Author Archives: IrvineRenter

Foreclosures Increasing as Expected: 216,263 Filings on California Debtors in First Quarter

The push to drive squatters from houses they are not paying for has begun. We have eclipsed our previous foreclosure records, and foreclosures will continue to increase in number for the remainder of 2010.

Irvine Home Address … 43 PARTISAN Pl Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price …… $655,000

{book1}

Oh yes, I'm the great pretender

Pretending I'm doing well

My need is such

I pretend too much

I'm BROKE but no one can tell

Oh yes, I'm the great pretender

Adrift in a world of my own

I play the game but to my real shame

You've left me to dream all alone

Freddie Mercury — The Great Pretender

Californian's are great spenders living in a world of their own. They play the game with no real shame pretending they really have wealth. They are below broke and left alone dreaming of lives they do not own.

Today's HELOC-abusing squatters

Usually, I conclude with the sordid details about the property owner's finances, but today I am starting with it. When presented with statistics about macroeconomic events like "foreclosure activity goes up," it is easy for readers to lose the connection between the decisions lenders and borrowers made and the macroeconomic event. The increase in foreclosure findings I am reporting today is the direct result of thousands of families making bad financial decisions just like the owners of today's featured property.

When I first started covering HELOC abuse, many readers thought I was searching through many property records to find an isolated case. In reality, I have to search through many property records to find an owner who didn't spend their house. The HELOC abuse and debt dependency is the rule not the exception.

Policy makers have scared everyone into bailing out the banks ostensibly to help loan owners stay in their houses. In reality, this is a poorly disguised bailout of the banks. For the banks to stay in business, they will need to obtain income from their non-performing assets. That means they need to foreclose on people and either rent the place out or sell it to be rid of it.

It is appropriate to feel compassion for people losing their homes, but this compassion must be tempered by wisdom. For the most part, the people losing their home made bad decisions — remember, responsible homeowners are NOT losing their homes. Expressing compassion does not mean bailing these people out. That is enabling. Do California debtors really deserve our financial assistance?

Let's take a careful look at the loans that were made and how these owners lived and see if the lending or the borrowing is wise behavior we want to see more of.

  • This property was purchased for $321,000 on 12/18/1998, near the last market bottom. The mortgage information is not available, but the borrower likely put 20% or more down.
  • The first mortgages was refinanced on 4/11/2002 for $200,000. A second party appears on the mortgage. Apparently, when the owner was single, the demands for money were a bit less.
  • On 2/4/2005 the first mortgage was refinanced for $480,000. A HELOC was also opened for $195,750.
  • On 7/31/2006 the owners refinanced with a $693,000 first mortgage and a $153,000 HELOC.
  • On 10/2/2006 the HELOC was increased to $200,000.
  • Total property debt is $893,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal was $693,000 since April of 2002.

They have since been squatting for more than a year:

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 10/29/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 07/22/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

What prompted these people to spend nearly $700,000 in just a few years? And does it matter? Are there any circumstances where you believe these debts should be forgiven at the expense of the US Taxpayer? How do you feel about their squatting for over a year on your dime?

When you read the grim statistics about foreclosures, do you tear up for the poor families who lost everything or rejoice for their new lives free of entitlement and debt? Foreclosure is not the crisis; it is the cure.

FORECLOSURE ACTIVITY INCREASES 7 PERCENT IN FIRST QUARTER

By RealtyTrac Staff

New Quarterly Records for Scheduled Auctions and Bank Repossessions

All Foreclosure Types Spike in March, Which Posts Highest Monthly Total for Report

IRVINE, Calif. – April 15, 2010 — RealtyTrac® (realtytrac.com), the leading online marketplace for foreclosure properties, today released its U.S. Foreclosure Market Report™ for Q1 2010, which shows that foreclosure filings — default notices, scheduled auctions and bank repossessions — were reported on 932,234 properties in the first quarter, a 7 percent increase from the previous quarter and a 16 percent increase from the first quarter of 2009. One in every 138 U.S. housing units received a foreclosure filing during the quarter.

Foreclosure filings were reported on 367,056 properties in March, an increase of nearly 19 percent from the previous month, an increase of nearly 8 percent from March 2009 and the highest monthly total since RealtyTrac began issuing its report in January 2005.

“Foreclosure activity in the first quarter of 2010 followed a very similar pattern to what we saw in the first quarter of 2009: a shallow trough in January and February followed by a substantial spike in March,” said James J. Saccacio, chief executive officer of RealtyTrac. “One difference, however, is that the increases were more tilted toward the final stage of foreclosure, with REOs increasing 9 percent on a quarterly basis in the first quarter of 2010 compared to a 13 percent quarterly decrease in REOs in the first quarter of 2009.

“This subtle shift in the numbers pushed REOs to the highest quarterly total we’ve ever seen in our report and may be further evidence that lenders are starting to make a dent in the backlog of distressed inventory that has built up over the last year as foreclosure prevention programs and processing delays slowed down the normal foreclosure timeline.” …

… California foreclosure activity decreased 6 percent from the first quarter of 2009, but the state still documented the nation’s fourth highest foreclosure rate — one in every 62 housing units receiving a foreclosure filing. …

… California alone accounted for 23 percent of the nation’s total foreclosure activity in the first quarter, with 216,263 properties receiving a foreclosure notice — the nation’s highest foreclosure activity total.

Readers here are not surprised by these numbers. Last year, there were stories planted in the mainstream media that the foreclosure crisis is ending because filings were down. Well, filings were down because banks stopped filing, not because borrowers stopped defaulting. Shadow inventory is a disgraceful squatter's paradise. Fortunately, lenders are finally moving to clean up their books. It is about time.

