Category Archives: Library

Government Sponsored Loan Modifications are the New Liar Loans

The taxpayers are absorbing bad bank debt through the TARP loan modification program. It is a direct transfer of wealth from Main Street to Wall Street.

Irvine Home Address … 5212 SKINNER Ave Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price …… $699,000

{book1}

I won't ever leave while you want me to stay

Nothing you could do that would turn me away

Hanging on every word

Believing the things I heard

Being a fool

You've taken my life, so take my soul

That's what you said and I believed it all

I want to be with you as long

As you want me to

I won't move away

Ain't that what you said?

Ain't that what you said?

Ain't that what you said?

Liar, liar, liar

Three Dog Night — Liar

The newest liar loan is sponsored by the US government. The HAMP loan modification program is merely documenting the bad loan underwriting standards that collapsed to bring down the housing bubble. The effect of these loan modifications is to transfer the bad debt from the lender to the US government. In short, it is government orchestrated theft. Taxpayer money is being given to the banks. And what's worse, the poorer the loan quality on the banks books, the bigger the bailout.

The New Liar Loan

John Burns — President John Burns Consulting

May 6, 2010

Does anyone really think that homeowners can afford to pay 60% of their income for housing? Apparently, the architects of the latest loan modification program called HAMP do. Government officials are touting that they are saving the housing industry by modifying more than 1 million loans to date, and converting 170,000 of those to "permanent" status, with many more to come.

Those so-called "permanent modifications" cost the Borrower 31% of their income today, but the Borrower still has 61% of their income going to total debt obligations (credit card, HELOC, car payment, etc.). These statistics, known as the Back-end Debt to Income ratio, can be found on page 6 located PDF here. Although not disclosed, we believe most of these loans exceed 100% LTV today as well. This is nothing more than a fully documented version of the same garbage that took down the banking system two years ago, and this time the Federal government rather than Countrywide and New Century are underwriting it. Almost all of these Borrowers will eventually re-default.

Last Friday, I wrote about The Mechanism For Diverting Bank Losses to the US Taxpayer. This program is a manifestation of the same thing. Take a toxic mortgage, modify it with a government guarantee certain to fail, and a toxic mortgage is moved from a bank balance sheet to the government's balance sheet. It is a direct transfer of wealth from the US government to the banks in a thinly disguised rip off.

It is very obvious that the architects of HAMP are short-term focused, and are tricking us into thinking they are solving the problem by calling these permanent modifications. Until these loans are renamed, let's call them "Liar Loans 2," except this time the liar is the Bank of the United States rather than the Borrower because this modification is anything but "permanent". We do believe that stabilizing home prices and the banking system are critical to the recovery of the U.S. economy, but let's at least tell the truth about what is being done.

The truth is that the banks are off-loading their toxic crap. First, about $1,200,000,000,000 was purchased by the Federal Reserve indirectly through their GSE purchases, and now billions more are being recycled directly through bogus government loan modification attempts.

I wonder how many of these will be done without borrower knowledge or consent? The bank could modify the loan themselves, and when the borrower continued to be delinquent, the bank could then turn to the US government to make them whole.

Did you realize each loan modification made this transfer of liability and it is designed to fail?

What this means for you is that the housing recovery that is being touted by elected officials is far from assured. There will be fewer homeowners thrown out on the street this month than would have occurred otherwise, but they will be tossed out later. The modification programs have helped stabilize home prices around the country, mostly because they have created so much confusion that people can live in their home for free for one year or more, and are buying time for thousands of banks to continue improving their balance sheets with earnings from good loans, while deferring the write-off of bad loans. The biggest beneficiaries of this program are the banks with the largest Home Equity Loan portfolios, which are also the banks needed to provide capital to businesses to start hiring again.

The banks are embarking on a program of widespread borrower squatting until loans can be modified. Last week we looked at The Lender Decision Tree and Limited Resale Inventory. They are choosing squatting over foreclosure because when they foreclose, declining neighborhood values encourage too much strategic default. Of course, the squatting causes its own issues including moral hazard, but the banks are so desperate they are choosing moral hazard to stay alive — a zombie existence.

This is the problem of zombie banks. Rather than allocating capital toward making good, new loans, banks must constantly buffer their loan loss reserves to cover the losses on the very stupid loans from the past. New banks can make new loans. Zombie banks cover losses on old loans. If we had nationalized the banks back in 2008, we would have eliminated the zombie banking problems.

How does this change things? We will be adding 170K additional future foreclosures to our forecast, with many more to come, and guiding our clients through these turbulent times by analyzing every indicator we can get our hands on. Despite the negative tone of this email, there are and will continue to be plenty of opportunities to make money, particularly taking advantage of the distressed selling that will go on for years, but having a long term investment horizon. Also, the national housing market is becoming more local than ever, which means those with local market knowledge, or the ability to roll up all of the local factors into a national view, will make the most money. In other words, those who do their homework will get straight A's.

Unfortunately, the real estate industry's only prospect for growth for the foreseeable future is in distressed properties. One of the effects of this property loan distress is going to be continuing deflation as lenders finally take the painful write downs they are trying to avoid.

Future interest rates

We are at the bottom of the interest rate cycle, and it is very unlikely that mortgage interest rates will go much lower, but I don't see rates rising very high very fast either. Part of the reason is that I believe the The Bernanke Put: The Implied Protection of Mortgage Interest Rates is very real, but I also think we have some huge deflationary headwinds blowing. The amount of second mortgage debt on the books of the banks is very troubling. The losses are certain to be much larger than the banks are currently willing to admit.

Also, the commercial real estate bust has barely started. The only hope lenders have with commercial loans is that many of them were personally guaranteed by wealthy people or corporations that will stand by the losses. The write downs for commercial mortgages has only just begun, and as the cycle drags on, many small and mid-sized banks are going to get wiped out. There are Midwestern banks with entire portfolios of California raw land deals. The assets in many instances have a near negative current value, but loans on the books of these lenders is in the millions. Marking to reality is going to be very painful, and squatting has ruled the day. Most of the raw land deals in California are tied up in some underwater banking limbo.

The yet-to-be-recognized loan losses are very deflationary. Loan losses are the destruction of lender capital. The loan itself may have been imaginary money, but the losses are very real. This deflationary pressure will keep interest rates low for as long as it lasts. The commercial real estate bust is in front of us, not behind us.

