Author Archives: IrvineRenter

Should You Walk Away from Home Debt?

For many underwater homeowners, walking away from their mortgage debt is the best financial decision; however, most will not walk away from their mortgages. Enough borrowers will default to make a steady stream of properties like today’s.

806 SILK TREE Irvine, CA 92606 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 806 SILK TREE Irvine, CA 92606
Resale Home Price …… $459,000

{book1}

From the lands lying at the end of World
I am bringing this dress as a gift, it is
Made with the purest silk
She smiled at me,
She never wore the dress
Touching the fabric was like holding
Nothing in your hand

The Silk Dilemma — Elvenking

Nothing in your hand; it is what underwater homedebtors have. They occupy a house — just like renters do — but most of them do so at a huge premium to renting. Underwater homedebtors have no equity; what they do have is the dream of equity in the future. They have a position in a financial market that most resembles an option contract that is out-of-the-money.

People who are underwater today and paying a premium are still hoping they will get a return on those premium dollars when their house value rises above their mortgage and puts them back in-the-money. Mostly this is based on fantasy or Zillow Zestimates or some other such nonsense, when in reality, their property values will likely decline further, and it will take much longer than they want for prices to come back. That is the way financial bubbles deflate.

Most people will not walk away. Most will continue to suffer in silence wait the decade or more for prices to recover. People become invested in the process. Once they have held on for two or three years too long, they feel committed to seeing it through, and many will. This was the experience of the early 90s, and since that bubble wasn’t near so massive, the market did recover in 8-10 years and life went on.

{book3}

The Great Housing Bubble was much, much larger than the bubble of the 90s, and we have not deflated back to stable price levels yet. Those that hang on will likely wait much longer than those who bought in the last bubble.

Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis

Brent T. White

Abstract

“Contrary to reports that homeowners are increasingly “walking away” from their mortgages, most homeowners continue to make their payments even when they are significantly underwater. This article suggests that most homeowners do not strategically default as a result of two emotional forces: 1) the desire to avoid the shame and guilt of foreclosure; and 2) exaggerated anxiety over foreclosure’s perceived consequences. Moreover, these emotional constraints are actively cultivated by the government and other social control agents in order to induce homeowners to ignore market and legal norms under which strategic default might not only be a viable option, but also the wisest financial decision. Unlike lenders, individual homeowners have thus generally not acted to minimize their losses and have born a disproportionate share of the burden from the housing collapse.”

WalkingAway1029.pdf

From the main text:

“This article suggest that most underwater homeowners don’t default as a result of two emotional forces: 1) the desire to avoid the shame or guilt associated with foreclosure; and 2) fear over the perceived consequences of foreclosure – consequences that are in actuality much less severe than most homeowners have been led to believe. Moreover, fear, shame, and guilt are not mere “transaction costs” that homeowners calculate according to their own personal tolerance for each. Rather, these emotional constraints are actively cultivated by the government, the financial industry, and other social control agents in order to induce individual homeowners to act in ways that are against their own self interest, but which are – wrongly this article contends – argued to be socially beneficial.”

I totally agree with the observation made here. The powers-that-be are working in a coordinated effort to convince people to keep hanging on, not because it helps the borrower, but because it benefits the lender. The culmination of these efforts is a series of Bailouts and False Hopes.

“Unlike lenders who follow market norms, individual homeowners are encouraged to behave in accordance with social norms of “personal responsibility” and “promise-keeping.” Thus, individual homeowners tend to ignore market and legal norms under which
strategic default might not only be a viable option but also the wisest financial decision. As a result, individual homeowners have born a disproportionate share of the costs of the housing meltdown.”

When a borrower defaults at a bank, it is a tiny blip on some complicated financial statement of a large, faceless lender — the same lender that made a fortune putting the borrower into an unstable loan to begin with. Lenders made the problem, but they are trying, hoping, praying they can pass off the responsibility to everyone else — particularly underwater homeowners. It is the individual homeowners who bear the greatest burden and it is the borrowers who will pay the price through a decade of debt slavery with the feeble hope of appreciation to bait them on.

{book2}

IMO, this is where it gets even worse. For the whole system to hold together, kool aid intoxication must be sustained. If the underwater homeowners truly accepted the idea that prices may not come back in a reasonable time — and prices will never come back as quickly as homedebtors imagine — people will default in larger numbers.

In one of the more damning portions of the paper, Dr. White writes:

… social control agents such as the government, the media, and the financial industry use both moral suasion and disinformation to cultivate these emotional constraints in homeowners.