Irvine Home Address … 43 PARTISAN Pl Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price … $655,000

Home Purchase Price … $321,000

Home Purchase Date …. 12/18/1998

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $294,700

Percent Change ………. 104.0%

Annual Appreciation … 6.1%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$655,000 ………. Asking Price

$131,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.24% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$524,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$139,354 ………. Income Requirement

$2,890 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$568 ………. Property Tax

$117 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$55 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$0 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,629 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$714 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$602 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$272 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$82 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$2,667 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$6,550 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$6,550 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,240 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$131,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$149,340 ………. Total Cash Costs

$40,800 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$190,140 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 43 PARTISAN Pl Irvine, CA 92602

——————————————————————————

Beds: 5

Baths: 3 baths

Home size: 2,300 sq ft

($285 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 8,500 sq ft

Year Built: 1998

Days on Market: 17

MLS Number: S611660

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: West Irvine

Tract: Heri

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

One of the Larger lot in the Tract. Cover Patio, Extra Long Drive Way. Formal Living Room, Downstairs Bedroom with full bath. Large Master Bedroom and Bath, Walk-in Closet. 4th Bedroom Upstairs is the size of a 2 Rooms combined and can easily be converted into a 5th Bedroom to become a SIX BEDROOM house. Award Winning Schools, NO HOA, Low Tax.

I hope you have enjoyed this week, and thank you for reading the Irvine Housing Blog: astutely observing the Irvine home market and combating California Kool-Aid since 2006.

Have a great weekend,

Irvine Renter

House Prices Will Not Reach Bubble Highs for Over 15 Years

In The Great Housing Bubble, I predicted Irvine resale prices would not reach their bubble peak for over 15 years. The analysts at Fiserv Case-Shiller have drawn a similar conclusion.

Of course, the owner of today's featured property doesn't believe that. In his world, prices never stopped appreciating in 2006.

Irvine Home Address … 35 WOODS Trl Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price …… $2,589,000

{book1}

If I could … Maybe I'd give you my world

How can I … When you won't take it from me

You can go your own way Go your own way

You can call it … Another lonely day

You can go your own way Go your own way

Tell me why … Everything turned around

Packing up … Shackin’ up’s all you wanna do

If I could … Baby I'd give you my world

Open up … Everything's waiting for you

Fleetwood Mac — Go Your Own Way

Every seller must go their own way. Some accept the reality of the market and price accordingly. Some do not. Every owner wants house prices to take flight, particularly those who are underwater. Unfortunately, fundamentals that support the housing market can only go up so fast, and in case you didn't notice, wages are going down.

Fiserv Case-Shiller Home Price Insights: For Many U.S. Markets, the Return to Peak Home Prices Will Be a Long, Slow Road

Bubble-era home prices won't be seen again until 2025 or beyond in California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada

BROOKFIELD, Wis., Apr 08, 2010 (BUSINESS WIRE) — Fiserv, Inc., the leading global provider of financial services technology solutions, today released an analysis of home price historical trend data and forecasts for more than 375 U.S. markets based on the Fiserv(R) Case-Shiller Indexes(R), which is owned and generated by Fiserv, data from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and Moody's Economy.com.

The Fiserv analysis indicates the markets that experienced the greatest price bubble, including certain metro areas in California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada, won't see home prices return to peak levels until 2025 or later. That represents an unprecedented market cycle that will last a full generation from the top of the market in 2006-2007. Many other markets, including major urban centers in the Northeast and industrial Midwest, may need to wait a decade or more until prices return to their market peaks.

"Nationally, Fiserv Case-Shiller data points to a further seven percent decline in home prices through the end of this year, with a prolonged recovery beginning early in 2011. In many markets, the emphasis is on the word 'prolonged,'" said David Stiff, Chief Economist, Fiserv. "We see several powerful forces in the market that will severely hinder the housing recoveries of many metro areas, particularly in the hard-hit states of California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada. It will take these markets 15 or more years before home prices climb back to their peaks."

… Home sales grew dramatically, jumping from 4.5 million units in January to 6.5 million units in November 2009, the highest gains since 2006. This was attributed to lower prices, almost record-low mortgage interest rates, and the $8,000 tax credit for first-time home buyers. Another factor that temporarily slowed the erosion of home prices has been the financial institutions' inability to effectively sell homes with distressed mortgages.

… Detailed home price data and information on the Indexes can now be found at the new Fiserv Case-Shiller website at www.caseshiller.fiserv.com. At that site, users can get the latest housing news and find detailed information and home price forecasts for 381 U.S. markets.

In The Great Housing Bubble, I noted the following:

Table 11: Summary of Predictions for Irvine, California Home Prices

Method

Total Decline

Appreciation Rate

Recovery Year

S&P/Case-Shiller Inflation Support

55%

3.3%

2039

Median House Price and Historic Appreciation

45%

4.4%

2023

Price-To-Rent Ratio

22%

4.7%

2019

Price-To-Income Ratio

43%

3.2%

2029

===================================== ======== ============ =========

41%

3.9%

2028

The range of predictions for the decline of home prices in Irvine, California, is from 22% to 53% with an average of 41%. The predicted time of peak-to-peak recovery ranges from 2019 to 2033 with an average of 2028. Of course, since Irvine is in the heart of a bubble-prone market, recovery may happen more quickly, but then again, that would mean prices have entered another unsustainable price bubble.