Some loan modifications can and should work

Loan modification programs fail because borrowers are generally better off in default. Some can't afford the debt service under any circumstances. They can get out from under their debt and be much better off than hanging on for fantasies of better days to come. However, when borrowers have plenty of equity and if they could afford their payments under normal circumstances, then loan modifications are a good solution. Unfortunately, there aren't many people who have equity and can afford the debt under normal repayment terms.

The owner of today's featured property purchased for $275,000 on 3/22/1999. Or at least that is what my data source shows. I don't think this is right. I think he paid $345,000 based on the $276,000 first mortgage, $28,000 second mortgage. I suspect there was also a $41,000 down payment, but I can't be sure. I doubt this was cash-out purchase in 1999.

The mistake this owner made was taking out an Option ARM for $320,000 on 11/2/2007. He may have fallen on hard times when he opened a HELOC on 6/19/2008 for $80,000. This owner went through the entire bubble without refinancing, so he didn't start refinancing for HELOC abuse.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 01/27/2010

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 05/11/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

This guy defaults on his Option ARM, but he still has 50% equity in the property, so foreclosing on him simply forces him to sell. This is a borrower for whom loan modification program are designed. He needs his Option ARM converted to a low-interest fixed-rate mortgage so he can stay in his house. He could afford the smaller mortgage under stable terms. He did for seven years without Ponzi borrowing.

I support loan modifications for borrowers like this guy. Unfortunately, he is the exception rather than the rule. Most are over extended Ponzis waiting for their bailout to continue building their huge pile of debt to support their fake lives.

He was given a small private loan to cure his default.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 02/22/2010

Document Type: Notice of Rescission

Perhaps he has come to accept that he can't afford this house any longer and he must sell. That is sad… Well, it is sad to a point. He is still going to sell and pocket $350,000 for being an owner during the housing bubble.

When loan modifications don't work, borrowers are really screwed

In the year since the program got rolling, it has generally failed to lower payments. Of the 3.4 million eligible loans, 228,000 have been permanently reduced, while 155,000 have been rejected during the trial period, according to Treasury Department data compiled by the nonprofit Pro Publica.

"If they're rejected, collection starts again immediately," said Ali Tarzi, housing supervisor for the San Diego nonprofit Community Housing Works.

Robles said his payments were lowered by about one-third for nine months, and he paid them all on time. In February, he got a letter saying he'd been rejected from the program because he had too much in savings to qualify.

Then he got the bill for $10,500, the sum of the difference between nine months of lowered payments and the amount he was supposed to pay, plus interest charges and late fees. He also learned his credit rating had fallen steeply, thanks to two reports of being 60 days overdue, and two of being 30 days overdue.

"I was like, how can you do that?" he said. "I never missed a payment!"

Treasury guidelines say that when borrowers go into a trial modification, their credit status should freeze: If the borrowers are delinquent, they stay delinquent; and if they're current, they stay current, though the guidelines allow lenders to report that the payment is being modified, which causes a small credit hit.

Irvine Home Address … 5212 SKINNER Ave Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price … $699,000

Home Purchase Price … $275,000

Home Purchase Date …. 3/22/1999

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $382,060

Percent Change ………. 154.2%

Annual Appreciation … 8.1%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$699,000 ………. Asking Price

$139,800 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.01% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$559,200 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$144,900 ………. Income Requirement

$3,005 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$606 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$58 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$0 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,669 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$735 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$671 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$273 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$87 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$2,624 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$6,990 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$6,990 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,592 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$139,800 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$159,372 ………. Total Cash Costs

$40,200 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$199,572 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 5212 SKINNER Ave Irvine, CA 92604

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 2 full 1 part baths

Home size: 2,324 sq ft

($301 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 6,240 sq ft

Year Built: 1972

Days on Market: 81

Listing Updated: 40310

MLS Number: P722993

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Tract: Rc

——————————————————————————

GREAT LOCATION IN IRVINE. THIS HOME NEEDS A LITTLE TLC, BUT HAS A GREAT FLOOR PLAN AND LARGE YARD.A WINE CELLAR IS IN BACK YARD. A HUGE FAMILY ROOM OFFERS AN AREA FOR THE ENTIRE FAMILY TO RELAX. THIS PROPERTY HAS BEEN REDUCE $25000 AND WE ARE LOOKING FOR A FAST SALE.

Foreclosure Is a Superior Form of Principal Reduction

The lingering problem from the Great Housing Bubble is excessive debt. Foreclosure, which has long been identified as the problem, is really the cure. People simply are not ready to accept that fact, and in their denial, they suffer.

Irvine Home Address … 146 West YALE Loop Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price …… $645,000

{book1}

I won't cast the first stone

or leave the first mark

but I will leave a lasting impression

you believe what you want

and you said what's been said

and i do hope you learn a lesson

what's your problem

can't you see it

and you go and blow it

like everyone knows you will

A New Found Glory — Failure's Not Flattering

The banks blew it. We all know that, and now we are all being asked to pay the bills for their catastrophic mistakes. I didn't cast the first stone, but I hope my writing about this issue has left a lasting impression. I also hope we can all learn something from this are avoid the mistakes again in the future. I have my doubts. We can all see the problem and the solution, but we all know the government is likely to blow it.

Excessive debt is the problem

Ever since the Great Housing Bubble began to deflate, everyone has incorrectly identified the problem as foreclosure. The real problem is not foreclosure, the real problem is that borrowers have excessive debts due to the huge loans lenders underwrote that inflated the housing bubble. Foreclosure is not the problem, it is the cure. Further, there is only one reason foreclosure is seen as the problem: people have to move out of their homes after a foreclosure, and I have demonstrated how private hedge funds and other parties could solve that problem.

One way or another, the banks are going to write down huge amounts of bad debt. Nothing can save them, and we shouldn't try. Principal reductions are the worst possible solution to the problem of excess debt left over from the Great Housing Bubble. Principal reductions merely gives foolish borrowers a pass. If the borrowers go through foreclosure, they have consequences that minimize moral hazard:

  1. Borrowers will be forced to rent, at least for a time.
  2. Borrowers will have reduced access to consumer credit as the foreclosure lowers their FICO score.
  3. Borrowers will have to save and be prudent in order to meet the standards of home ownership and get another loan.

