The lingering problem from the Great Housing Bubble is excessive debt. Foreclosure, which has long been identified as the problem, is really the cure. People simply are not ready to accept that fact, and in their denial, they suffer.

Irvine Home Address … 146 West YALE Loop Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price …… $645,000

{book1}

I won't cast the first stone

or leave the first mark

but I will leave a lasting impression

you believe what you want

and you said what's been said

and i do hope you learn a lesson

what's your problem

can't you see it

and you go and blow it

like everyone knows you will

A New Found Glory — Failure's Not Flattering

The banks blew it. We all know that, and now we are all being asked to pay the bills for their catastrophic mistakes. I didn't cast the first stone, but I hope my writing about this issue has left a lasting impression. I also hope we can all learn something from this are avoid the mistakes again in the future. I have my doubts. We can all see the problem and the solution, but we all know the government is likely to blow it.

Excessive debt is the problem

Ever since the Great Housing Bubble began to deflate, everyone has incorrectly identified the problem as foreclosure. The real problem is not foreclosure, the real problem is that borrowers have excessive debts due to the huge loans lenders underwrote that inflated the housing bubble. Foreclosure is not the problem, it is the cure. Further, there is only one reason foreclosure is seen as the problem: people have to move out of their homes after a foreclosure, and I have demonstrated how private hedge funds and other parties could solve that problem.

One way or another, the banks are going to write down huge amounts of bad debt. Nothing can save them, and we shouldn't try. Principal reductions are the worst possible solution to the problem of excess debt left over from the Great Housing Bubble. Principal reductions merely gives foolish borrowers a pass. If the borrowers go through foreclosure, they have consequences that minimize moral hazard:

1. Borrowers will be forced to rent, at least for a time.
2. Borrowers will have reduced access to consumer credit as the foreclosure lowers their FICO score.
3. Borrowers will have to save and be prudent in order to meet the standards of home ownership and get another loan.

All of those consequences — inadequate though they may be — are eliminated if the GSEs merely reduce principal. The borrowers who have the most to gain are those who borrowed most foolishly, and the people paying the price are (1) prudent borrowers and (2) those who didn't borrow at all. Next time around, there will be no prudent borrowers, and everyone will participate. Who is going to pass on free money?

The worst part is that the government may decide this is a good idea. If every borrower in the country had their principal balance reduced to the lower of (1) current property values or (2) their ability to repay, prices would stabilize in most markets because the distressed property issues would be eliminated. With the distressed properties eliminated, prices would begin to rise, and HELOC spending could resume again. This would be a huge boom to the economy, and we could begin inflating the next Ponzi scheme. I could see government officials thinking this is a good idea.

Freddie and Fannie won't pay down your mortgage

By Tami Luhby, May 14, 2010

NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) — Pressure is mounting on loan servicers and investors to reduce troubled homeowners' loan balances…but the two largest owners of mortgages aren't getting the message.

They are getting the message; however, it is a stupid message so they are ignoring it. There is no mounting pressure. What we have is a mounting public relations campaign designed to make it look like there is a possibility of principal reduction. This is a purposeful lie. It is hoped that homeowners will keep paying with the false hope that they might be bailed out. Expect to see this dangling carrot appear periodically over the next several years. Fantasies of principal reduction are the lenders only defense against strategic default.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are controlled by the federal government, do not lower the principal on the loans they back, instead opting for interest rate reductions and term extensions when modifying loans.

But their stance is out of synch with the Obama administration, which is seeking to expand the use of principal writedowns. In late March, it announced servicers will be required to consider lowering balances in loan modifications.

And just who would tell Fannie and Freddie to start allowing principal reductions? The Obama administration.

Asked whether they will implement balance reductions, the companies and their regulator declined to comment. The Treasury Department also declined to comment.

The savior Obama is being thwarted by the GSEs and the Treasury Department? Does anyone really believe that? The Secretary of Treasury, Tim Geithner, serves at the pleasure of the president. If Geithner were doing something Obama didn't approve, Geithner would be fired. The GSEs are totally controlled by the Treasury under the conservatorship agreement. If Obama decided principal reductions at the GSEs was a good idea, he could make it happen. He doesn't because it would be a catastrophe.

What's holding them back is the companies' mandate to conserve their assets and limit their need for taxpayer-funded cash infusions, experts said. If Fannie and Freddie lower homeowners' loan balances, they are locking in losses because they have to write down the value of those mortgages. Essentially, that means using tax dollars to pay people's mortgages.

That seems like a pretty good reason not to give principal reductions. Do taxpayers really want to directly gift people hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt relief? What are we getting out of it? What lessons will these people learn? Obama knows that principal reduction is a very costly solution that creates a transfer of wealth from the taxpayers to homeowners. The gross unfairness of such a transfer and the moral hazard it would create is a very good reason not to do it.