My predictions of the bottoming price look unlikely at this point. The Federal Reserve has raised the trough with its activity. I think this pushes the bottom forward, perhaps to 2012 or 2013 and raises it. Nothing changes the underlying fundamentals. Unless we inflate another housing bubble, prices will take a very long time to reach the peak.

What is happening in Irvine?

One measure of price activity in a market is dollars-per-square-foot. In The Great Housing Bubble, I described it this way:

The median is a good measure of general price activity in the market, but it does have a significant weakness: it does not indicate the value buyers are obtaining in the market. The houses or structures built on the land compose the most significant portion of real estate value in most markets. These structures deteriorate over time and require routine maintenance that is often deferred. During times of prosperity, many people renovate homes to add value and improve their living conditions. The impact of deterioration and renovation of individual properties is not reflected in the median resale value. Also, at the time of sale, there are often buyer incentives which inflate the recorded sales price relative to the actual cost to the buyer. These buyer incentives also distort the median sales price as a measure of value.

Many data reporting services measure, record, and report the average sales cost on a per-square-foot basis to address the problem of evaluating what buyers are getting for their money. For instance, in a declining market if people start buying much larger homes at the limit of affordability, the generic median sales price would remain unchanged, but since buyers are getting much larger homes for the same money, the average cost per-square-foot would decline accordingly. This makes the average cost per-square-foot a superior measure for capturing qualitative changes in house prices; however, this method of measurement does not capture the relative quality of the square footage purchased, only the price paid for it. High quality finishes may justify a higher price per square foot. There is no way to objectively evaluate the impact finish quality has on home prices. The main problems with using the average cost per-square-foot to measure price is that it does not provide a number comparable to sales prices since it has been divided by square feet, and it is not widely measured and reported.

The change in market mix will also impact the $/SF measure. Larger properties generally sell for less than smaller properties on a $/SF basis; therefore, when the mix changes to larger properties, the $/SF will decline. That is much of what is driving the slide witnessed in the $/SF measure since last September, a period within which the median went up.

If the Federal Reserve had not propped up the market last year, we would likely be seeing $275/SF to $300/SF across most of Irvine. We still might get there depending on interest rates and inventory. It doesn't seem likely that prices will go up given the current market head winds.

Didn't get the press release

The owner of today's featured property obviously did not get the Fiserv press release. In his world, there was no housing bubble, and his house kept on appreciating while the remaining housing market collapsed around him. This property value went up 20% since the peak in summer of 2006. WTF?

The owner put a large amount down, and he has only recently obtained a few private loans to get him through the recession. In his mind, he is still a millionaire.

Irvine Home Address … 35 WOODS Trl Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price … $2,589,000

Home Purchase Price … $2,171,500

Home Purchase Date …. 6/18/2006

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $262,160

Percent Change ………. 19.2%

Annual Appreciation … 4.4%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$2,589,000 ………. Asking Price

$517,800 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.24% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$2,071,200 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$550,820 ………. Income Requirement

$11,424 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$2244 ………. Property Tax

$417 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$216 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$410 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$14,711 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$1851 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$2380 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$1076 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$324 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$11,879 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$25,890 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$25,890 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$20,712 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$517,800 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$590,292 ………. Total Cash Costs

$182,000 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$772,292 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 35 WOODS Trl Irvine, CA 92603

——————————————————————————

Beds: 5

Baths: 4 full 1 part baths

Home size: 3,583 sq ft

($723 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 9,270 sq ft

Year Built: 2006

Days on Market: 12

MLS Number: U10001525

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: Turtle Ridge

Tract: Arez

——————————————————————————

Beautiful Tuscan-style home in the Arezzo enclave of the guarded Summit development with 5 bedrooms & 4.5 baths. The home has approx. 3600 sq ft & is situated on a premier lot with 9270 sq ft. Beautiful panoramic views to Shady Canyon, the mountains, parkland & city lights views at night. The stylish flag-stone patio with fountains, built-in stainless steel BBQ & sideyard offers an incredible venue for outdoor entertaining. The gourmet kitchen with stainless steel appliances & granite countertops opens to a great room leading out to the backyard. A formal dining room is adjacent to the living room. Bedroom & full bath on the main floor. 2nd level has 4 bedrooms including a spacious master bedroom with private master bath appointed with Travertine. Large balcony from the master bedroom offers another incredible viewing opportunity out to the mountains & gorgeous parkland. Over $450K in upgrades! The Summit development offers a resort-style pool & clubhouse. Go to www.35WoodsTrail.com

Banks Refuse to Recognize HELOC and Second Mortgage Losses

Holders of HELOCs and second mortgages are going to lose a great deal of money. So far, few of these losses have been recognized, and lenders are in no hurry to do so.

Irvine Home Address … 41 MOJAVE Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price …… $900,000

{book1}

This bloody road remains a mystery

This sudden darkness fills the air

What are we waiting for?

Won't anybody help us?

What are we waiting for?

We can't afford to be innocent

Stand up and face the enemy

It's a do or die situation

We will be Invincible

This shattered dream you cannot justify

We're gonna scream until we're satisified

What are we running for?

We've got the right to be angry

What are we running for?

When there's no where we can run to anymore

Pat Benetar — Invincible

None of us knows how the housing bust will play out. Some contend it already has, but those living in the reality-based community know we have a tremendous problem with delinquencies lenders are unable to resolve. What are we waiting for? Lenders to take losses.

The delinquency problem will be resolved through a combination of loan modifications, short sales and foreclosures. Those are the only three viable options. Loan modifications are proving to fail, so that leaves short sales and foreclosures. Either solution will push prices lower.

Short sale approval takes many months, and many times, no approval is given. Lenders fail to foreclose on houses even when the borrowers quit paying and make no effort to work out a deal. These strange lender behaviors are caused by the same root problem: pending losses exceed the value of capital in our banking system.

