Category Archives: Real Estate Analysis

Doubling Time

Do houses double in value every 8 years? The rate of appreciation is volatile, but the stable rate of appreciation in Irvine is 4.4%, and it takes houses 16 years to double in price.

6232 SIERRA SIENA Rd Irvine, CA 92603 door

Irvine Home Address … 6232 SIERRA SIENA Rd Irvine, CA 92603
Resale Home Price …… $1,269,000

{book1}

Fly, robin fly
Fly, robin fly
Fly, robin fly
Up, up to the sky

Fly, Robin Fly — Silver Convention

California real estate prices take flight fueled by kool aid intoxication and a firmly held belief that trees really can grow to the sky. The reality is that prices cannot go up faster than incomes without (1) raising debt-to-income ratios and (2) lowering interest rates.

We inflated prices beyond the limits of people’s ability to service debt, so the Federal Reserve has lowered interest rates to compensate. They can’t hold rates down forever.

The discussions about appreciation always come back to the question, “How quickly should house prices appreciate?” Today we are going to explore that question plus a related one, “How long should it take for a house to double in value?” Once we answer the first question, the answer to the second question is applied mathematics.

How Fast to Appreciate

Home prices do not go up by magic. I discussed this at length in Ownership Cost: Income, Payments and House Prices:

“Wage inflation is the slow increase in aggregate wages over time in
a given area. Wage inflation is a driver of price inflation because
workers will use wage increases to bid up the cost of goods and
services they demand. in a housing market, wage growth pushes up prices
as follows:

Assume a worker is earning $100,000 and can borrow $400,000 to bid
on property in today’s market. In one year, if this worker gets a 3%
raise (not this year), he will be making $103,000, and if other terms
do not change, he will be able to borrow $412,000. If he has also
increased his savings, the amount he can bid on real estate has also
increased by 3%.

A property that might sell for $500,000 today can sell for $515,000 in one year and it is no more expensive in terms of its financial impact; debt-to-income, savings impact, time of amortization — the key
variables remain the same. This is “normal” home price appreciation.”

If this is the mechanism at work, then what is the rate of wage inflation, and why do prices in California go up faster than wage inflation?

Wage Inflation

Since 1975, wages have grown by 4.3% annually in Irvine. This is well above the national average of 3.3%. This explains much of the health of our local real estate market and the long-term growth in prices we have witnessed.

Wage inflation has primarily caused the long-term rate of home price appreciation in Irvine to stand at 4.4% — at least that is the rate from 1984-1998, the last period that spans two market bottoms (see below).

Irvine, CA, Projections from Historic Appreciation Rates, 1984-2026

What is your prognosis for long-term wage growth in Irvine? Will we continue to outpace the country by 1% per year indefinitely? Will outsourcing and offshoring cause our wage growth to be below its recent 4.4% rate of growth? Over the long term, wage growth equals home price appreciation.

Declining Interest Rates

One reason we have seen prices rise faster than the general level of inflation and the local level of wage growth is due to the long-term trend of declining interest rates over the last 25 years.

Declining Interest Rates, 1984-2006

Note that I am only looking at interest rates since they stabilized after the inflation fiasco of the 70s. I don’t need to add the drama of the huge interest rate spike of the early 80s to make the point.

Lower interest rates make for larger loans. Part of the 4.4% yearly appreciation rate in Irvine over the last 25 years is due to steadily decreasing interest rates.

Debt-to-Income Ratios

Another reason for price increases greater than wage growth is our ever-increasing debt-to-income ratio. Since the late 1970s, lenders have been testing the limit on the DTIs people can handle before they default. Each time lenders enable borrowers to cross the threshold of 32% DTI (based on market aggregates), the market will continue higher due to irrational exuberance and kool aid intoxication until the music stops.

Take a look at the chart below that graphs the aggregate debt-to-income ratio in Irvine based on the national contact interest rate, Irvine income data and Irvine median home price data. The shaded areas have been added to show some key thresholds.

Irvine debt-to-income ratios 1975-2009

When the government first engineered loan modifications, they tried to modify people to 38% DTIs — which was a big drop for many — but the number is just too high, and borrowers redefaulted at very high rates. The recent rounds of loan mods have been at much lower DTIs.

Each time the aggregate market DTI moves above 32% (1979, 1987, 2003) the market enters its manic rally phase when prices move higher when they should be moving lower (contrast with 1994). Thirty-two percent represents a Ponzi limit in residential lending. Each time lenders develop a loan program to push DTIs higher (interest-only loans, Option ARMs), they simply create a Ponzi Scheme that inevitably collapses. When the market DTIs get down below 32% into the green range, prices stabilize near 28% DTIs — at least when the FED isn’t buying mortgage debt and directly controlling interest rates.

Doubling Time

So back to the original question, “how long should it take for a home to double in price? In Irvine, a home should appreciate at 4.4% per year to match wage growth. At 4.4% growth, a home will double in price in 16 years.

If you buy a home during a period of debt-to-income payment affordability, and sell during a period of very low affordability (time the bubble), you can make significantly more than 4.4% — as today’s 11.5% attests; however, the opposite is also true.

If you buy during a period of very low affordability, you may be at or below water for a very long time. People who bought in 1988, 1989 and 1990 saw no significant appreciation for a decade. What will be the fate of those who bought from 2003-2009? I have profiled many of them….

At 3.3% it takes 22 years for prices to double, at 4.4% it’s 16 years, at 7.2% it’s 10 years.

Many have made the analogy about trees growing to the sky to illustrate the problem of very high or differential appreciation rates. For those of you that like charts and graphs, below I show what prices will be like in 20 years if we step back to 2000 prices as a base (like the chart above) and project forward to 2030.

