Category Archives: Real Estate Analysis

Understanding Riverside County's RE Market

Our open thread this weekend contains a brief analysis of the Riverside County housing market. All of Southern California’s real estate markets are interconnected by commuters. What happens over the hill impacts pricing here in Irvine.

Here is a great article from the LA Times: HUD’s Dollar Homes falls short of mission.

I would like to share with you some interesting blog posts I read this week at The Housing Chronicles Blog,

Declines in the Case-Shiller Index not uniform

Apartment rents falling in Southern California

“Shadow inventory” of foreclosures remain hidden from the market

And related to today’s topic:

Signs of life in the hardest-hit housing markets

They say an end can be a start
Feels like I’ve been buried yet I’m still alive
It’s like a bad day that never ends
I feel the chaos around me
A thing I don’t try to deny
I’d better learn to accept that
There are things in my life that I can’t control

If I Ever Feel Better — Phoenix

Will prices ever stop falling in Riverside County? Will their real estate market in the Inland Empire rise like a Phoenix from the ashes? Prices will not rise any time soon, but there will be an increased activity among cashflow investors absorbing the inventory of foreclosures. Eventually, all of the houses from the bubble will be recycled, and the new homeowners will not have near as much debt as the previous ones. The economy will recover, and life will go on.

Cashflow Investing

Riverside County and parts of San Bernardino County are collectively known as the Inland Empire. It is a mess. Unemployment is high, house prices are already down 50%, and they are still falling. Prices will continue to fall until real estate savvy cashflow investors loaded with cash enter the market and begin absorbing the inventory. Call it opportunistic, vulture investing, value buying, or whatever term you think appropriate, but the people who invest in this manner are the ones who will create the bottom with their buying activity.

In every disaster there is opportunity. Uncertainty in any market negatively impacts pricing; however, there is a price point where investors believe they are being properly compensated for the risks they are taking on. Even now, there are properties in Riverside County that warrant serious consideration from cashflow investors.

Think about it, let’s say you find a property where the cashflow value with a 10% return is $180,000. However, you are worried that you will have difficulty finding tenants for the next two or three years. How much income might you lose? $10,000? $20,000? Discount the property to account for the difference. There is generally a price point where an investment makes sense.

Cashflow investing is a process of determining value, evaluating risks and discounting as appropriate. Whoever has the most aggressive set of assumptions will acquire a property in the open market. Those who are too aggressive will lose money, and those who are too conservative will never transact. That is how markets work.

The Inland Empire

I want to thank Boyd Martin of Market Profiles for providing the information presented today. He provides an analysis of New Home prices in various sub-markets across California. Like many in my industry, I receive his quarterly updates. I called him on Thursday to obtain his permission to reproduce his study from the 4th quarter of 2008 for the Inland Empire.

Market Profiles
714-546-3814

bmartin@marketprofilesinc.com
wscott@marketprofilesinc.com

NewHomesMatch.com

I mentioned a couple of weeks ago the BIA website NewHomesMatch.com. They have every floorplan of every new home in Southern California in their database. It is a really cool service.

All of the data presented today is accurate for new homes. These prices are not reflective of resale home prices. New home prices are a much better indicator of market strength and direction. The active builders do not live in denial because they must sell their inventory to stay alive. If that means prices must be lowered, then they will lower prices. At whatever price levels new home bottom, resale homes will bottom out even lower usually 2 or 3 years later because the less expensive new homes puts tremendous pressure on resale prices. This deep recession may put our resale market bottom back from 2011 to 2012 or 2013.

The Inland Empire’s Local Markets

Market Profiles 4th quarter new home sales prices

Above is the grahpic from his update. I have used his graphic to provide a general overview of the Inland Empire markets:

As you might expect, the sub-markets in the Inland Empire can be broadly grouped by their proximity to Orange and LA Counties. The growth in these markets began as a “cost push” of housing as people sought less expensive homes. This still goes on today.

The first of these sub-markets is the eastern edge of Orange County and Corona. The next level is the Riverside and Lake Elsinore Markets. Further inland you arrive at Moreno Valley, Perris, and Murrieta. The extreme fringe of this market is Banning, Beaumont, San Jacinto and Hemet.

The further out on the fringe you go, the less expensive pricing becomes, and the more risk you take on as an investor. As prices crash, people migrate to the west. This leaves the eastern fringe markets with excess supply and problems with vacancy. Properties on the eastern fringe require major price reductions to compensate for the risks of vacancy and declining incomes. These are also more difficult to manage. Since the extreme eastern markets are also the markets that saw the most construction during the bubble, there is a huge turnover of homes due to foreclosures. However, this is also an opportunity; this is where you can pick up a house that is less than 5 years old for prices well under construction costs. In short, they almost are giving them away.

East OC and Corona

OC Edge Corona

As you can see from the graphic, new home prices in Corona declined in price about 10% last year. They are also still building a lot of McMansions (3,409 average square footage). What do you think this does to pricing in Orange County? Some people are going to go to Corona and buy a new McMansion for $150/SF, particularly when the Irvine Company still wants to get $385/SF. (Here is one for $109/SF) There is no way OC pricing holds up when new homes are available that close for that much less. Yes, I know, none of us want to go live there, but we are the Irvine Housing Blog; we do not represent a typical market cross section. Many people will go over the hill to buy these houses. Prices there have probably not bottomed, particularly for new homes, but their market is closer to the bottom than to the top.

