A series of new studies on borrower behavior shed some light on the motivations behind those who quit paying their mortgages.

Irvine Home Address … 23 FOXHOLLOW Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price …… $319,900

On and on we're charging to the place so many seek

In perfect synchronicity of which so many speak

We feel so close to heaven in this roaring heavy load

And then in sheer abandonment, we shatter and explode.

Judas Priest — Turbo Lover

Strategic default: the abandonment of mortgage and property. A financial explosion.

Most buyers of property were seeking riches from appreciation. They all enjoyed the synchronized movements of the market when everyone was clamoring for more property. Trees don't grow to the sky, and no matter how close prices get to heaven, nirvana is always out of reach.

Strategic Defaults Threaten All Major U.S. Housing Markets

Posted by Keith Jurow 09/30/10 8:00 AM EST

In my last article, we examined the shadow inventory to determine how many distressed properties (not on MLS) were almost certain to be forced onto the market in the not-to-distant future.

For a sensible follow up, let's take an in-depth look at so-called "strategic defaults" to see how many homeowners are likely to "walk away" from their mortgage debt although they might be financially able to continue paying it.

Strategic Default Defined

According to Wikipedia, a strategic default is "the decision by a borrower to stop making payments (i.e., default) on a debt despite having the financial ability to make the payments." This has become the commonly accepted view.

From Accelerated Default: What Strategic Default Really Is: "There is no accepted definition of strategic default. Lenders have tried to define the issue as any borrower who is capable of making a payment and chooses not to. On the surface that sounds reasonable, but that misses a very important distinction. Some people chose to default because they know they can't afford the home and they are merely choosing the timing of the inevitable.

When I think about strategic default, I think about people who chose the timing of their default when there is little reasonable hope of having equity and they are facing escalating payments. The only thing strategic about the default is the timing, not whether or not they will lose the home."

In a recent, thorough study of strategic defaults, an effort was made to narrow its definition even more specifically. The report examining 6.6 million first lien mortgages was published this past April by Morgan Stanley analysts. They considered a default to be strategic only if a borrower went from being current on the debt to 90 days delinquent in consecutive months "without any curing in between or thereafter."

The authors went further and included two other prerequisites. First, the borrower had to be "underwater" on the first lien mortgage. Second, the homeowner had to have an outstanding non-mortgage debt balance of more than $10,000. The purpose of this last requirement was explained to me in a phone conversation with the lead analyst. He clarified that unless the borrower had at least $10,000 in non-mortgage debts which continued to be kept current; it was very likely that the mortgage default was induced by the inability to continue making the payments.

While this definition by the Morgan Stanley analysts is plausible, I consider it to be too narrow. It excludes too many borrowers who choose to stop paying the mortgage even though they may miss payments on some of their other debt obligations. I define a strategic defaulter to be any borrower who goes from never having missed a mortgage payment directly into a 90 day default. We'll examine a graph a little later which clearly illustrates this definition.

This definition is not a bad way to identify people who default by choice, but it doesn't necessarily tell us why they made the choice. Many people who financially implode keep it all together until the reach a breaking point where they capitulate. The only thing we can be sure of about the people Mr. Jarow has singled out is that they were decisive. Once they stopped making payments, they didn't bother to play around with loan modifications or otherwise game the system.

I believe it is important to note that most people chose to default because they know continuing to pay is futile. Just because someone is capable of continuing a futile act doesn't mean that stopping is an irrational decision. In fact, those that acclerate their defaults are far more rational than those who continue to pay when it makes no financial sense for them to do so.

Why Do Homeowners Walk Away from Their Mortgage?

In the midst of the housing bubble, it was inconceivable that a homeowner would voluntarily stop making payments on the mortgage and lapse into default while having the financial means to remain current on the loan.

Then something happened which changed everything. Prices leveled off in 2006 before starting to decline. With certain exceptions, they have been falling ever since around the country. In recent memory, this was something totally new and it has radically altered how homeowners view their house.

In those metros where prices soared the most during the housing bubble and collapsed most severely, many homeowners who have strategically defaulted shared three essential assumptions:

1. The value of their home would not recover to their original purchase price for quite a few years.

2. They could rent a house similar to theirs for considerably less than what they were paying on the mortgage.

3. They could sock away tens of thousands of dollars by stopping mortgage payments before the lender finally got around to foreclosing.

