have all the same information when it is ready to go.

Borrowers Paying Large Mortgages Hinder Economic Recovery

People who continue to pay bloated mortgages with onerous debt-to-income ratios are slowing the economic recovery.

Irvine Home Address … 5092 CINNAMON Irvine, CA 92612

Resale Home Price …… $425,000

Forgotten lies aim to distnact me

This moon-mind must not connect

Pure nature will contain me

Freefall in air I will surpass

When I'm falling, calling, I return

Floating closer to your shore

I start to drift with the tide

Maybe I'll reach, I'll reach the beach

The Fixx — Reach the Beach

Milllions of loan owners struggle to stay afloat. Many persist like a shipwreck suvivor clings to a makeshift raft hoping and praying they will reach the beach.

Back in March, I asked the question Why Do Struggling Homeowners Keep Paying Their Mortgages? and recently we looked at What Really Prompts Borrowers to Accelerate Their Default? Today, we examine the economic impact of the underwater loan owners "doing the right thing" by continuing to pay their oversized mortgage.

Millions of homeowners keep paying on underwater mortgages

The payments absorb billions of dollars that might be used for other forms of consumer spending, creating a drag on the overall economy.

By Don Lee, Los Angeles Times

November 1, 2010

For almost two years, home foreclosures have swept the nation, spreading misery among once-buoyant families, spattering lenders with red ink and undermining efforts to restart the economy.

But a bigger problem may turn out to be the millions of Americans who are still faithfully paying their mortgages, but on houses worth far less than before the bubble burst. It's not that these homeowners will stop making their payments. It's just the opposite — that they will keep doing it.

How could that be a source of future trouble? Because, with home prices stagnant in much of the country, payments on mortgages that are underwater could absorb billions of dollars that might be used for other forms of consumer spending — a drag on family finances, the housing market and the overall economy.

A refresher from California Personal Finance: Ponzi Style:

"Examine the graphic above. The first column shows a graphical breakdown of the income of a typical homeowner. Total home related debt (including taxes, insurance, HOA and other monthly expenses) is limited to 28% of gross income. Consumer debt including all other debt service payments is limited to 8%. Taxes take up about 24% (depending on income and tax bracket), and the remaining 40% is disposable income to cover the other expenses of daily life.

The second column shows what happens as people start to stretch to buy a home in a financial mania (charts are below). The increasing home debt reduces the tax burden a little, but the increased consumer spending and home debt takes a big chunk out of disposable income. The recession of the early 90s lingered for so long here in California because the people who bought in the frenzy of the late 1980s found themselves with crushing debts and greatly reduced disposable income. Prior to the increase in housing debt, this disposable income would have been spent in the local economy; instead, this money was sent out of state to the creditor who made the loan.

The big financial innovation–if you want to call it that–of the Great Housing Bubble was the nearly unrestricted use of cash-out refinancing and HELOCs to tap into home price appreciation. The third column shows the impact this new source of credit had on personal income statements. HELOC money allowed people to pay off their consumer debt while only modestly increasing their home debt. Since this income was untaxed (borrowed money is not truly income), the extracted money was entirely converted to disposable income. This incredible influx of disposable income caused our economy to explode.

Unfortunately, as is documented in the post Our HELOC Economy, the loss of this HELOC income is having devastating effects on local tax revenues and our economy. When you examine the personal income statements of borrowers in column four, you see that home debt and consumer debt have now become so burdensome that there is no longer enough disposable income to cover life's basic needs; borrowers are insolvent.

The only solution to the problem of borrower insolvency is a monumental restructuring of both home and consumer debt. Realistically, the only way this is going to occur is through foreclosure and bankruptcy. We are not going to re-inflate this Ponzi Scheme because when sustainable loan terms are applied to real incomes, people cannot raise bids to sustain or inflate home prices–even with 4.5% interest rates. Without home price appreciation and subsequent HELOC borrowing, the Ponzi Scheme does not work.

The implications of this are clear; we are going to experience an extended recession bordering on depression here in California that is going to linger for many, many years. During this extended crisis, a significant percentage of California homeowners are going to face foreclosure and personal bankruptcy.

The collapse of a Ponzi Scheme is never pleasant, and that is what we are facing. According to Arthur Miller, “An era can be said to end when its basic illusions are exhausted.” The unsustainable lifestyles and illusions of wealth created during The Great Housing Bubble are exhausted; the era has ended."

Back to the LA Times article:

And the drag could persist for years.

Of the estimated 15 million homeowners underwater, about 7.8 million owed at least 25% more than their properties were worth in the first quarter of this year, according to Moody's Analytics' calculations of Equifax credit records and government data.

More than 4 million borrowers, including 672,000 in California, 424,000 in Florida and 121,000 in Illinois — three of the biggest real estate markets — were underwater more than 50%. Their average negative equity: a whopping $107,000.

Many of these homeowners are paying much higher interest rates than the latest national average of 4.25%. They still have jobs and can afford to make the payments.

But they can't refinance because they owe too much. That home equity line of credit isn't going to happen. Even ordinary loans may be impossible to get. And selling the home at a huge loss is out of the question.

Nor can most underwater borrowers take advantage of the Treasury Department's loan-modification program, which generally requires a job loss or another kind of hardship.

In other words, they're stuck.

The individual loan owners are stuck, and the California economy is stuck because The California Economy Is Dependent Upon Ponzi Borrowers. With the various Ponzi loans being withdrawn from the market, California houses are no longer a viable source of spending money. We may maintain a significant amount of air in the housing bubble here because the Desire for Mortgage Equity Withdrawal Inflated the Housing Bubble, and this same desire will work to sustain it. Most loan owners in California view home price appreciation as an entitlement they can spend at will.