It is human nature to project short term uptrends to infinity. Californians believe they are capable of producing unlimited appreciation working within limited incomes, limited borrowing and limited savings. Prices occasionally appreciate quickly, and lenders enable unlimited HELOC spending which taxes the limits of homedebtor avarice, pride, lust, envy and gluttony. Wishful thinking enabled by lender greed; the California housing cycle.

6232 SIERRA SIENA Rd Irvine, CA 92603 door

Irvine Home Address … 6232 SIERRA SIENA Rd Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price … $1,269,000

Income Requirement ……. $233,563
Downpayment Needed … $253,800
20% Down Conventional

Home Purchase Price … $429,000
Home Purchase Date …. 4/10/2000

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $763,860
Percent Change ………. 195.8%
Annual Appreciation … 11.5%

Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.00%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $5,450
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $7,540
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $5,590

Property Details for 6232 SIERRA SIENA Rd Irvine, CA 92603

Beds 4
Baths 0 full 3 part baths
Size 2,550 sq ft
($498 / sq ft)
Lot Size 6,625 sq ft
Year Built 1972
Days on Market 6
Listing Updated 11/18/2009
MLS Number S596070
Property Type Single Family, Residential
Community Turtle Rock
Tract Bm

10+++One of the best ever to come on the market in Turtle Rock Broadmoors! Charming single level custom home completely remodeled with over 750 sq. ft. added in 2008. Looks like it is right out of a magazine! Excellent floorplan with HUGE state of the art kitchen designed by well known designer Lynn Pries. This dream kitchen opens to HUGE family room w/high ceilings….HUGE Bedrooms..4th bedroom currently used as an open office area that can easily be converted. Quality craftsmanship throughout featuring all new windows,french doors, gorgeous wood floors, raised ceilings, remote control skylights, wainscoting, 2 air conditioners, epoxy garage floor, etc. etc. Enjoy relaxing on the darling porch with a custom brick fireplace and white picket fence. Worth your wait to finally buy without building your own. Architectural plans included for future expansion if needed! Sought after neigborhood! Best Irvine Schools: University High and Bonita Canyon Elementary. No Mello Roos & Low assoc.

neigborhood?

This property was purchased on 4/10/2000 for $429,000. The owners used a $130,000 first mortgage and a $299,000 downpayment. They did increase their mortgage debt during the last nine years like everyone else did, but they only took out and spent about $300,000 — which was their original downpayment. They spent their initial equity, but the bubble has enriched them, and if they sell now before the high end collapses, they stand to make about $750,000.

Low-End Payment Affordability

The payment affordability at the low end the market is so good that a wage earner making $12.50 per hour can now afford to buy in Irvine.

275 STREAMWOOD Irvine, CA 92620 complex

Irvine Home Address … 275 STREAMWOOD Irvine, CA 92620
Resale Home Price …… $126,140

{book1}

I’ve been sitting here ’bout half the night.
Oh, mama, fill my cup up.
Bottoms Up
Said I came to waste some time.
I think I’m gonna jump up.
I’m singin’, I’m dancin’ most every night.
And I want to do that with you babe.
Let’s do this bottle right.
Oh, oh, baby, bottoms up.

Bottoms Up — Van Halen

“PRICES HAVE BOTTOMED!!!” said Kool aid man in his new condo, “Are you ready to PARTY!!! BOTTOMS UP!!!” I’ll spare you the “bottoms up” photo… you can still see it, can’t you?

Is this a bottom in pricing? That depends on interest rates, but I feel confident that I can call the bottom on payment affordability. It will never be less expensive on a payment basis for a relatively low-income wage earner to buy property at market prices.

Over my years of working in the land development industry, I have worked on a number of low-income affordable projects. I worked on my first one in my mid 20s, and I felt noble about helping working families get good housing. Without going into a treatise on affordability programs, I will tell you they all rely on some form of market price controls to ensure properties stay affordable.

Low-income units are in high demand, and the demand often fails to meet the supply. It is very unusual in California when market priced homes compete with low-income subsidized housing. When it does, the activity is great for the community and for the low end of the housing market. Those who seemingly had been “priced out forever” can finally afford homes — assuming some flipper doesn’t crowd them out.

Payment Affordability

From today’s listing, “WHY RENT WHEN YOU CAN OWN?”

Income Requirement ……. $23,481
Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.10%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $548
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $900
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $720

It seems to me that we do not need to subsidize low-income housing when open-market condos go for prices that allow people to live there who make $24,000 a year ($12.50 per hour wage). Payment affordability is extraordinary at these interest rates. It is not surprising that anything below the $500,000 price level in Orange County gets snapped up by 20 eager bidders.

The myriad of government distortions to the market has created a shortage of supply in price ranges where the GSEs and the FHA underwrite, and almost nothing at other prices. Armageddon awaits the non-GSE supported markets; they do not enjoy government price support.

There is no guarantee the Government will continue price supports in the face of political or financial market forces. It is likely they will maintain some level of backstop support as long as necessary to prevent a national catastrophe — possibly worse than the current recession. Sometimes the Least Bad Scenario is the correct path to chose. Since this path is also bad, it will endlessly be second guessed.

Both the Government and the lenders are crossing their fingers and hoping they can absorb the upcoming foreclosures without causing the cascading defaults that really crush prices (think Las Vegas). We will almost certainly see pockets of this throughout Orange County, and the substitution effect will create ripples in price and volume that will create unusual (unsustainable) price spreads between neighborhoods.

Selling homes at the last market bottom

Back in September of 2007, an astute observer known as Bubblegum sent me some images of marketing materials produced in 1997 — the last market bottom time. I originally posted them in The Market Bottom:

Market Bottom 2

I followed that image with this line, “Since I began writing on this blog, I have stated I will buy when the
cost of ownership equals the cost of rental. An advertisement like this
— when it reflects reality — would motivate me to buy. How about you?” Well, as you can tell from my statement, I had no clue that the Federal Reserve and the GSEs would increase affordability artificially lowering interest rates.