All of those consequences — inadequate though they may be — are eliminated if the GSEs merely reduce principal. The borrowers who have the most to gain are those who borrowed most foolishly, and the people paying the price are (1) prudent borrowers and (2) those who didn't borrow at all. Next time around, there will be no prudent borrowers, and everyone will participate. Who is going to pass on free money?

The worst part is that the government may decide this is a good idea. If every borrower in the country had their principal balance reduced to the lower of (1) current property values or (2) their ability to repay, prices would stabilize in most markets because the distressed property issues would be eliminated. With the distressed properties eliminated, prices would begin to rise, and HELOC spending could resume again. This would be a huge boom to the economy, and we could begin inflating the next Ponzi scheme. I could see government officials thinking this is a good idea.

Freddie and Fannie won't pay down your mortgage

By Tami Luhby,

But their stance is out of synch with the Obama administration, which is seeking to expand the use of principal writedowns. In late March, it announced servicers will be required to consider lowering balances in loan modifications.

And just who would tell Fannie and Freddie to start allowing principal reductions? The Obama administration.

Asked whether they will implement balance reductions, the companies and their regulator declined to comment. The Treasury Department also declined to comment.

The savior Obama is being thwarted by the GSEs and the Treasury Department? Does anyone really believe that? The Secretary of Treasury, Tim Geithner, serves at the pleasure of the president. If Geithner were doing something Obama didn't approve, Geithner would be fired. The GSEs are totally controlled by the Treasury under the conservatorship agreement. If Obama decided principal reductions at the GSEs was a good idea, he could make it happen. He doesn't because it would be a catastrophe.

What's holding them back is the companies' mandate to conserve their assets and limit their need for taxpayer-funded cash infusions, experts said. If Fannie and Freddie lower homeowners' loan balances, they are locking in losses because they have to write down the value of those mortgages. Essentially, that means using tax dollars to pay people's mortgages.

That seems like a pretty good reason not to give principal reductions. Do taxpayers really want to directly gift people hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt relief? What are we getting out of it? What lessons will these people learn? Obama knows that principal reduction is a very costly solution that creates a transfer of wealth from the taxpayers to homeowners. The gross unfairness of such a transfer and the moral hazard it would create is a very good reason not to do it.

The housing crisis has already wreaked havoc on the pair's balance sheets. Between them, they have received $127 billion — and recently requested another $19 billion — from the Treasury Department since they were placed into conservatorship in September 2008, at the height of the financial crisis.

Housing experts, however, say it's time for Fannie and Freddie to start reducing principal. Treasury and the companies have already set aside $75 billion for foreclosure prevention, which can be spent on interest-rate reductions or principal write downs.

"Treasury has to bite the bullet and get Fannie and Freddie to participate," said Alan White, a law professor at Valparaiso University. "It's all Treasury money one way or the other."

Though servicers are loathe to lower loan balances, a growing chorus of experts and advocates say it's the best way to stem the foreclosure crisis. Homeowners are more likely to walk away if they owe far more than the home is worth, regardless of whether the monthly payment is affordable. Nearly one in four borrowers in the U.S. are currently underwater.

Notice the repeated nonsense about expert opinions. The reporter is promoting the idea that there is consensus among experts that principal should be reduced. That is not reality. The consensus among experts is that principal reduction is a bad idea because principal reduction is a bad idea. The "growing chorus" is a group of crazies assembled to promulgate the purposeful lie to get people to hang on and make a few more payments.

"Principal reduction in the long run will lower the risk of redefault," said Vishwanath Tirupattur, a Morgan Stanley managing director and co-author of the firm's monthly report on the U.S. housing market. "It's the right thing to do."

This is a specious argument. Reducing principal to lower risk of redefault? While they are at it, why don't they forgive all mortgage debt? If people had no mortgage at all, defaults would certainly decline. This idea is like saying we should give money to theives so they don't steal from us.

If the mortgage balance is reduced through a foreclosure — which is how the system is designed to work — then there are consequences to the borrower. The government or private entities can work to improve the lives of former owners and even allow them to stay in their homes, but they must endure the consequences of (1) renting for a few years, (2) living without new consumer debt, and (3) saving to be able to purchase a home again. If their principal is reduced by the GSEs, none of these meaningful consequences will impact borrowers.

Meanwhile, a growing number of loans backed by Fannie and Freddie are falling into default. Their delinquency rates are rising even faster than those of subprime mortgages as the weak economy takes its toll on more credit-worthy homeowners. Fannie's default rate jumped to 5.47% at the end of March, up from 3.15% a year earlier, while Freddie's rose to 4.13%, up from 2.41%.

On top of that, the redefault rates on their modified loans are far worse than on those held by banks, according to federal regulators.

Some 59.5% of Fannie's loans and 57.3% of Freddie's loans were in default a year after modification, compared to 40% of bank-portfolio mortgages, according to a joint report from the Office of Thrift Supervision and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. This is part because banks are reducing the principal on their own loans, experts said.

So, advocates argue, lowering loan balances now can actually save the companies — and taxpayers — money later.

What? The GSEs will lose money on their portfolios whether through principal reduction or through foreclosure. They will lose less if they go through foreclosure because fewer loans will go bad. If they forgive principal, they will need to forgive everyone in their entire portfolio. How could they selectively forgive principal and achieve fairness to all borrowers? Do we forgive principal for HELOC abusers? They really need it.

What message does principal forgiveness send to those who were foolishly prudent? Think about it: if you were prudent and paid down your mortgage, you will probably not see much if any principal reduction; however, if you were a wildly irresponsible HELOC abuser, you will see significant principal reduction which will merely enable more HELOC abuse later. Principal reductions will serve as a major incentive for reckless borrowing. Everyone knows if enough people take the money and behave stupidly that everyone will get bailed out.

Foreclosure balances the equation. There must be some consequences to borrowers for their behavior, not because it is immoral, but because what you don't punish, you encourage. We can't afford to privatize gains and collectivize losses or we will go broke as a country. We are not a banana republic, but principal reduction without consequence is certainly a path that leads us there.

Hooray! No HELOCs!