The housing crisis has already wreaked havoc on the pair's balance sheets. Between them, they have received $127 billion — and recently requested another $19 billion — from the Treasury Department since they were placed into conservatorship in September 2008, at the height of the financial crisis.

Housing experts, however, say it's time for Fannie and Freddie to start reducing principal. Treasury and the companies have already set aside $75 billion for foreclosure prevention, which can be spent on interest-rate reductions or principal write downs.

"Treasury has to bite the bullet and get Fannie and Freddie to participate," said Alan White, a law professor at Valparaiso University. "It's all Treasury money one way or the other."

Though servicers are loathe to lower loan balances, a growing chorus of experts and advocates say it's the best way to stem the foreclosure crisis. Homeowners are more likely to walk away if they owe far more than the home is worth, regardless of whether the monthly payment is affordable. Nearly one in four borrowers in the U.S. are currently underwater.

Notice the repeated nonsense about expert opinions. The reporter is promoting the idea that there is consensus among experts that principal should be reduced. That is not reality. The consensus among experts is that principal reduction is a bad idea because principal reduction is a bad idea. The "growing chorus" is a group of crazies assembled to promulgate the purposeful lie to get people to hang on and make a few more payments.

"Principal reduction in the long run will lower the risk of redefault," said Vishwanath Tirupattur, a Morgan Stanley managing director and co-author of the firm's monthly report on the U.S. housing market. "It's the right thing to do."

This is a specious argument. Reducing principal to lower risk of redefault? While they are at it, why don't they forgive all mortgage debt? If people had no mortgage at all, defaults would certainly decline. This idea is like saying we should give money to theives so they don't steal from us.

If the mortgage balance is reduced through a foreclosure — which is how the system is designed to work — then there are consequences to the borrower. The government or private entities can work to improve the lives of former owners and even allow them to stay in their homes, but they must endure the consequences of (1) renting for a few years, (2) living without new consumer debt, and (3) saving to be able to purchase a home again. If their principal is reduced by the GSEs, none of these meaningful consequences will impact borrowers.

Meanwhile, a growing number of loans backed by Fannie and Freddie are falling into default. Their delinquency rates are rising even faster than those of subprime mortgages as the weak economy takes its toll on more credit-worthy homeowners. Fannie's default rate jumped to 5.47% at the end of March, up from 3.15% a year earlier, while Freddie's rose to 4.13%, up from 2.41%.

On top of that, the redefault rates on their modified loans are far worse than on those held by banks, according to federal regulators.

Some 59.5% of Fannie's loans and 57.3% of Freddie's loans were in default a year after modification, compared to 40% of bank-portfolio mortgages, according to a joint report from the Office of Thrift Supervision and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. This is part because banks are reducing the principal on their own loans, experts said.

So, advocates argue, lowering loan balances now can actually save the companies — and taxpayers — money later.

What? The GSEs will lose money on their portfolios whether through principal reduction or through foreclosure. They will lose less if they go through foreclosure because fewer loans will go bad. If they forgive principal, they will need to forgive everyone in their entire portfolio. How could they selectively forgive principal and achieve fairness to all borrowers? Do we forgive principal for HELOC abusers? They really need it.

What message does principal forgiveness send to those who were foolishly prudent? Think about it: if you were prudent and paid down your mortgage, you will probably not see much if any principal reduction; however, if you were a wildly irresponsible HELOC abuser, you will see significant principal reduction which will merely enable more HELOC abuse later. Principal reductions will serve as a major incentive for reckless borrowing. Everyone knows if enough people take the money and behave stupidly that everyone will get bailed out.

Foreclosure balances the equation. There must be some consequences to borrowers for their behavior, not because it is immoral, but because what you don't punish, you encourage. We can't afford to privatize gains and collectivize losses or we will go broke as a country. We are not a banana republic, but principal reduction without consequence is certainly a path that leads us there.

Hooray! No HELOCs!

It's a discretionary seller, folks. This owner really has some equity. The property records show very little activity as these owners responded to the free money by allowing it to accumulate. Good for them. Too bad they will be asked to pay off the debts of their foolish neighbors.

Carpe Diem

These owners resisted the tempation to spend their equity as it accumulated, and now they will get a check at the closing table for more than $300K. Their lives during the housing bubble was boring by the standards of conspicuous consumption of their HELOC abusing neighbors.

Which is better? Spending $300K propping up deficient income over a period of years, or obtaining a $300K check at the end? The possibility of principal reduction changes the answer to that question. HELOC abusers can obtain the benefit of the spending, and once they get their principal reduced after the crash, they can get the benefit again on the next cycle. The prudent only see the benefit once when they sell. Principal reductions make HELOC abuse twice as rewarding.

Irvine Home Address … 146 West YALE Loop Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price … $645,000

Home Purchase Price … About $262,500

Home Purchase Date …. Unknown/1987?

