Keeping the truth straight is difficult with good information, but once policitians and political operatives get involved with the flow of data, truth can be obscured and elusive.

Today's featured property belongs to a family that skimmed the appreciation and sold just in time to avoid a short sale.

Irvine Home Address … 34 CAPOBELLA Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price …… $745,000

{book1}

Wouldn't it be nice if we were older

Then we wouldn't have to wait so long

And wouldn't it be nice to live together

In the kind of world where we belong

Maybe if we think and wish and hope and pray it might come true (run, run, run)

Baby then there wouldn't be a single thing we couldn't do

Beach Boys — Wouldn't It Be Nice

Wouldn't it be nice if houses really could provide lifelong income? California is truly a remarkable place. People here actually believe permanent, life-sustaining home-price appreciation happens. It does occasionally, and people build a life around it.

Wouldn't it be nice if politicians used real information to make substantive decisions? Instead we get and endless barrage of lies and manipulations. Politicians make realtors look honest.

Housing Bubble as Political Rugby

The housing bubble was a bipartisan failure. Both sides of the political spectrum have tried to blame the other for the housing bubble. It is all nonsense.

The political Right has touted the "Barney Frank inflated the housing bubble" about as far as it can go. The Right likes to forget that Barney Frank was in the impotent minority in the House from 1994-2006. He was a loudmouth who wasn't responsible for anything; although, he was effective as an annoying loudmouth. Personally, I think Barney Frank is a tool, and I wished he were not as powerful as he is today, but the characterizations from the Right about his involvement in the bubble are silly.

The latest evolving narrative on the Left is a populist appeal to blame the evil banks and get that bailout money back home to Main Street where we can bail out some victimized homeowners. That is nonsense too.

Resident Evil: Are Struggling Homeowners as Immoral as the Big Banks?

Do homeowners who are underwater on their mortgages deserve to lose their homes? That's what finance commentator Barry Ritholtz says, in a post called "More Foreclosures, Please." Ritholtz must have been channeling his inner Rick Santelli when he wrote that "the boom and bust saw irresponsible and reckless behavior by lenders and home buyers alike," adding that mortgage relief programs for homeowners reward those who were "reckless, speculative, and foolish" while punishing those who are not.

It's not reasonable to put Barry Ritholtz in the same category as Santelli, of course. Ritholtz is a highly informative, widely quoted writer on economic issues. Santelli's the frat-boy trader turned CNBC host whose rant about "rewarding the losers" got a cheer out of some morons on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (and started the Tea Party movement). But Ritholtz puts financially beleaguered homeowners in the same "moral hazard" dumping ground as the banks who wrote their mortgages, suggesting that both of them "overused leverage, disregarded risk, (and) ignored history." Is that really fair?

Yes, It is.

After all, what kind of information was available to the average home buyer during the last decade? How would the average reasonable person have decided whether to buy a home or what kind of mortgage to use — in, say, 2004?

They probably read articles like the one published in February of 2004 in USA Today ("America's newspaper") with the headline "Greenspan says ARMs might be better deal." "Overall, the household sector seems to be in good shape," said Greenspan, who added that adjustable-rate mortgages might be the right choice for many homeowners. Greenspan enthusiastically promoted the new-style mortgages that later played a big role in the meltdown: "American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage," he said.

Greenspan wasn't just Chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time. He was the man the press kept touting as a genius, the one they called "Maestro." Were homeowners guilty of a "moral hazard" for listening to him? Should they face foreclosure because they weren't reading Nouriel Roubini or Paul Krugman or Joseph Stieglitz?

This just underscores the depth of Greenspan's failure. He was market cheerleader and irresponsible Federal Reserve chairperson largely responsible for unregulated derivatives that inflated the housing bubble. This guy's argument also ignores the more important role of the National Association of realtors. Nobody buying a house during the bubble paid any attention to Alan Greenspan; they were paying careful attention to their realtor telling them house prices were going up. They were also paying attention to their mortgage broker who was telling them they could borrow and spend that money as soon as it appeared from thin air.