When short sales are not approved, and when squatters are allowed to stay in property without paying, resale transactions do not occur that would ordinarily would be happening. Therefore, sales volumes are well below normal.

Our local inventory is still very low relative to historic norms.

Prices are only sustained by very low inventories which are a result of lenders refusing to foreclose. The inventory we do have looks more abundant than it really is because a significant portion of that inventory is short sales that have been sitting on the market for months with 20 waiting offers.

Lenders are not going to let borrowers squat until prices come back. Why would they? If they are not going to get any wage income from the borrower, it makes more sense financially to boot them out, rent the property to a paying tenant and wait for appreciation to bail them out. They are going to receive the benefit of appreciation either way, so they might as well get some income from the occupant.

Once lenders can absorb the losses on their financial statements, they will begin to push squatters out. The only question is when this will happen. Since Bank of America to Increase Foreclosure Rate by 600% in 2010 and The Debt Star Has Cleared the Planet, it looks as if now is the time. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that now is the beginning of a process that will go on until the excess debt is cleared from the system.

Second Lien Position is a total loss

Lenders are concerned about losses on their first mortgage portfolios, but the array of market props has likely provided a stable floor in many markets (not ours) that should limit losses. However, second mortgages — and that includes HELOCs — only recoup their capital after the first mortgage is paid in full. If the first mortgage takes any loss at all, the second mortgage is completely wiped out.

When you look at a lender's balance sheet, they show loans as an asset. The value of that asset is based on the likelihood of repayment and the claim to underlying capital in foreclosure. In the case of second mortgages and HELOCs, the likelihood of repayment is very low, and the value of the claim to underlying collateral is less than zero. In short, holders of second lien mortgages are screwed.

Refusal of holders of second lien mortgages to recognize their losses is the primary barrier to market clearing through increased short-sale volume.

Look at a short sale transaction from the perspective of a second lien holder: If the house sells, the second lien is wiped out, so the asset is worth nothing. If the second lien holder blocks the sale, there is a chance, either someone will pay them something to go away, or appreciation will bail them out. They have no incentive to consummate a transaction today that wipes them out, and they have every incentive to block the sale until a better day. The only power they have in the negotiation is the power of no, and since they have everything to lose and nothing to gain, they say no most of the time.

HAFA is designed to give something to second lien holders to get them to participate in the short sale process. If lenders take the government payoff through HAFA, short sales will occur in large numbers. If lenders do not take the deal, foreclosures will clear out the rest. Since the short sale nets something whereas the foreclosure nets nothing, lenders are strongly encouraged to take what they can get.

The HELOC Bust: Next Problem for Big Banks?

By Charles Feldman Apr 13th 2010

Say it ain't so. If a prediction from a leading research firm turns out to be accurate, three of the country's biggest banks are poised for colossal losses of up to $30 billion — this time because of their exposure to home-equity loans.

The research firm, CreditSights Inc., says that Bank of America, Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase — the three biggest U.S. consumer banks — are particularly vulnerable to "changes in the consumer cycle," reports Britain's Telegraph. And HELOCs, as the home-equity loans are known, are shaping up to be the next problem area in housing.

HELOCs and seconds are just now surfacing as problems because lenders have ignored the truth of these loans with a few years of mark-to-fantasy accounting. The problem was always there. Its shape was formed years ago. Now is the first time the media has paid any attention to it, so more bank write downs from HELOCs and seconds is merely the next of the many housing market problems the media is finally making the weary masses aware of.

In case you forgot how we got here:

Irresponsible lending caused this problem.

In the last quarter of 2009, late payments on home-equity loans hit record highs, according to the American Bankers Association. The loans, typically taken out on top of a primary mortgage, are a source of dispute among lenders and those who advocate reducing mortgage principal to stem foreclosures — and the subject of a Congressional hearing being held today. Second loan holders are forced to take a loss when the first mortgage loan is modified, which they are loathe to do.

JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, says Bloomberg, told investors in the bank's annual report in February that quarterly writedowns in home-equity lending "could reach $1.4 billion" this year. But CreditSights believes the HELOC problem could be so bad that the three banks could see their 2010 profits — estimated at $30 billion — completely wiped out, the Telegraph reported.

Do you see the game the Federal Reserve is playing? By giving banks money at 0% and allowing them to earn 5%, the Federal Reserve allows them to make billions of extra dollars. Unfortunately, they lost so much money from their bubble foolishness, that an entire years earnings will only cover their losses on HELOCs and seconds (if the estimates are correct). What about their derivative losses? What about the commercial real estate losses they have not written down yet? Despite the common belief that inflation will come, the deflationary winds are still blowing hurricane force.

CreditSights, by the way, reputedly predicted the housing downturn back in 2006, so people are taking notice of its latest warning.

In an interview with Bloomberg, CreditSights' senior bank analyst Baylor Lancaster said: "While a lot of people are looking for dramatic improvement in the short term, one area that still has to be worked through in a material way is home equity." The writedowns from HELOCs are not likely to show up in earnings reports until later this year, Lancaster said.

Together with Citigroup the banks hold about 42 percent of the $1.1 trillion in second-home liens. Unlike first mortgages, they are typically not bundled and sold off to investors but kept on the banks' books. The biggest home-equity lender in the U.S. is Bank of America, holding some $138 billion in such loans. Wells Fargo has about $123.8 billion of home-equity loans.

Charles Feldman is a journalist, media consultant and co-author of the book, "No Time To Think-The Menace of Media Speed and the 24-hour New Cycle." He has written about real estate related issues for several years.