Riverside and Lake Elsinore

Riverside Lake Elsinore

This next market segment could probably be separated into two different markets as Riverside and Lake Elsinore have very different market dynamics. Riverside has more of an economic base than Lake Elsinore does because it is a more established community. Lake Elsinore more than doubled in size during the bubble whereas Riverside saw a much smaller percentage increase in its population. That being said, I lump these together because they both represent an additional 20-30 minute drive from the OC and LA markets.

As you can see, the pricing in Lake Elsinore is getting hammered. If you really want to see carnage/opportunity, take a look at nearby Wildomar. How does $31/SF for a 2006 home grab you? (Most are near $70/SF) There isn’t a pooper-scooper big enough for some of these markets. The general pattern to look for in Riverside county is to find concentrations of houses built during the bubble, and you will find entire neighborhoods of REOs and very low prices.

I consider these markets some of the better cashflow investment opportunities. Even though the current inventory is high, it will be easier to attract and keep renters here because you have two other markets even farther to the east you can attract renters away from. These markets will be less damaged by the westward migration than will the extreme fringe markets.

Moreno Valley, Perris and Murrieta

Moreno Valley Perris Murrieta

The third level inland is a high-risk market. There is little economic activity out there because it is dependent upon real estate. Market conditions will get worse here, and coditions will stay bad for quite some time. There are cheap houses here too. This one is $45/SF. However, based on current pricing across the area, this is the market slice I find least attractive. IMO, prices not low enough to compensate investors for the risk. I foresee continued downward pressure on prices across this entire market swath.

You can already see the brutal beating the Moreno Valley market is getting. Prices are down 20% YOY there.

Banning, Beaumont, Hemet and San Jacinto

Banning Beaumont San Jacinto Hemet

This last market is utter chaos. When Jim Cramer talked about “plowing under the Inland Empire,” this is the area he was talking about. The sleepy little communities in this area exploded with housing developments from 2003-2006. Everything out there is new. Now, with the collapsing prices to the west, everyone is abandoning their homes and moving closer to work and cutting their housing costs in half. This area is a disaster zone. It will be the last to recover. However, for those with a long-term market view and a lot of nerve, this is where the home-runs will be hit. There will likely be many properties less than 5 years old transacting near $40/SF. Here is one at $42/SF. At those prices, you could almost let it sit empty for three years and just factor in the vacancy loss to your calculations (maybe not that long, but you get my point). There is a price point where these properties become attractive. Anyone thinking about investing out there needs to be fully aware of the risk. There is a reason the prices are so low.

Notice that in none of this discussion did I mention appreciation. These properties are cashflow investments; appreciation is not a consideration. Sure, if California blows up another massive housing bubble some of these properties may provide a convenient exit point by offloading it to some fool caught up in a financial mania. But realistically, prices are not going up in Riverside County for a very long time. If you want to buy an “investment” property in these markets because you think pricing is going to recover soon, you are a fool.

Bull or Bear?

For those of you that want the IHB to remain permanently bearish, I am sorry, but I am not a permabear. I am still very bearish on Irvine and most of Orange County. I am still somewhat bearish on pricing in the Inland Empire, but price levels in many areas do cashflow. This is a fact. There are risks in this market: (1) prices might drop further, (2) rents may decline, (3) jobs might disappear, and (4) incomes may go down. But an objective analysis of many properties in Riverside County shows that buying them and renting them out currently provides returns superior to other investment classes. It is what it is.

Does reporting this fact make me bullish? No, it makes me a reporter of market conditions. Only an investor who weighs the risks and rewards and has an accurate idea of what they want can determine whether they are bearish or bullish on any given asset class. Some people will look at these properties and conclude prices must drop further; others may not. No investment is without risk–a fact that escaped everyone who was speculating on the sure thing during the bubble.

I Will Not Call a Bottom

Many of you have told me you are waiting for me to call the bottom. I am not going to do that. The bottom will not need to be called because when it is time to buy, the numbers will tell you so.

59 Emerald kitchen

Asking Price: $843,900

Address: 59 Emerald, Irvine, CA 92614

{book4}

Time — Pink Floyd

You are young and life is long and there is time to kill today
And then one day you find ten years have got behind you
No one told you when to run, you missed the starting gun

I will never call a bottom. For any of you waiting for the big announcement on the IHB that the bottom is here, that announcement will never come.

I have written about the market bottom on a number of occasions including: The Market Bottom and Fundamentals at a Market Bottom, and I have predicted where the bottom will occur in Predictions for the Irvine Housing Market, and I followed up with I Was Wrong, It’s Worse… But today, I want to talk about what will happen when we get near the bottom of the market and why I will not need to call it–and no, it isn’t because I am afraid to. It is because it is unnecessary.

I will profile properties, and I will
discuss what I believe the value of these homes are based on rental and
income numbers. At some point, probably 2 years from now, asking prices and comparable sales prices should be at or below reasonable valuation
levels based on rent and income. It will not be a call to buy, it will
merely be a comparison of value to current pricing. When current
pricing is below values based on cashflow, it is an implied buy signal. It
doesn’t mean property values might not decline further, but it does
mean that even if that occurs, you are still saving money owning versus
renting and declining values are not going to hurt (as much).