It's a discretionary seller, folks. This owner really has some equity. The property records show very little activity as these owners responded to the free money by allowing it to accumulate. Good for them. Too bad they will be asked to pay off the debts of their foolish neighbors.

Carpe Diem

These owners resisted the tempation to spend their equity as it accumulated, and now they will get a check at the closing table for more than $300K. Their lives during the housing bubble was boring by the standards of conspicuous consumption of their HELOC abusing neighbors.

Which is better? Spending $300K propping up deficient income over a period of years, or obtaining a $300K check at the end? The possibility of principal reduction changes the answer to that question. HELOC abusers can obtain the benefit of the spending, and once they get their principal reduced after the crash, they can get the benefit again on the next cycle. The prudent only see the benefit once when they sell. Principal reductions make HELOC abuse twice as rewarding.

Irvine Home Address … 146 West YALE Loop Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price … $645,000

Home Purchase Price … About $262,500

Home Purchase Date …. Unknown/1987?

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $343,800

Percent Change ………. 145.7%

Annual Appreciation … 3.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$645,000 ………. Asking Price

$129,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.01% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$516,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$133,706 ………. Income Requirement

$2,773 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$559 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$54 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$410 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,796 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$475 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$619 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$252 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$81 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$3,034 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$6,450 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$6,450 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,160 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$129,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$147,060 ………. Total Cash Costs

$46,500 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$193,560 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 146 West YALE Loop Irvine, CA 92604

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 1 full 2 part baths

Home size: 2,161 sq ft

($298 / sq ft)

Lot Size: n/a

Year Built: 1977

Days on Market: 14

Listing Updated: 40311

MLS Number: S615514

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Tract: Es

——————————————————————————

**WOW**MUST SEE** Wood floor entry welcomes you to this lovely home.** REMODELED throughout, also stairway which leads to 4 spacious bedrooms with remodeled bathrooms,cabinets,sinks,bathtub lights & much more. Walk-in closet & organizers in MA BR. Double pane windows upstairs. 2 ceiling fans. Neutral carpet. The Kitchen features, Granite Countertops & Stainless Steel appliances. Walk- in pantry & GREAT eating area. **LARGE Family Rm**with fireplace, & built-ins. Windows running the lenght of the Family rm, overlooking the** STUNNING** backyard which has been landcaped & hardcaped beautifully. This is a LARGE BACKYARD with Apricot & Fig tree. ** EXTRA BONUS** of a Playhouse or small office/studio with electricity & a window. **NATURAL LIGHT in Living rm** with Cathedral Ceilings & Formal Dining rm overlooking the* SUNNY landscaped atruim* . 2 car garage with storage. Storage in attic as well. AC. Walk to all Wonderful Woodbridge amenities . Close to award winning schools.

What is an EXTRA BONUS? I thought getting a bonus was by definition getting something extra. Perhaps I could get an ADDITIONAL BONUS, or an ADDITIONAL EXTRA, or a BONUS EXTRA?

You get this added extra special bonus as well as many additional features to supplement our unique offer.

The Mechanism For Diverting Bank Losses to the US Taxpayer

The GSEs made many bad loans during 2008 and 2009. Loan buyback clauses in mortgage-backed securities deals insured by the GSEs is how these loans will become the responsibility of US taxpayers.

Irvine Home Address … 28 BELMONTE Irvine, CA 92620

Resale Home Price …… $675,000

{book1}

Oh baby, baby

How was I supposed to know

That something wasn't right here

My loan losses are killing me

I must confess, I still believe

When I'm not in homes I lose my money

Give me a sign

Hit me baby one more time

Britney Spears — Baby One More Time

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and the FHA all insure loans against default. Investors that buy mortgage-backed securities pools from the GSEs or other governmental agencies know that if the loans in the pools go bad, the insurance will kick in and the insuring entity will either make up the payment or buy the loan back from the pool and make the investor whole. This buyback clause is the mechanism by which bad loans become the responsibility of the insurance pools covered by the US taxpayer.

Ever since the GSEs were nationalized in 2008 — an occurrence preceded by decades of official denial of the implicit guarantee given by the US Government — the GSEs underwrote loans during the crash of the Great Housing Bubble. The government enticed buyers to overpay for real estate with tax incentives. The Federal Reserve agreed to overpay for the bad government paper to lower mortgage interest rates and make affordability possible at very high debt-to-income ratios. As a result, many knife-wielding borrowers caught the market in 2008 and 2009 and prices have at least temporarily stabilized.

Most of the crash buyers will fall underwater over the next several years as the slow decline in prices continues. Rising interest rates and the overhang of distressed properties will pressure market prices. Many of the loans securitized and insured by the GSEs in 2008 and 2009 will go bad. When they do, the GSEs will have to repurchase these loans and eat the losses. Since the US taxpayer is now responsible for the GSEs, the US taxpayer will absorb all GSE losses. These losses will be very significant.

Fannie Mae mortgage holdings up after loan buyouts

By Lynn Adler

NEW YORK, May 7 (Reuters) – Fannie Mae (FNM.N), the largest buyer of residential home loans, said on Friday its March mortgage portfolio was inflated by buyouts of seriously delinquent loans repurchased from securities pools.

The company's total book of business, gross mortgage portfolio, commitments to buy loans and net and new business acquisitions included about $40 billion of loans it bought back from the pools.

Forty billion in seriously delinquent loans, meaning those over 120 days late. That is a lot of bad loans.

Excluding those repurchases, which will not be reflected as liquidations from the mortgage-backed securities that Fannie Mae holds until April data, the total book of business would have declined 2.3 percent in March. Including them, there was a 2.8 percent increase to a total book of business of $3.263 trillion.

The company, like its counterpart Freddie Mac (FRE.N), is in the process of buying back tens of billions of dollars in troubled home loans that now collateralize its securities. The loans being repurchased are at least 120 days late and are a capital drain.

The serious delinquency rate on Fannie Mae single-family loans rose 7 basis points in February, the latest month for which data is available, to 5.59 percent. The rate rose 4 basis points on multifamily loans to 0.73 percent.

If 5.59% of their portfolio is seriously delinquent. That is a lot of bad loans.

A year earlier, the single-family rate stood at 2.96 percent and the multifamily rate at 0.32 percent.