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $343,800

Percent Change ………. 145.7%

Annual Appreciation … 3.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$645,000 ………. Asking Price

$129,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.01% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$516,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$133,706 ………. Income Requirement

$2,773 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$559 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$54 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$410 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,796 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$475 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$619 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$252 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$81 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$3,034 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$6,450 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$6,450 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,160 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$129,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$147,060 ………. Total Cash Costs

$46,500 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$193,560 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 146 West YALE Loop Irvine, CA 92604

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 1 full 2 part baths

Home size: 2,161 sq ft

($298 / sq ft)

Lot Size: n/a

Year Built: 1977

Days on Market: 14

Listing Updated: 40311

MLS Number: S615514

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Tract: Es

——————————————————————————

**WOW**MUST SEE** Wood floor entry welcomes you to this lovely home.** REMODELED throughout, also stairway which leads to 4 spacious bedrooms with remodeled bathrooms,cabinets,sinks,bathtub lights & much more. Walk-in closet & organizers in MA BR. Double pane windows upstairs. 2 ceiling fans. Neutral carpet. The Kitchen features, Granite Countertops & Stainless Steel appliances. Walk- in pantry & GREAT eating area. **LARGE Family Rm**with fireplace, & built-ins. Windows running the lenght of the Family rm, overlooking the** STUNNING** backyard which has been landcaped & hardcaped beautifully. This is a LARGE BACKYARD with Apricot & Fig tree. ** EXTRA BONUS** of a Playhouse or small office/studio with electricity & a window. **NATURAL LIGHT in Living rm** with Cathedral Ceilings & Formal Dining rm overlooking the* SUNNY landscaped atruim* . 2 car garage with storage. Storage in attic as well. AC. Walk to all Wonderful Woodbridge amenities . Close to award winning schools.

What is an EXTRA BONUS? I thought getting a bonus was by definition getting something extra. Perhaps I could get an ADDITIONAL BONUS, or an ADDITIONAL EXTRA, or a BONUS EXTRA?

You get this added extra special bonus as well as many additional features to supplement our unique offer.

A recent Harvard study concluded, "the boom and bust in housing over the last decade was not primarily caused by low interest rates, reduced downpayment requirements, or laxer underwriting standards"

I cringe with embarrassment for them….

Irvine Home Address … 20 VILLAGER Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price …… $950,000

{book1}

Now I like takin' off

don't like burnin' out

Every time you turn it on

makes me want to shout

We keep getting hotter

movin' way too fast

If we don't slow this fire down

we're not gonna last

Cool the engines

red line's gettin' near

Cool the engines

better take it out of gear

Boston — Cool The Engines

The wisdom of song lyrics eludes everyone in a market rally. Prices can only rise so fast in a stable market. Fundamental constraints can be ignored for a time, but wicked bear markets signal their return when the collective insanity that grips the market wanes.

Academics study the problem, but so far, progress in the field of economics has been very slow and prone to decades long wastes of time on theories like Efficient Markets. Greed and fear are the features that move market prices. What we really need is to learn how to cool the engines; instead, we strive to go faster and we blow the engine apart.

New Harvard Kennedy School Study Questions Direct Link between Lower Interest Rates and Higher Housing Prices

Cambridge MA. — Contrary to the assertions of many economists and others, the boom and bust in housing over the last decade was not primarily caused by low interest rates, reduced downpayment requirements, or laxer underwriting standards, conclude Edward Glaeser, Joshua Gottlieb, and Joseph Gyourko in “Did Credit Market Policies Cause the Housing Bubble?” a new Policy Brief published by the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston and the Taubman Center for State and Local Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

I like their two policy recommendations, but neither one has any chance of passage.

Diana Olick didn't see the wisdom in this study either, and I will let her have the first shot.

Loose Lending Didn't Create the Housing Bubble

"Contrary to the assertions of many economists and others, the boom and bust in housing over the last decade was not primarily caused by low interest rates, reduced down payment requirements, or laxer underwriting standards."

My sixth grade English teacher always told me never to start with a quote, but in this case, how could I not?

Read it again, if you will; I read it three times just to make sure.

Yes, after years of bashing the mortgage industry for lax underwriting, bashing the Federal Government for negligently low interest rates and blaming investors for vacuuming up homes with no-money-down loans, three guys from Harvard say they're all off the hook.

Thank you, Diana. I am not the only one dumfounded at the ignorance of their assertions.

…I found a lot of this quite hard to digest, given the debate I've been covering for the last four years, from peak to trough to recovery. So I called Prof. Glaeser, who very affably took my questions.

Diana: If loose lending and over-borrowing didn't cause the housing bubble, what did?