Is he a conspiracy-theory nutter, or is he an accurate observer of what is going on? I will let you decide.

Should You Walk Away?

I found a link to a site, Pay or Go. With a few simple inputs the site will tell you whether or not it is in your best interest financially to walk away. It also has a number of informative links to major newspaper articles on the subject.

The calculator on the site has an important note that drives to the heart of the problem: people believe house prices appreciate faster than they really do.

IS IT IN MY ECONOMIC INTEREST TO WALK AWAY?

You decide. This calculator is just a tool to help. Numerous variables are involved but the biggest is probably your assessment of the future of housing pricing. No one can predict future prices, but the conventional wisdom says that it is probably not realistic to believe that housing prices will increase by more than 4%-8% per year on average.

It seems obvious to me that one of problems people were having with this tool was that they put in assumptions for appreciation that are too aggressive. It is the same kind of thinking that inflated the bubble.

Faith in market kool aid is not enough. With a massive overhead inventory of those who want or need to get out at breakeven (including the lenders and their shadow inventory), no amount of wishful thinking is going to make prices rise. Timing Does Matter. Low interest rates may help cushion the blow, but peak prices are not right around the corner.

I am starting to believe that kool aid intoxication may never go away, particularly now that it is in the government’s best interest to keep it tasty and keep it flowing.

806 SILK TREE Irvine, CA 92606 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 806 SILK TREE Irvine, CA 92606

Resale Home Price … $459,000

Income Requirement ……. $95,908
Downpayment Needed … $91,800
20% Down Conventional

Home Purchase Price … $650,000
Home Purchase Date …. 6/29/2007

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(218,540)
Percent Change ………. -29.4%
Annual Appreciation … -13.7%

Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.08%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $1,989
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $2,800
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $2,300

Property Details for 806 SILK TREE Irvine, CA 92606

Beds 3
Baths 4 baths
Size 868 sq ft
($329 / sq ft)
Lot Size n/a
Year Built 2007
Days on Market 62
Listing Updated 11/7/2009
MLS Number 9405653
Property Type Condominium, Townhouse, Residential
Community Columbus Grove
Tract Oakp

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

A MUST SEE! 3BED+4BA+3CAR GARAGE W/WIDE OPEN VIEW IN PRIME LOCATION. HARD WOOD FLOORS & UPGRADED CARPET,GRANITE COUNTERS IN KITCHEN, GE PROFILE STAINLESS STEEL APPLIANCES,SPA,CLUB HOUSE, TENNIS CT. CITY LIGHTS, NEAR THE DISTRICT FOR ALL SHOPPING, DINING & ENTERTAINMENT,BIKING, RUN/WALK.

ALL CAPS

A MUST SEE! Wow! I am so motivated….

I could have titled this post, “How to Lose a Fortune Quickly.” A 30% drop in just over 2 years is remarkable… documenting the transaction that began 5 months after I started warning buyers on the IHB… that is priceless.

IHB News 12-19-2009

I hope you are enjoying your pre-holiday weekend. Are you finished shopping for the holidays? Spend or save — what’s an American supposed to do?

41 GILLMAN St Irvine, CA 92612 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 41 GILLMAN St Irvine, CA 92612
Resale Home Price …… $510,000

{book1}

The battled starts adversaries
We bathe in our blood
The worst is yet to come
We’ve reached the covenant
To kill what we have started

Escape the Fate — The Guillotine

IHB News

When I first started writing for the blog, there was no set format or template for anything, so each post was made from scratch or with a little cut and paste. Over time, with the desire to improve accuracy, deliver more information, and do it quickly (and still have a life), I developed an Excel Spreadsheet I use to create the structure of a post.

Each week I sit down to select properties and write my posts for the week (yes, I batch them). My first task is to look up the average APR on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and put it into my template. Each property I evaluate will be using the same interest rate assumption, and as long as the post isn’t delayed too long, the rates are current. I use the average APR instead of the average interest rate because I want to look at the true cost of financing instead of the rate that gets attention.

For each post, I need 6 specific data points plus the data dump from the MLS. The key data points are (1) address, (2) asking price, (3) original purchase price, (4) original purchase date, (5) Mello Roos fees, and (6) HOA Fees. Information below the property details is cut and paste from the IDX so there are no inaccuracies in typing.

The cool part is how much calculation goes on in the background to generate the tables of numbers.