Heather Hines and her husband reflect this new reality. They owe $415,000 on a Santa Rosa, Calif., town house they bought in 2004 for $430,000. When the county appraised the three-bedroom home a few weeks ago, it was worth $246,000 — even less than a year earlier.

The couple had planned to move to a larger home after their two grade-school children became teenagers, but now that looks impossible. Their house needs a new roof, but they've put off replacing it for more than a year.

They did not budget for later home improvements because they expected the house to pay for itself. The appreciation was supposed to appear by market magic, and they would then borrow the money — at ever decreasing interest rates — to fix that roof. The best laid plans of mice and men often go astray.

"It's hard to think of making that investment when you're hundreds of thousands underwater," said Hines, 37, a city planner who like her husband is employed and has an advanced university degree. "It just feels hopeless. What are we supposed to do? It feels like we're never going to see any equity in our home."

They should feel that hopeless. Unless the Fed can print enough money to put everyone back to work and stimulate some major wage inflation, house prices are not going to regain their former peaks any time soon.

Theoretically, the Hineses could walk away — stop making the mortgage payments that consume a big part of their income. But defaulting would ruin their credit and have other negative consequences. So, she said, they'll keep paying and hoping for the best.

Hope is not a plan.

Unhappily for the rest of the country, that's not the end of the problem: The Hineses' financial bind will ripple throughout their community and the larger economy.

The real estate market depends on such homeowners being able to sell and move up; without them the trade-up market can't grow.

This is an under-appreciated feature of the housing market. When the government manipulations put in a temporary bottom at an elevated price point, they delayed the bottoming of the market. If the market had been allowed to crash and bottom in 2011, move-up buyers would have started becoming active by 2013, and the rate of sales would increase with the new influx of equity from appreciation. With all the government manipulation, we have elevated the bottoming price, but delayed the bottom for two or three years. The impact of that will be apparent over the next several years as the market drags along the bottom and few obtain any equity to simulate a move-up market.

Meantime, the Hineses will keep delaying that new roof, depriving a local roofer of business. They're unlikely to redecorate or upgrade the kitchen either, as millions of families were doing before the recession — more potential losses for local businesses, not to mention the car dealers, clothing and consumer electronics stores and manufacturers of the products that the Hineses won't buy.

Weighed down by the huge debt on their house, they also will be a lot more cautious about how they use credit cards. Big family getaways in the summer? Forget it, Hines said.

Multiply such sentiments by millions across the country and that translates into lackluster private spending, which accounts for 70% of the American economy.

"Families have not yet boosted their spending above the levels preceding the severe cuts they made during the recession," William Dudley, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, said in a speech last month.

"This frugality stands in stark contrast to the first year of recovery from previous deep recessions," Dudley said.

This frugality will be long lasting. With the debt orgy we just witnessed, many are shunning debt in favor of a lifestyle of prudence and saving. Contrary to popular belief among economists, frugality and savings are good for the economy as people can invest in productive activities and assets instead of mindlessly consume.

In prior downturns, the housing industry and consumer spending powered the economy back to strength. Home building not only created construction and finance jobs but also fueled manufacturing of glass and lumber, furniture and appliances, and a host of other goods and services.

In normal times, the U.S. should be putting up about 1.7 million new houses annually, but this year it's running at about 600,000, economist David Crowe of the National Home Builders Assn. said. He thinks it will be three years before home building returns to its potential.

From what I am observing with the building industry here in California, we are coming out of the double dip, and activity is beginning to pick up again. Developers and builders are out working on land projects again preparing for the next cycle. Of course, this new activity is minor compared to the activity in 2005, but it feels like a boom compared to 2008 and 2009.

Rather than going out on their own or starting families, young Americans are doubling up with friends and relatives, saving more and paying down debts. Older Americans are staying in their jobs longer, hoping that the single biggest asset for most of them, their homes, will recover in value.

But nobody is expecting a return of rapid real estate appreciation any time soon.

Except here in California where everyone thinks the bottom is formed and the new party is about to begin.

If home prices were to rise at an annual rate of 3%, not an unlikely scenario, it would take the Hineses about 11 years to get to a point where their mortgage balance was even with their property value.

Refinancing the Hineses' 6.5% interest loan could be a big help, saving them almost $600 a month. But lenders won't even consider them.

And unless borrowers fall behind on their mortgage payments or face a high risk of defaulting, there's little chance that lenders, even with federal incentives, would reduce their principal or lower their interest rates.

"They feel completely left out," said Fred Arnold, past president of the California Assn. of Mortgage Professionals, referring to many underwater borrowers.

"If you stop payments, you have a much better chance of getting a modification," Arnold said.

Given these truths, is it surprising that some many mortgage loans are delinquent?

He contends that the federal government should set aside funds to help more borrowers refinance: "It would put immediate money into the economy." But that's not in the cards, especially with budget deficits weighing on Washington and the American public.

Eventually, economists suggested, a lack of options will push more underwater borrowers to walk away from their mortgages. But in the meantime, the stress on families, the housing market and the whole economy will continue.

Fix the Housing Market: Let Home Prices Fall. We will not see significant economic improvement until the housing market is allowed to bottom naturally — a process finally possible now that some of the more overt government market manipulations of interest rates and tax incentives has expired. Eliminating Government Housing Subsidies Will Improve the Economy.

Mike Saint-Just, 62, doesn't see a lot of room to maneuver. In 2007, he put down $125,000 on a $230,000 one-bedroom condominium near Palm Springs. County tax authorities say it is now worth $87,000.