Notice the considerable value lenders obtained by their failure to foreclose. Locally, where house prices are still elevated above reason, people believe house prices will return to peak valuations in a few years and the HELOC party will be back on. Denial keeps people making payments who would ordinarily accelerate their default. Many families in Orange County cannot afford their houses. Many have already defaulted. Few have been foreclosed on so prices remain elevated, and the hopeless maintain denial of a brighter tomorrow.

Put yourself into the mind and the shoes of an underwater homeowner who held these three assumptions. The temptation to default became very difficult to resist. What would you have done?

The author presumes everyone believes accelerated default is wrong. He portrays it as something evil that people are tempted with. It isn't the default that is a tempting evil, it was taking out the loan in the first place. If someone goes out on an all night bender, are they tempted by evil aspirin in the morning? People who accelerate their defaults are merely curing the problem that was created by their earlier mistakes.

Now you may ask: What has kept most underwater homeowners from defaulting?

Why Do Struggling Homeowners Keep Paying Their Mortgages?

This is not an easy question to answer. I suggest that you take a look at a very thorough discussion of this issue in a paper written by Brent White, a professor of law at the University of Arizona and published in February 2010. Its title is "Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Social Crisis." He asserts that there are strong societal norms and pressures that lead to feelings of shame, fear and guilt which prevent many underwater homeowners from choosing to default.

He also cites the strong moral condemnation heaped on strategic defaulters by the press as well as by significant political figures. Take the speech given in March 2008 by then Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson. Paulson declared on national television: "Let me emphasize, any homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply a speculator – and one who is not honoring his obligations." Coming from the former Chairman of a Wall Street firm that earns billions every year by speculating, these words had a certain hollow ring to them.

Strategic Default Is Merely Collecting On Home Price Protection Insurance Sold By Lenders

Walking Away from a Mortgage to Secure Their Children’s Future

Two Key Studies Show that Strategic Defaults Continue to Grow

Within the past six months, two important studies were published which have tried to get a handle on strategic defaults. First came the April report by three Morgan Stanley analysts entitled "Understanding Strategic Defaults." Remember their narrow definition of a strategic defaulter which I described earlier:

1. an underwater homeowner who goes straight from being current on the mortgage to a 90+ day delinquency "without any curing in between or thereafter"

2. has an outstanding non-mortgage debt balance of at least $10,000 which does not become delinquent

The study analyzed 6.5 million anonymous credit reports from TransUnion's enormous database while focusing on first lien mortgages taken out between 2004 and 2007.

One conclusion which the authors reach is that the percentage of defaults which they label strategic has risen steadily since early 2007. By the end of 2009, 12% of all defaults were strategic. Even more significant is that loans originating in 2007 have a significantly higher proportion of defaults which are strategic than those originated in 2004.

Interesting. It appears that people who have not been in the home as long are more prone to walk away. Are they less attached? Since their values went nowhere but down, did they fail to get a taste of kool aid to keep them hooked?

The following chart clearly shows this difference.

It is also important to note that with higher Vantage credit scores, the strategic default rate rises very sharply. [Vantage scoring was developed jointly by the three credit reporting agencies and now competes with FICO scoring].

Is anyone else surprised that strategice default is more common among people with good credit scores? I guess we really are all subprime now.

Another Morgan Stanley chart shows us that for loans originated in 2007, the strategic default percentage also climbs with higher credit scores.

Notice that although the percentage of loans which default at each Vantage score level declines, the percentage of defaults which are strategic rises. A fairly safe conclusion to draw from these two charts is that homeowners with high credit scores have less to lose by walking away from their mortgage. The provider of these credit scores, VantageScore Solutions, has reported that the credit score of a homeowner who defaults and ends up in foreclosure falls by an average of 21%. This is probably acceptable for a borrower who can pocket perhaps $40,000 to $60,000 or more by stopping the mortgage payment.

Very interesting data. If you had an 800 FICO score, a strategic default will lower it 160 points to a value of 640. It probably doesn't take long to bring that up enough to qualify for most forms of credit, albeit at a higher rate.