Fannie Mae also said in its March portfolio summary that the unpaid principal balance of its gross mortgage portfolio spiked by 87.1 percent to $764.8 billion due to the repurchases that were not reflected as liquidated from the MBS trusts yet.

As of March 31, the gross portfolio end balance, taking into account $25.5 billion in net commitments to sell mortgage assets, stood at $739.3 billion, Fannie Mae said.

Retained holdings were $725.9 billion in February and $783.9 billion in March 2009.

Fannie Mae's total debt outstanding grew to $800 billion in March from $767 billion the prior month. A year ago, the company had $869.3 billion outstanding.

CAPITAL STRAIN

Fannie Mae has yet to report first quarter earnings.

But Freddie Mac on May 5 reported an $8 billion first-quarter loss, which included a dividend payment on senior preferred stock owned by the Treasury Department, and asked the government for an added $10.6 billion in aid.

That draw would bring federal aid for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to more than $136 billion.

The Treasury has provided an open credit spigot for the two companies through 2012.

Your potential losses are unlimited. During the Christmas holidays last year when nobody would notice, the $400 billion cap on assistance was removed. No matter how large the bill gets, the US taxpayer will take on the losses. That is a lot of bad loans.

Fannie and Freddie were taken under government control in September 2008, in the midst of the deepest housing crisis since the Great Depression, as loan defaults and record foreclosures slashed their capital.

Fannie Mae is spreading its larger amount of loan buyouts over several months whereas Freddie conducted the lion's share in a single month.

In the aftermath, Freddie reported on April 30 the first decline in the single-family delinquency rate in three years. Still, the 4.13 percent rate in March was well above 2.41 percent a year earlier.

Freddie Mac reports a statistical blip after three years of constant, significant, and unprecedented rises in its delinquency rate. Happy days are here again, right?

The takeover the GSEs was engineered as a stealth bailout of the banks. If bank loans can be redone and repacked with government backed insurance, the losses are transferred from the banks to taxpayers. The losses from the GSEs and the FHA will mount. Some of these losses will be hidden on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, but most will be covered by the general obligations of the US Treasury. That's you and me.

Now that we are all absorbing these losses, perhaps we should go along with whatever the banks want? Or worse yet, perhaps underwater homeowners should keep paying their oversized mortgages and "take one for the team?" Our leaders made poor decisions. We should not be liable for the bailout of banks either directly through TARP or indirectly through the GSEs. The poor decisions of our leaders does not mean we have some collective obligation to make the bad decisions of lenders go away. Besides, no matter how bad the losses are, twenty years from now the government will produce an accounting report showing that we made money on the deal.

This whole situation sucks. The banks give large amounts of money to irresponsible people who blow it. When the Ponzi scheme collapses and both the Ponzis and the lenders are suffering, the government is called in to take money from the prudent to bail out the reckless. I don't feel good about it.

More equity-stripping HELOC-abusing Ponzis

It was suggested in the comments recently that Irvine house prices have held up because fewer borrowers here are in distress. We do have fewer underwater homeowners because the banks haven't caught up with their foreclosures, but we still have many borrowers who stripped the equity from the walls and spent themselves into oblivion. I profile these every day, and I don't need to hunt and cherry pick to find these people.

  • Today's featured property as purchased on 12/8/2003 for $600,000. The owners used a $400,000 first mortgage, a $170,000 second mortgage, and a $30,000 down payment.
  • On 7/26/2004 they opened a $196,000 HELOC and got back most of their small down payment.
  • On 1/26/2005 they refinanced with a $585,000 first mortgage and a $99,900 second mortgage.
  • On 3/31/2005 they refinanced the first mortgage with a $585,000 Option ARM with a 1% teaser rate.
  • On 12/14/2006 they refinanced the first mortgage for $710,000.
  • On 5/7/2007 they obtained a $131,000 HELOC, and with their previous pattern of borrowing, we can assume they took it out and spent it.
  • Total property debt is $841,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $271,000.
  • The stopped paying the mortgage early this year or late last year.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 04/28/2010

Document Type: Notice of Default

Irvine Home Address … 28 BELMONTE Irvine, CA 92620

Resale Home Price … $675,000

Home Purchase Price … $600,000

Home Purchase Date …. 12/8/2003

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $34,500

Percent Change ………. 12.5%

Annual Appreciation … 1.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$675,000 ………. Asking Price

$135,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.01% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$540,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$139,925 ………. Income Requirement

$2,902 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$585 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$56 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$0 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,543 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$710 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$648 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$263 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$84 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$2,534 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$6,750 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$6,750 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,400 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$135,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$153,900 ………. Total Cash Costs

$38,800 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$192,700 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 28 BELMONTE Irvine, CA 92620

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 2 full 1 part baths

Home size: 2,144 sq ft

($315 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 5,000 sq ft

Year Built: 1979

Days on Market: 3

Listing Updated: 40309

MLS Number: S616799

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Tract: Ol

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

Spacious home on a quiet cul-de-sac location. Living room with fireplace. Dining room with wet bar. Kitchen overlooks family room. Oversized master bedroom. Large private backyard. Three car attached garage.

I hope you have enjoyed this week, and thank you for reading the Irvine Housing Blog: astutely observing the Irvine home market and combating California Kool-Aid since 2006.

Have a great weekend,

Irvine Renter

Riverside County: 90% of mortgages underwater, 23% of mortgages 60-days late

The mortgage statistics out of Riverside County are pretty grim. Will the substitution effect pull prices down here in Irvine?

Irvine Home Address … 40 SALT BUSH Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price …… $4,995,000

{book1}

And I'm here to remind you

Of the mess you left when you went away

It's not fair to deny me

Of the cross I bear that you gave to me

You, you, you oughta know

And I'm not gonna fade as soon as you close your eyes

And you know it

And every time I scratch my nails down someone else's back

I hope you feel it…well can you feel it

Alanis Morissette — You Oughta Know

Lenders,

I am here to remind you of the mess you made when your standards went away.

It's not fair to deny it.

Of the cross they bear that you gave to them.

You oughta know.

I'm not gonna fade away if you close your eyes.

And you know it.

And every time someone defaults on your loan.

I hope you feel it… well can you feel it?