After tapping a home equity line of credit, Saint-Just owes $143,000 — about two-thirds more than the value of his home.

Saint-Just draws a federal pension, enough to stay current on his loan but not much more. When he asked his lender about getting a new loan with lower rates, he said he was told he was too far underwater.

The loan officer "did say I could go into foreclosure and hope, maybe, they might do something. And they might not, in which case my credit would be ruined and I'd be out the door of the unit," he said.

So Saint-Just keeps making his monthly payments and cutting back on nearly everything else.

"It means dropping grocery stores and going to Wal-Mart, the 99 Cents store for food and generic items," he said.

With the winter coming, he's preparing to dress warmly and wrap himself in a large afghan to save on heating. That may get Saint-Just through the cold weather, but it may leave the overall economy to shiver.

don.lee@latimes.com

Those that continue to pay bloated mortgages damage the economy, and those that stop making payments stimulate the economy: Strategic Default: The $10,000,000,000 Monthly Economic Stimulus. So what do we make of that? Would a widespread loan owner revolt be a good thing for the economy?

They borrowed too much

Some people may have been able to afford their properties when they bought them, but then they simply over-borrowed and now they face losing their homes from excessive debt.

  • Today's featured property was purchased on 7/20/1998 for $237,500. The owners used a $190,000 first mortgage and a $47,500 down payment.
  • On 1/19/2001 they refinanced with a $305,000 first mortgage.
  • On 10/20/2004 they refinanced with a $388,500 first mortgage.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $198,500 including their down payment.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 10/04/2010

Document Type: Notice of Rescission

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 09/29/2010

Document Type: Notice of Default

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 08/13/2010

Document Type: Notice of Default

Their recent notice of rescission suggests they just got a loan modification. The reality of their debts has prompted them to sell to get out from under the mortgage they can't afford. They already spent their profits on the deal, and now they are hoping they can escape without becoming another short sale. Their asking price gives them some room to maneuver, but not much.

Do you think they will get out without becoming a short sale?

Irvine Home Address … 5092 CINNAMON Irvine, CA 92612

Resale Home Price … $425,000

Home Purchase Price … $237,500

Home Purchase Date …. 6/20/1998

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $162,000

Percent Change ………. 68.2%

Annual Appreciation … 4.7%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$425,000 ………. Asking Price

$14,875 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

4.29% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$410,125 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$81,027 ………. Income Requirement

$2,027 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$368 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$71 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$209 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$2,675 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$321 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$561 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$23 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$53 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$1,870 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$4,250 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$4,250 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$4,101 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$14,875 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$27,476 ………. Total Cash Costs

$28,600 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$56,076 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 5092 CINNAMON Irvine, CA 92612

——————————————————————————

Beds: 3

Baths: 2 baths

Home size: 1,539 sq ft

($276 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 1,500 sq ft

Year Built: 1974

Days on Market: 80

Listing Updated: 40473

MLS Number: S628876

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Community: University Park

Tract: Tr

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

HUGE $50,000 PRICE REDUCTION!!! One of the most desireable neighborhoods in Irvine. The Terrace has it all. Expansive lighted greenbelts, tot lots, two pools, a clubhouse, walkways and its close to everything; shopping (walking distance to a Ralphs market), freeways, entertainment centers like The Spectrum and The District and so much more. This three bedroom home is a wonderful spacious floor plan with a large kitchen, dining area and a cozy living room with a fireplace. Good sized, fenced and private rear patio. The single story home is situated on a small cul de sac and has an oversized driveway. Its in Move-In condition, in a great location and ready for you and your furniture. Great starter home or an investment property. No Mello Roos and low HOA dues. Wonderful community. This short sale should go fast.

desireable?

This short sale should go fast? When in the history of mankind has a short sale gone fast?

I bet they were surprised when they made their "HUGE $50,000 PRICE REDUCTION!!!" and no offers came in. The price has been reduced another $25,000 since then.

Date Event Price
Oct 22, 2010 Price Changed $425,000
Oct 13, 2010 Price Changed $450,000
Sep 21, 2010 Price Changed $499,000
Aug 13, 2010 Listed $549,900
Jul 20, 1998 Sold (Public Records) $237,500
Jun 22, 1995 Sold (Public Records) $180,000

Great starter home or an investment property. Starter home, maybe; investment property, not unless you are a fool.

The TARP Program: Failure or Success?

Is the TARP program a failure or a success? It depends on whether you ask Wall Street or Main Street.

Irvine Home Address … 117 ROCKWOOD 55 Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price …… $289,000

Winners and losers, turn the pages of my life

We’re beggars and choosers, with all the struggles and the strife

I got no reason to turn my head and look the other way

We’re good and we’re evil, which one will I be today?

There’s saints and sinners

Life’s a gamble and you might lose

There’s cowards and heroes

Both have been known now to break the rules

Social Distortion — Winners and Losers

The story of the TARP program has been about winners and losers. Contrary to the much touted goal of preventing foreclosures, the TARP program is primarily designed to prop up our ailing banks. In this regard, it has succeeded. As for helping loan owners stay in their homes, not so much. Of course, the loan owners have benefited from amend-extend-pretend because they have been allowed to squat, but people don't want to squat, they want to own their homes with a reasonable payment. Unfortunately, they paid so much that owning with reasonable payments is not going to happen.