The endless array of failed bailouts and the neverending mortgage crisis occurs to disguise the insolvency of our banks. Lenders have not taken the write downs on what will likely be huge losses on all these loans. I have profile massive losses day after day just here in Irvine. The HELOCs and second mortgages are almost always a total loss, and our market hasn't fallen as much as others.

The dance between lenders and borrowers has gone on for so long because lenders had few viable options in 2008 and 2009. If they would have processed their foreclosures in a timely manner, their losses would have been staggering, bank insolvency would have been exposed, and we would have been forced to nationalize the banking system. By pretending for a couple of years, they made enough money to expose their dirty laundry, take their necessary write downs, and keep their jobs and their bonuses.

Punished for restraint

  • This property was purchased on 4/21/2004 for $1,175,000. The owners used a $881,250 first mortgage and a $293,750 down payment.
  • On 12/28/2004 they obtained an $82,200 HELOC.
  • On 3/27/2006 they refinanced the first mortgage with a $915,000 Option ARM.
  • On 4/13/2006 they obtained a $200,000 HELOC.
  • Total property debt is $1,115,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $233,750.

Today's HELOC abusers are not as bad as most. I give them a D. They put a sizable amount down, but they steadily withdrew it and added to their mortgage balance. They didn't take out more than they paid, so they didn't get back all of their down payment. They probably wish they had because now they are losing their house, their credit is trashed, and their down payment is lost. I hope the down payment money wasn't a gift from parents or something like that. The parents would be pissed.

If this family had been more foolish, they probably could have taken several hundred thousand more than they paid out of the property. They received no reward for prudence. What are they going to do next time?

Irvine Home Address … 41 MOJAVE Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price … $900,000

Home Purchase Price … $1,175,000

Home Purchase Date …. 4/21/2004

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(329,000)

Percent Change ………. -23.4%

Annual Appreciation … -4.3%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$900,000 ………. Asking Price

$180,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.24% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$720,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$191,479 ………. Income Requirement

$3,971 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$780 ………. Property Tax

$333 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$75 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$90 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$5,250 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$981 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$827 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$374 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$113 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$3,928 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$9,000 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$9,000 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$7,200 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$180,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$205,200 ………. Total Cash Costs

$60,200 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$265,400 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 41 MOJAVE Irvine, CA 92602

——————————————————————————

Beds: : 4

Baths: :3

Sq. Ft.: : 3456

Lot Size: : 5,775 Sq. Ft.

Property Type:: Residential, Single Family

Style:: Two Level, Other

Community: : Northpark

County: : Orange

MLS#: : P717754

Source: : SoCalMLS

——————————————————————————

Beautiful home in Northpark, totally remodeled.

We Haven't Learned the Lessons of the Great Housing Bubble

People learned lifelong lessons about financial management from the Great Housing Bubble. Did they learn the right ones?

The owners of today's featured property learned how to squeeze every last penny from the walls, then they resorted to squatting for the last year and a half.

Irvine Home Address … 14952 GAINFORD Cir Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price …… $460,000

{book1}

I’m marrying money, whose wanna say the best man?

I win on the honey moon and came home with the best tan.

There’s green all over me, in my pockets and left hand.

Green, you should know what I mean

Chamillionaire — Show Me The Money

Did those people who lost their homes during the Great Housing Bubble learn any important lessons? Did people learn that certain financial management techniques don't work very well? Or did people learn that building a Ponzi Scheme is a great way to manage their finances except during those unexpected economic downturns?

People can learn very valuable life's lessons from the mistakes of others. If I didn't believe that, I wouldn't keep writing. However, this blog is not likely to change the way millions of California borrowers live. As long as lenders enable foolishness, we will have fools who will step forward.

Best Protection Against Another Housing Bubble May be a Generation's Painful Lessons

Mar 29th 2010 @ 2:30PM

The market value of your house is down 20 to 30 percent from its peak and could have further still to go. Jobs are scarce and the idea that home values will rise again seems remote. But this, too, shall pass (yes, your home value will eventually recover). And I can tell you exactly why — psychology.

The good news is that for all the economic pain and suffering, we've probably just bought ourselves, as a people, 50 years of immunity to economic depression. The bad news is that this immunity has nothing at all to do with house prices, public policy, Bernanke, Dodd, Geithner, or Obama, much less Paulson or Bush. It would have happened anyway.

The premise of this author's entire argument is that people endured the consequences of their decisions and they have been conditioned not to repeat the same mistakes. This is obviously wrong. The moral hazard of innumerable bailouts has insulated the population from the consequences of their mistakes.

The real lesson people have learned is that they can game the system for personal gain and pass the losses on to everyone else. Any real consequences will be avoided. We have guaranteed ourselves another housing bubble and even more massive bailout.

I'm reminded of a story about Sid Richardson. Back in the 1950s, Richardson, a Texas oilman, was arguably the richest man in the world — the bachelor uncle of today's ultra-rich Bass Brothers. (You though they made that money all by themselves?) Richardson made his fortune from West Texas crude and he owned a refinery in Midland, Texas. One day, a crane operator working on construction at the refinery swung the boom of his crane around and smashed into one of the catalytic cracking towers, knocking the tower clean over. There was a massive oil spill, the kind we'd really worry about today. But this was back in the days when DDT was good and oil spills didn't matter so much. Still, the accident did cause more than $1 million in damage, and since the refinery was self-insured, that million came straight from Sid Richardson's pocket. When the catalytic cracking tower was knocked over, everyone had to come have a look, including Richardson. And when they had all shaken their heads and pointed at the destruction, Richardson finally said it was time to get back to work and he sent the crane operator back up to the cab of his crane.

