Monthly Archives: April 2010

Bubble Market Psychology – Part 3

Bailouts and False Hopes

One of the more interesting phenomena observed during the bubble was the perpetuation of denial with rumors of homeowner bailouts. Many homeowners held out hope that if they could just keep current on their mortgage long enough, the government would come to their rescue in the form of a mandated bailout program. Part of this fantasy was not just that people could keep their homes, but that they could keep living their lifestyle as they did during the bubble. What few seemed to realize was any government bailout program would be designed to benefit the lenders by keeping borrowers in a perpetual state of indentured servitude. With all their money going toward debt service payments, little was going to be left over for living a life.

All of these plans had benefits and drawbacks. One of the first problems was to clearly define who should be “bailed out.” The thought of bailing out speculators was not palatable to anyone except perhaps the speculators themselves, but with regular families behaving like speculators, separating the wheat from the chaff was not an easy task. If a family exaggerated their income to obtain more house than they could afford in hopes of capturing appreciation, did they deserve a bailout? The credit crisis that popped the Great Housing Bubble was one of solvency, and there was no way to effectively restructure payments when a borrower could not afford to pay the interest on the debt, and this was a very common circumstance. None of the bailout programs did much for those with stated-income (liar) loans, negative amortization loans, and others who are unable to make the payments, and since this was a significant portion of the housing inventory, none of these plans had any real hope of stopping the fall of prices in the housing market.

The main problem with all of the plans is the moral hazard they created because those who did not participate in the bubble and instead behaved in a prudent manner would be penalized at the expense of those who were cavalier about risk. In one form or another either through free market impacts or direct subsidies from the government paid by tax dollars, these bailout plans all asked the cautious to support the reckless. [xv]

Many of the early bailout plans called for changing the terms of the mortgage note. This might have been easy in the days when banks held mortgages in their own portfolios, but it was much more difficult once these mortgages were bundled together in collateralized debt obligations and sold to parties all over the world. Even if it would have been possible to easily change the terms, the resulting turmoil in the secondary mortgage market would have caused higher mortgage interest rates. When an investor faces the risk of the government changing the terms of their contract, and these changes would not be in their favor, the investor would demand higher returns. Higher investor returns means higher mortgage interest rates which would raise the cost of borrowing. This was the opposite of what the government bailout plans were trying to accomplish.

Hope Now?

The first of the numerous bailout programs was “Hope Now” introduced in October of 2007. As the name suggests, Hope Now was sold to the general public as a reason for them to hang on and continue making crushing payments for as long as possible. It was a false hope, but even false hope gave homeowners a little emotional relief, and it provided a few more payments to the lenders. According to their website, “HOPE NOW is a cooperative effort between counselors, investors, and lenders to maximize outreach efforts to homeowners in distress.” [xvi] The plan was to streamline the process of negotiating workouts between lenders and borrowers to keep borrowers making payments and ostensibly to stop them from losing their homes. The emphasis was on making payments and maximizing investor value in collateralized debt obligations. Very few people benefited from the program, despite government claims to the contrary, and no rights or benefits were conferred to borrowers that they did not already contractually have. There was much fanfare when it was first announced, but the program did far too little to have any impact on the housing market.

The next bailout was aimed directly at the lenders with the Super SIV program introduced in October of 2007 (Paulson, 2007). An SIV is a special investment vehicle. It is an off-balance-sheet investment designed to hold investments a company (usually a lender) does not want to show on its own balance sheets. It is a smoke-and-mirrors device used primarily to get around regulations intended to stop lenders from taking excessive risk. The Super SIV program was intended to purchase assets from the troubled SIVs and provide liquidity for lenders who desperately needed it. The problem with the Super SIV was simple: nobody wanted these assets. Moving bad mortgage paper around was akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Few in the general public knew what this program was for, and even fewer cared. Most wanted to know their government was doing something to solve the problem, and the Super SIV announcement provided them with much wanted denial.

In December of 2007, the government offered a more direct homeowner bailout plan. The proposal was to freeze the interest rates on certain loans for certain borrowers for five years. This was greeted as a panacea by all parties, and the beast of homeowner denial was fed once again. As with the Hope Now program, few people qualified, and it did nothing to hold back the tide of increasing defaults and foreclosures. The denial was short lived, and this unnamed bailout plan quickly fell from the headlines.