SIGTARP Quarterly Report (PDF)

Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program

General Telephone: 202.622.1419 Hotline: 877.SIG.2009

SIGTARP@do.treas.gov

www.SIGTARP.gov

October 2010

More than two years have passed since the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”) authorized the creation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”). On October 3, 2010, Treasury’s authority to initiate new TARP invest- ments expired, marking a significant milestone in TARP’s history but also leading to the widespread, but mistaken, belief that TARP is at or near its end. As of October 3, $178.4 billion in TARP funds were still outstanding, and although no new TARP obligations can be made, money already obligated to existing programs may still be expended. Indeed, with more than $80 billion still obligated and available for spending, it is likely that far more TARP funds will be expended after October 3, 2010, than in the year since last October when U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner (“Treasury Secretary”) extended TARP’s authority by one year. In short, it is still far too early to write TARP’s obituary.

At the same time, TARP’s two-year anniversary is a fitting time for an interim assessment. To what extent has TARP met the goals set for it by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) in announcing TARP programs and by Congress in providing Treasury authorization to expend TARP funds — avoiding financial collapse, “increas[ing] lending,” “maximiz[ing] overall returns to the taxpayers,” “provid[ing] public accountability,” “preserv[ing] homeownership,” and “promot[ing] jobs and economic growth” — and at what cost? In answering these questions, it is instructive to compare TARP’s impact on Wall Street with its impact on Main Street. By fulfilling the goal of avoiding a financial collapse, there is no question that the dramatic steps taken by Treasury and other Federal agencies through TARP and related programs were a success for Wall Street. Those actions have helped garner a swift and striking turnaround, accompanied by a return to profitability and seemingly ever-increasing executive bonuses. For large Wall Street banks, credit is cheap and plentiful and the stock market has made a tremendous rebound. Main Street, too, has reaped a significant benefit from the prevention of a complete collapse of the financial industry and domestic automobile manufacturers, the ripple effects such collapses would have caused, and increased stock market prices. Main Street has largely suffered alone, however, in those areas in which TARP has fallen short of its other goals.

As these quarterly reports to Congress have well chronicled and as Treasury itself recently conceded in its acknowledgment that “banks continue to report falling loan balances,” TARP has failed to “increase lending,” with small businesses in particular unable to secure badly needed credit.

As an aside, I note that I was contacted by my bank and asked if I wanted a credit line for my new business. When I said, no, I run a cash business trading in hard assets, the loan officer told me they are getting pressure to extend these credit lines, and if I change my mind, they want to loan money.

Indeed, even now, overall lending continues to contract, despite the hundreds of billions of TARP dollars provided to banks with the express purpose to increase lending. As to the goal of “promot[ing] jobs and economic growth,” while job losses may have been far worse without TARP support, unemployment continues to hold at roughly 9.6%, 3% higher than at the start of the program. While large bonuses are returning to Wall Street, the nation’s poverty rate increased from 13.2% in 2008 to 14.3% in 2009, and for far too many, the recession has ended in name only. Finally, the most specific of TARP’s Main Street goals, “preserving homeownership,” has so far fallen woefully short, with TARP’s portion of the Administration’s mortgage modification program yielding only approximately 207,000 (out of a total of 467,000) ongoing permanent modifications since TARP’s inception, a number that stands in stark contrast to the 5.5 million homes receiving foreclosure filings and more than 1.7 million homes that have been lost to foreclosure since January 2009.

I find the blunt truthfulness of this report refreshing. I am amazed this came from our own government.

On the cost side of the ledger, the results have been mixed as well. It is undoubtedly good news that recent loss estimates continue to suggest that the financial costs of TARP may be far lower than earlier anticipated, with the most recent estimates placing the dollar loss at between $51 billion and $66 billion. But costs can involve far more than just dollars and cents. Any fair assessment of TARP must account for other costs that, while more difficult to measure, may be even more significant. For example, as SIGTARP has noted in past quarterly reports, increased moral hazard and concentration in the financial industry continue to be a TARP legacy. The biggest banks are bigger than ever, fueled by Government support and taxpayer-assisted mergers and acquisitions. And the repeated statements that the Government would stand by these banks during the financial crisis has given a significant advantage to the larger “too big to fail” banks, as reflected in their enhanced credit ratings borne from a market perception that the Government will still not let these institutions fail, although the impact of this cost may be blunted by recently enacted regulatory reform.

Indeed our big banks are in a race to see who can get too big to fail. Once there, they no longer have to worry about maintaining good financial ratios, making good loans that will get repaid, or sacrificing short-term gains for long-term growth.

Another even more fundamental non-financial cost, as SIGTARP warned in October 2009, is the potential harm to the Government’s credibility that has attended this program. Despite the recent surge in reporting on TARP’s successes, many Americans to continue to view TARP with anger, cynicism, and mistrust. While some of that hostility may be misplaced, much of it is based on entirely legitimate concerns about the lack of transparency, program mismanagement, and flawed decision-making processes that continue to plague the program. When Treasury refuses for more than a year to require TARP recipients to account for the use of TARP funds, or claims that Capital Purchase Program participants were “healthy, viable” institutions knowing full well that some are not, or when it provides hundreds of billions of dollars in TARP assistance to institutions, and then relies on those same institutions to self-report any violations of their obligations to TARP, it damages the public’s trust to a degree that is difficult to repair. Similarly, when the Government promotes programs without meaningful goals or metrics for success, such as its mortgage modification programs, or when it makes critical and far-reaching decisions without taking an even modestly broad view of their impact, such as pushing for dramatically accelerated car dealership closings without considering the potential for devastating job losses, or when it fails to negotiate robustly on behalf of the taxpayer, as it did when agreeing to compensate American International Group, Inc.’s (“AIG”) counterparties 100 cents on the dollar for securities worth less than half that amount, the Government invites public anger, hostility, and mistrust. And by doing so, it dangerously undermines its ability to respond effectively to the next crisis.

Interesting that this report documents exactly how the government corporatocracy is screwing us.