The equation has changed for me. With payment affordability, I believe a window is open, but only if you really are going to be a long-term homeowner. Unfortunately, most people who buy plan on staying long term, but life intervenes, and sometimes they need to move. Statistics show home ownership lasts about 7 years. Between Government manipulation and the inflation that is likely to follow, it does not make sense on an inflation adjusted basis to buy today and have the same amount of a devalued currency later, but on a nominal basis, the numbers may look right.

Sometimes all the deflation and inflation talk does my head in, but they are important concepts, and they can have a big impact on your financial life.

BTW, today’s featured property is not a one-off: 338 STREAMWOOD Irvine, CA 92620.

275 STREAMWOOD Irvine, CA 92620 complex

Irvine Home Address … 275 STREAMWOOD Irvine, CA 92620

Resale Home Price … $126,140

Income Requirement ……. $23,481
Downpayment Needed … $25,228

Home Purchase Price … $61,000
Home Purchase Date …. 12/12/1994

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $57,572
Percent Change ………. 106.8%
Annual Appreciation … 5.0%

Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.10%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $548
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $900
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $720

Property Details for 275 STREAMWOOD Irvine, CA 92620

Beds n/a
Baths 1 bathCalifornia Home Foundations
Size 415 sq ft
($304 / sq ft)
Lot Size n/a
Year Built 1977
Days on Market 2
Listing Updated 11/11/2009
MLS Number U9004904
Property Type Condominium, Residential
Community Northwood
Tract Othr

According to the listing agent, this listing is a bank owned (foreclosed) property.

WHY RENT WHEN YOU CAN OWN? WELCOME HOME TO THE CITY OF IRVINE, ONE OF THE VERY BEST CITIES IN ORANGE COUNTY. THIS PROPERTY IS JUST THE RIGHT SIZE FOR YOUR ACTIVE LIFESTYLE. THE UNIT IS A ONE BATHROOM STUDIO, THAT LIVES LARGER THAN YOU CAN IMAGINE, WITH CLOSE TO 415 SQUARE FEET OF INTERIOR LIVING SPACE, AND A PRIVATE PATIO, YOU WILL BE ENJOYING THIS INTIMATE RESIDENCE UPON MOVING IN. THE PROPERTY IS PART OF AN ASSOCIATION THAT PROVIDES A POOL, A SPA, AND COMMON AREAS THAT HELP TO CREATE THE FEELING OF LIVING IN A RESORT. YOUR LOCATION IS FANTASTIC, YOU ARE CLOSE TO ALL THE GOOD THINGS IN IRVINE; SCHOOLS, PARKS, RECREATION, SHOPPING AND TRANSPORTATION. SO COME HOME TO IRVINE AND START TO LIVE THE BEST OF TTHE ORANGE COUNTY LIFESTYLE TODAY… BUYER SHOULD INSPECT THE PROPERTY WITH A PROFESSIONAL INSPECTOR.

Just to illustrate the impact of interest rates on pricing, take a look at today’s property which as originally purchased in conditions very similar to ours in 1994; in fact, I would go as far as to say 2009 is most similar to 1994 as things play out. When this property was purchased in December of 1994, the contract mortgage interest rate was 9.2% — very near the 40-year average of 9%.

Let’s calculate the owners income based on a the affordable payment based on an 80% loan, a 9.2% interest rate and a 31% DTI… the payment is $400… HOAs were lower then, but the monthly out-of-pocket would still be $550… so, $550 / 0.31 = $1,775 monthly gross income or $21,300 per year. If you inflation adjust this number forward to allow for local income growth since 1994, you get $31,311 in today’s income dollars. Back in 1994, this was not as payment affordable as it is today.

The Government controlled housing markets enjoy payment affordability,
but price ranges outside the conforming loan limit are subject to
market forces, and price and supply pressures will build at higher price ranges, but as long as the interest rates stay low, prices will remain high relative to historic measures.

History of Fundamental Value

Why do I believe there are market fundamentals? And how do I calculate these numbers? Today we will look at the history of Irvine median home prices, IHB Current Cashflow Value, IHB Fundamental Value from 1975 to present.

31 DEER Crk Irvine, CA 92604 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 31 DEER Crk Irvine, CA 92604
Resale Home Price …… $699,000

Block Party 11-9-2009

{book1}
No Kool Aid Irvine Housing Blog

If you wake up and don’t want to smile,
If it takes just a little while,
Open your eyes and look at the day,
You’ll see things in a different way.

Don’t stop, thinking about tomorrow,
Don’t stop, it’ll soon be here,
It’ll be, better than before,
Yesterday’s gone, yesterday’s gone.

Why not think about times to come,
And not about the things that you’ve done,
If your life was bad to you,
Just think what tomorrow will do.

Don’t Stop — Fleetwood Mac

Why do we spend so much energy thinking about tomorrow’s house prices? Well, Timing Does Matter.

I have felt an angst about how current cashflow value suggests prices are in a stable range when we know that real fundamental value is significantly lower. Also, Shevy recently challenged me with feedback he has been receiving about our reports. When we are showing people IHB Current Cashflow Value, we have been calling it IHB Fundamental Value. People were upset that perhaps we were taking advantage of interest rate manipulation by the FED to suggest prices were a good value. Shevy was upset with me because he said it is not who we are, and he felt our reports were not accurately reflecting our opinion of Fundamental Value. He was right.

In today’s post, I am going to fix this problem by parsing terms of value, and I will demonstrate the power of these analytical tools by examining the long history of home prices and fundamental value since 1975. Also, I will show two updated pages of our IHB Reports.

{book4}

IHB Value

To better understand the distinctions in value I am making today, I need to clean up and define some terms for you.