How do you feel about the banks?

I am seeing the argument put forward frequently that we need to coddle the banks because if they lose money, we all suffer. Many are suggesting that Individual borrowers should continue to make payments when they are hopelessly underwater and they can rent something much cheaper elsewhere in order to preserve neighborhood property values and prevent the banks from going under. That is rubbish. People don't owe their neighbors or the banks anything.

The lenders created this mess, and they need to experience the consequences of their foolish lending otherwise they will do nothing to learn from their mistakes and prevent doing it again. They loaned too many people too much money under unstable loan terms. They deserve the pain they get. They do not deserve our tax dollars or assistance.

The more I pay attention to this issue the more I become annoyed at the banks. They inflate bubbles with their loans. They create the Ponzis. They enable the squatters. They conspire to keep prices artificially high and keep prudent families out of reasonably priced homes. I have a problem with their behavior and how it impacts all of us.

Fitch finds Calif. at both extremes in mortgages

Copyright © 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

NEW YORK — California has the best-performing U.S. region in mortgage performance as well as some of the worst, according to a study by Fitch Ratings.

Results of the ratings agency's study of all securitized non-agency California mortgage loans were released Wednesday.

Among the findings, it said the Bay Area region of San Francisco, San Mateo and Redwood City has a 60-day mortgage delinquency rate of just 4 percent. That was No. 1 among the 382 metropolitan statistical areas tracked by Fitch.

Recent price trends have helped. While California home prices are under stress and further declines are likely, San Francisco home prices have increased by 12 percent over the past year.

I don't know the listed markets to comment, but I I do note that it pays to live in neighborhoods with others with 800 FICO scores. The lower the delinquency rate the better the values are holding up; although, the real correlation is to foreclosures: the higher the rate of foreclosure the lower the resulting property values.

Banks stopped foreclosing after they kicked out all the poor, subprime borrowers. The middle- and upper-middle- class borrowers who were given Alt-A loans and Option ARMs have simply been allowed to squat. Lenders have made a conscious decision to allow the Ponzis to squat in cities like Irvine because they know foreclosing on them will reduce prices.

This isn't a story of the rich getting richer… well, that did happen too, but the poor certainly did get poorer. The borrowers given subprime loans all went delinquent like their higher wage earning counterparts in Alt-A and prime borrowing pools, but the subprime crowd was actually foreclosed upon, and values in these areas cratered as expected. Of course, that means those markets have found a market clearing price, and the lives of the people can be rebuilt and go on.

The Alta-A and prime borrowers took out toxic loans like Option ARMs and interest-only financing with low down payments. Despite recent reports to the contrary, toxic loans and low down payment speculation did inflate the housing bubble. The only difference between these neighborhoods and the subprime neighborhoods is the foreclosures. The middle class and the working affluent are being given a pass.

At the other end of the spectrum is the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario (Riverside) region, at 367th among all U.S. metro areas with a 60-day delinquency rate of 23 percent.

Nearly one in four borrowers is not paying their mortgage. One in four. Unemployment is not that high. Despite reports that strategic default is a small percentage of delinquencies, how do lenders explain a 23% delinquency rate without strategic default? The people in the land of the dirt people are not stupid. They recognize when the economics favor walking away, and they do.

Ninety percent of Riverside mortgages are now "underwater," Fitch said, and

Only one borrower in nine has any equity in Riverside County. Wow! I guess it pays not to be a loan owner out there….

nearly 60 percent of borrowers owe more than 150 percent of the value of their homes.

It will take forever for house prices to recover enough for these people to survive without scuba gear. They won't even qualify for a principal reduction program because they are too far underwater. This is the primary reason so many strategic defaults are occuring.

Fitch said California mortgage trends are important for both new and existing securities in the rest of the nation, since the state has about 40 percent of overall mortgage origination volume.

What happens in California determines what happens to the banks. It is in the banks best interest to maintain the Ponzi scheme anywhere it hasn't already imploded. You know they must be desperate when their only option is widespread squatting, and they chose that option. Banks typically are not in the business of buying homes for people and letting them live there for nothing. Yet that is what they are doing. The banks bought all these homes at ridiculous prices, allowed Ponzis to move in, and now they are just letting them live there. Amazing.

Riverside County Substitution Effect

Yesterday, I was in south Corona on the terrace of the Retreat Golf Club overlooking the finishing holes and the surrounding real estate development. It is a sea of McMansions of a quality as high as anything in Irvine. Buyers can have a 4,152 SF home with a prime location looking down on a golf green perched on the edge of a lake for under $600,000. There is a price where people say to themselves, "I can get an 1,800 SF condo touching another 1,800 SF condo in Irvine, or I can go get a 4,000 SF McMansion in Corona for the same price." When the disparity gets very high, like it is now, people substitute for the larger home in the less desirable location.

If you want to speculate on where prices will go up in the future, you can bet on the improvements in our traffic corridors. When improvements go in, real estate values go up in the areas serviced by the improvements. A classic example from history is the construction of the Brooklyn Bridge and the impact it had on property values in Brooklyn. The slow ferries that made commuting slow and expensive gave way to speedy and inexpensive land travel.

There is a bottleneck where the 241 meets the 91 that backs up for hours. If you have ever waited in that line, you know the maddening experience of the people who bypass the entire wait and try to cut in at the last minute. The police patrol it heavily, but I am surprised there are not more road-rage shootings at this location. The daily wait at that location is the primary thing preventing more people from living in Riverside County and working in Orange County.

Much of the real estate value in Orange County remains due to this bottleneck because it strongly inhibits the substitution effect. If cars could quickly and efficiently move to and from Orange and Riverside Counties, much of the real estate value would leak out of Orange County to the nearest transportation system locations in Riverside County. Improvement in our transportation system would be great for commerce, but it would almost certainly raise real estate values in Riverside County at the expense of properties in Orange County.

Is the perception of premium self-reinforcing?

Is it possible that areas where prices have not fallen attracts other money that prevents prices from falling? Is there a premium for being premium? If someone had suggested this to me a year ago, I would have laughed, but there certainly are buyers in the market motivated by the apparent flight to quality. The real question is, "are there enough zealot buyers acting on faith instead of math to support the entire market?" We won't know the answer until the foreclosure and delinquencies problems are resolved. I don't think so.