Prof. Glaeser: The historical relationship between these variables and the housing market is just to small to explain this. In terms of understanding it, we believe that neither we nor anyone else understands this. The mechanics of bubbles, they certainly are associated with all sorts of irrational exuberant beliefs of future price changes. That's' always been true of housing. What specifically caused this thing? A strange cocktail that brought together things that created the bubble.

It is clear that Professor Glaeser does not understand what happened, but there are many people who do understand it. I explained it clearly above, and I will expand more now.

There is a mechanism by which prices are inflated. Prices do not increase by magic. A borrower is given a loan by a lender to buy real estate. The standards the lender applies and the terms of the loan determine who gets the loan and how big it is. It isn't mysterious; It is how our housing market works. All causes of the housing bubble must be explained by their impact on loan terms and standards. In fact, the failure to make this link is the weakness of all housing market analysis based on macroeconomic conditions.

There is a basic connection between what individuals do and the results of the collective actions of individuals. Individual borrowers taking out very large loans from stupid lenders bid up the prices on houses. The collective action of all these individuals is rising market prices and a bubble. I hope everyone who reads this is capable of explaining it to the Harvard professor. All of you now know more than he does.

Diana: But didn't subprime lending drive prices higher by bringing certain fiscally ineligible buyers into the market?

Prof Glaeser: The subprime mortgage market is different than the housing price boom. We think that it did drive prices higher. But even the historical relationship of LTV is a very small fact relative to the boom that occurred.

I pushed the professor on the loose lending some more, and he agreed that it was certainly an ingredient in the cocktail, but not the sole driver of the housing bubble.

One thing I do find interesting about this study is the conclusions they draw from their work.

So what are these researchers are trying to prove? Well that comes at the end of the press release:

While the data do not explain the housing bubble, the authors do contend that "the relatively modest link between interest rates and housing prices makes us more confident about rethinking [other] Federal housing policies," most notably the ability to deduct mortgage interest from federal income taxes, a politically popular policy that many analysts believe is inefficient, unfair, and environmentally unsound .

Prof. Glaeser argues that the mortgage interest deduction is not healthy for the housing market, and, while he didn't say as much, perhaps more dangerous than low, low mortgage interest rates or no-money-down loans. Why? Because it gives borrowers a continuing, long term incentive to borrow more than they should.

How did the home mortgage interest deduction get dragged into this? The professor is correct in his observations, but there is no linkage to his study. If the HMID somehow inflated the bubble, the argument would have greater strength, but since it didn't, the professor's argument looks like a pet idea he included because he couldn't figure out what really caused the bubble and what anyone could do about it.

The truth is lenders giving out Option ARMs and other toxic loans enabled borrowers to inflate prices, and the Desire for Mortgage Equity Withdrawal Inflated the Housing Bubble. The evidence is clear. And the government's response to the problem with HAMP is simply bringing back the Option ARM. Temporary interest rate reductions and principal deferment are the two characteristics of Options ARMs that made them unstable, yet that is the cornerstone of the government's loan modification program.

If the professor wanted to analyze the problem and suggest a change in government policy, he should go after the ridiculous bailouts and loan modification programs rather than proposing a battle against the politically impossible to repeal HMID.

Problem solving begins with a clear grasp of the problem. If the problem is not defined correctly, all solutions that follow are likely to fail. So far, we have defined the problem as foreclosure, so all our solutions are designed to delay or prevent foreclosure, and they have all failed. In reality, our problem is too much debt, and foreclosure is the solution. When policy makers finally realize this, perhaps they will get out of the way and allow the cleansing foreclosures to go forward. We can only wait and hope.

Irvine Home Address … 20 VILLAGER Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price … $950,000

Home Purchase Price … $1,148,000

Home Purchase Date …. 5/28/2005

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(255,000)

Percent Change ………. -17.2%

Annual Appreciation … -3.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$950,000 ………. Asking Price

$190,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.24% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$760,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$202,116 ………. Income Requirement

$4,192 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$823 ………. Property Tax

$300 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$79 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$82 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$5,477 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$1036 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$873 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$395 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$119 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$4,081 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$9,500 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$9,500 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$7,600 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$190,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$216,600 ………. Total Cash Costs

$62,500 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$279,100 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 20 VILLAGER Irvine, CA 92602

——————————————————————————

Beds: 5

Baths: 4 baths

Home size: 3,537 sq ft

($269 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 4,057 sq ft

Year Built: 2002

Days on Market: 104

MLS Number: P716076

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: Northpark

Tract: Bela

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

This property is in backup or contingent offer status.

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That is one of the worst descriptions I have read in quite a while. I ran out of room for graphics. it has almost every convention of bad realtor writing in one paragraph. Stunning!

Defaulting owner

This property may be facing foreclosure due to unemployment. The owner paid way too much back in 2005, but he put $229,600 down. He refinanced and pulled out a little, but he still stands to lose $200,000 when this property sells. He is trying to short sell, and squatting until it happens:

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 09/03/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 05/29/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default