The Income Requirement started out as a simple 25% of purchase price. I wanted to emphasize to people back in 2007 to the fact that house prices bottomed at 4-times income, and if you go back to traditional financing, you need much larger incomes to support the prices at the time. Well, that served its purpose, but to give a more accurate vision of the financing picture, I created a formula that takes traditional underwriting standards to calculate the income it takes to support the asking price at current interest rates. People can judge for themselves if a property is affordable or desirable.

The Downpayment needed used to be a simple 20% of the purchase price. Again, back in 2007, I wanted to emphasize to people who were not accustomed to 20% downpayments that these monsters were coming back, and the sticker prices on houses was going to have to adjust to the fact that nobody has a downpayment (cue FHA). Now, the formula I use is more nuanced; it displays 20% down for any property over $417,000 (a somewhat arbitrary cutoff), and it displays 3.5% down for any property under $417,000. The assumption is that lower priced properties are probably first-time buyers using FHA financing, and their financial picture is different than the 20% down buyer.

I used to get out a hand calculator and type the details of each transaction to calculate the total profit and loss. I am amazed I did not make more mistakes. Now it is in a spreadsheet, and I accurately represent the amount the owner (or lender) netted after sales commissions. A benefit of this is that I can accurately measure the financial performance of the “trade” — since so many are obsessed with making a fortune in real estate, it seems appropriate to see the truth, good or bad.

The calculation of annual appreciation is the most complex of the ones I make. It is really an internal rate of return calculation where I assume the purchase price was spent in period 1, and the proceeds come back later. The calculation is difficult because the holding period for houses can range from a few months to 30 years so getting a stable number of periods that did not crash the calculation was tough. I finally duplicated the formula in three different time periods, and I take the result of the most precise time period that does not return an error… I think this is probably only interesting to Excel buffs, but…

The Mortgage Payment, Monthly Cash Outlays and the Monthly Cost of Ownership are directly from our fundamental value reports. I don’t display it in the post, but my spreadsheet has the complete breakdown of the cost of ownership including the Mello Roos and HOA fees. I investigate those for each property, but I don’t directly post the result. I can if people are interested, but I want to keep the size of the posts manageable and the content relevant.

So that is where we are with the post information and presentation. Sometimes the interesting part of the post is in these numbers, and sometimes it is not. Either way, the data is always available, and I try to make it as accurate as possible.

Housing Bubble News from Patrick.net

Luxury-House Owners in U.S. Walk Away More Than Others (bloomberg.com)
Debtor’s Dilemma: Pay the Mortgage or Walk Away (online.wsj.com)
Shadow inventory looms over housing market (centralvalleybusinesstimes.com)
Federal government is selling lots of houses in South Florida (sun-sentinel.com)
More People Remaining Unemployed Longer (courant.com)
Spend or save — what’s an American supposed to do? (latimes.com)
Banks walk away, while telling you not to! (market-ticker.denninger.net)
Citigroup to stop admitting losses for 30 days (usatoday.com)
More foreclosures on horizon in LV (lvrj.com)
Housing’s Treacherous Path: From 44% Houseownership to 70% (financemymoney.com)
Many counties in California are still overpriced. Massively overpriced. (doctorhousingbubble.com)
Foreclosure buyer demand dips as supply mounts (reuters.com)
Realtor: “All the CRAZIES are out there buying now” (healdsburgbubble.blogspot.com)
Underwater Houseowner Should Have Waited Longer To Buy (online.wsj.com)
The Fed will hike rates — in 2011 (money.cnn.com)
The biggest real estate flops of 2009 (finance.yahoo.com)
Luxury house markets show bigger % price cuts (lansner.freedomblogging.com)
California house values likely to be down in 2010 (nctimes.com)
Nearly 650,000 are long-term jobless in CA (economy.freedomblogging.com)
Another wave of Phoenix-area foreclosures forseen (google.com)
Why a 35% Decline in Housing Values Would Be Good for the Nation (Charles Hugh Smith)
Weathering the Downhill Slope of Recreational Real Estate (nytimes.com)
Fannie Mae Losses May Exceed $200Bn (housingwire.com)
America’s municipal-bond market: State of pay (economist.com)
How buying a house is gambling (seekingalpha.com)
Los Angeles-area foreclosure rate increases in October (latimesblogs.latimes.com)
California housing market will face another bad year in 2010 (doctorhousingbubble.com)
Foreclosures fall, but banks bracing for next big wave (csmonitor.com)
U.S. House rejects mortgage “cramdown” measure (news.yahoo.com)
Goldman Trades Shouldn’t Get U.S. Aid, Volcker Says (bloomberg.com)
Interest Rates Are Low, but Banks Balk at Refinancing (nytimes.com)
There is no “Free Market” Housing Solution (newgeography.com)

Housing Bubble News

Payback For Bernanke

ForbesJoshua Zumbrun‎Dec 17, 2009‎

Worse, he denied that the housing bubble was a concern, and as a highly-regarded Harvard- and MIT-educated economist, who went on to chair the economics

Which Bubbles Should The Fed Pop?