For instance, right now in several markets, there are properties
trading at a discount to rental parity or even cashflow investor
levels. Go to Redfin and look at some of the properties in Riverside
County. They are everywhere. If I were to do a cashflow analysis of
these properties and show price levels of rental parity and cashflow
positive investment value, you would see that the current comparable
sales are trading below these levels in many instances. That is a buy
signal. At some point in the future, not now, the same analysis will
point to buying in Irvine’s market.

I have been experimenting to find a simple way to communicate these ideas in a report people can easily understand. The chart to the left is my attempt. Let me explain what everything means:

Each property is subjectively evaluated to determine its desirability as a long-term residence. This is a subjective evaluation. For instance, today’s featured property would be an excellent long-term home. It is a large home in a good neighborhood with few negatives. If the best properties in the entire market would rank a 1, and if the very worst would rank as a 5, this one, IMO, is a bit better than a 2. The little green dot represents my subjective evaluation of this property.

The black dots represent different important price points every buyer should be aware of. The first is the “value,” if you want to call it that, of comparable sales in the market. This has nothing to do with cashflow, and it is based totally on what people are currently paying for similar properties in the market. As we all know, we are still deflating from a massive housing bubble, so this comparable sales value in Irvine is currently well above any reasonable cashflow metric. The Comparable Sales Value floats up and down this chart based on whatever people are currently paying.

The next black dot on the list is the asking price. This can also be just about anywhere. The frequent WTF listing prices I profile here would be off the top of the chart. Hopefully, if anyone is actually considering buying in this market, they would at least try to pay less than current comparable sales.

The next black dot on the list is the Maximum Cashflow value of the property. Do you remember the post, Investment Value of Residential Real Estate? As I begrudgingly described in that post, there is a legitimate financial reason to pay more than rental parity for blue-chip properties a buyer plans to own for 10 years or more. This is not a large premium over rental parity. The calculations in that post demonstrate you can pay up to 10% more than rental parity on a long-term hold because you obtain the benefit of the inflation hedge. This is not a price point for homes you know you will want to move up and out of in a few years.

The next black dot on the list is the oft-described rental parity. One of the better discussions of this concept is contained in Rent Versus Own. This is the price level most properties in Irvine should reach at the bottom of the market. At this price point, the cost of ownership is equal to the cost of a rental. In theory, a buyer considering only financial concerns would be indifferent between renting and owning at this price point.

The zone between rental parity and cashflow investor levels is the gray area where all the less desirable properties fall. This would include most condos, any two-bedroom properties and what are commonly known as “starter homes.”

The final black dot is the cashflow investor level. This is the price point where an investor can acquire a property, rent it out, and turn a monthly profit from owning the property. This is the bottom of the line for Irvine properties, and it is usually about 25% below rental parity. Many of the crappy condos that have been leading the charge to the bottom will find support at this price point.

The final number on the chart would be those properties nobody wants to live in. Does everyone remember Dr. Housing Bubble’s series Real Homes of Genius? Those are the properties I am talking about. What they really need is a bulldozer.

So with that lengthy preamble, let’s examine what a good deal would look like. Take a look at this listing in Corona, California. I have not pulled comps for sales and rentals, but just by looking at the property and the price, I can make a barely educated guess about the dynamics of the property. To me, this looks like a nice median Corona property. The pricing should be at rental parity; however, looking at this asking price and the comps, it certainly appears as if both comparable sales and the asking price are below rental parity. This would be a property to buy, assuming you want to live in Corona (I am not endorsing buying this specific property as I have not researched it in detail). A person looking at a property like this one in Corona would see a chart like the one at the left.

You see, there is no need to “call a bottom.” I only have to identify good deals. Over time there will be an
emergent trend where each day here at the IHB we see more and more
properties trading at or below rental parity. When that occurs, the
bottom, although not called by anyone, will be under our feet.

59 Emerald kitchen

Asking Price: $843,900IrvineRenter

Income Requirement: $210,975

Downpayment Needed: $168,780

Monthly Equity Burn: $7,032

Purchase Price: $639,000

Purchase Date: 6/24/1996

Address: 59 Emerald, Irvine, CA 92614

Beds: 4
Baths: 3
Sq. Ft.: 2,794
$/Sq. Ft.: $302
Lot Size: 5,500

Sq. Ft.

Property Type: Single Family Residence
Style: Contemporary
Year Built: 1985
Stories: 2
Area: Woodbridge
County: Orange
MLS#: S570083
Source: SoCalMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 1 day

New Listing (24 hours)

lite-brite

Rare find. Light, Bright and Spacious Home in Woodbridge. 4 Bedrooms
plus a den with 3 Baths. Vaulted ceilings, Sunken Living Room,
Breakfast Area, Fireplace in Family Room and Master Suite. Private Pool
in the Backyard. Woodbridge features 2 Lakes and Private Beaches, lots
of Parks, Pools, and Tennis Courts. Walk to schools and close to
Freeways and Shopping.

This property was purchased for $639,000 on 6/24/1996. The owner used a $500,000 first mortgage and a $139,000 downpayment. Just for giggles, I calculated the compound rate of return this property witnessed between 1996 and 2009. It works out to 2.16%.