In February of 2008 Congress and the President signed the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 temporarily increasing the conforming loan limit for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government sponsored entities (GSEs) that maintain the secondary mortgage market. The GSEs provide insurance to mortgage backed securities, and by raising the conforming limit, the GSEs were able to insure large, so called “jumbo” loans. This enabled the holders of jumbo loans who were unable to sell these mortgages access to capital in the secondary market. All of this was seen as another reason for homeowners in severely inflated bubble markets to hope the government was going to rescue the housing market.

Forgiveness of Debt

Perhaps the most outrageous suggestion put forth was the suggestion by the FED Chairman Ben Bernanke when he proposed lenders forgive mortgage debt in early 2008 (Bernanke B. S., Reducing Preventable Mortgage Foreclosures, 2008). The moral hazards were obvious. Would people stop making their payments to make sure they qualified? Would more people buy homes they could not afford then appeal for debt relief? Rational people became frightened when they heard the head banker in the United States propose massive debt forgiveness as they realized this meant the entire banking system was in peril. The implications of this proposal were lost on the typical homeowner who only saw how they might benefit from it. Debt forgiveness was the ultimate fantasy of every homeowner. They could be relieved of their financial burdens and get to keep their houses and their lifestyles. It did not matter to the financially troubled that the proposal made no sense and had no possibility of happening, the thought of it would motivate them to hang on a little longer to see if maybe they could hit the jackpot.

Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008

In late July 2008, Congress passed and the President signed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 that included the following provisions: Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008, and the Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008. At the time of this writing, these programs have not been fully implemented, and it is too soon to determine if they are successful. Of course, success can mean different things to different parties. For homeowners, success means keeping their house, getting a lower payment, and profiting from its eventual sale. For lenders and holders of mortgages, success means keeping a steady flow of money coming in from previously insolvent debtors. For the government, success means doing something to make angry homeowners less likely to vote them out of office and keep our financial system from complete collapse. As with many pieces of legislation, it is an ugly series of compromises, and ultimately, none of the concerned parties may deem it successful.

In the Savings and Loan disaster of the late 1980s, the government was liable to investors for their losses through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). The government had no choice but to compel taxpayers to cover the costs of the industry bailout. The Great Housing Bubble had no such direct government liability until this burden was assumed by the government retroactively. The Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008 established a regulator to watch over the GSEs. This was too late to do anything about the serious problems facing the GSEs, and it acted as an interim step toward a direct GSE bailout of lenders and investors at the expense of the taxpayers. If one of the GSEs would have failed prior to this legislation, many in Congress would have resisted a taxpayer bailout because the activities of the GSEs were not strictly regulated. Once the regulatory framework was in place, Congress had greater political cover to justify a taxpayer bailout.

In early September 2008, not long after the legislation was passed, the Department of Treasury took over “conservatorship” of the GSEs. It is unclear what will happen once under government control–other than the taxpayers of the United States will be directly responsible for all losses. In time, the government’s interests in the GSEs will likely be sold, and the GSEs will become private companies again, but this time with greater governmental oversight. With any regulatory framework, enforcement is pivotal to its success. If another bubble starts inflating, enforcement may not take priority over profits, particularly when the GSE lobbyists start donating heavily to key Congressional leaders.

The HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008 and the Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2008 are of primary interest to homeowners. [xvii] It falls well short of what most homeowners wanted: direct debt relief from the government. However, it does provide incentives for lenders and investors to forgive the debts of homeowners, but it makes homeowners agree to take out an FHA loan with a higher interest rate and give half the profits on the eventual sale to the FHA. Neither of those provisions will be palatable to borrowers. Both the lender and the homeowner must voluntarily participate. If the lender is determined to foreclose or if the borrower is determined to give up paying back the loan, neither party is compelled to work with the other. For lenders facing taking a property back in foreclosure, writing off a significant portion of the original loan may be preferable to taking a larger loss in a foreclosure. Desperate owners facing foreclosure may like the idea of debt forgiveness, but their payments will not go down much, and giving up half their appreciation will not go over well when they go to sell the property.

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008

In early October 2008, the Congress passed and the President signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. The purpose of the bill was “to restore liquidity and stability to the U.S. financial system and to ensure the economic well-being of Americans.” The law authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to purchase the toxic waste poisoning the balance sheets of lenders and other financial institutions. This measure was passed in response to an unprecedented seizure of the short-term credit markets. Banks quit lending money to other banks once it became apparent that few of them were solvent. This fear spread to all short-term commercial paper and threatened to bring down the entire financial system. It is unclear whether or not this new program will save the institutions holding the toxic waste.