Ignorance of the law is no defense, but ignorance of contrarian economic thought circa 2005 should be. If Greenspan and Geithner and Paulson and all the talking heads on CNBC and the other networks couldn't see the bubble, how could the average home buyer?

I can't believe he is making that argument. Ignorance is ignorance, and if it costs someone money, too bad. He is setting up ignorance as some reason people should be given a bailout. That is ignorant.

The truth is, most people buy homes because they need a place to live — and because for generations they've been told that buying a home is preferable to renting. Our tax code is structured to encourage home ownership, and the ownership message is reinforced in everything from news reporting to popular culture. (Think Miracle on 34th Street.)

BULLSHIT!!! (pardon the realtorspeak) People bought during the bubble because they wanted to get the appreciation and spend it. Very few people bought because they needed a place to live during the bubble. It was always a speculative investment they could also live in.

And generalizations about irresponsible, speculative borrowing overlook the fact that the nation's housing problems vary widely by geography. Some areas aren't having a housing bust:

Is a homeowner in Glens Falls, NY any more "reckless, speculative, and foolish" than one a couple of hours down the road in Poughkeepsie? Poughkeepsie experienced a boom in prices followed by a bust, while high-performing Glens Falls experienced a boom with no bust. West of Glens Falls, my home town of Utica did pretty well too, as this chart illustrates:

It probably helps that Utica experienced its financial collapse a long time ago, so housing prices were already unusually low.

Above is a fine example of the intentional use of confusing and misleading data. If you can't dazzle them with brilliance, you can baffle them with bullshit. Obfuscation is helpful when there is no point to be made. The fact that the housing bubble varied by region was caused by many variables, and irresponsible borrowing and speculation are chief among them. This author is throwing up a mud screen of meaningless and confusing data to dupe you into thinking he must be some kind of special expert who understands these things. He is an idiot with an agenda.

Here's something interesting: The areas with stable housing prices had a much lower percentage of nonprime loans than the country as a whole. As the report's authors mention, the explanation for that probably "runs in both directions–an increase in nonprime lending led to more significant home price appreciation, and more rapid home price appreciation led to a rise in nonprime lending."

In other words, it was a cycle: Risky loans drove housing prices up, and climbing housing prices led to greater availability (and selling) of risky loans. That's not a borrower problem — it's a pattern of lender behavior. It's a sign of banks driving a speculative frenzy as a "get rich quick" scheme, then leaving the borrowers with the wreckage.

It takes two to tango. This is clearly a lender problem, and I have argued that Lenders Are More Culpable than Borrowers, but the endless stream of HELOC abusers and squatters I find right here in our affluent community of Irvine, California, show how widespread borrower malfeasance was. Hard-working honest borrowers are not the ones in trouble right now. Speculators and foolishly over-extended borrowers are the ones who are asking for bailouts.

Ritholtz makes some excellent points about the weakness of HAMP (the Home Affordable Modification Program), and its tendency to reward banks for their very real "moral hazard." The biggest problem with the revised HAMP program isn't that it's too generous to troubled homeowners. It's that it's a "pretty please" program that only requires lenders to consider lowering the principal on home loans (or, in the Orwellian language of the program's Fact Sheet, "servicers will be required to consider an alternative Modification approach" – "required to consider" being one of those self-contradicting phrases George Carlin used to rattle off, like "jumbo shrimp.")

But the idea of principal reduction — whether it comes from HAMP or individual lenders like Bank of America — is a reasonable one. Most reductions in principal will still leave homeowners owing more than their house is worth, which should give them their just portion of punishment for any "moral hazard."

The idea of principal reduction is not a reasonable one. It is a really, really stupid idea. They have received no punishment at all for their behavior, and that is exactly why moral hazard is a problem. The only people who think it is a good idea are the people whom might personally benefit from principal reduction. Of course, the author knows this. He is pandering to those people in hopes that they will support him. This is part of the evolving left-wing narrative and populist appeal.