I have one major problem with this idea. One sign of kool aid intoxication is that people bought property simply because prices were going up. People had no idea why prices were going up, but prices were, and this induced more buying which was actually the cause of prices going up. Isn't buying because prices are not going down the same thing? Isn't buying into a market crash in areas that have not crashed yet another manifestation of buying on faith? Isn't that the very essence of kool aid intoxication?

The fact that we may have witnessed a temporary bottom and a bear rally does not mean that the move we are seeing is based on any underlying fundamentals of the market.

(1) Rents are dropping,

(2) salaries are dropping,

(3) anyone in real estate is making less money,

(4) unemployment is still very high,

(5) our state is going bankrupt,

(6) interest rate subsidies are ending,

(7) government tax incentives are ending, and

Everything about this real estate market move is an illusion. However, many believe we will fake it 'til we make it. I can't argue with that. We might.

I still believe prices will go down as the cartel loses its grip on the market, but I am surprised at the effectiveness of their squatting program. By allowing Ponzis to squat, they are sustaining values and preventing widespread strategic default in many areas. Only time will tell if this fix was a good solution or an enduring one.

Losing $1,619,700 sucks

This is the biggest loss I have seen to date on an Irvine property, and the owner is the one losing the money, not the bank.

  • Today's featured property was purchased on 4/3/2007, the eve of the subprime implosion. The owners used a $3,750,000 first mortgage and a $2,565,000 down payment.
  • On 8/2/2007 they refinanced with a $3,400,000 first mortgage. They actually paid their mortgage down. They earn an A for mortgage management. I doubt that is much comfort to them.

No mortgage equity withdrawal, and no squatting. This deal has not worked out as well for them as it has for others….

Irvine Home Address … 40 SALT BUSH Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price … $4,995,000

Home Purchase Price … $6,315,000

Home Purchase Date …. 4/3/2007

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(1,619,700)

Percent Change ………. -20.9%

Annual Appreciation … -7.2%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$4,995,000 ………. Asking Price

$999,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.07% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$3,996,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$1,042,522 ………. Income Requirement

$21,623 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$4329 ………. Property Tax

$750 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$416 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$475 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$27,593 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$2395 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$4740 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$1981 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$624 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$23,064 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$49,950 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$49,950 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$39,960 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$999,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$1,138,860 ………. Total Cash Costs

$353,500 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$1,492,360 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 40 SALT BUSH Irvine, CA 92603

——————————————————————————

Beds: 5

Baths: 5 full 2 part baths

Home size: 7,150 sq ft

($699 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 20,150 sq ft

Year Built: 2006

Days on Market: 28

Listing Updated: 40280

MLS Number: U10001628

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Tract: Shdc

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

This property is in backup or contingent offer status.

Live La Dolce Vita in Shady Canyon at this tremendous Tuscan-inspired estate on one of the enclave's most sought-after oversized lots. Gracing the top of a scenic promontory, the property soaks in panoramic vistas of the verdant hillsides – while also offering the ultimate in privacy at the end of a cul-de-sac with only one neighbor. Encompassing more than 7,100 square feet of relaxed elegance, the estate provides 5 bedrooms and 5 and 2-half baths, including a secluded guest casita. Designed for alfresco living in all seasons, the estate features expansive living 'suites,' where disappearing doors create a seamless transition from indoor to outdoor spaces. A stylish formal living room opens to a sheltered loggia and to the sparkling hillside pool/spa, cabana and sun-drenched dining terrace beyond. Even the lantern-lit entry portico, with its breathtaking reclaimed brick barrel-vaulted gallery, sets the stage for unparalleled entertaining.

These photographs are beautiful.

.

The Cash Value of Real Estate Explained

With an understanding of the relationship between mortgage interest rates, capitalization rates and market rents, the cash value of real estate can be readily calculated. Today, I show you how.

Irvine Home Address … 1 WINTERSWEET Way Irvine, CA 92612

Resale Home Price …… $1,188,000

{book1}

I wanna be a billionaire so fricking bad

Buy all of the things I never had

Uh, I wanna be on the cover of Forbes magazine

Smiling next to Oprah and the Queen

I swear the world better prepare

For when I’m a billionaire

Travie McCoy — Billionaire

Most people purchase real estate in California because they believe they will get rich. Few want to spend money to provide a home for their family as most expect their home to provide money for the family. Houses are the new wage earners, not through rental cashflow but through appreciation. Life doesn't work that way. Real estate can be a profitable cashflow investment, and it can make people rich — not through speculation on buying and selling, but through owning for positive cashflow.

Cash value of real property

Establishing the cash value of real property requires an understanding of risk and relative rates of investment return. Today, we will review these basics and apply a little simple math to show how to value real estate based on its cashflow value.

Cashflow investment is very different than speculation. The value obtained from owning a cashflow investment does not come from the change in the assets resale price; the value comes from the cash the investment provides while it is owned. In contrast, a speculative investment derives its value from the change in resale price that presumably goes up. Sometimes speculative investments provide cashflow, but in the case of California real estate, speculative investments often have a strongly negative cashflow because people over pay and over leverage themselves in order to speculate.

Since a cashflow investment relies on positive cashflow to derive value, the investment is best analyzed with an assumed permanent holding period. Appreciation or depreciation is not considered as it is not important to the investment's performance. Potential changes in asset value may be important if the investor needs to liquidate for other reasons, but a resale value at a later date is not a major consideration in analyzing the investment.

Also, since a cashflow investment needs positive cashflow to warrant consideration, the investment must perform immediately upon purchase. Once cashflow investors begin projecting future increases in rents to justify a purchase price, they are entering the fantasy world of speculation and failing to make a wise cashflow investment decision. Nearly everyone in California looks at property in this foolish way.

To properly analyze a rental real estate investment, the property must provide a minimum return in the first year of ownership without regard to future resale value. If rosy projections of the future occur, that is a bonus; if they don't the investment is still likely to perform as planned. That is low-risk investing.

Equity and Debt

If you analyze nearly any property in coastal California, the capitalization rate (the measure of cash return) is very low, generally between 3% and 4%. With mortgage interest rates at 5%, such low capitalization rates are unwarranted. Why would anyone want to earn 3% in an equity position when they could invest in mortgage debt an earn 5%? Most do this because they expect rapid appreciation.