Atlantic OnlineDaniel Indiviglio‎Dec 14, 2009‎

The tech bubble of the late 90s, for example, didn’t hurt many people who lived outside Silicon Valley or didn’t own many tech stocks. The housing bubble

FHA Troubles Are Likely to Curtail Demand

Monthly ReviewDean Baker‎Dec 12, 2009‎

It seems that many policymakers even now have not come to the grips with the housing bubble. They fail to recognize that the surge in house prices from 1996 .

41 GILLMAN St Irvine, CA 92612 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 41 GILLMAN St Irvine, CA 92612

Resale Home Price … $510,000

Income Requirement ……. $105,721
Downpayment Needed … $102,000
20% Down Conventional

Home Purchase Price … $265,000
Home Purchase Date …. 8/31/2001

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $214,400
Percent Change ………. 92.5%
Annual Appreciation … 7.5%

Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.01%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $2,193
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $2,800
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $2,240

Property Details for 41 GILLMAN St Irvine, CA 92612

Beds 2
Baths 2 baths
Size 1,594 sq ft
($320 / sq ft)
Lot Size 6,608 sq ft
Year Built 1965
Days on Market 85
Listing Updated 12/8/2009
MLS Number S598344
Property Type Single Family, Residential
Community University Park
Tract V1

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

Beautiful single level home, 2BD/2BA + den. Nicely upgraded, well maintained, wood flooring throughout. Spacious kitchen. Bright, open floor plan. Fireplace in living room and den. Large lot which includes a spacious back yard and an enclosed front yard. Walking distance from association pools/club house. Conveniently located in University Park, top schools. This unit is a must see unit.

When I first saw this property listed as a short sale, I figured it was a familiar story; Irvine homeowner more than doubles mortgage and ends up walking away. This one is not quite so clear. From my data source, it shows about $310,000 in mortgage debt and about $90,000 in mortgage equity withdrawal. There may be an mortgage or refi that isn’t showing up in my data source to explain why this would be a short sale.

Maximizing Home Ownership

It is long-standing government policy to maximize home ownership, but is that really a good idea?

30 GRAY DOVE   Irvine, CA 92618  front 2

Irvine Home Address … 30 GRAY DOVE Irvine, CA 92618
Resale Home Price …… $909,000

{book1}

Here comes the action
Here comes at last
Lord give me reaction
Lord give me your chance

You should follow me down
In satellite towns
There’s no colour and no sound
I’ve been ten feet underground

I gotta get out of this satellite town

Black and White Town — Doves

I don’t know who the blogger is over at Finance My Money, but the posts are excellent. Below is an exerpt from Housing’s Treacherous Path: From 44 Percent
Homeownership to 70 Percent. The Levittown Dream and Nothing Down
Madness. How a Nation lost its way with Homeownership
.

The cookie cutter planned community madness started with Levittown
after World War II. These towns were built in communities in New York,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico. The communities were built
with speed and efficiency. It is interesting that the communities
started out as rental units and within two days 2,000 units had been
rented. With demand surging the properties were then sold as purchase
units with the help of the Federal Housing Administration (more on them
later).

Levittown is now used in a derogatory sense to highlight massive
cookie cutter suburbia. Many people in these communities actually
enjoyed their towns but critics were everywhere. Yet we went from
Levittowns to McMansion Villages with the twist that homes were bigger
for ever smaller families. Once the credit markets were freed from any
shackles by deregulation banks pushed the limits on the borrowing
population. That is how places like California saw home prices triple in less than a decade.

The problem with believing that homeownership is part of the
American Dream is that it misses the fundamental economic question. By
labeling something a dream it makes it harder to confront with factual
data. This reminds me of the parents that let their kids audition for
American Idol even though they sound like a cat in heat. Many people
should not be homeowners and that is okay. Yet politically this must
be like kryptonite because who in the world is going to want to pop
that dream? Can you imagine being labeled the anti-homeownership
candidate?