When this legislation was first introduced, there was widespread public disapproval of what amounted to be a transfer of wealth from taxpayers to rich bankers on Wall Street. There was no mention of bailing out troubled homeowners who were the cause of all the financial distress in the lending industry. Since desperate homeowners were not being given any new false hope, they saw no reason to support the bailout. A series of dramatic drops in the equities markets while the legislation was being debated helped turn the tide of public opinion.

The impact of this legislation is unknown at the time of this writing; however, it appears to be designed as part of a controlled implosion of the banking system. With $700,000,000,000 at his disposal and complete discretion on how to spend it, the Treasury Secretary, with cooperation from the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, will be able to sort out the healthy banks from the unhealthy ones, broker mergers and acquisitions and recapitalize the survivors. By October of 2008, the need for bailouts and false hopes had gone beyond foolish borrowers; the banks were the ones who needed some denial.

Zero Coupon Notes

Of all the intervention programs put forward, only one had any chance of providing any real relief to homeowners if it had been implemented, but the terms would not have been to the liking of homeowners, and the long-term implications would not have been pleasant: convert part of the mortgage to a zero coupon bond. A zero coupon bond is a bond which does not make periodic interest payments. Think of it a zero amortization loan. The borrower pays neither the interest nor the principal, and both accumulate for the life of the loan. The loan would be due upon the sale of the house.

There were many borrowers who were capable of making the payments on a conventional 30-year mortgage when their loans reset, but they were unable to refinance because they owed more on their mortgage than was allowed to qualify for refinancing. For this group of borrowers, the government could have instituted a “loan guarantee” program similar to what they did for Chrysler in the 80s. It would have been in both the lender’s interest and the borrower’s interest to make the loan and have the borrower continue to make payments, and some banks would have done this on their own (or would have been forced to in a “cram down“); however, many other banks would not, so a government program would have been necessary to prevent further disruption in the market.

Here is how it would have worked for our typical homeowner: Assume a borrower utilized 100% financing and took out a $500,000 interest-only mortgage with a 2% teaser rate that is due to adjust to 6%. Further assume the borrower’s real income (not what was reported on the liar loan) could support a $1,500 payment on a $250,000 conventional 30-year mortgage at 6%. The bank could convert $250,000 to a conventional mortgage, and convert the other $250,000 to a zero coupon bond at 6% due on sale. The homeowner could have made their payment and kept their house; however, when they later sold their house, they would have owed the bank a great deal of money. If they sold the house in 20 years, they would owe $800,000 on the zero coupon bond note. In other words, all the equity gain on the value of the home would have gone to the bank.

This would have solved a multitude of problems: First, it would have provided a mechanism whereby people who were victims of predatory lending could have kept their homes. This would have made the homeowner happy, and it would have kept government regulators out of the lender’s business. Second, it would have made the lenders more money in the long run because they still would have been making their interest profit even if they did not see it until after the home was sold. (Many may not be aware of it, but lenders book income on the increase in principal on a negative amortization loan). Third, since foreclosures were the primary mechanism facilitating the crash, it would have kept home prices from crashing by reducing the number of foreclosures.

Sounds like a panacea, but there would have been some problems. The first problem would become apparent when people start selling their houses. People are greedy. They would not have wanted to give the bank all their equity when they sold. They would have conveniently forgotten the debt relief and avoiding foreclosure and all the problems they had earlier. All they would have seen is that they sold the house for much more than they paid for it, and they did not make any money. And what happens when the appreciation does not match the term of the note? Would they have completed a short-sale 20 years down the line? This would have caused a huge uproar and more calls for congressional intervention. In other words, for everyone involved the day of reckoning would be delayed, not avoided.

This solution would have done nothing for the affordability problem. If prices did not crash, a great many people really would have been priced out forever. To solve that problem, banks would have had to make zero coupon bonds available to everyone, and eventually everyone would have had them. Think about where we would have been then: we would have become a society of homeowners who had collectively agreed to give all our equity to the bank for the pride of ownership: starts to sound a bit like Pottersville from It’s a Wonderful Life. [xviii] Is that the way we all would have wanted to live?

The zero coupon bond solution would have effectively eliminated the move-up market because people would not have had any equity to take with them from house to house. Unless a prospective move-up buyer has saved a substantial sum or obtained a large pay increase to afford a larger payment, they could not get a more expensive home. This would have resulted in a dramatic flattening of prices. In other words, the low end would have been supported at inflated levels while the high end would have stagnated or declined.