There is one more key chart from the study that is worth looking at. This one looks at strategic default rates for different original loan balances.

Note that the size of the original loan balance has little impact on the strategic default rate.

Rich people and poor people accelerate their defaults at the same rate. I would have guessed that wealthier people would hold out longer by drawing on other sources of credit. Apparently not.

The Key Factor Behind Strategic Defaults

Then what is the decisive factor that causes a strategic default? To answer this, we need to turn to the other recent study.

This past May, a very significant study on strategic defaults was published by the Federal Reserve Board. Entitled "The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions," the study was extremely focused in scope. It examined 133,000 non-prime first lien purchase mortgages originated in 2006 in the four bubble states where prices collapsed the most — California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona. All of the loans had 100% financing with no down payment. These loans came to be known as 80/20s – an 80% first lien and a 20% piggy back second lien. It's hard to remember that those deals once flourished.

The first conclusion to note is that an astounding 80% of all these homeowners had defaulted by September 2009.

Anecdotally, I am not surprised by that number. Do you remember back in 2007 and 2008 many of the properties I profiled were 100% financing walkaways. By the end of 2008 and into 2009, we stopped seeing those and we began seeing people who had put 5% to 10% down. It is still rare to see a default where the owner put 20% or more down and there was no HELOC abuse.

Half the defaults occurred in less than 18 months from origination date. During that time, prices had dropped by roughly 20%. By September 2009 when the study's observation period ended, median prices had fallen another 20%.

The study really zeroes in on the impact which negative equity has on the decision to walk away from the mortgage. Take a look at this first chart which shows strategic default percentages at different degrees of being underwater.

Notice that the percentage of defaults which are strategic rises steadily as negative equity increases. For example, with FICO scores between 660 and 720, roughly 45% of defaults are strategic when the mortgage amount is 50% more than the value of the home. When the loan is 70% more than the house's value, 60% of the defaults were strategic.

Now take a look at this last chart. It focuses on the impact which negative equity has on strategic defaults based upon whether or not the homeowner missed any mortgage payments prior to defaulting.

This chart shows what I consider to be the best measure of strategic defaulters. It separates defaulting homeowners by whether or not they missed any mortgage payments prior to defaulting. As I see it, a homeowner who suddenly goes from never missing a mortgage payment to defaulting has made a conscious decision to default. The chart reveals that when the mortgage exceeds the home value by 60%, roughly 55% of the defaults are considered to be strategic. For those strategic defaulters who are this far underwater, the benefits of stopping the mortgage payment outweigh the drawbacks (or "costs" as the authors portray it) enough to overcome whatever reservations they might have about walking away.

Intuitively, this makes sense: the further you are underwater, the more hopeless your situation, so you are far more likely to accelerate your default. With deeply underwater homeowners — like anyone who has not defaulted already in Las Vegas — true strategic default becomes much more common. I am sure I would default on my mortgage if I were 50% underwater. Anyone that far underwater is stupid not to default.

Where Do We Go From Here?

The implications of this FRB report are scary. Keep in mind that 80% of the 133,000 no down payment loans examined had gone into default within three years. Clearly, homeowners with no skin in the game have little incentive to continue paying the loan when the property goes further and further underwater.

While many of these 80/20 zero down payment loans have already gone into default, there are still a large number of them originated in 2004-2005 which have not. We know from LoanPerformance that roughly 33% of all the Alt A loans that were securitized in 2004-2006 were 80/20 no down payment deals. Over 20% of all the subprime loans in these mortgage-backed security pools had no down payments. These figures are confirmed by the Liar Loan study which I referred to in a previous article. It found that 28% of the more than 700,000 loans examined in that report which had been originated between 2004 and 2007 were 80/20 no down payment deals.

The problem of strategic defaults goes far beyond those homeowners who put nothing down when they bought their home. Although the Morgan Stanley study found that only 12% of all the defaults observed were homeowners walking away from the mortgage, I think their definition of a strategic defaulter is much too narrow.

The chart from that study which we looked at earlier shows strategic default rates when the loan exceeded the home value by 20-60%. Total default rates were over 40% for mortgages of all sizes. This tells me that a substantial proportion of all these defaults by underwater homeowners were walk-aways.