While TARP is arguably moving to a new phase, recent actions this past quarter unfortunately suggest that the risks it poses to the public’s trust in Government will continue. Indeed, two areas of the greatest anticipated spending going forward — the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) and the AIG recapitalization plan — highlight those risks.

This rather scathing report has generated some uncomfortable questions at the Congressional Oversight Panel.

Schwartz to Congressional Oversight Panel: HAMP gets a bad rap

Wednesday, October 27th, 2010, 2:49 pm

The government's much-criticized Home Affordable Modification Program helped set the stage for a successful private loan modification effort that likely wouldn't have gotten off the ground without it, said Faith Schwartz, former executive director of Hope Now.

If that is true, I wish this program had never started. Loan modifications do nothing but provide false hope to loan owners and extend this crisis.

Schwartz testified Wednesday before the Congressional Oversight Panel on the Troubled Asset Relief Program, in a hearing about TARP foreclosure mitigation programs.

"The HAMP roadmap set the stage for servicers to better apply solutions for distressed borrowers who failed to meet the HAMP requirements," Schwartz said in written testimony submitted to the panel.

"The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) has received criticism, in part, because it did not immediately produce certain projected numbers of permanent loan modifications," she wrote.

The program has also been criticized by people like me who think it should not exist at all.

"This criticism is not entirely accurate," according to Schwartz. "HAMP has played an important role by helping to organize the participants and process in the loan modification effort and instituted a loan modification protocol that would have been difficult to mandate in any other way. Hope Now and government agencies attempted this in 2008 through the streamlined modification program, but it did not reflect all investors and primarily focused on GSE-owned loans. That was a start, but the HAMP program expanded and formalized those initial standards for loan modifications."

The Hope Now Alliance was formed in 2007 to expand and better coordinate the private sector and nonprofit counseling community to reach borrowers at risk.

"Early on, the goal of the Alliance was simple: reach at-risk borrowers that had no contact with their servicer," Schwartz said. "Research showed that over 50% of all foreclosures involved homeowners who were not in contact with their servicer."

Have you noticed rumors of principal forgiveness crop up whenever lenders want to get people to contact them? I think they use that as a bait-and-switch enticement to get people to contact their lender.

The alliance established a hotline, organized community outreach events, sent letters to delinquent borrowers and launched a website.

It also established HOPE LoanPort, a Web-based system that enables for uniform intake of an application for a modification, allows stakeholders to see the same information in a secure manner, and delivers a completed loan package to the servicer that is actionable. The pilot program includes 14 large mortgage servicers, representing a majority share of the market.

Everyone knows how slow and inneficient government programs are. As soon as the government got involved, it should have been apparent to everyone that by the time they got their programs working, the majority of loan owners would already be foreclosed on.

"HAMP modifications offer a well-defined safety net for borrowers as a first line of defense," Schwartz said. "As evidenced by Hope Now data, servicers are implementing significant modifications after reviewing for HAMP eligibility by offering alternative modifications in lieu of foreclosure. Servicers report proprietary non-HAMP solutions run almost three times greater than HAMP modifications due to eligibility challenges."

"These are modifications that do not require taxpayer dollars and they are meant to benefit the homeowner and investor in lieu of foreclosure," she said.

HAMP should not exist. It has largely been a failure; and in that, I think it was a success.

Get as much as possible as quickly as possible

One of the lessons the Ponzis learned from the housing bubble is that they need to refinance as soon as a new comp gives them some equity, and they need to keep borrowing to the full extend of their borrowing power. Besides the immediacy of the spending money, it gives them downside protection. When the market inevitably crashes, they have already sold the property to the bank for peak pricing. Then they get to walk away, and while the air comes out of the bubble, they can repair their credit to get ready for the next cycle.

  • The owner of today's featured property paid $170,000 on 10/3/2000. He used a $163,150 first mortgage and a $6,850 down payment.
  • On 8/20/2002 he refinanced with a $189,000 first mortgage.
  • On 7/30/2003 he refinanced with a $189,200 first mortgage.
  • On 8/29/2003 he refinanced with a $201,000 first mortgage.
  • On 10/23/2003 he obtained a 21,500 stand-alone second.
  • On 3/25/2005 he refinanced with a $251,000 Option ARM with a 1% teaser rate.
  • On 1/10/2006 he refinanced with a $328,000 Option ARM with a 2% teaser rate. and obtained a $90,000 HELOC.
  • Total property debt is $418,000 plus negative amortization and almost two years of missed payments.
  • Total squatting time is about 20 months so far.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 08/16/2010

Document Type: Notice of Default

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 11/19/2009

Document Type: Notice of Rescission

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 06/18/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

Do you ever wonder when I will run out of these? Irvine is supposed to be an upscale neighborhood where everyone makes hundreds of thousands of dollars a year. Why do we have so much HELOC abuse? Why are so many losing their homes due to their excessive borrowing? Could it be that Irvine is a facade? How much of Irvine is populated by posers trying to impress other posers?

Irvine Home Address … 117 ROCKWOOD 55 Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price … $289,000

Home Purchase Price … $170,000

Home Purchase Date …. 10/3/2000

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $101,660

Percent Change ………. 59.8%

Annual Appreciation … 5.2%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$289,000 ………. Asking Price

$10,115 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

4.29% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$278,885 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$55,099 ………. Income Requirement

$1,378 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$250 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$48 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$490 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$2,167 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$125 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$381 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$16 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$36 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$1,713 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$2,890 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$2,890 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$2,789 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$10,115 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$18,684 ………. Total Cash Costs

$26,200 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$44,884 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 117 ROCKWOOD 55 Irvine, CA 92614

——————————————————————————

Beds: 2

Baths: 1 full 1 part baths

Home size: 917 sq ft

($315 / sq ft)

Lot Size: n/a

Year Built: 1980

Days on Market: 65

Listing Updated: 40474

MLS Number: S630604

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Community: Woodbridge

Tract: Othr

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

Price Reduction!!! CLEAN UPSTAIRS 2 BEDROOM, 2 BATH CONDO. BEAUTIFUL VIEW OF PARK/GREEN BELT. GREAT FOR FIRST TIME BUYERS/INVESTORS AND WONDERFUL FAMILY COMMUNITY. WOODEN BLINDS THROUGHOUT. NEWER CARPET AND PAINT. SEPARATE DINING ROOM.