"You can't send him back to work on that crane!" the refinery manager shouted to Richardson. "The guy can't be trusted."

"Believe me," said Richardson, "he's not going to make that mistake again."

There is a lesson here for all of us, because — just like that crane operator — stressful experiences eventually teach the rest of us lessons, too. But unlike that crane operator, it usually takes us three times to figure things out.

That's what Professor Vernon L. Smith (now of George Mason University) learned decades ago in economics experiments conducted at the University of Arizona — experiments that earned him the 2006 Nobel Prize in Economics. Smith conducted real money experiments with groups of students. In their buying and selling of assets, the students inevitably created asset bubbles that eventually collapsed. Given another try, the same group created a second bubble that also collapsed. But given a third try, the same group consistently showed it had learned its lesson and no more bubbles were created.

… And so this three-strikes-and-you're-out (of danger) apparently works in real life. That explains why American savers and investors suffered through the Florida Land Bubble collapse of 1925 followed by the Wall Street stock bubble crash of 1929 and the consequent bank panic of 1933, before that same group assiduously avoided repeating any of those behaviors on a similar scale for the next 50+ years.

The cause and effect this author identifies is very weak. We have been inflating and deflating bubbles forever. You can pick any point in time and find three economic catastrophes preceding. The reason we had 50+ years of stability following the Great Depression is that we passed Glass-Steagall and other legislation to limit the ability of lenders to inflate Ponzi Schemes. It wasn't until we removed these protections in 1999 that problems began. The 50+ years of stability came from the legislation they passed not the personal lessons they learned.

In that 50 years, we had bubbles and recessions, but we had no huge bubbles and no depressions.

The Great Depression turned Americans, who had not been savers in the 1920s, into savers for the rest of their lives. But what the Depression gave us, generational transitions and Reaganomics took away. Savings rates began to drop in the late 1980s just as the Gipper was on his way back to Santa Barbara.

What does this means for today? Well, our generation has experienced the 1990s dot-com bubble and its pop, the 2000's housing bubble and its pop, and now the Great Recession. We're in our third time and likely due our own bit of subsequent wisdom as a result.

If it were only true….

The irony here, of course, is that while we credit the SEC and FDIC and maybe World War II for saving us from the Great Depression, it may have been that we were simply fed-up. Similarly, whatever Bernanke, Dodd, Geithner, and Obama finally do to reform the current U.S. financial system may matter less to our future prosperity than the painful lessons we've been learning as a people.

It's us, not them.

This is not accurate. Since people and institutions that were bailed out learned the opposite lesson. The pain was not deep enough to create lifelong changes in patterns of behavior. Once the Siren's Song of unlimited consumption tempts a recession weary population, "Don't wait and save when you can have it now…." Have we really endured such hardship that a broad cross-section of society will say no?

Worse, people-learned-their-lesson is the kind of argument lobbyists for lenders will use to convince legislators not to regulate the industry. After all, we don't need legislative reform if people suddenly got smart and stop demanding unstable loan products. Don't hinder commerce.

We'll make the pols look good for a few decades until enough time passes and the cycle of boom and bust starts all over again, as it inevitably will.

But until then, like Sid Richardson's crane operator, our generation — and only our generation — has probably learned our lesson: we aren't going to do that again.

I would be both thrilled and amazed if Californian's choose to behave like Texan's and reject bidding up house prices to obtain mortgage equity withdrawal. I believe we haven't learned a thing. In fact, the more people know, the more foolish they feel for failing to join the party last time.

Show me the money!

The owner of today's featured property had to look no further than the walls of his house to find plenty of money. It is a judgement call between a D and an E for this owner. The periodic use of the housing ATM shows this was part of routine financial planning. The only real debate is whether or not this represents thoughtless spending, or if the owners maintained self delusion about spending their house faster than it could go up in value. In either case, it is foolish because now they are losing their house.

  • The property was purchased on 9/22/2000 for $265,000. The owner used a $251,750 first mortgage and a $13,250 downpayment.
  • On 4/12/2004 he becomes they, and they refinanced with a $315,000 first mortgage.
  • On 9/16/2004 they refinanced with a $381,500 first mortgage.
  • On 3/30/2005 they obtained a $50,000 stand-alone second.
  • On 1/5/2006 they refinanced the second and added a $20,000 HELOC.
  • On 8/2/2006 they refinanced with a $119,100 stand-alone second.
  • Total property debt is $500,600.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $248,850.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 06/25/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 03/20/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

They got 18 months or more of squatting out of the deal too. They are likely still there.

Irvine Home Address … 14952 GAINFORD Cir Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price … $460,000

Home Purchase Price … $265,000

Home Purchase Date …. 9/22/2000

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $167,400

Percent Change ………. 73.6%

Annual Appreciation … 5.7%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$460,000 ………. Asking Price

$16,100 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

5.24% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$443,900 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$97,867 ………. Income Requirement

$2,448 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$399 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$38 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$0 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$2,885 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$409 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$510 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$33 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$58 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$2,057 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$4,600 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$4,600 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$4,439 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$16,100 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$29,739 ………. Total Cash Costs

$31,500 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$61,239 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 14952 GAINFORD Cir Irvine, CA 92604

——————————————————————————

Beds: 3

Baths: 2 baths

Home size: 1,116 sq ft

($412 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 5,096 sq ft

Year Built: 1971

Days on Market: 186

MLS Number: S592003

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: El Camino Real

Tract: Wl

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

This property is in backup or contingent offer status.