It is not only the four worst bubble states examined in the FRB study to which these two reports are applicable. Remember, prices have declined by 30% or more in just about all of the 25 large metros that had the highest number of distressed properties which I examined in my previous article on the shadow inventory.

Another chart from the Morgan Stanley study showed that for all the 6.6 million loans analyzed, the percentage of them defaulting rose steadily from 45% for loans with a LTV of 100 to 63% for loans with a LTV of 155. It seems clear from these two reports that as home values continue to decline and LTV ratios rise, the number of homeowners choosing to strategically default and walk away from their mortgage obligation will relentlessly grow. That means real trouble for all major housing markets around the country.

Where we go from here is simple: we foreclose on the squatters and let whatever happens happen. There is no real dilemma here. We just don't want to do what is necessary and endure the pain that goes along with it.

The HELOC Lifestyle

California is the only place in the world where people come to believe they can live on home price appreciation as a reliable source of income. It isn't surprising that real estate takes on a special level of desirability when each house comes with a built-in ATM machine. It becomes obvious that people come to expect and rely on this source of income when you witness them steadily and methodically increasing their mortgage balance.

Of course, since banks allow people to borrow this money and become dependant upon this source of income, houses become desirable beyond all reason. The competition for free money becomes intense, house prices rise, and when the market rally fizzles, prices crash back to earth, and the banks lose billions of dollars.

• The owners of today's featured property paid $175,000 on 3/18/1999. They used a $169,750 first mortgage and a $5,250 down payment.
• On 11/15/2001 they refinanced with a $229,500 first mortgage.
• On 12/4/2002 they refinanced with a $240,000 first mortgage.
• On 2/11/2003 they refinanced with a $278,000 first mortgage.
• On 11/1/2004 they refinanced with a $300,000 first mortgage.
• On 2/11/2008 they refinanced with a $323,000 first mortgage.
• Total mortgage equity withdrawal was $153,250.
• Total squatting time is about 15 months so far.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 09/14/2010

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 03/24/2010

Document Type: Notice of Rescission

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 03/09/2010

Document Type: Notice of Default

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 10/30/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

This is what passes for good mortgage management in California. They tried to live within their means so to speak; they only spent what they perceived to be within the bounds of normal appreciation for their property. Of course, they were wrong, but that is the mindset by which they approached their mortgage management.

Am I the only one who thinks this is crazy?

Irvine Home Address … 23 FOXHOLLOW Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price … $319,900

Home Purchase Price … $175,000

Home Purchase Date …. 3/18/1999

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $125,706

Percent Change ………. 71.8%

Annual Appreciation … 5.2%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$319,900 ………. Asking Price

$11,197 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

4.74% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$308,704 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$64,292 ………. Income Requirement

$1,608 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$277 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$27 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$340 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$2,252 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$150 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$389 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$20 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$40 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$1,774 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$3,199 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$3,199 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$3,087 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$11,197 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$20,682 ………. Total Cash Costs

$27,100 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$47,782 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 23 FOXHOLLOW Irvine, CA 92614

——————————————————————————

Beds: 3

Baths: 1 full 1 part baths

Home size: 1,300 sq ft

($246 / sq ft)

Lot Size: n/a

Year Built: 1985

Days on Market: 17

Listing Updated: 40443

MLS Number: S632715

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Community: Woodbridge

Tract: St

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

Desirable 3 bedroom two story condominium in the Somerset Tract near an amazing and tranquil rest and park area, Green Belt and Pool. This perfect starter home includes super upgraded laminate and travertine floors. Kitchen has gas stove and stainless steel sink. Crown moulding and 3 inch baseboards grace each of the rooms, along with custom paint, smooth ceilings, and textured walls. For your comfort, home also features an oversized five year old air conditioner. Bathrooms feature new light fixtures. Living Room is showcased with a slate Fireplace and beautiful French Doors that open on to the Patio with an 8 year old fruit bearing guava tree. Enjoy all the Woodbridge area amenities, including the Lakes, Pools, Parks, Schools and Shopping. This home is lovingly maintained by this family and not a short sale fixer upper.

I hope you have enjoyed this week, and thank you for reading the Irvine Housing Blog: astutely observing the Irvine home market and combating California Kool-Aid since 2006.

Have a great weekend,

Irvine Renter