Good for investors? Sure, I want to pay $289,000 to obtain $1,700 a month in rent, and give $490 a month to the HOA. Only a kool aid intoxicated fool would consider this a good investment.

After Eight Years of Squatting, Who Absorbs the Losses?

The losses from the housing bubble will exceed $1.1 trillion. Who is going to pay for it?

Irvine Home Address … 29 SMOKESTONE 30 Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price …… $285,000

Yeah runnin' down a dream

That never would come to me

Workin' on a mystery, goin' wherever it leads

Runnin' down a dream

I rolled on as the sky grew dark

I put the pedal down to make some time

There's something good waitin' down this road

I'm pickin' up whatever's mine

Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers — Running Down a Dream

Mortgage Mess: Shredding the Dream

The foreclosure crisis isn't just about lost documents. It's about trust—and a clash over who gets stuck with $1.1 trillion in losses

October 21, 2010 — Peter Coy, Paul M. Barrett and Chad Terhune

In 2002, a Boca Raton (Fla.) accountant named Joseph Lents was accused of securities law violations by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Lents, who was chief executive officer of a now-defunct voice-recognition software company, had sold shares in the publicly traded company without filing the proper forms. Facing a little over $100,000 in fines and fees, and with his assets frozen by the SEC, Lents stopped making payments on his $1.5 million mortgage.

The loan servicer, Washington Mutual, tried to foreclose on his home in 2003 but was never able to produce Lents' promissory note, so the state circuit court for Palm Beach County dismissed the case. Next, the buyer of the loan, DLJ Mortgage Capital, stepped in with another foreclosure proceeding. DLJ claimed to have lost the promissory note in interoffice mail. Lents was dubious: "When you say you lose a $1.5 million negotiable instrument—that doesn't happen." DLJ claimed that its word was as good as paper. But at least in Palm Beach County, paper still rules. If his mortgage holder couldn't prove it held his mortgage, it couldn't foreclose.

Eight years after defaulting, Lents still hasn't made a payment or been forced out of his house. DLJ, whose parent, Credit Suisse, declined to comment for this story, still hasn't proved its ownership to the satisfaction of the court. Lents' debt has grown to about $2.5 million, including unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties. As the stalemate grinds on, Lents has the comfort of knowing he's no longer alone. When he began demanding to see the I.O.U., he says, "I was looked upon like I had leprosy. Now, I have probably 20 to 30 people a month come to me" asking for advice. Lents is irked when people accuse him of exploiting a loophole. "It's not a loophole," he says. "It's the law."

The Lents Defense, as it might be called, doesn't work everywhere.

This guy is obviously a crook. Wether the bank can produce the paperwork or not doesn't change the basic facts:

  1. There was a note at one time that encapsulated the agreement between this borrower and the lender.
  2. He did borrow the money.
  3. He did agree to repay the money or surrender the house in a foreclosure action.

Since these basic facts are not in dispute, and since Mr. Lent's is not disputing that he failed to meet his contractual obligations, why can't this foreclosure go forward? He says this is not a loophole, but this clearly is a loophole or technical evasion. This squatter needs to get out the bank's house, then he can fight with them over "damages" caused by their failure to produce the note. Since he obviously is not being damaged in any way, his frivilous counter-suit would be dismissed.

So who ends up paying for the losses caused by this squatter. On the surface, this looks like a bank loss, but we all know that the taxpayer will ultimately be on the hook. Are you happy about this guy squatting in luxury while you pay for it?

Thousands of Floridians have lost their homes in lightning-fast "rocket dockets." In 27 other states, judges don't even review foreclosures, making it harder for homeowners to fight back….

Even if the documentation problems turn out to be manageable—as Bank of America (BAC) and others insist they will be—the economy will still suffer long-term consequences from the loose underwriting that caused the subprime housing bubble.

Bullshit alert! This was NOT a subprime housing bubble. The damage has largely been felt by subprime borrowers only because the alt-a and prime borrowers who defaulted have been allowed to squat. When the media begins falsely portraying this as a subprime housing bubble, it implies this was a problem caused by and limited to subprime. That is not accurate, and if widely believed may cause policy errors directed toward the "subprime" problem.

According to an Oct. 15 report by J.P. Morgan (JPM) Securities, some $2 trillion of the $6 trillion in U.S. mortgages and home-equity loans that were securitized during the height of the bubble, from 2005 through 2007, are likely to go into default. The report says the housing bust will ultimately cause losses of $1.1 trillion on those bonds.

Who is going to absorb the $1,100,000,000,000 in losses? The banks can't absorb that much as it would completely wipe out the capital in our banking system. In the end, it will be a combination of investor losses, bank losses, and US taxpayer bailouts that mop up this mess. As you might imagine, investors and bankers are working feverishly to pass that loss on to you.

While banks and investors take their hits, millions of homeowners continue to be punished by unaffordable mortgage payments and underwater home values.