2.16%
1996 $ 639,000
1997 $ 652,818
1998 $ 666,936
1999 $ 681,358
2000 $ 696,093
2001 $ 711,146
2002 $ 726,524
2003 $ 742,235
2004 $ 758,286
2005 $ 774,684
2006 $ 791,437
2007 $ 808,552
2008 $ 826,037
2009 $ 843,900

So much for the rampant appreciation of the bubble. At least this owner cashed out. She got a $750,000 first mortgage and a $300,000 second from Lehman Brothers back in 2006.

If this property sells for its asking price, if a 6% commission is paid–and this one probably will as it is priced below neighborhood comps–the trusties for the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy will lose $256,734.

This price isn’t at rental parity, and it isn’t at maximum cashflow value either, but it is making significant progress toward affordability. Wait, prices will get better.

{book5}

Ticking away the moments that make up a dull day
You fritter and waste the hours in an off hand way
Kicking around on a piece of ground in your home town
Waiting for someone or something to show you the way


Tired of lying in the sunshine staying home to watch the rain
You are young and life is long and there is time to kill today
And then one day you find ten years have got behind you
No one told you when to run, you missed the starting gun

And you run and you run to catch up with the sun, but its sinking
And racing around to come up behind you again
The sun is the same in the relative way, but youre older
Shorter of breath and one day closer to death

Time — Pink Floyd

Responsible Homeowners are NOT Losing Their Homes

One of the biggest myths of the real estate bubble is that responsible homeowners are losing their homes; they are not.

Today’s featured property is owned by HELOC abusers who already took out almost $900,000, and now they want $400,000 more.

6326 Sierra Elena Rd kitchen

Asking Price: $1,629,000

Address: 6326 Sierra Elena Road, Irvine, CA 92603

{book1}

Right Round — Flo Rida

I’m spendin my money
I’m out of control
Somebody help me

You spin my head right round, right round
When you go down, when you go down down

Interesting song about oral sex HELOC abuse and falling house prices.

Many of the sob stories in the mainstream media have been focused on what are characterized as “responsible homeowners” who are in danger of losing their homes. Several articles of this type have been posted here, and many commenters have noted the extravagances and poor decisions that often make these homeowners look less than completely responsible. Let’s be clear about one thing:

Responsible homeowners are NOT losing their homes.

To see the truth in this statement, one needs to have a clear definition of “responsible homeowner.”

A “responsible homeowner” is a buyer who, if they utilized financing, did not stray from the conservative parameters set forth by lenders (prior to the bubble) and financial planners. This includes using a maximum 28% debt-to-income ratio on the mortgage, at least a 20% downpayment and fixed-rate conventionally amortizing financing.

Few who fit this definition are going to lose their homes; although, some of them may chose to walk away from the debt because they are hopelessly underwater. The only ones who fit the above definition who are in danger of losing their homes are those who lose jobs; they are the truly sad casualties of the housing bubble. Unfortunately, this is becoming more common due to the financial crisis caused by all the homeowners who borrowed irresponsibly.

Responsible borrowers are not the ones defaulting on their mortgages; irresponsible homeowners are.

If “responsible homeowner” is defined as a buyer who believed they could manage their monthly payment and did so until the loan terms changed, then by this definition, many responsible homeowners are going to lose their homes.

Almost everyone who signed up for a toxic loan thought they could make the payment; most did for a while. Many were convinced they could make the payments by a predatory lender out to make a few bucks on the origination. Many more believed they could supplement their incomes with the rapid appreciation they would enjoy as their house values rose to infinity. Does ignorance to their inability to sustain their housing payments make them responsible?

In the political debate surrounding foreclosure moratoriums and homeowner bailouts, the politicians are using the latter definition of “responsible homeowner.” The ignorant and those who knowingly took excessive risk are being rewarded with a government bailout. The prudent are the ones paying the bill.

To see the truth in the importance of these definitions, we need to look no further than the astute observations on this blog. One of our frequent commenters is a responsible homeowner. He purchased near the peak, but he did so with terms that his family can afford. He meets the parameters in the first definition. He is in no danger of losing his house in foreclosure. Yes, he is annoyed that the values have dropped–who wouldn’t be–but he is not going to become a foreclosure statistic.

If you want to know what the lenders really worry about it is that guys like him may chose to go into foreclosure and walk away from the debt. There are already enough irresponsible homeowners on their way to the meat grinder. A wave of walkaways would make sausage of the entire banking industry.

The reality is responsible homeowners are not losing their homes; some may lose their houses because of a job loss, and some may chose to walk away, but very few truly responsible homeowners are endangered. The foreclosure crisis is caused by the irresponsible.

{book3}

Today’s featured property was emailed to me by a reader who was wondering about all the WTF prices in Turtle Rock and Turtle Ridge. This reader sent me an email asking about four properties including the one I featured today. The others I looked at had the following results:

19125 Sierra Majorca, Irvine, CA 92603
Asking: $1,526,827
Paid $1,000,000 in 2003 — No HELOC abuse, but they have a $700,000 mortgage, and a $100,000 HELOC.

11 Bethany, Irvine, CA 92603
Asking: $1,359,000
Paid $645,000 in 2004 — $750,000 first mortgage and a $250,000 HELOC

17 Sunrise, Irvine, CA 92603
Asking: $1,548,000
Paid $675,000 in 1999 — $987,000 Option ARM with 1% teaser rate and a $250,000 HELOC

Of the four properties, three of them had significant HELOC abuse. I usually find a high percentage of for-sale properties have HELOC abuse, not a good sign for the market. When HELOC abusers have to go back to conventional financing, can they afford the payments?