Equity should trade at a premium to debt. Just as a second mortgage carries a higher interest rate than a first mortgage, equity should carry a higher cap rate than debt because equity is a subordinate claim to real estate. Landlords must pay the mortgage before they pay themselves. If the mortgage is greater than the rent, the landlord loses money. Similarly, if the landlord sells a rental property, the debt is paid first, and any remainder is paid to the landlord. Given the subordinate position and the associated risk, smart equity demands a premium for subordination. One of the surest signs of overvalued real estate is cap rates that are lower than mortgage interest rates.

Of course, California speculators do not see it this way. Fools believe prices rise very quickly and go up forever, and they see debt as a tool that positions them to capture this appreciation. It works well during market rallies, but it is devastating when prices crumble — and prices do crumble because appreciation in excess of wage growth is not sustainable. Speculators chasing the dream of appreciation pay too much for real estate, and in doing so, they push cap rates down well below the cost of debt.

Advantages of equity

There are two main advantages of taking an equity position in real estate versus a debt position:

  1. Equity returns are perpetual because it is ownership. Debt can be paid off and retired whereas equity can be kept forever and passed on through multiple generations.
  2. Equity returns rise as rents increase with wage inflation whereas prudent debt is fixed. Adjustable rate debt may go up or down with interest rates, but it will never see steady growth like an equity position.

California speculators believe these advantages warrant paying a large premium to own real estate; however, overpaying for real estate reduces the return and negates much of the advantage of ownership. Premiums are not infinite.

The equity premium

When I say that equity carries a premium to debt, it is easy to get confused about what that means for pricing. For capitalization rates to exceed the cost of debt, prices must be low. Obtaining an equity premium means paying less for a property, not paying more. The relationship between the amount invested and the return on that investment is inverse; In other words, the more you pay, the worse your return and the lower your cap rate.

As a general rule, equity should trade at a 20% to 40% premium to debt. For instance, at 5% interest rates, capitalization rates should be between 6% and 7%:

5% x 120% = 6%

5% x 140% = 7%

Last week I profiled a cashflow property in Corona. The capitalization rate exceeded the mortgage interest rate and fell within the parameters listed above. That property is an excellent cashflow investment.

Cash value of real estate based on mortgage interest rates and monthly rent

Based on the relationship between debt and equity explained above, it is possible to produce a simple spreadsheet that relates mortgage interest rates and monthly debt to arrive at a properties cashflow value.

The table below is loaded with information. The two assumptions are the expense ratio which is how much of the income goes toward taxes, insurance, upkeep, and other expenses, and the other assumption is the equity premium I described above.

The first four lines show the calculation of net operating income from monthly rent. I have selected rents showing a range typical across properties here in Irvine. The columns to the right show the capitalization rate based on the mortgage rate as I described above.

The table itself shows the resulting cashflow value when you divide net operating income by the capitalization rate.

I imagine many who view these numbers in Irvine think they are rather quaint but completely meaningless. However, when you look at properties where values are not inflated — like the property in Corona — the numbers illustrate a basic truth about bottoming values in a real estate market. Once the equity premium over debt reaches a viable threshold, money is attracted to a market and prices are stabilized. Large swaths of Riverside County, most of Las Vegas, and much of the Phoenix markets are at prices consistent with positive cashflow valuations. In short, they are as cheap as they need to be for cashflow investors to come in an clean up the mess.

This doesn't mean we are at the bottom in some of these markets because the huge supply of current and future foreclosures will continue to put pressure on prices, but cashflow investors will buy anyway because to them, if prices fall more, it is more reason to buy. Cashflow opportunities as good as what is currently available in Las Vegas are very rare, and cashflow investors are buying everything available.

I am very bullish on Las Vegas, not because prices will rise any time soon, but because prices are very attractive on a cashflow basis.

Today's featured property

Today's featured property clearly illustrates how clueless speculators are to cashflow values here in Irvine. The property is being marketed as a cashflow property. It is occupied by 6 students.

First, I believe marketing this property as a multi-family property in a single family neighborhood is against code, and since this property is in my neighborhood, I plan to forward this listing to code enforcement and see if they will do something about it.

Second, for this property to be worth almost $1.2M, these six students must be paying a combined $12,000 a month rent. I would be surprised if they pay half that amount. It would take a very foolish investor to pay double the cashflow value for a property that is not zoned for the occupation necessary to obtain the value. On a cashflow basis, this property is not worth what the owner paid for it, yet this guy plans to make almost $500K. If buyers in Irvine are that stupid, everyone should quit their jobs and start doing illegal rental conversions.

This is one of the dumbest ideas I have seen. Perhaps the guys who remodeled the monstrosity at 2 Angell can go this route to get out from under their albatross. If this guy gets $1.2M, anything is possible.

Irvine Home Address … 1 WINTERSWEET Way Irvine, CA 92612

Resale Home Price … $1,188,000

Home Purchase Price … $700,000

Home Purchase Date …. 4/25/2009

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $416,720

Percent Change ………. 69.7%

Annual Appreciation … 49.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$1,188,000 ………. Asking Price

$237,600 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.07% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$950,400 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$247,951 ………. Income Requirement

$5,143 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$1030 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$99 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$180 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$6,451 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$1413 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$1127 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$471 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$149 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$4,531 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$11,880 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$11,880 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$9,504 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$237,600 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$270,864 ………. Total Cash Costs

$69,400 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$340,264 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 1 WINTERSWEET Way Irvine, CA 92612

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 2 full 1 part baths

Home size: 2,500 sq ft

($475 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 3,840 sq ft

Year Built: 1966

Days on Market: 15

Listing Updated: 40291

MLS Number: H10044068

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Tract: Shdc

——————————————————————————

6 suites fully rented to UCI students. Beautiful home in the heart of Irvine University Park is surrounded by acres of parks, trees, and greenbelt – a tremendous health benefit for residents. Corner lot in a cul-de-sac. Total living area 3327 sq ft. profile only shows 2500 sq ft. Previous owner added 549 sq ft and current owner added 278 sq ft (both has permits please verify with city). Major remolded on 2008 likes new house. Owner occupy or investment.