Punished? Well, it they stupidly took on a mortgage payment they cannot afford, they deserve it. If they bought an overvalued house, that is their problem. The authors are setting up loan owners as victims when many of them were buying based on greed.

Laurie Goodman, a mortgage analyst at Amherst Securities Group, said in an Oct. 1 report that if government doesn't step up its intervention, over 11 million borrowers are in danger of losing their homes. That's one in five people with a mortgage. "Politically," she wrote, "this cannot happen. The government will attempt successive modification plans until something works."

We are revisiting this nonsense again. Why can't this happen? What if it does? People will move out of their homes, and new people will move in. So what?

I think she is right that the government will do everything it can to prevent the market from doing what it must to clear the bad debt, and in the process, the government's actions will delay the recovery and cause more people to suffer. When it's all over, the government will release some bullshit report claiming everything they did was right and helpful.

Meanwhile, a high-stakes fight is breaking out between the banks that made loans and the investors who bought them. A shot was fired on Oct. 18 when a group of major investors claimed that Bank of America's Countrywide Home Loan Servicing had failed to live up to its contracts on some of more than $47 billion worth of Countrywide-issued mortgage bonds. The group said Countrywide Servicing has 60 days to correct the alleged violations, such as failure to sell back ineligible loans to the lenders. According to people familiar with the matter, the group includes Pimco, BlackRock (BLK), and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

For banks that have just started making money again after near-death experiences in 2008, mortgage losses could delay the return to good health. Chris Gamaitoni, an analyst for Compass Point Research & Trading, a Washington financial advisory firm, estimates losses for the big banks of $134 billion from having to buy back bad loans from private investors and another $27 billion in losses from buying back loans from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Other estimates are lower—from $20 billion to $84 billion—in part because those analysts are less certain than Gamaitoni that investors will succeed in court.

This battle between investors and bankers is more important than most realize. If the investors win, and if banks are liable to repay these losses, banks will suffer longer, and the economy will continue to sputter.

Bank of America, the nation's largest lender, has resorted to tough tactics in resisting repurchases of bad loans. Facing pressure from Freddie Mac, one of the two government-controlled mortgage financing companies, to buy back money-losing home loans with problems like inflated appraisals, overstated borrower income, or inadequate documentation, Bank of America issued a blunt threat, according to two people with direct knowledge of the incident. If Freddie Mac did not back off its demands for the buybacks, Bank of America officials said, the bank would take more of the new, more profitable mortgages it is originating these days to rival Fannie Mae, these people said. Freddie and Fannie, known as GSEs (government-sponsored entities), need a steady supply of healthy new loans to climb out of their financial hole.

Now that is playing hardball. Good for Bank of America.

The claimed threat from Bank of America, which was not put into writing, according to one of these people, was taken seriously enough that it has been discussed at several Freddie Mac board meetings, including one in mid-October. Some officials have urged the Federal Housing Finance Agency—the government conservator that has controlled Fannie and Freddie since they were bailed out in 2008—to confront Bank of America and prevent it from trying to play one against the other, which may be infuriating but is not illegal. "If the tactic worked, I'd be shocked and appalled," said Thomas Lawler, a former portfolio manager at Fannie Mae and now an economic consultant. "The GSEs are supposed to be run now to minimize losses to the taxpayers. Freddie ought to ignore the threat." FHFA Acting Director Edward J. DeMarco declined to comment, as did officials of Freddie Mac. Bank of America also declined to comment.

Why shouldn't Bank of America play one off against the other? The whole reason there are two GSEs instead of one was to foster competition and prevent either from having monopoly powers.

For policymakers, the dilemma is this: Enormous losses will cause problems wherever they end up. They could further harm Fannie and Freddie, which insure the vast majority of the nation's mortgages and have already received nearly $150 billion in taxpayer support. Or, if Fannie and Freddie succeed in pushing the burden back to the banks, the losses could cripple some of the major institutions that have just emerged from a government bailout. Bank of America faces $12.9 billion in buyback requests, and mortgage insurers have asked for the documents on an additional $9.8 billion on which they may consider seeking repurchases, according to regulatory filings. (Bank of America has put aside $4.4 billion for buybacks, and CEO Brian T. Moynihan says the costs will be manageable.) "The Treasury is very aware that they can't push too hard on this because if you do push too hard it might put the companies in negative capital again," says Paul J. Miller, an analyst at FRB Capital Markets. "There's a lot of regulatory forbearance going on."

Aside from ignoring banks' bad debts, Washington hasn't done much to fix the crisis. Both houses of Congress easily passed a bill this year that would have undermined centuries of law by requiring every state to recognize MERS-type electronic records from other states. Only a pocket veto by President Barack Obama kept it from becoming law.

One option, opposed by the Obama Administration and most Republicans in Congress but favored by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and others, is a national moratorium on foreclosures. It would last until regulators assure themselves that lenders have straightened out their foreclosure procedures.

So how is that supposed to work? The banks have all resumed their foreclosure proceedings, and they all claim they have worked out any procedural problems. Who can claim otherwise? Do we want to give a bunch of bureaucrats the ability to hold up foreclosures because in their opinion the banks procedures are inadequate? If the banks were not complying with existing laws, then they should be held accountable, but so far, there have been very few cases where any procedural flaws have been identified, and many reporters, loan owners, and attorneys have been looking.

Opponents say it would delay the recovery of the housing market by preventing qualified buyers from getting their hands on foreclosed homes.

Opponents of a moratorium say those things because it does delay the recovery, and it does prevent a qualified buyer from getting their new home.

Look at the language the authors used, "getting their hands on foreclosed homes." They portray the new buyer — a buyer qualifying under new stricter lending standards who will likely make their payments — as some kind of illegitimate claimant, a greedy buyer trying to get their filthy hands on someone else's property. The author's agenda is showing.