  • Base Payment is current rent (or 31% of income) minus expenses of ownership. Base Payment is the amount of debt service available to repay a loan.
  • IHB Current Cashflow Value is the value of the property derived from Base Payment applying current interest rates.
  • IHB Fundamental Value is the value of the property derived from Base Payment applying a long term average of interest rates. The number I am using is 8.99%, the average interest rate since 1971.

For instance, (31 Deer Creek — IHB Fundamental Value Report for Owner Occupant.pdf) if the current rent (IHB reports use comparable leases from the MLS) is $2,850, the Base Payment yields a IHB Current Cashflow Value of $690,000 and IHB Fundamental Value of $516,300. The difference between the value at a 5% interest rate and a 9% interest rate is remarkable.

History of Home Price and Value

The long history of home prices and values is a harmonic dance with the measures tethered in an ever more volatile relationship. It begins in the mid 1970s during a rough time for the economy, but a stable time for the relationship between Median Home Price, IHB Current Cashflow Value and IHB Fundamental Value.

Irvine, California, has endured three real estate bubbles since
1975. The first occurred from 1978 to 1981 when prices skyrocketed in an
inflationary spiral. As usual, lenders were willing to fuel the fire.
Prices stabilized briefly in the mid 80s before taking flight again.
Valuations declined below Current cashflow value and bottomed at
Fundamental Value in the late 90s. The fact that prices bottomed here for so long suggests there is durable market support at this price level.

Besides the statistical accuracy of Fundamental Value, I favor it because
there is concrete reasoning for this level to be so strong — owning is
less expensive than renting on a stable cashflow basis. There is an
identifiable microeconomic event creating the macroeconomic effect we are looking for — bottoming activity.

(There is much information in the notes on the charts below, so examine them carefully.)

In 1978, inflation was running 14% per year. Lets say you borrowed
with an astronomical 60% debt-to-income ratio. That first year, you
would be eating Rice-a-Roni, but since you would be getting a 10% raise
next year, and the year after that, and so on, your debt-to-income
ratio is falling rapidly. By 1982 your income is 50% higher, and your
DTI is now down to a very manageable 30%. This was the inflation
calculus of yesteryear.

This big inflation hurdle explains why so many people think it is
wise to really stretch to get into that first house. Back in 1978, that
stretch meant three to five years of pain because inflation bailed
everyone out. Now, if you stretch like that, you have 20 years or more
of indentured servitude waiting for you. Just ask some Japanese
landowners from their bubble how much fun that is. All those people
working years to clean up the mess a number of foolish bankers made 30
years ago. We are traveling the same road.

The market bottomed after the first bubble from 1985 to 1987 when prices traded below both the Current Cashflow Value and the Fundamental Value. Prices took flight again in the summer of 1987, and they went up about 50% by summer of 1990 when prices became very high relative to cashflow measures. This rally was almost entirely psychological. People feared being priced out. The market bottom again from 1994 to 1999, while prices traded below Current Cashflow Value and at Fundamental Value for several years. Is that our future?

In examining these charts, I noticed something interesting that does have value for today’s market. From 1975 to 1999, market pricing fell below current cashflow value on three different occasions — just as it is doing today. The first time was 1985, and the intersection occurred while pricing was also below fundamental valuation. The time of crossover represented a bend in market direction; in 1985 it went from flat to up.

When prices went cashflow positive again in 1992, the market was heading downward steeply, and once it became less expensive to own, the rate of price decline slowed just as it has in today’s market. The market did not bottom in 1992 because prices were still elevated from fundamentals. Interest rates went up in 1994 bringing cashflow value down again. When cashflow value went positive again later that year, the market bottomed and began creeping higher. No real estate recovery has begun with rapid appreciation.

Prices matched Fundamental Value very closely from 1994 to 1999, then conditions changed, and we inflated The Great Housing Bubble.

Comparison of home prices and value - Irvine California - 1997-2009

The precipitating factor for the housing bubble was the lowering of interest rates to combat the 2000-2001 recession. As interest rates went down, prices went up to match the new financing available. This increase in prices was rapid enough to excite irrational exuberance and already inflated prices went much higher. Lenders enabled the next push higher by eliminating loan qualification standards and peddling Option ARMs far and wide. The rest can be read in our library.

What is interesting for today is the current relationship between prices, Current Cashflow Value and Fundamental Value. We are at a price level that nearly matches Current Cashflow Value of $561,837 but is well elevated from the Fundamental Value of $375,885 — which is the bottoming value I am most recently credited with predicting. The current market pricing intersecting with Cashflow Value is what has
caused prices to fall more slowly or even tick up a bit this summer. As long as the Federal Reserve continues to backstop interest rates and keeps current cashflow values high, prices will hold at current levels pending the timing and quantity of future inventory processing and release.

Will the FED ease off and give us a protracted decline in a very wide “U” shape typical of housing market bottoms? Will inflation force the FED to allow interest rates to go higher? These are titanic forces beyond my ability to comprehend much less foresee. For now, it looks like a protracted “U” shape bottom perhaps at price levels above previous fundamental valuations. I will revise my projections as more data comes in.

Hedging is no fun. It was easier when the market gave unambiguous bearish signals….

IHB Fundamental Value Reports Revisited

With that lengthy preamble, I introduce a new page to our report and a new front cover.

31 Deer Creek -- IHB Fundamental Value Report for Owner Occupant-1

Notice at the bottom in our summary area, we now have the Current Cashflow Value and the IHB Fundamental Value. My concern is that the report is becoming a mess of confusing numbers, but for those with that want to get into the financial details, it is all there including…

31 Deer Creek -- IHB Fundamental Value Report for Owner Occupant-5

We have also added two new sections taking up a full page to show the impact interest rates will have on resale value and a comparison of FHA versus conventional financing as these are the most commonly requested scenarios. People are generally surprised that it is more expensive to own through FHA. Equity is cheaper than debt, so borrowing 96.5% is maximizing your expensive interest costs to minimize your inexpensive opportunity costs.