This insistence on allowing the homeownership dream to permeate the
country has pushed the homeownership rate to unsupportable levels:

home-ownership-rates

Now during the Great Depression homeownership dropped to 44
percent. It is also the case that during this time many loans were
also based on 5 year balloons which made it hard for many to borrow,
especially in the bank failing environment of the depression. Yet
after that bump, homeownership increased from 1941 all the way to our
housing peak in 2005 reaching a peak near 70 percent. Yet very few
even bothered to ask if this was even good for our economy? Clearly it
wasn’t.

{book4}

I discussed this issue in The Great Housing Bubble:

Before a policy can be formulated, there needs to be an open
discussion of the goal of maximizing home ownership. Owning a home has
become synonymous with the American Dream. Every Presidential
administration has had the expansion of home ownership as one of its
goals. The tax code is structured to give tax breaks to home owners to
encourage home ownership. The idea of home ownership is deeply embedded
in our culture.

Managing the rate of home ownership is analogous to managing the
rate of economic growth. It is not the policy of our government or the
Federal Reserve to maximize economic growth. Instead, the Federal
Reserve balances economic growth with inflation and tries to manage
economic growth to keep it on a sustainable path. This policy grew out
of our painful history of economic cycles of boom and bust. It was
realized that economic growth must be tempered to a sustainable level
to minimize the damage of economic downturns. Similarly, the rate of
home ownership should not be maximized. Home ownership will never reach
100%, and this should not be the goal of housing policy. Just as
economic growth is tempered by the rate of inflation, home ownership
rates are tempered by the rate of default of mortgage loan programs.

The harsh reality is that a certain percentage of the population
lacks the desire, discipline or responsibility requisite to be a
homeowner. There is a percentage of the population who do not want to
be homeowners. Many people require mobility to pursue career
opportunities or other goals. Some people like the freedom of renting
and do not want the responsibilities of home ownership that go beyond
monthly payments. There are some people who simply do not make housing
payments consistently. This group is not capable of sustaining home
ownership. There may be opportunities for policy initiatives to
increase education to make this group smaller, but there will always be
some people who cannot or will not do what is necessary to keep a
house: make their payments. There is a percentage of the general
population who should be renters.

There is a natural, sustainable level of home ownership. Home
ownership rates in the United States increased markedly at the end of
World War Two as the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage became the commonly
accepted vehicle of home finance. In the 60 years that followed, home
ownership rates stabilized between 60% and 65% through good economic
times and recessions and interest rates ranging from below 6% to above
18%. Subprime lending demonstrated that increasing the home ownership
rate through the widespread use of lending programs with high default
rates is inherently unstable. Managing the home ownership rate is not a
subject of governmental policy. Any legislative initiative to
specifically limit home ownership rates would be politically
unpalatable; however, either a market-based initiative or a legislative
initiative that prevents the widespread use of loan programs subject to
high rates of default rates would effectively manage the home ownership
rate and prevent painful declines in that rate. Home ownership rates
decline as homeowners become renters, a painful process known as
foreclosure.

Do you think we should be using the GSEs to put people into homes when they can’t sustain ownership? That is what we are doing.

30 GRAY DOVE   Irvine, CA 92618  front 2

Irvine Home Address … 30 GRAY DOVE Irvine, CA 92618

Resale Home Price … $909,000

Income Requirement ……. $188,432
Downpayment Needed … $181,800
20% Down Conventional

Home Purchase Price … $1,215,500
Home Purchase Date …. 12/13/2006

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(361,040)
Percent Change ………. -25.2%
Annual Appreciation … -9.6%

Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.01%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $3,908
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $5,630
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $4,350

Property Details for 30 GRAY DOVE Irvine, CA 92618

Beds 3
Baths 4 baths
Size 2,717 sq ft
($335 / sq ft)
Lot Size 4,481 sq ft
Year Built 2006
Days on Market 1
Listing Updated 12/11/2009
MLS Number P713959
Property Type Single Family, Residential
Community Portola Springs
Tract Lasc

According to the listing agent, this listing is a bank owned (foreclosed) property.

Portola Springs beauty! Three bedrooms upstairs- each with their own attached bath! Downstairs comes with charming court yard and living area- kitchen boasts stainless steel appliances, and granite countertops. Come see this one this weekens as it won’t last!

There are a few IHB readers who have told me they looked at properties over $1,000,000 in Portola Springs in early 2007 and after reading the blog, they decided to wait. Today’s featured property puts those families about $350,000 ahead of the purchaser of today’s featured property. Based on the purchase date, my early analysis posts came out two months too late. Sorry.