"More foreclosures, please" is exactly what we don't want. Ritholtz is understandably concerned about the unfairness of "rewarding" homeowners who got in trouble in a way that keeps prices higher for those who behaved responsibly. But he paints an overly rosy scenario of bad actors being driven from their homes like poltergeists, so that new and vibrant families can move in — families that can afford the mortgage and have money left over to spend in the local economy. The real solution is going to look less like a ghost story and more like Tim Burton's Beetlejuice, where the ghosts and the living learn to live together happily.

More bullshit. Barry is exactly right, and this guy is exactly wrong.

The millions of homeowners who got in over their heads have already suffered a lot. Let's get them some help. And let's keep the focus on the people who caused this problem: The bankers who got rich off these schemes, and the politicians and regulators who let them do it.

I actually agree with his conclusion that we should focus our efforts on regulating banks and stopping the huge bankster ripoffs. However, the millions of fools who got themselves in trouble deserve not one penny of our tax money in bailouts. Not one penny.

I don't care about party affiliation, and I don't identify with labels of Progressive or Conservative. Any politician who supports bailing out anybody has lost my confidence. This shouldn't be a battle between the side the supports the lenders and the side the supports the common man. Both sides of that argument are wrong. Where is a good Libertarian when you need one….

Calculated HELOC use?

Occasionally someone will defend HELOC abuse as ordinary HELOC use, as if it is okay to spend home equity and use a house like a credit card. If there were no government bailouts, I might be more persuaded, but since we are all paying for the abuses, the line between "use" and "abuse" gets pushed much closer to zero use.

• This property was purchased ages ago on 6/22/1993 for $334,000. The original loan information is not present, but we can assume they used a $267,200 first mortgage (80%) and a $66,800 down payment.
• On 10/26/1999 they refinanced into a $307,500 first mortgage.
• On 1/7/2000 they opened a HELOC for $60,000.
• On 3/17/2003 they refinanced with a $424,000 first mortgage.
• On 9/14/2004 they refinanced into a $540,000 option ARM. It appears to have blown up 5 years later.
• On 12/22/2004 they opened a $116,000 HELOC.
• Total property debt is $656,000 plus negative amortization.
• Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $388,800.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 02/23/2010

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 01/04/2010

Document Type: Notice of Default

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 11/20/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

This property is scheduled for auction on 20 April 2010. Do you think the sale will close in time or will this go REO?

The borrowers who are about to sell today's featured property obviously grew their mortgage to obtain and spend their equity. They avoided a short sale; although, they spent most of their equity, and their credit is trashed. What lesson have they learned? Why won't they do this again on their next property?

The lesson this family learned is that they could spend their home equity the moment it appeared, and there is no real consequence. Of course, they could be leaving home with several hundred thousand dollars more in a closing check, but they wouldn't have had all the fun with their HELOCs. Do you think this behavior is wise? They do.

Renting with housing income

There is another way to look at this transaction. It may help explain why California homes are so desirable.

Lets say someone rented this home for 10 years with an average rent of about $2,500. It may rent for more now, but it probably rented for less in 2000. A renter would have spent $300,000 on housing during a ten-year period ($2,500 X 12 X 10 = $300,000).

These owners started their HELOC frenzy around the millennium, so they probably paid more in cost of ownership than they would have spent in a rental, so their total cost of ownership would have been closer to $360,000 during the same ten-year period ($3,000 X 12 X 10 = $360,000). At first glance, it would appear that owning was not a big advantage; however, If you factor in the mortgage equity withdrawal of $388,800, their net cost of ownership was less than zero. The house paid for itself.

That's why everyone in California wants a house.

When this family moves out, they are no better or worse off than a renter. They will leave with no equity. But the renter would have endured a housing cost whereas this owner endured none.

Irvine Home Address … 34 CAPOBELLA Irvine, CA 92614

Resale Home Price … $745,000

Home Purchase Price … $334,000

Home Purchase Date …. 6/22/1993

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $366,300

Percent Change ………. 123.1%

Annual Appreciation … 4.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$745,000 ………. Asking Price

$149,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.23% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$596,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$158,324 ………. Income Requirement

$3,284 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$646 ………. Property Tax

$67 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$62 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$41 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$4,099 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$811 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$686 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$309 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$93 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$3,004 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$7,450 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$7,450 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,960 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$149,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$169,860 ………. Total Cash Costs

$46,000 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$215,860 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 34 CAPOBELLA Irvine, CA 92614

——————————————————————————

Beds:: 3

Baths:: 3

Sq. Ft.:: 2325

Lot Size:: 4,695 Sq. Ft.