31 Deer Creek — IHB Fundamental Value Report for Owner Occupant.pdf

31 DEER Crk Irvine, CA 92604 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 31 DEER Crk Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price … $699,000

Income Requirement ……. $131,598
Downpayment Needed … $139,800

Home Purchase Price … $266,500
Home Purchase Date …. 11/25/1997

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $390,560
Percent Change ………. 162.3%
Annual Appreciation … 13.2%

Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.20%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $3,071
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $3,780
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $2,810

Property Details for 31 DEER Crk Irvine, CA 92604

Beds 4
Baths 1 full 1 part baths
Size 2,125 sq ft
($329 / sq ft)
Lot Size 5,400 sq ft
Year Built 1976
Days on Market 211
Listing Updated 11/4/2009
MLS Number S570571
Property Type Single Family, Residential
Community El Camino Real
Tract Dc

MODEL PERFECT FAMILY HOME WITH CUSTOM FEATURES AND UPGRADES THROUGHOUT. CUL-DE-SAC LOCATION WITH PRIVACY AND SPACE. NEW PAINT, CROWN MOLDING, WOOD FLOORS, NEW DUAL-PANE WINDOWS, NEW SOLID DOORS, NEW MASTER BATH, BRAND NEW SECOND BATH, NEW FRONT PORCH, NEW GARAGE DOOR AND OPENER. CORIAN KITCHEN COUNTERS AND MAPLE CABINETS. LARGE 15X30 STORAGE AREA ABOVE GARAGE WITH PULL-DOWN LADDER. THIS HOME HAS OVER $150K IN UPGRADES AND IS READY TO MOVE IN TO AND ENJOY!

I hope you find these enhancements to our reports, and I hope the
interesting look at the history of home prices and values gives you
insights into how this will all play out. The collective wisdom of the
IHB community will come to the correct answer. I am in awe of power of
astute observations to widen and deepen the conversation. So where do
you think prices are heading? Are fundamental values still a market
bedrock?

I want to invite you to our IHB Block Party from
6:30-10:00 tonight at JT Schmids at the District.

Block Party 11-9-2009

UCLA Anderson Forecast Orange County

The UCLA Anderson Forecast has deteriorated to market cheerleading and bottom calling. This year’s incorrect bottom call will not help their credibility.

12 ORANGETIP Irvine, CA 92604 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 12 Orangetip Irvine, CA 92604
Resale Home Price …… $494,900

{book1}

I don’t mind the things that you say
I don’t even mind going out of my way
I try and do these things for you
Why should I do it
I’m always untrue
Well, I did you no wrong

Did you No Wrong — Sex Pistols

I attended the UCLA Anderson Forecast for Orange County last Thursday. The keynote speaker, Ramin Toloui an Executive Vice President for PIMCO, was very good. The speaker for the Orange County Outlook, Mark Schniepp the Director of the California Economic Forecast, was awful.

Commercial Real Estate Forecast

The forecast for commercial real estate was not very positive. The commercial real estate market is facing the same woes as residential, but with an 18-month lag. Rents are falling, vacancy is rising, financing is difficult to find, and most borrowers are over-leveraged. It will take many years for the commercial market to recover.

Ramin Toloui was an excellent speaker. He explained the solvency
problem of over-leveraged borrowers facing refinancing (he was speaking
about commercial, but the same applies to residential). A property
purchased in 2007 for $100M may have $80M worth of debt (it probably
has even more). This debt will need to be refinanced during the next 5
years. The value of the property has cut in half, and the new lender is
demanding 30% equity. When this property needs to be refinanced, the
borrower’s loan will be capped at 70% of $50M which is $36M; they need to roll over
$80M. The gap is too large to be overcome. If the spread were smaller,
creative financing may be able to bridge the divide, but as it stands,
we are going to see massive deflation in the commercial lending market.

The problem of insolvency Toloui described is the same facing ARM
reset debtors in the residential market. A property purchased in 2006
for $1,000,000 with little or no money down will be worth about
$800,000 when the ARM resets. A lender will look at comps and limit the
loan to 80% of 800,000. The borrower will need to come up with the cash
to finance the difference between $640,000 and whatever they owe. Not
many will have $300,000 sitting around, and many who do will not want
to waste it by dumping it into a depreciating asset. The FED is trying
to solve the problem of residential insolvency by lowering interest
rates. The commercial loan market will have no such luxury.

This presentation was the best part of the morning.

UCLA Anderson Forecast

According to the website of The UCLA Anderson Forecast,

“For fifty years, the UCLA Anderson Forecast has provided
forecasts for the economies of California and the United States. Founded by professor
Robert M. Williams in 1952, the national forecast has been recognized as one of the
most accurate, and has a reputation for being unbiased – a factor that the numerous
corporate and Wall Street forecasts cannot lay claim to. The UCLA Anderson Forecast
for California is the most widely followed and oft-cited in the state and was unique
in predicting both the seriousness of the early-1990s downturn, and the strength of
the state economy’s rebound since 1993.

I call bullshit.

What I saw on Thursday looked a bit like trained seals balancing a ball on its nose to get a feast of fish. Whatever objectivity and credibility they believe they have, it isn’t reflected in rigorous analysis leading to objective conclusions. Instead what is presented is a bit more like Gary Watts with a shotgun blast of statistics supporting a predetermined bullish(it) conclusion.

The main problem I have with forecasts like these is their lack of direct causation.

Direct Causation

I have written before about Telling Good Analysis from Bad.

Once you have accurate data, the analysis of this data must focus on cause and effect. There must be direct causation linking a specific set of conditions to the outcomes these conditions will produce. A good analysis demonstrates this direct causal link in a clear and unambiguous manner. When an analysis relies on indirect causation, it is weak; when an analysis relies on implied causation, it is worthless.