Supporters of the idea, such as Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, say there are plenty of already foreclosed homes available for sale and thus no urgent need to add to the supply.

Goodman, the Amherst Securities analyst, says banks need to reduce the principal that people owe on their homes so they have an incentive not to walk away. "Ignoring the fact that the borrower can and will default when it is his/her most economical solution is an expensive case of denial," Goodman writes. If the home whose mortgage was reduced happens to regain value, 50 percent of the appreciation would be taxed, she says. Meanwhile, to discourage people from sitting tight in homes while foreclosure proceedings drag on, she would have the government tax the benefit of living in the home rent-free.

Those ideas are bad on many levels. First, Foreclosure Is a Superior Form of Principal Reduction. Giving borrowers money only encourages the worst kind of moral hazard. Banks are far better off losing more money now and eliminating moral hazard than encouraging borrowers to steal from them over and over again in the future. Second, the 50% tax on appreciation sounds great, but as soon as some seller somewhere has to actually pay that tax, there will be a tax revolt, and congress will roll over and repeal the tax.

The one idea I do like is taxing the squatters. These people are receiving the beneficial use of the property as surely as if it were a gift of cash. It should be taxed to help pay for the bailouts.

CitiMortgage is testing an innovative alternative based on the legal procedure known as "deed in lieu of foreclosure." The owner turns the deed over to the bank without a fight if the bank promises not to foreclose, lets the family stay in the house after the agreement for six months, and gives relocation assistance.

In other words, CitiMortgage is giving cash for keys, a practice I am learning much about in Las Vegas.

Other ideas: In a New York Times blog post on Oct. 19, Harvard University economist Edward Glaeser suggested federal assistance to overwhelmed state and local courts, as well as $2,000 vouchers for legal assistance to low-income families that can't afford to fight foreclosures.

Just what we need, a handout for attorneys.

Bloomberg News columnist Kevin Hassett, who is director of economic policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, says in his Oct. 18 column that the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council should make the foreclosure mess its first big project, "take authority for solving it, and do so as swiftly as possible."

Speed is essential. The longer it drags on, the more the foreclosure crisis corrodes Americans' faith in their financial and legal systems. A pervasive sense of injustice is bad for the economy and democracy as well. Take Joe Lents. The Boca Raton homeowner hasn't made a mortgage payment since 2002, but he perceives himself as a victim. "I want to expose these guys for what they're doing," Lents says. "It's personal now."

Yes, let's take Joe Lents as an example. He is a perfect example of how a pervasive sense of injustice and victimhood can be cultivated among those perpetrating the injustice. Squatters need to get out of the houses they are not paying for. The pervasive injustice is that good families with the buying power to purchase a home are being denied that opportunity by delays in the foreclosure process and political grandstanding.

Evict the squatters now!

He nearly quadrupled his mortgage debt

Some borrowers were obviously gaming the system. No amount of careless spending can explain a borrower that methodically increases his mortgage to its maximum at every opportunity. This borrower had to know he was stripping the equity out of this place, and he was going to do so until he couldn't borrow any more. There was no thought given to actually paying down the mortgage.

  • Today's feature property is one of the hardest working condos I have seen to date. The property was purchased on 8/24/1998 for $130,000. The owner used a $104,000 first mortgage, a $13,000 second mortgage, and a $13,000 down payment.
  • On 3/9/2000 he got a stand alone second for $35,000. After about 18 months of ownership, he got back his down payment plus $18,000 (about $1,000 per month). It almost makes this property cashflow positive if you look at it that way.
  • On 6/7/2002 he refinanced the first mortgage for $176,000.
  • On 6/5/2003 he refinanced the first mortgage for $262,675.
  • On 4/14/2003 he refinanced with a $274,400 first mortgage.
  • On 7/8/2004 he refinanced with a $364,500 first mortgage and obtained a HELOC for $20,250.
  • On 11/1/2006 he refinanced with a $353,000 first mortgage and a $43,950 stand-alone second.
  • Total property debt is $396,950.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $279,950.
  • Total squatting time is over two years.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 07/08/2010

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 04/16/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 01/12/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

So what do you think about this borrowers behavior? Perhaps we should reward him with principal reduction. He would be happy to borrow that money all over again, particularly if you are going to pay it off for him through your tax dollars.

Irvine Home Address … 29 SMOKESTONE 30 Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price … $285,000

Home Purchase Price … $130,000

Home Purchase Date …. 8/24/1998

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $137,900

Percent Change ………. 106.1%

Annual Appreciation … 6.5%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$285,000 ………. Asking Price

$9,975 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

4.29% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$275,025 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$54,336 ………. Income Requirement

$1,359 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$247 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$48 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$290 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$1,944 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$123 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$376 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$15 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$36 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$1,496 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$2,850 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$2,850 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$2,750 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$9,975 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$18,425 ………. Total Cash Costs

$22,900 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$41,325 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 29 SMOKESTONE 30 Irvine, CA 92614

——————————————————————————

Beds: 2

Baths: 2 baths

Home size: 917 sq ft

($311 / sq ft)

Lot Size: n/a

Year Built: 1980

Days on Market: 174

Listing Updated: 40480

MLS Number: R1003214

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Community: West Irvine

Tract: Othr

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

A CLEAN 2 BR 2 BATH DOWN STAIRS CONDO. HARDWOOD FLOORS, PLANTATION SHUTTERS. COZY. GREAT FOR A STARTER OR DOWN-SIZING FAMILY. ENJOY THE CLEAN COMMUNITY OF WOODBRIDGE.