Property Type:: Residential, Single Family

Style:: Two Level, Other

Community:: Westpark

County:: Orange

MLS#:: S606385

Source:: SoCalMLS

——————————————————————————

Spectacular Westpark location with 3 spacious bedrooms and a loft. Extremely private with property angled so neighbors cannot see in. Property is light and bright with cathedral ceilings and recessed lighting. The family room features a fireplace and the kitchen has GE Profile stainless steel appliances with dual convection ovens. The home has an in-ground spa and will be perfect for entertaining.

Barry Ritholtz is leading the chorus demanding that lenders get on with the foreclosure process and get the economy moving again.

Today's featured property may have the Irvine record for HELOC abuse. We are up over $1,000,000!!!

Irvine Home Address … 58 CEZANNE Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price …… $1,600,000

{book1}

Tell it like it is

Don't be ashamed to let your conscience be your guide

Life is too short to have sorrow

You may be here today and gone tomorrow

You might as well get what you want

So go on and live, baby go on and live

Aaron Neville — Tell It Like It Is

I like people who tell it like it is, and I try to do the same. I think "balanced" reporting is one of the reasons for the death of newspapers. Most issues in life are shades of gray, and presenting both sides of an argument can be helpful for people to decide for themselves what they believe is right and what is wrong. However, there are many issues that fall much more to the extreme of black or white, wise or foolish, good or bad, right or wrong. When these issues are presented in a balanced way, it distorts the truth.

I think the various bailouts for both lenders and borrowers are wrong — 100% wrong. There is no balanced middle where some moral hazard is acceptable. Taxpayer funded bailouts are state-sanctioned theft, not in the general sense of government compelling us to pay taxes, in the specific detail of my tax dollars going to support foolish and greedy lenders and borrowers who will inflate another housing bubble and take my money again. It is 100% wrong, and no amount of balanced coverage is going to change that fact.

Barry Ritholtz is one of my favorite writers concerning the real estate bubble because he sees the issue so clearly, and when he writes about it, he does not sugar-coat what he sees.

More Foreclosures, Please . . .

By Barry Ritholtz – March 25th, 2010, 7:15AM

I have been dismayed about the latest actions out of Washington and Wall Street. The banks are now pushing all manner of mortgage mods and foreclosure abatements. These are little more than “extend & pretend” measures, designed to put off the day of reckoning. They are not only ineffective, they are counter-productive. They reward the reckless and punish the responsible, and create a moral hazard. Worse yet, they penalize middle America for the sake of giant Wall Street banks.

It may sound counter-intuitive, but the best thing for the nation (but not necessarily the banks) is to allow the foreclosure process to proceed unimpeded. We need more, not less foreclosures.

How did we get to this bizarre place in history? A brief recap of our story so far:

It started with the ultra-low rates of 2001-04. It was aided and abetted by an abdication of traditional lending standards, at first by non-bank lenders, but eventually, by nearly all. The Lend-to-Sell-to-Securitizer NonBanks pushed lending standards ever lower to the point of non-existence. This increased the pool of potential mortgage buyers, credit worthiness be damned.

The net result of all this was a credit bubble. I estimate that making mortgage requirements disappear brought between 10 and 20 million marginal new home buyers into the real estate market during the 2,000s decade. This drove prices to unsustainable levels, leading to a huge boom and eventual bust cycle in housing.

Prices have fallen about 30% nationally from the 2005-06 housing peak. As the artificial demand created by free money and an accompanying gold rush mentality disappeared, the housing market collapsed.

Despite this, even down 30% or so, prices still remain elevated by historical metrics. The net result has been 5 million foreclosures and counting. One in four “Home-owers” are underwater — meaning, they owe more on their mortgages than their houses are worth. There are another 3-5 million likely foreclosures coming over the next 5+ years.