In The Anatomy of a Credit Bubble, I demonstrated a number of direct causal links which impact how much people pay for houses:

  • House prices are directly correlated with amounts borrowed.
  • Amounts borrowed are directly correlated with the interest rate offered.
  • Amounts borrowed are directly correlated with the borrowers debt-to-income ratio.
  • Artificially low interest rates (reset issue) and exotic financing cause foreclosures.
  • Foreclosures cause higher interest rates.
  • Foreclosures above a certain threshold cause house prices to decline.
  • Declining house prices causes more foreclosures. (note the causally related downward spiral)
  • Declining house prices and increasing foreclosures cause lenders to lower debt-to-income ratios and raise interest rates.
  • Lower debt-to-income ratios and rising interest rates cause amounts borrowed to decline.
  • Less amounts borrowed (in conjunction with foreclosures) causes house prices to decline.

Notice the focus is always on correlation and causation forming a
chain of events leading to an inevitable conclusion. A good analysis
centers the debate around the premises. If the premises are true and
accurate, the conclusions cannot be denied.

In contrast, a bad analysis states a conclusion and offers support
through indirect or implied causation. When you read through the Gary Watts Real Estate Outlook 2007 you find yourself asking, “How does that impact house prices?” It is a question that is never answered.

The UCLA Anderson Forecast for Orange County is full of statistics just like a Gary Watts support, but the lack of direct causation weakens it significantly.

Residential Real Estate

I knew the presentation was in trouble when the speaker tells the audience to feel secure in buying a house because prices are at the bottom. I felt like I was being sold a used car or listening to a briefing by Baghdad Bob. He even called out the commenters on the blogs of the OC Register as “doom and gloomers.” I felt the camaraderie of the bubble blog world being challenged; besides, we were right.

The presentation is a series of charts and graphs similar to my analysis posts. There were a number of slides on defaults and foreclosures that looked very much like mine in Shadow Inventory Orange County.

There was a moment when the presenter was commenting on how defaults keep rising, but due to moratoriums foreclosures dropped for a time. I was thinking, “yes, that is shadow inventory.” But with a wave of his hands, he stops and says, “don’t worry about it, foreclosures will go down.”

WTF?

Did I hear him properly? How can you lead people right up to the problem, show it to them, and then deny that it is there? He offered no explanation as to what happens to this inventory. He did say if there is any future inventory problem that it will be absorbed by rising prices.

Yea, right?

What is supposed to lead us to believe that the UCLA Anderson Forecast is correct? Their say so? That plus a report full of fancy graphs and trivial statistics is all you get.

Other than perhaps agreeing with my conclusions or maybe John Burns (Webcast: US Housing – Recovery on Government Life Support?) who also says we have 15,000 units of shadow inventory in OC, what would have impressed me?

Timing the Bottom

Let’s say the UCLA boys had taken their wonderful data and applied some historic parallels and direct causation to call a bottom. That would have impressed me. The analysis might have looked like this (with some help from Calculated Risk):

  • The last housing recession began in 1991.
  • The recession ended in 1992.
  • Unemployment peaked in 1993.
  • Foreclosures peaked in 1996.
  • The market bottomed in 1997.

Let’s look at the direct causation between these events and speculate on whether or not it should happen differently this time around.

The recession in the early 90s was caused by a slowdown in housing and real estate just like this one. That recession also saw slowdowns in defense contracting and other industries that made problems even worse. The recession ended in 1992, but the effect lingered as people had to be retrained to work in other fields, so unemployment did not peak until 1993. The delay between the end of the recession and the peak in unemployment is well documented.

There were many reasons for the foreclosure crisis of the mid 90s, and we have all of those problems back with more force. The foreclosures caused by unemployment do not occur on the day a borrower loses their job. The delay caused by draining all sources of savings, maxing out credit lines and utilizing legal maneuvers can slow the process for two or three years — as we have seen with properties profiled here daily; therefore, it is reasonable to assume foreclosures will peak two or three years after a major unemployment crisis. In fact, I would argue it is unreasonable to assume that foreclosures have peaked for this cycle — as the UCLA Anderson Forecast does — considering unemployment has not peaked, and the newly unemployed will cause defaults.

Last time around house prices bottomed as foreclosures peaked. It is unclear if either one caused the other. For example, if house prices bottomed simply because prices were affordable and supply was low, then foreclosures may peak not because borrowers are not distressed, but because distressed borrowers can sell into the resale market rather than go through foreclosure. Remember, foreclosures are not a sign of distress as much as they are a sign of distress that cannot be masked by selling in the open market.

The more commonly accepted conclusion is that once the pressure of distressed inventory was removed from the market — foreclosures ran their course — then prices rose because there was not overhanging supply keeping prices down. This explanation sounds reasonable, but is doesn’t explain why there was not a lag time between the peak of foreclosures and prices rising to work off the inventory. This lack of lag leads me to believe rising prices were partially responsible for falling foreclosures — something the UCLA Anderson Forecast is counting on this time.

Neither explanation of the coincidence in timing between the peak of foreclosures and the bottom of the market give us any indication of whether or not this phenomenon will repeat. I suspect it will not because the foreclosure volume is so large that there will be a significant period of time to work off the inventory, and contrary to the primary conclusion of the forecast, I do not think it is reasonable to assume that rising prices will magically absorb our shadow inventory because it is too large.

We will see who is right and who is wrong.

Block Party 11-9-2009

When will the housing market bottom?

I originally figured we would bottom in 2011. I was most recently quoted as saying I believe the bottom has been pushed back to 2012. Based on the facts and direct causations assembled above, when will the market bottom?