I want you to contemplate how much trouble our market is in. I will use the analogy of drinking and partying and compare the Irvine experience to that of Minnetonka, Minnesota (from the post Southern California’s Cultural Pathology).

Let’s say you are a Minnetonka resident. You make just as much money as residents in Irvine, but your median house price at the peak was $305,000. This is higher than historic norms, but as far as kool-aid partying goes, you had only a few social drinks. If you take an aspirin and drink a big glass of water, you will feel fine in the morning. The Federal Reserve is providing the aspirin in the form of 4.5% mortgage interest rates and the guaranteed ability to refinance your conforming mortgage. You as a Minnetonka resident did not party too hard; your hangover is manageable.

Now imagine you are an Irvine resident. You make a decent living, but instead of paying $305,000 for a median home, you paid $723,000 (or borrowed that much on your HELOC). You had a great time: you bought cars, took vacations, and impressed all your friends and neighbors with how rich you are. You did more than take a few social drinks of kool-aid. You downed the bottle; when that wasn’t enough, you found a bigger bottle, and as the party went on, you finally went intravenous. You are now dependant upon kool-aid (HELOC money), and there is no amount of medicine that can save you from a wicked hangover, delerium termens, and the worst withdrawal pains possible. The Federal Reserve’s medicine is not going to help you; your mortgage is not conforming, and you not going to be allowed to refinance. You are screwed.

People bidding on Irvine real estate in the new financing environment simply cannot bid prices as high as they used to, and they are not going to be able to raise their bids for quite some time. It is very unlikely that prices will rise enough to bail out all the homeowners facing ARM resets. There are too many people who drank too much kool aid (see examples above). All of these overextended homedebtors must be flushed from the system. Based on available data, (1) we know that refinancing is not going to be possible, (2) we know these people cannot afford the payments, and (3) we know that their are not enough buyers who really do make that much money to take over these people’s debts and bail them out. There are no other viable alternatives.

I used to think that Turtle Rock would be spared the worst of the housing correction. Most residents are long-term owners, so there is relatively little toxic financing on purchases. The only thing that could flatten Turtle Rock–other than big declines in neighboring communities–is mortgage equity withdrawal. I didn’t think it could be that bad; perhaps I was wrong.

6326 Sierra Elena Rd kitchen

Asking Price: $1,629,000IrvineRenter

Income Requirement: $407,250

Downpayment Needed: $325,800

Monthly Equity Burn: $13,575

Purchase Price: $292,500

Purchase Date: 11/23/1994

Address: 6326 Sierra Elena Road, Irvine, CA 92603

Beds: 4
Baths: 4
Sq. Ft.: 3,400
$/Sq. Ft.: $479
Lot Size: 6,120

Sq. Ft.

Property Type: Single Family Residence
Style: Craftsman
Year Built: 1972
Stories: 2
View: Hills, Panoramic, Has View
Area: Turtle Rock
County: Orange
MLS#: P680677
Source: SoCalMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 4 days

This is the home for you’re family. Custom Craftsman style Beauty.
Exposed beams. Spacious open great room. Kitchen area features a custom
center Island, rich wood cabinetry, and views of surrounding hillside.
This home features custom built-ins throughout. Secluded Master Suite
on first floor. Each Bedroom is extra Large. Walk to Orange County
Register’s #1 rated elementary school Bonita Canyon Elementary.

This is the home for you’re family. This is the home for you are family. That makes sense…

Sentence fragments, random Capitalization.

  • On 11/23/1994 this property was purchased for $292,500. The owners used a $263,200 first mortgage and a $29,300 downpayment. Keep in mind as you read the rest of this section that they only put $29,300 of their own money into the transaction.
  • On 7/16/1998 they refinanced with a $266,300 first mortgage.
  • On 11/12/1998 they opened a HELOC for $30,000.
  • On 11/4/2002 they opened a HELOC for $172,000.
  • On 11/4/2002 they refinanced with a $300,000 first mortgage. By 2002 they had already doubled their debt.
  • On 8/25/2004 they refinanced with a $630,000 first mortgage.
  • On 7/6/2005 they opened a HELOC for $250,000.
  • On 10/27/2005 they refinanced with a $900,000 first mortgage.
  • On 12/14/2005 they opened a HELOC for $155,000.
  • On 5/28/2008 they opened a HELOC for $250,000.
  • Total property debt is $1,150,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $886,800.

These people put $29,300 of their own money into a house in 1994, and they managed to take out $886,800 over the next 14 years. That averages $63,342 a year for 14 years. That is a hard working house. It explains why houses are so desirable, doesn’t it?

WTF

It gets better though, they still expect to make more when they sell it! OMG!

If this property sells for its asking price, these owners will still walk away with another $381,260. The total gain on the sale will be $1,238,760.

Does anyone think this is the way you are supposed to manage your financial life? Are you entitled to a million dollar payday just for owning California real estate? This is insane.

Does this strike you as a “responsible homeowner?”

Do you think we should bail him out? Well, perhaps we will not have to. Someone may buy this house and pay off his debt for him. After all, the house will be worth $3,000,000 15 years from now, right?