This property was purchased for $1,215,500 on 12/13/2006. The owner used a $972,160 first mortgage, a $121,520 HELOC and a $121,820 downpayment. The downpayment may explain why he held on so long…

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 09/18/2009
Document Type: Notice of Sale (aka Notice of Trustee’s Sale)

Foreclosure Record
Recording Date: 06/12/2009
Document Type: Notice of Default

The lender, US Bank National Association, bought the property back for $887,826 on 11/12/2009.

Irvine Housing Blog No Kool Aid

I hope you have enjoyed this week, and thank you for reading the Irvine Housing Blog: astutely observing
the Irvine home market and combating California Kool-Aid since
September 2006.

Have a great weekend,

Irvine Renter

Unemployment and Foreclosures

As unemployment keeps rising so will foreclosures; in fact, foreclosures will not peak until well after unemployment does.

35 POTOMAC Irvine, CA 92620 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 35 POTOMAC Irvine, CA 92620
Resale Home Price …… $599,999

{book1}

I been laid off from work
My rent is due
My kids all need
Brand new shoes

So I went to the bank
To see what they could do
They said son – looks like bad luck
Got-a hold on you

Money’s Too Tight to Mention — Simply Red

A recent Bloomberg article, U.S. Foreclosures to Reach Record 3.9 Million in 2009, “We are a long way from a recovery,” John Quigley,
economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley,
said in an interview. “You can’t start to see improvement in
the housing market until after unemployment peaks.” The UCLA Anderson Forecast Orange County, believes foreclosures can decline in the face of rising unemployment. I don’t know why. As I noted:

The recession in the early 90s was caused by a slowdown in housing
and real estate just like this one. That recession also saw slowdowns
in defense contracting and other industries that made problems even
worse. The recession ended in 1992, but the effect lingered as people
had to be retrained to work in other fields, so unemployment did not
peak until 1993. The delay between the end of the recession and the
peak in unemployment is well documented
.

There were many reasons for the foreclosure crisis of the mid 90s,
and we have all of those problems back with more force. The
foreclosures caused by unemployment do not occur on the day a borrower
loses their job. The delay caused by draining all sources of savings,
maxing out credit lines and utilizing legal maneuvers can slow the
process for two or three years — as we have seen with properties
profiled here daily; therefore, it is reasonable to assume foreclosures
will peak two or three years after a major unemployment crisis
. In
fact, I would argue it is unreasonable to assume that foreclosures have
peaked for this cycle — as the UCLA Anderson Forecast does —
considering unemployment has not peaked, and the newly unemployed will
cause defaults.

Last time around house prices bottomed as foreclosures peaked. It is
unclear if either one caused the other. For example, if house prices
bottomed simply because prices were affordable and supply was low, then
foreclosures may peak not because borrowers are not distressed, but
because distressed borrowers can sell into the resale market rather
than go through foreclosure. Remember, foreclosures are not a sign of
distress as much as they are a sign of distress that cannot be masked
by selling in the open market.

You can buy a house if you plan to be there for a long time and you recognize prices will probably go lower. If you are buying a house because you think prices have bottomed, and you better hurry because you might be priced out, you will be upset and disappointed.

35 POTOMAC Irvine, CA 92620 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 35 POTOMAC Irvine, CA 92620

Resale Home Price … $599,999

Income Requirement ……. $124,377
Downpayment Needed … $120,000
20% Down Conventional

Home Purchase Price … $540,000
Home Purchase Date …. 3/15/2004

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $23,999
Percent Change ………. 11.1%
Annual Appreciation … 1.8%

Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.01%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $2,580
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $3,240
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $2,580

Property Details for 35 POTOMAC Irvine, CA 92620

Beds 3
Baths 1 full 2 part baths
Size 1,424 sq ft
($421 / sq ft)
Lot Size 3,500 sq ft
Year Built 1985
Days on Market 4
Listing Updated 12/9/2009
MLS Number S598384
Property Type Single Family, Residential
Community Northwood
Tract Gl

Highly upgraded two story home with nicely landscaped wrap around yard, attached 2 car garage; hardwood floors,totally remodeled kitchen with granite counters, added counter space; new cabinets; custom window coverings;large master bedroom with ceiling fan; dual sinks in master bath; two closets. This home is gorgeous!! Must see!

Exclamation points and the venerable “Must see.” Typical realtorese.

I do like the photograph of the front of the house. The rich blue sky, the fall colors and the interesting shadows make it a nice photo. I don’t know if it helps sell this house as the front yard looks unkempt, but it is a cool photo.