Well, we can throw out 2009 or 2010 because prices cannot bottom before unemployment peaks and foreclosures peak. On this basis alone, I am confident the UCLA Anderson Forecast is wrong. If unemployment peaks in 2010, and if there is a two or three year delay between the peak in unemployment and the peak in foreclosures caused by various delay tactics, then foreclosures should not peak until 2012 or 2013. If this corresponds to the bottom again, then we will bottom in 2012 or 2013. If we have a significant lag between the peak in foreclosures and the bottom of the market due to a glut of inventory, then we may not bottom until 2015.

Don’t do out and buy a house because you believe we are at the bottom. We aren’t.

12 ORANGETIP Irvine, CA 92604 front 12 ORANGETIP Irvine, CA 92604 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 12 Orangetip Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price … $494,900

Income Requirement ……. $92,128
Downpayment Needed … $98,980

Home Purchase Price … $699,000
Home Purchase Date …. 4/17/2006

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(233,794)
Percent Change ………. -29.2%
Annual Appreciation … -8.3%

Monthly Mortgage Payment … $2,150
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $2,820
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $2,130

Redfin Property Details for 12 Orangetip Irvine, CA 92604

Beds 3
Baths 2 full 1 part baths
Size 1,689 sq ft
($293 / sq ft)
Lot Size 2,462 sq ft
Year Built 2005
Days on Market 8
Listing Updated 10/28/2009
MLS Number P708154
Property Type Single Family, Residential
Community Walnut
Tract Othr

HOME BUILT IN 2005 NEAR IRVINE HIGH SCHOOL. 3 BEDROOMS, 3 BATHS, BONUS LOFT/OFFICE WITH RECESS LIGHTING. MASTER SUITE HAS DOUBLE SINKS, SPA TUB AND WALK IN CLOSET. FORMAL AND CASUAL DINNING WITH FIREPLACE. LOW MONTHLY HOA THAT INCLUDES 2 POOLS, 2 TENNIS COURTS AND CLUB HOUSE. UPGRADED KITCHEN AND BATH WITH GRANITE COUNTER TOPS AND STAINLESS STEEL APPLIANCES.

ALL CAP

These undesirable properties are getting pounded. This infill site is between the 5, a shopping center and an old condo development next to the high school. It has every combination of negative.

Ownership Cost: Taxes and Opportunity Costs

Taxes and opportunity costs impact the financial life of owners in ways that have nothing to do with the property. Today we will examine these two features more carefully.

5 WILDBROOK Irvine, CA 92614 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 5 WILDBROOK Irvine, CA 92614
Resale Home Price …… $495,000

{book1}

My strength slips away
Soon I must fall
Victim of fortune
My sources grow small
Life slips away
As demons come forth
Death takes my hand
And captures my soul

Black Magic — Slayer

Today is part 5 finishing the series on Ownership Cost:

Ownership Cost: Income, Payments and House Prices

Ownership Cost: Interest Rates and Downpayment Requirements

Ownership Cost: Property Taxes and Mello Roos

Ownership Cost: Homeowners Associations

Ownership Cost: Taxes and Opportunity Costs

Four Major Variables that Determine Market Price

Over the last four days we looked at the four main variables that determine home price:

  1. borrower income,
  2. allowable debt-to-income ratios,
  3. interest rates, and
  4. downpayment requirements.

Today we are looking at tax implications and opportunity costs because these number will give you a more accurate measure of the impact home ownership will have on the owner’s financial life.

Taxes

Owning real estate has two significant tax benefits: (1) favorable capital gains tax exemptions and (2) income tax benefit through the home mortgage interest deduction (HMID). Be forewarned that this is not an exhaustive treatise on every permutation in the tax code. I am going to look at the general case the most people will find themselves in.

Capital Gains Taxes

If you own a home more than two years, you can ignore the gains on the first $250,000 or $500,000 if your married. If you don’t make more than $250,000 or $500,000 on the sale — which most people don’t — then you don’t pay any capital gains taxes. It is a tremendous tax advantage that favors capital gains and appreciation.

The reason we have a large deduction or excluded amount is because years ago when there was no exclusion, long-term homeowners would be punished with capital gains taxes when they sold a principal residence when most of that gain was due to inflation. Without a method of adjusting the purchase price basis for inflation (like using the CPI), owners are being taxed on the profits created by inflation. They are getting less than their money back when you consider money’s purchasing power.

Personally, I think it would be a good idea to link the property basis to inflation. An exclusion can be created by linking the basis for the capital gains to the Consumer Price Index, and the tax can be levied on any overage. For instance. If someone purchased a home for $100,000 when the CPI was at 100, then later the property was sold for $300,000 when the CPI was at 200, the tax would be levied on only half the profit:

Adjusted Basis = Original Price times new CPI divided by old CPI
Adjusted Basis = $100,000 * 200 / 100 = $200,000.

$300,000 Resale Price
$200,000 Adjusted Basis
$100,000 Profit subject to Capital gains tax.

This gets around the issue of inflation taxing while taxing irrational exuberance. It will never happen.

The big tax break for capital gains is what makes life as a mid-term flipper possible. There were many people during the bubble who bought with intention of flipping in two years when their gains would not be taxed. Of course, this tax strategy took second place to the pandemonium of the crazy market rally.

Favorable capital gains tax treatment is really a tax-free retirement savings account Uncle Sam worked into the system to benefit homeowners. If you own a property long enough to have capital gains, and the sale of that home represents a significant portion of family savings (which is usually does), the capital gains tax benefit can have significant financial impact on your financial life in retirement.

Income Taxes and the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction

The tax code allows wage earners the ability to give up the Standard Deduction and write off Home Mortgage Interest against their income on Schedule A. If the taxpayer is already itemizing deductions for expenses not related to home mortgage interest, then the taxpayer recieves the full benefit of this deduction.