{book2}

I’m spendin my money
I’m out of control
Somebody help me
She’s takin my bank roll.
But I’m king of the club
And I’m wearin the crown
Poppin these bottles
Touching these models
Watchin they **** go down down
down down, down down [this line x4]

(Flo Rida)
You spin my head right round, right round
When you go down, when you go down down

Right Round — Flo Rida

Real Estate's Lost Decade

Much has been written about the “Lost Decade” in the Japanese economy. In the 90s they faced the same decisions we face today, and we appear to be making the same mistakes.

Today’s featured property is a condo being offered for 55% off its peak purchase price; a new record for Irvine. It is our first 2001 price rollback.

Asking Price: $149,900

Address: 76 Lakepines, Irvine, CA 92620

{book1}

Turning Japanese — The Vapors

I think I’m turning Japanese
I really think so

Japan simultaneously inflated massive financial bubbles in real estate and stocks during the late 1980s. The slow deflation of this bubble and the general economic malaise that impacted Japan during the years that followed became known as the “Lost Decade.” The United States is facing a similar set of circumstances in the aftermath of the Great Housing Bubble. So far, we have been following the same policy actions as the Japanese did. Perhaps our officials have come to believe a Lost Decade is preferable to the next Great Depression.

Today, I want to demonstrate how easy it would be to have a similar result in our own housing market. By lowering interest rates to artificially low levels, the Federal Reserve hopes to stabilize the housing market; however, weaning the housing market off these subsidies will need to be a slow process to prevent real estate prices from taking another nosedive. Gradually increasing interest rates back to long-term norms will result in an erosion of buying power that prevents price appreciation. I want to be clear about the implications of this; we are not looking at a decade to get back to peak prices, we are looking at a decade of stagnate prices at the bottom. Real estate will not reach peak prices until 2032.

The Lost Decade

The chart above shows median home prices in Irvine stabilizing at
$450,000 in 2010 as interest rates bottom at 4.5%. To calculate a median home price, I needed to make assumptions about incomes, allowable debt-to-income ratios and interest rates.

The example above uses the most recent Irvine Median Household Income Data. At the end of 2007, the median household income in Irvine was $91,101. Due to the recession, I have assumed this will also be the median household income at the end of 2009. It might be higher; it might be lower. The historic rate of income growth between 1980 and 2007 is 3.6%. I assume that median household income will again increase at this rate starting in 2010. By 2019, this figure reaches $129,500.

The recent bailout legislation passed by Congress is a combination of workouts and government buy-downs to get borrowers debt-to-income ratios down to 31%. Previous bailouts failed because they only got the borrowers debt-to-income ratios down to 38%. The FHA has long term records showing 31% is as high as this ratio can go without significant increases in defaults. I have assumed debt-to-income ratios will be limited to 31% going forward. Also, I have assumed 30-year fixed-rate conventional financing; exotic financing will not be coming back any time soon.

The Federal Reserve’s policy of “quantitative easing” (aka printing money), is an attempt to drive down long-term interest rates like those for home mortgages. If the FED is successful–and for the short term they probably will be–mortgage interest rates could drop as low as 4.5%. The average interest rate since the early 1970s when the GSEs started keeping records is 8% (7.99% actually). I further assumed interest rates will rise once this economic crisis is over from an unprecedented 4.5% to the long term average of 8%.

I used Microsoft Excels handy solver tool to calculate the interest rate required to keep prices stable while incomes grew. The interest rate chart above shows interest rates going up about 35 basis points a year for 10 years. This puts interest rates back to historic norms of 8%. If interest rates can be eased upward at this controlled rate, and if incomes rise again at their historic 3.6%, prices will stabilize at $450,000 in 2009, and they will stay there for 10 years. After 2019, incomes have caught up with 8% interest rates, and prices begin to appreciate at 3.6% a year to match income growth.

In my opinion, this is a realistic outcome. Eventually interest rates have to go back up. When this crisis is over, the money the FED is printing will cause inflation to return. The Federal Reserve will need to raise interest rates to control inflation. If they do this too quickly, it would take the floor out from under home prices, and despite a high level of general price inflation in the economy, house prices would resume their descent.

When you look at these charts collectively, it suggests the Federal Reserve may allow inflation at levels higher than what is normally desirable for several years after this crisis is over. This will help the Federal Government inflate away much of the debt it is taking on with its stimulus spending, and it will keep a floor under asset prices, particularly housing. Note that asset prices will not be increasing. The consumer price index may increase significantly, but house prices will not budge. Also when you consider the impact of the long-term foreclosure crisis in real estate due to the resetting of adjustable rate mortgages, the FED has incentive to keep rates as low as possible for as long as possible, and house prices have resistance to upward movement.

It is difficult to be bullish with these market conditions. How exactly
would prices go up? Will interest rates stay at 4.5% permanently?

  • People can only increase their bids if lenders give
    them the opportunity. Rising incomes provides the ability to bid prices
    higher, but only at the rate of rising incomes. The long-term average
    is 3.6 %, not exactly rampant appreciation.
  • Another way people can
    raise bids is if they increase their debt-to-income ratio, and lenders
    must allow this in their underwriting. With the history of defaults
    with DTIs over 31%, it doesn’t seem likely that lenders will be
    relaxing this parameter any time soon.
  • Another way buyers can raise
    their bids is through using exotic financing; we all know how that
    turned out last time. I don’t see Option ARMs going to Subprime borrowers without verified income happening again, do you?
  • The final way people can raise their bids is to
    settle for less. Personally, I will not buy a tiny 1/1 condo like today’s
    featured property when I can rent a nice 3/2 SFD.