The net results of the credit bubble are as follows:

1) An enormous number of families living in homes they cannot afford.

2) Bank balance sheets laden with current bad loans and lots of potential future defaulting loans.

3) Real Estate Sales, despite being propped up with historic low mortgage rates and tax purchase credits, are continuing to slide.

4) A weak overall economy with a very slow, soft recovery.

Whether a function of populist politics or bad economics, the proposals so far appear to address items one and three. But upon closer examination, they do nothing of the kind. In fact, they are actually gaming the system to help issue two — the bad loans the banks are carrying.

Even worse, they are making issue #4 — the economy — increasingly problematic.

We should allow the real estate market to experience a healthy price normalization process. Even though home prices have fallen dramatically, they have yet to reach their historical means relative to income or the cost of renting. This is to say nothing of the usual careening past the median towards under-valuation that typically follows a massive mis-allocation of capital.

We own a home, and have a vacation property. Rooting for falling prices is “talking against my own book.”

Why is it so beneficial to allow foreclosures to proceed unimpeded? Consider the following benefits of foreclosure:

• Increasing Economic Activity: The areas of the country with the greatest foreclosure rates have seen the biggest increase in real estate activity. Look at California and Florida — they have seen enormous upticks in sales versus the lower foreclosure states.

The process moves real estate holdings from weak hands to stronger ones. When someone purchases a home they actually can afford, they end up spending quite a bit of money on additional goods and services. They do renovations, hire contractors, make durable goods purchases, buy cars. They do lawn work, plant gardens, paint and repair. They even hire baby sitters, go out to diner and movies, they spend money in the local community.

The people who are hanging on by their fingernails, however, do almost none of these things. They pay a vastly disproportionate amount of their incomes to service their mortgages. This is not productive economic activity.

• Helping Families: Foreclosures, wrenching thought hey may be, move over-stretched families into housing they can afford. They avoid a steady stream of all manner of excess fees. The banks squeeze whatever they can from delinquent homeowners, who end up futilely tossing $1000s of dollars down the drain.

Worse, the HAMP programs have been totally ineffective in keeping families in their homes. The vast majority ultimately default anyway. More fees paid, more debt accrued, for nothing. The last thing these families need is a banking fee orgy, before they ultimate lose the house anyway.

The HAMP programs have been an enormous taxpayer subsidized boondoggle for the banks, however.

• Punishing the Prudent: The boom and bust saw irresponsible and reckless behavior by lenders and home buyers alike. They overused leverage, disregarded risk, ignored history. Having the taxpayers subsidize this behavior presents a moral hazard.

Worse than that, it punishes the people who behaved prudent and responsibly. Those who refused to buy a home they could not afford, chose not to over-extend themselves, and have been saving for a down payment are the net losers in this.

By working so feverishly to artificially reduce foreclosures and prop up home prices, we punish the first time home buyer, the newlyweds, the savers who want to buy a house they can actually afford.

The net result of all these programs and subsidies for recklessness is that we prevent home prices from normalizing. The people who are punished the most are the group that was not reckless, speculative or foolish.

• Rewarding Bad Banks: Despite the helping families rhetoric, it is not what these mods are about. The various foreclosure abatements, mortgage mods and capital write-downs are little more than a game of kick the can down the road. All of these programs are part of a broad “Extend & Pretend” mind set. They are an extension of the FASB 157 rule changes that allows banks to hide their bad loans.

The entire set of proposals can be described as “What's good for the banks is good for America.” Only they are not. The various foreclosure programs are essentially a way the banks don’t have to take their write offs now. Avoid the hangover, have another shot of tequila, push the pain of into the future, regardless of economic cost.