Beautiful single story detached home. Remodeled Kitchen with large dining area with breakfast counter and bar with granite. Bathrooms were also remodeled in 2005 with new cabinets with granite counters. Laminate flooring in front room with tile in kitchen. All ceilings are scraped and textured. Vaulted ceiling in the living room with a nice cozy fireplace. Crown molding in master bedroom. Garage attic storage w/hide a ladder. Over 5000 sq ft large lot with newer fence. Gas built in range. Newer roof. No Mello Roos or HOA's. Close to Heritage Park Library and community center.

Failed Bailouts and the Neverending Mortgage Crisis

The bailouts never seem to end, and neither does the flow of irresponsible debtors in need of a bailout.

Irvine Home Address … 10 MOZZONI AISLE Irvine, CA 92606

Resale Home Price …… $294,000

{book1}

Oh, who can take tomorrow, dip it in a dream

Separate the sorrow and collect up all the cream

The Candy Man, oh the Candy Man can

The Candy Man can 'cause he mixes it with love and makes the world taste good

Sammy Davis Jr. — The Candy Man

At the core of every con is a dream. A con artist tempts a victim with dreams of riches or power to come in order to get them to do something today. It wasn't long ago it was only realtors and mortgage brokers who sold the dream. Now, our own government is joining the choir.

Over two years ago, I expressed by deep cynicism over the endless parade of Bailouts and False Hopes. As the bailouts continued, grew in number, and failed miserably, others have come to share my view.

The Permanent Mortgage Crisis

One more housing bailout to prolong the market agony.

Last Friday the White House announced its latest plan to prevent mortgage foreclosures, and earlier this week the famous Case-Shiller index found mostly flat home prices in January with analysts warning about a new wave of foreclosures to come. You can't blame the latest proposal for that outcome, but what about the previous 10 or 20 federal housing rescue plans?

We're supposed to believe that this latest effort to build an artificial floor under home prices will perform better than the Hope Now Alliance announced by President Bush in October 2007;

  • better than the revised Hope Now program announced two months later;
  • better than Hope for Homeowners, which was passed by Congress and signed by Mr. Bush in 2008;
  • better than the foreclosure moratoriums promoted by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Representative Barney Frank into early 2009;
  • better than the $127 billion that taxpayers have thus far poured into Fan and Fred, much of it for foreclosure relief;
  • better than the Federal Reserve's purchase of $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities;
  • better than last year's expansion of the 2008 First-Time Home Buyer Tax Credit to up to $8,000;
  • better than the billions in stimulus dollars that have been spent "to restore neighborhoods hardest hit by concentrated foreclosures," according to the White House;
  • better than the $1.5 billion announced earlier this year to state housing finance agencies in the electorally hard-hit areas of Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan and Nevada, and $600 million more this week for other states certified as political disaster areas;
  • and certainly better than Mr. Obama's year-old Home Affordable Modification Program to offer mortgage modifications to troubled borrowers or his companion program to offer generous refinancing. We could go on, but you get the joke, even if the housing market hasn't.

Here's a heretical thought: What if Washington had simply let housing prices fall on their own to find their natural bottom? The pain would have been more severe more quickly for some owners who bought more expensive homes than they could afford. But the pain might also be over by now as housing markets cleared faster, and housing might be contributing to a healthier economic expansion.

Heresy! Sacrilege!

Instead we are heading toward year five of the housing recession, with Washington proposing even more ideas to prolong the agony. One senior banking regulator we talk to calls it "extending and pretending."

But how long can troubled borrowers even pretend? The latest Mortgage Metrics report from the Comptroller of the Currency shows that most of the loans modified in the first quarter of 2009 had gone bad again within nine months—52% were more than 60 days delinquent.

Nothing has changed. We were talking about the horrendous recidivism rates years ago, and the performance has not improved.

Watching its previous failures, Team Obama will now emphasize reducing principal instead of merely lowering monthly mortgage payments for some years. The White House no doubt noticed that many of the loans modified outside of the various government programs—with aggressive principal reductions—had better re-default rates.

But this doesn't mean that such reductions are always a good idea. Many of these private reductions were the result of legal settlements, not business decisions. Obviously if taxpayers chip in to provide equity to millions of underwater borrowers, the borrowers will have less incentive to default. But how many more borrowers will be motivated to seek assistance when the subsidies become more generous?

A lower mortgage bill is surely a relief to an unemployed worker, but what he really needs is a job, and we see nothing in this plan (or any other Washington scheme) to encourage job creation. To the extent that these payments are merely unemployment benefits laundered through the mortgage system and thus reduce incentives to find work, the jobless rate will stay higher for longer and the entire economy will be worse off.

Think about the new unemployment subsidy we are giving only to loan owners. Why aren't we subsidizing the rent payments of the unemployed? I imagine the apartment owners association would get behind that idea. Renting a lot of money to occupy a home really does put people in a privileged class.

Potentially the most expensive part of this plan for taxpayers is the new Federal Housing Administration refinancing option. (Yes, that is the same FHA that is already struggling under mortgage losses and announced last year that its capital had fallen below the level required by law.) Taxpayers will be required to stand behind a "homeowner" who owes mortgage debt equal to 115% of the value of the home and whose monthly mortgage bill is up to 31% of total income. Message to owners who borrowed responsibly: Next time, don't be such a sap.

You'll also be pleased to know the Administration says the price tag on this latest housing plan won't exceed the $50 billion already earmarked for mortgage relief in the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Just don't expect it to end the mortgage crisis.