When the current owners bought this place back in 2004, they must have felt they had reason to celebrate. They paid $540,000 on 3/15/2005, but after waiting 60 days, they managed to get an appraisal for $594,000, and opened a HELOC bringing their debt to that amount. It is possible they simply went through the motions to get the credit line as there are no further refinances after 2004.

Lenders Can Hold Real Estate Indefinitely

Did you know that the only pressure on lenders to dispose of their real estate owned comes from shareholders?

15 MORRO BAY Irvine, CA 92602 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 15 MORRO BAY Irvine, CA 92602
Resale Home Price …… $1,629,000

{book1}

So sure
So sure you are
Nothing can
Touch you now
I need to know
Did you think of me
But you’re forgettng me now
Slow down
Don’t be so
Eager to let me go
Realise it could change you
It could change your mind

Repetition — Blur

Today I briefly want to again Revisit Option ARMs, and I want to address a common misperception about REO; lenders do not have to sell REO due to regulatory pressure. Shareholders may dissuade lenders from becoming real estate investors, but the banking regulators will not.

The Option ARM Kingpins: Who Holds the Elusive Option
ARMs?

$189 Billion Securitized and Outstanding and big Three of Wells
Fargo, JP Morgan, and Bank of America Playing with Time
.

There have been many charts … and much of the confusion is around a few key points:

-1. Banks have been circumspect given the actual number of option ARMs

-2. Many option ARMs are in California (roughly 60 percent of the market)

-3. Many of those behind on payments are now simply not paying their mortgage but banks are not moving

It is hard to quantify the above data since this is something banks
would like to hide. Nearly 60 percent of all current outstanding
option ARMs are in the hard hit state of California.
As many of you know, the median price of a home in California has
fallen by 50 percent. The peak in home prices was reached in 2007, the
last year option ARMs were made in mass. Since that time, option ARMs
were merely ticking financial bombs.

But what if homeowners balk? Many in California are strategically
defaulting. In many cases, unless their mortgage meets with market
rents many will walk away. Also, the California unemployment and
underemployment rate is at 23 percent so no amount of modifying can
help out with a loss of income.

So let us sum up the option ARM market:

option arm market data

$750 billion in option ARMs were originated between 2004 and 2007.
The top 10 option ARM originators cornered over 60 percent of the
market. Of these, many are now part of the too big to fail banks.
We know that $189 billion is still securitized in investor portfolios
while many billions are still on the banks books (i.e., $107 billion
with Wells Fargo and $50 billion with Chase). The bottom line is the
option ARM issue is still here and we will be contending with this for
the next couple of years.

That doesn’t sound very good, does it?

From yesterday’s discussion about Shadow Inventory, matt138, said, “Shadow Shadow inventory – the people who are currently thinking, “why the hell am I still paying if nobody else is?” I did some calculations and my result was: A LOT.”

What I find interesting is how much of the Option ARM problem has already been resolved (probably through foreclosure). If $750B was issued, and only $200B remains, only 20%-25% of the Option ARM problem remains — at least in the form of Option ARMs. Many of these original borrowers already went through short sale, foreclosure or walked away. The Option ARMs didn’t go away due to market sale because the homedebtors were all underwater, and these loans did not go away through successful loan modification because cure rates are very low.

The good news is 75% of the Option ARM holders appear to have defaulted early. The bad news is most of the homes of these borrowers will end up as REO sold on the open market, it is only a matter of when. This problem is going to be stretched out as long as possible, and the abundance of overhead supply will prevent appreciation from saving the market for many years.

Lender’s Options for REO

The lenders I have spoken with are genuinely concerned about the auditors forcing them to reclassify loans. Many lenders are not properly categorizing their loans for accounting purposes — the still have it on their books as if it is a good loan and the borrower is making their payments. Many, many non-performing residential loans are still classified as performing while lenders have the shield of government loan modification programs. The reality is many of these loans are not performing, they are never going to, and lenders are not being forced to recognize this fact until their balance sheet ratios support it.

Regulators are not concerned with what a lender does with the REO it picks up through the foreclosure process as long as the losses are accurately accounted for — in theory. Once the REO department gets a property, the only pressure they get to sell property comes from through management from shareholders.

Shareholder Pressure

People who invest in banks are investing in a business that writes loans and carries loans on its balance sheet. If a balance sheet becomes polluted in the eyes of investors with real estate assets, it starts to look less like a bank and more like a real estate investment trust or a hedge fund. When banks cease to be banks, investors bail out and stock prices crumble — at least that is the belief of bankers, so the management does not want to hold real estate. Also, REO is lingering evidence of prior poor lending practices, and nobody wants to keep that around.