If my assumptions are correct, and if events unfold as I have outlined, prices will bottom over the next couple of years, and they will stay there for a decade while both incomes and interest rates slowly increase. The “Lost Decade” that the Japanese experienced is not just realistic, it is perhaps a best-case outcome.

{book}

Asking Price: $149,900IrvineRenter

Income Requirement: $37,475

Downpayment Needed: $29,980

Monthly Equity Burn: $1,249

Purchase Price: $322,000

Purchase Date: 7/12/2005

Address: 76 Lakepines, Irvine, CA 92620

Beds: 1
Baths: 1
Sq. Ft.: 932
$/Sq. Ft.: $161
Lot Size: 763

Sq. Ft.

Property Type: Condominium
Style: Townhouse
Year Built: 1977
Stories: 2
Floor: 1
View: Creek/Stream
Area: Northwood
County: Orange
MLS#: P658271
Source: SoCalMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 173 days

Unsold in 90+ days

Beautiful 1 Bdrm Loft Townhome Over-Looking Bubbling Brook. Stand Alone
Fireplace in the Living Room; Breakfast Bar and Separate Dining Area.
Assigned Carport Parking. Walk-In Master Bdroom Closet. Spacious Back
Patio. Full-Size Washer/Dryer Hookups.

Check out the listing price history:

Date Event Price
Mar 19, 2009 Price Changed $149,900
Feb 01, 2009 Price Changed $215,000
Nov 07, 2008 Price Changed $229,900
Sep 29, 2008 Listed $265,000
Jul 12, 2005 Sold $332,000
May 23, 2001 Sold $163,000
Dec 03, 1996 Sold $89,000
Sep 14, 1989 Sold $116,000

This property was purchased for $332,000 on 7/12/2005. This is a full year before the peak, so this property might have appraised for around $360,000 in the summer of 2006. The owner used a $265,600 first mortgage, a $66,400 second mortgage, and a $0 downpayment.

This property is listed at 55% off its 2005 purchase price, and it is below its 2001 sales price.

If this property sells for its asking price, and if a 6% commission is paid, the total loss to the lender will be $191,094.

Rollback

Our housing market is starting to look like a Wal-Mart.

{book2}

I’ve got your picture of me and you
You wrote “I love you” I wrote “me too”
I sit there staring and there’s nothing else to do
Oh it’s in color Your hair is brown
Your eyes are hazel And soft as clouds
I often kiss you when there’s no one else around

I’ve got your picture, I’ve got your picture
I’d like a million of you all round my cell
I want a doctor to take your picture
So I can look at you from inside as well
You’ve got me turning up and turning down
And turning in and turning ’round

I’m turning Japanese
I think I’m turning Japanese
I really think so
Turning Japanese
I think I’m turning Japanese
I really think so
I’m turning Japanese
I think I’m turning Japanese
I really think so
Turning Japanese
I think I’m turning Japanese
I really think so

Turning Japanese — The Vapors

What Can The Federal Reserve Learn from the US Forest Service?

Sometimes important lessons can come from unusual locations. The experience of the US Forest Service has much to teach the Federal Reserve. Will they learn the lesson?

Our featured property is a three-bedroom property in Irvine for under $250,000. How the mighty have fallen…

46 Eagle Point Inside

Asking Price: $247,900

Address: 46 Eagle Point #25, Irvine, CA 92604

{book1}

Burning Down The House — Talking Heads

Hold tight wait till the party’s over
Hold tight were in for nasty weather
There has got to be a way
Burning down the house

Outwardly, the Federal Reserve and the US Forest Service seem to have little in common. The Federal Reserve manages our currency and banking system while the US Forest Service manages public lands in national forests and grasslands, which encompass 193 million acres, according to their website. Nevertheless, they both manage complex systems and the outcomes of their choices are commonly obscured for many years.

Our economy, which is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve, is a collection of interrelated individuals and entities whose behavior impact the system. These participants are also reacting to the system, and thereby they are impacted by it. Our forest ecosystem, which is the responsibility of the US Forest Service, is a collection of interrelated plants and animals that both impact the system and are impacted by it.

Both complex systems under management by these two agencies are unpredictable and difficult to manage effectively. Oftentimes the results of management practices are not fully realized until decades after policies are put in place. The similarities between the missions of these two agencies and the nature of the problems they face make them analogous. Lessons learned by one agency can often be extrapolated to the other, and given the long timeframes in their system’s lifecycles, it is important to review and learn these lessons when they are presented.

What Lesson Did the Forest Service Learn?

For years the US Forest Service was dominated by timber production interests. It was a classic example of regulatory capture. The US Forest Service’s primary objective, and thereby its land management policies, favored timber production. Forest Fires were seen as an obvious threat to timber production, so policies of fire suppression were absolute: put out all fires as quickly as possible, and do not let anything burn. This was forest service policy for several decades.

To its chagrin, the US Forest Service discovered its policy was flawed. By not allowing small fires to burn, leaf litter and other combustible natural growth accumulated. In unmanaged forests, periodic fires eliminate this source of fire fuel. In managed forests this accumulation of fuel fosters fires that get out of control (think Yellowstone).