These hopeless programs exist only to provide false hope to debtors. To the degree that they are successful is the degree to which we create moral hazard. Who wants to be the responsible one paying the bills next time around? If lenders and borrowers do not experience the consequences of their actions, they will repeat them.

People get caught up in misguided compassion and think that these poor suffering souls need a bailout. They don't. Any bailout is paid for by those not receiving the benefits. It is a direct transfer of wealth from one household to another — state sanctioned theft.

It was bad enough during the bubble to watch the entitled class and their conspicuous consumption, but now we have to pay for it as well.

Subsized Financial Irresponsibility

We have all seen those people who manage their finances by falling short every month and waiting for either a bonus or a tax refund or some other timely windfall to keep them afloat. In the HELOC Abuse Grading System, these people earn a C:

HELOC Abuse Grade C

I hate to give borrowers in this category a "passing" grade, but this is the reality for most Americans. Growing credit card or mortgage debt slowly generally can be compensated for through home price appreciation, and although I consider this a bad idea, I can't really call it HELOC abuse, just foolish HELOC use. Is there a distinction there? I will let you decide.

Financial planners will tell you that most people fail to budget properly for unexpected expenses (they don't save), so when they fall behind a little each month, they put the balance on a credit card and hope they can pay it back with a tax return — or during the bubble with a visit to the housing ATM.

People are still going to manage their bills this way going forward, and there will be pressures to "liberate" this equity to pay for these expenses. The money changers will continue to peddle this nonsense as sophisticated financial management. It is a stupid way to manage debt, and I give it a C.

Years ago people that lived this way were finally chewed up by high interest fees on their credit cards. They survive by finding a point of buoyancy well underwater only coming up near the surface briefly before going on a spending spree and resubmerging themselves.

Once widespread HELOC abuse became the preferred method of financial management, borrowers developed equity surfing techniques to consistently extract equity as it became available and spend it. The owner of today's featured property illustrates how this was done.

  • The property was purchased on 8/26/2003 for $270,000… That is $270,000 for a 1,000 SF 1 bedroom condo. It isn't clear from my records what the original financing was. Assume it was 100% because it probably was.
  • On 4/15/2004 the owner refinanced a first mortgage for $288,000. She had to live in this dump for a little over 6 months before she could get a loan for $18,000 more than she paid. This little condo made her about $3,000 per month.
  • On 12/7/2004 she was able to get a first mortgage for $341,000. She pulled out $71,000 in a little over 1 year.
  • On 5/24/2005 her lender gave her another $49,500 in a HELOC.
  • On 3/22/2006 she refinanced again with a $345,000 first mortgage and a $63,000 HELOC
  • Total property debt is $408,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $138,000… from a tiny condo in under two years.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 02/09/2010

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 06/08/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

Don't you feel kind of stupid for not doing this? Back in 2002-2005, you could have bought something — anything — and been given access to hundreds of thousands of dollars in free money. And you know what? Nothing has changed!

If prices start going up, people will demand HELOCs to spend the appreciation. Lenders know they are backstopped by the US taxpayer, so they will gladly make the loans. And borrowers know if the Ponzi Scheme collapses again, they will be given a host of bailouts to choose from to make their lives easier. Even our government, which is supposed to look out for us, is happy to re-inflate the housing bubble because it boosts the economy even if that means more bailouts.

Assuming our leaders continue to fail us — and there is no reason to think they will suddenly change course — there is no downside to buying real estate for those with no assets and a strong desire to spend money. In other words, the more irresponsible you are, the more desirable real estate is. Great system we have, isn't it?

Irvine Home Address … 10 MOZZONI AISLE Irvine, CA 92606

Resale Home Price … $294,000

Home Purchase Price … $270,000

Home Purchase Date …. 8/26/2003

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $6,360

Percent Change ………. 8.9%

Annual Appreciation … 1.2%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$294,000 ………. Asking Price

$10,290 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

5.24% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$283,710 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$62,550 ………. Income Requirement

$1,565 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$255 ………. Property Tax

$50 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$25 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$290 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$2,184 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$149 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$326 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$21 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$37 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$1,767 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$2,940 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$2,940 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$2,837 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$10,290 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$19,007 ………. Total Cash Costs

$27,000 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$46,007 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 10 MOZZONI AISLE Irvine, CA 92606

——————————————————————————

Beds: 1

Baths: 1 full 1 part baths

Home size: 1,022 sq ft

($288 / sq ft)

Lot Size: n/a

Year Built: 1990

Days on Market: 375

MLS Number: S569378

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Community: Westpark

Tract: Cb

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

This property is in backup or contingent offer status.

Back on Market. Rare 1 bedroom + Den or 2 bedroom condo. Cozy corner unit with lots of privacy. Only 1 common wall! Efficient floor plan feels a lot larger than actual square footage. Romantic fireplace in living Room. Private patio, upgraded carpet throughout & Large Master Suite. Great Location in Beautiful Gated Community of Corte Bella. Enjoy entertaining your guests in the relaxing court yard, take a dip in one of the many association pool, roast marsh mellows in the fire pit and end the evening soaking in the association spa. Serene, Private Setting with Mediterranean Architecture, Fountains and Courtyards. Convenient walking distance of shopping, recreation & parks. This home is convenient to guest parking and is the easiest for guests to locate within the development.Recent distressed sales have artificially depressed the value of these units. This is a great opportunity for a first time buyer or investor. Seller Needs OUT, let's make a deal.

Recently distressed sales have not artificially depressed values. These sales have driven prices back down toward affordability.

I find it amusing that the realtor is throwing this owner under the bus; after all, this is a distressed sale. You know, like those others that have artificially depressed prices. And like the many more to come….