The deduction is simple. Lenders issue a form 1098 telling a borrower how much interest they paid during the year, and this is put in the tax forms as a deductible interest expense. It does phase out for loans over $1,000,000, and there are exclusions from the deduction, but for most borrowers this is a significant benefit of ownership.

The root of this very popular deduction comes from the need to give owner-occupants the same tax advantages landlords have. Why should landlords get to deduct interest expense and owner-occupants can’t? Whether or not this is justification for the deduction, I don’t know. I do know that it will not be going away any time soon.

Calculating the true tax benefit of owning versus renting

The income tax benefit is calculated in the IHB Fundamental Value Report based on a simple estimation that most buyers will be getting a tax benefit at about 10% lower than their highest marginal tax rate. We base our estimate on two factors: (1) not all of the interest deduction would have been taxed at the highest marginal rate and (2) the loss of the Standard Deduction reduces the value of the home mortgage interest deduction. Anecdotally, when people expert in tax matters have run scenarios with tax software, the 10% reduction in effective tax savings has proven a useful estimate.

Let’s look in more detail as to why this effect happens. Assume a borrower has $50,000 in mortgage interest during a tax year, and this borrower makes about $150,000. For this borrower, the portion over $137,050 is taxed at 28%, and the amount between $67,900 and $137,050 is taxed at 25%, the gross tax savings would be about $12,888 for an effective marginal tax rate of 25.5%. This is the impact of crossing marginal tax rate lines.

Also, to be more accurate, we must subtract the negative impact of giving up the Standard Deduction of $11,400 for a family. If borrowers have $50,000 in deductible interest, but they have to give up $11,400 in tax benefit to get it, the net tax write off is $38,600. Crunching the numbers shows the tax savings is $10,038 instead of the $12,888 people thought they are getting. This reduction in tax benefit due to giving up the Standard Deduction.

When you combine these two effects, a good guide is to take 10% off the borrower’s highest marginal tax rate.

Opportunity Cost

When a buyer puts money into real estate and takes ownership, it changes their financial life. Money for a downpayment had to come out of some other asset even if this is only a savings account or CDs. The place where the money used to be parked either paid interest or provided some return. The interest, dividends or positive change in value of the competing asset is an opportunity cost the buyer must consider.

For instance, a buyer could choose to rent and park their money in a 2-year CD and earn about 2.25%. When someone goes to buy a house, they will take money out of CDs and put it into real estate where it earns nothing — unless prices appreciate. However, when considering the purchase from a cashflow basis, owning the asset can provide a cash return if your cost ownership is less than the cost of renting the same unit. This return is independent of appreciation and provides the only reasonable financial reason to own when prices are flat or declining.

Calculating Opportunity Cost

Projecting future costs is more an art than a science. Trying to estimate the opportunity costs of an average investor over the life of a 30-year mortgage is a guess at best. However, since this opportunity cost is real, there are useful theoretical models for providing an estimate to use in decision making.

Interest rates on savings are tethered to mortgage interest rates as all debt and deposit instruments are tied together in the web of risk and return in the debt market. The loosely correlated relationship between mortgage debt and reliable savings returns like medium-term Certificates of Deposit is the basis for estimating opportunity cost.

When mortgage interest rates are very high, the demand for money is high, and lenders will be paying high CD rates to try to supply the demand for money through loans. The inverse is also true. When lenders do not need money to loan, interest rates fall, and lenders do not need to pay borrowers much for money. Plus, in a deflationary environment the lender has no reliable customers to loan the money to anyway.

This direct relationship between mortgage interest rates and CD rates — irrespective of how loosely correlated they may be — is the basis of my calculation. I make the following assumptions:

  • CD Rates will never fall below 1%.
  • As mortgage rates go up, CD rates will go up 66% as fast.

When I put in different test numbers, the stretching spreads this formula creates does re-create the same phenomenon that happens in the real world when inflation expectation is added into the market’s thinking.

We have the ability to override our default settings and put in whatever inputs you believe most accurately reflects your financial situation in our reports.

5 WILDBROOK Irvine, CA 92614 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 5 WILDBROOK Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price … $495,000

Income Requirement ……. $92,146
Downpayment Needed … $99,000

Home Purchase Price … $555,500
Home Purchase Date …. 12/9/2004

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(90,200)
Percent Change ………. -10.9%
Annual Appreciation … -2.3%

Monthly Mortgage Payment … $2,150
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $2,820
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $2,130

Redfin Property Details for 5 WILDBROOK Irvine, CA 92614

Beds 3
Baths 2 baths
Size 1,816 sq ft
($273 / sq ft)
Lot Size n/a
Year Built 1980
Days on Market 84
Listing Updated 10/11/2009
MLS Number S584100
Property Type Condominium, Residential
Community Woodbridge
Tract We

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

Spacious single level home with formal dining and living room. Open kitchen with a large breakfast nook. Great private yard. Two car garage with indoor laundry. Located in the heart of Irvine in the woodlbridge village that offers, two lakes, pools, and tennis courts.

This short sale was purchased on 12/9/2004 for $555,500. The speculator used a $400,000 first mortgage, a $125,000 second mortgage, and a $30,500 downpayment. On 12/30/2005 he opened a HELOC for $208,000. Total property debt is $608,000. Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $$83,000 including his downpayment.

I don’t know what hoops people are being asked to jump through to get loan modifications, but this owner has dutifully stopped making payments and listed the property for sale.

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 07/15/2009
Document Type: Notice of Default
Document #: 2009000378012

Irvine Housing Blog No Kool Aid

I hope you have enjoyed the week of analysis posts here at the IHB. I may not be so ambitious next week. I over did it.

Thank you for reading the Irvine Housing Blog: astutely observing
the Irvine home market and combating California Kool-Aid since
September 2006.

Have a great weekend,

Irvine Renter

😉