To combat the accumulation of fire fuel, the US Forest Service changed its policies. Now, small fires in the understory are permitted to burn. By eliminating the excess fuel, the more dangerous and costly canopy fires are avoided. A few trees may get damaged in the small fires, but the forest survives.

What Can The Federal Reserve Learn from the Forest Service?

The interests of the timber industry to the US Forest Service are similar to the interests of Wall Street and other financial market participants to the Federal Reserve. The policy of the Federal Reserve is to stimulate the economy—to put out the fire with lower interest rates—every time there is an economic slowdown.

This policy became known as the “Greenspan Put” during the 20 years of Alan Greenspan’s tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman. This policy pleases business interests, and for many decades, it can look like a sensible policy.

There is a major problem with the “Greenspan Put” policy of stimulating the economy through artificially lowering interest rates. Just like the accumulation of fire fuel on the forest floor, our economy accumulates unsound business plans, Ponzi Scheme financing arrangements, idiotic investment strategies, and behavioral moral hazards. Recessions are supposed to be the small fires that destroy these destructive agents, but when the Federal Reserve manipulates interest rates and stimulates the economy, recessions are not allowed to serve their purpose, and the economic problems pile up.

Many have written that there is an 80-year cycle of economic activity that results in depression-like conditions. They speak of this as if it were a law of nature like the orbital period of Pluto. This is nonsense. The cycle of depressions—if we are to believe there is such a thing—is merely a calendar coincidence. There is no identifiable cause and effect between the passage of 80 years and the cause of an economic catastrophe.

It is my opinion that our problems are caused, albeit indirectly, by the manipulation of our financial system by the Federal Reserve. When our entire financial system gets out of control due to the build-up of unsound business practices—an accumulation caused by Federal Reserve policy—there is a tipping point where monetary policy cannot save the day. The fire burns down the financial house.

One of the functions of the Federal Reserve is to maintain stable prices and promote economic growth. It was formed out of a perceived need to smooth out the extreme economic cycles of boom and bust of the 19th century. Like it or not, it is probably not going away (although many would like it to.) The question they are going to have to wrestle with is how to smooth out the ups and downs without creating the conditions that send the economy careening out of control like it is now. I am not qualified to provide those answers, but in their quest for solutions, I hope the brain trust at the Federal Reserve looks at how the US Forest Service manages a similar problem. They may find guidance in this unlikely location.

{book3}

BTW, did any of you watch the interview with Ben Bernanke on 60 Minutes last night? (part 2 is here) It was very interesting.

I watch the new show Lie To Me on Fox too much. When I watched Bernanke talking, I kept seeing this nervous twitch in his face and lips. Maybe he was nervous because he was on 60 Minutes, but he is in the public eye, so he has been on camera before. Rather than fill me with confidence, it really frightened me to see our Federal Reserve Chairman so edgy when discussing our economy.

Today’s featured property is a crappy condo, but at $228/SF, it is the least expensive way to own a 3 bedroom unit in Woodbridge.

46 Eagle Point Inside

Asking Price: $247,900IrvineRenter

Income Requirement: $61,975

Downpayment Needed: $49,580

Monthly Equity Burn: $2,065

Purchase Price: $402,000

Purchase Date: 9/30/2005

Address: 46 Eagle Point #25, Irvine, CA 92604

Beds: 3
Baths: 2
Sq. Ft.: 1,088
$/Sq. Ft.: $228
Lot Size:
Property Type: Condominium
Style: Contemporary
Year Built: 1978
Stories: 1
Floor: 1
Area: Woodbridge
County: Orange
MLS#: S567144
Source: SoCalMLS
Status: Active
On Redfin: 1 day

New Listing (24 hours)

Fixer-upper

3 bedroom, 1 1/4 bath fixer upper. This end unit condo features newer
appliances, large patio and inside laundry hookups. Located in the
master planned community of Woodbridge you can take advantage of the 22
pools, 24 tennis courts, and 19 park areas or relax by one of the 2
lakes and lagoons. Close to shopping, restaurants, and excellent
schools.

Check out the shadow on the inside photo. Did you see the biceps on the realtor? That dude is pumped up.

Notice this unit is not being pumped as light and bright…

This unit has all the appeal of owning your own apartment–which is none.

This property is a good example of how the lenders are getting clobbered. The dollar amounts involved are small because this unit is low end; however, the magnitude of the loss is tremendous. It is foreshadowing losses to come on nicer properties.

The property was purchased on 9/30/2005 for $402,000. The owner used a $321,600 first mortgage, a $80,400 second mortgage, and a $0 downpayment. Now that values have cratered, it is not surprising that she walked.

When the lender went to the foreclosure auction, they only bid $239,250, which is 25% off the amount of the first mortgage, and they still got the property. Nobody wanted it. The auction price is 40% off, and the current asking price is 38% off the original purchase price. We haven’t seen many 40% discounts in Irvine to date. We will see more.

{book2}

Watch outTalking Heads
You might get what you’re after
Cool babies
Strange but not a stranger
Im an ordinary guy
Burning down the house

Hold tight wait till the party’s over
Hold tight were in for nasty weather
There has got to be a way
Burning down the house

Burning Down The House — Talking Heads