Were the banks required to report their mortgages accurately and/or write them down, they would be revealed as insolvent.

~~~

Now we get to the ugly Truth: The mortgage mods and foreclosure abatement programs are really all about propping up insolvent banking institutions on the taxpayer dollar and at the expense of the middle class. These programs are another losing round of helping Wall Street at the expense of Main Street. It is the worst kind of trickle down economics.

Herbert Spencer wrote, “The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly is to fill the world with fools.” We have done precisely that.

Barry has a clear understanding of the situation, and he is one of the few who openly tells it like it is.

Good Stoploss Management

The Ponzi Scheme in California went on for too long. There are adults whose entire financial life is an illusion sustained only by lender greed and stupidity. Many California borrowers believe a money-rentership position in real estate can provide them sustainable productive income they can extract through mortgage equity withdrawal.

To them, periodic trips to the housing ATM is simply good cash management. It's like getting a paycheck. But is also serves one other useful purpose; by periodically extracting all the equity available in real estate, borrowers can shift any risk of loss to lenders and maximize their gains.

One of the most perplexing issues with trading is management of exits and getting back into cash. If you don't take profits as they accrue, you risk losing them when prices reverse; however, if you sell and take profits, you miss the remainder of the upward price move. Fortunately, lenders make it very easy to manage cash exits with HELOCs.

By periodically removing all profits through mortgage equity withdrawal, very little potential cash profit is left to the market. Also, since this is a loan and not the reduction in an equity position like selling part of a stock holding, the borrower gets to obtain the full cash advantage of owning real estate while prices were rising.

Of course, the best part of the system is getting to pass all losses on to the lender. When prices go south, the lender is holding the bag.

So far the only potential downside is a negative credit report and the potential for a lender to go after other assets. This is probably not a big concern for sophisticated borrowers because the spendthrifts no longer have any assets, and the clever ones probably figured out some tax shelter to hide them.

Lenders are going to get crushed again after the next housing bubble. I hope taxpayers don't have to backstop that one as well.

Today's featured HELOC abusing squatter

Now that I am watching the trustee sale market more closely, I am seeing the turds float by that bypassed the MLS. Very few properties scheduled for auction appear on the MLS. When they do, they are like today's.

• This property was purchased for $1,262,500 on 4/9/2004. The owner used a $883,557 first mortgage and a $378,943 down payment.
• On 8/8/2005 he refinanced with a $1,260,000 first mortgage and obtained a $180,000 HELOC. So far so good. There is no evidence he used the HELOC.
• On 5/26/2006 he obtained a $500,000 HELOC.
• On 11/21/2006 he refinanced with a $1,750,000 first mortgage and another $500,000 HELOC.
• Here is where it starts to get fishy: On 3/9/2007 he sells the house to a couple for an undisclosed amount, then on 12/17/2007 it is deeded back to the original owner. This appears to be in preparation for default.
• On 5/6/2008 the lender files a notice of default
• On 6/4/2008, the owner transfers ownership to an entity he formed. My guess is he did this to try to shield himself from liability to the lender. Good luck with that.
• Total property debt is $2,250,000.
• Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $1,366,443, including his down payment. That may be a new Irvine record!

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 03/23/2010

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 08/12/2008

Document Type: Notice of Sale

This owner has not made a payment since late 2007, perhaps early 2008. He is scheduled for auction, but do you think a lender is ready to absorb the loss on this one? They will lose $750,000 or more.

Irvine Home Address … 58 CEZANNE Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price … $1,600,000

Home Purchase Price … $1,262,500

Home Purchase Date …. 4/9/2004

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $241,500

Percent Change ………. 26.7%

Annual Appreciation … 4.0%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$1,600,000 ………. Asking Price

$320,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.23% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$1,280,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$340,024 ………. Income Requirement

$7,052 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$1387 ………. Property Tax

$400 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$133 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$398 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$9,370 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$1609 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$1474 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$663 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$200 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$7,151 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$16,000 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$16,000 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$12,800 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$320,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$364,800 ………. Total Cash Costs

$109,600 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$474,400 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 58 CEZANNE Irvine, CA 92603

——————————————————————————

Beds:: 4

Baths:: 3

Sq. Ft.:: 3200

$0,500

Lot Size:: 0.28 Acres

Year Built:: 2004

Days on Market: 654 days

MLS#:: P643120

Property Type:: Residential, Single Family

Community:: Turtle Ridge

Style:: One Level, Other

——————————————————————————

Rare single story home with upgrades, large lot. desirable entertainment backyard with gazebo.