The implication for the market is simple, there will be no forced dump of REO instigated by bank regulators. That isn’t to say we don’t have a huge pig to send through the snake, but it can be digested in smaller pieces rather than one massive chunk. We may (probably will) see a cartel arrangement evolve, but the large amount of supply and the competition to dispose of it will serve as a drag on prices until the inventory is exhausted. In some markets that will take decades.

Direct from an Asset Manager

As part of my work, I go to Building Industry Association meetings on a regular basis. As a courtesy to them, I am keeping my sources anonymous, but should any of you wish to attend a BIA meeting, you can see and here these people yourself. The meetings are open to the public for a fee.

At a recent meeting I listened to asset managers from two major West Coast banks. I asked one of these asset managers to detail his banks policy toward REO based on market conditions. He said that in markets where they do not see recovery in a longer-term horizon (think Lancaster), they may sell at reduced prices to clean up the mess; however, if they do see the market recovering in a reasonable time, they will hold the property, and perhaps even rent it out while values improved. In short, the REO departments of these banks are empowered to act as responsible asset managers trying to obtain the greatest recovery for the bank. This also means there will be no massive inventory dump forced by a government regulator.

Each bank will evaluate its own financial circumstances, its exposure to the market and other factors and pursue a policy of maximizing recovery while disposing of these assets. Certain banks will dump in some markets and hold in others. It will be the chaotic collapse of a cartel with much volatility, and most likely slowly declining prices for several years as lenders slowly release their inventory to obtain price recovery.

Blue skies are not here yet.

15 MORRO BAY Irvine, CA 92602 kitchen

Irvine Home Address … 15 MORRO BAY Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price … $1,629,000

Income Requirement ……. $337,684
Downpayment Needed … $325,800
20% Down Conventional

Home Purchase Price … $791,875 ???
Home Purchase Date …. 3/28/2001

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $739,385
Percent Change ………. 105.7%
Annual Appreciation … 8.3%

Mortgage Interest Rate ………. 5.01%
Monthly Mortgage Payment … $7,004
Monthly Cash Outlays ………… $9,040
Monthly Cost of Ownership … $6,540

Property Details for 15 MORRO BAY Irvine, CA 92602

Gourmet Kitchen Award

Beds 4
Baths 4 full 1 part baths
Size 4,464 sq ft
($365 / sq ft)
Lot Size 8,285 sq ft
Year Built 2000
Days on Market 4
Listing Updated 12/10/2009
MLS Number P713549
Property Type Single Family, Residential
Community Northpark
Tract Cmbr

**Bring your checkbook & RUN…DONT WALK!** Drop-Dead GORGEOUS & *PRICED TO STEAL!* PREMIUM GREENBELT Location, Serene PRIVACY & Tranquil PARK VIEWS! Rare *OVERSIZED LOT* w/Huge ENTERTAINERS BACKYARD! Location! LOCATION! **THIS HOME SURPASSES EVERY HOUSE IN THIS PRICE RANGE!** Must See to Believe! Exquisite Architecture w/Romatic Archways, Dramatic 10-Ft Ceilings, Walls of Windows, Splendor of Natural Light & Inviting French Doors that Welcome Outdoor Living & Entertaining! Spacious Open Design offers 4 Bedrooms w/Bath en suite (Including Main Floor BR & BA) & BONUS ROOM (Optional 5th BR) plus Office, Exercise Rm/Study, & Elegant Formal Living & Dining. Huge Gourmet Kitchen w/Chefs Island Opens to Charming Breakfast Nook & Generous Family Room w/access to Sprawling Backyard & Custom BBQ. An Entertainers Delight! Master w/Retreat, Fireplace & Huge Closet plus Generous secondary bedrooms w/walk-in closets & tranquil park views! EVERY ATTENTION TO DETAIL! *ACT FAST!* Only ONE like this!!!

This description is awful on every level. It contains (1) RANDOM CAPS LOCK, (2) three exclamation points, (3) random asterisks, (4) numerous cliches, (5) over-the-top writing, (6) Intermittent Caps, (7) cheap techniques to create urgency, (8) and a general lack of substance. If the nonsense were strpped from the description, the number of words cuts in half and the reader is spared needless distraction.

My data records do not show the original purchase price, but it does show me the original first mortgage. I assumed the mortgage was 80% of the purchase price. That may not be correct.

As borrowers, the owner’s of today’s featured property did not add to their mortgage. Kudos. That is a rare accomplishment worthy of recognition.