Also, based on the problems above, it would have been difficult to find a new equilibrium in prices. How would people have calculated how much anything was worth? How would all price ranges have been supported equally? Small changes in the interest rate on the zero coupon bond would have made the difference between hundreds of thousands of dollars at the time of sale, particularly on a long-term hold. Does anyone think this would have turned out in favor of the borrower? We would have undoubtedly seen many short-sales as the banks graciously agreed to take all the gains and forgive the rest of the debt. This would take us back to our first problem with angry, greedy sellers.

Finally, this would have been only a short to medium term solution to the foreclosure problem. For as much as we are addicted to credit in this country, there is a point where people would have said “enough is enough.” When a house fails to have any investment value, people would not have been so excited about home ownership. People can blather on about pride of ownership all they want, but people want to make money when selling their houses. Inflated valuations are only supported by greed. If home ownership becomes less desirable, prices would have ended up falling back to their rental equivalent values because the demand would not have been there. In the long run, we would have ended up with prices where they should have been anyway, it would have been a much more prolonged and painful journey very similar to the Japanese experience of the 1990s.

Zero coupon bond structures and other exotic financing terms are quite common in complex real estate deals. Exotic loan terms are the exclusive purview of sophisticated investors who understand what they are doing. They are not intended for consumption by the general public. Given the profusion of interest-only, and negative amortization loans in the market, is not a surprise the financial innovations of the Great Housing Bubble turned out badly.

Let Markets Work

It is difficult not to become cynical about all the various bailout programs, and the proposals outlined were not the only ones discussed in the public forum. There was a steady drumbeat of public plans and announcements that were never substantial, and their only purpose seemed to be to foster denial among those who needed it.

There is no possible bailout program without the commensurate moral hazards and unfair benefits they would contain. The best course of action would be to ease the transition of people from overextended homeowner to renter and not to attempt to manipulate the financial markets for the benefit of a few. There is nothing that can be done to prevent of the collapse of financial bubbles. The solution lies in easing the pain of their deflation and in preventing them from inflating in the future.

Summary

The motivations for purchasing real estate or any asset differ considerably between investors and speculators. Since speculators rely on capturing the change in asset price, they are much more emotionally involved with the gyrations of market resale value, and since their emotions work against them, they most often sell at a loss. Trading houses became epidemic in the Great Housing Bubble. Houses became commodities to buy and sell and lost their intrinsic value as a shelter or a place to call “home.” People utilized 100% financing and treated mortgage obligations as little more than options contracts.

The emotional cycle of an asset price bubble emanates from the emotional cycle of individual speculators. Efficient markets theory would say these emotions are irrelevant as each investor acts rationally based on fundamental market data. Behavioral finance theory argues our herd instincts coupled with irrational beliefs and expectations are primary forces at work in financial markets. Efficient markets theory fails to explain asset price bubbles, whereas behavioral finance theory does. When the bubble bursts, each speculator must go through the stages of grief as she comes to accept her loss. These stages have analogous counterparts in the price cycle of an asset bubble, and it is through the actions of these grieving speculators that the timing of the cycle takes place.

Asset price bubbles can distort the values and behaviors of entire segments of society. Pathological beliefs can take root and grow into an unsustainable system doomed to crash down around all those who subscribe to the cultural pathology. The activity of governments can serve to reinforce pathological behaviors, and when called upon by a desperate public, the government can pander to the emotional needs of the citizenry through generating false hopes and supporting denial.

Many people like it when houses go up in price. During a rally the bulls become intoxicated with greed and obsessed with owning real estate as an investment. However, once houses become an investment, the prices of houses begin to behave like an investment, and volatility is introduced into the system. When houses trade with the volatility of a commodities market, it causes more harm than good. Price volatility is a very disruptive feature in a housing market: the upswings are euphoric, and the downswings are devastating–and there are downswings. Declining house prices are emotionally and financially draining both to individuals and to the economy as a whole. The upswings create massive amounts of unsustainable borrowing and spending, and the downswings create economic contraction, foreclosures and personal bankruptcy. Is the ecstasy of a rally worth the despair of a crash?

Houses should not be viewed as a commodity to trade. Most people lack the financial sophistication to successfully trade in commodity markets. Buying and hoping prices go up is not a successful strategy. Volatility in housing prices is harmful to the community as the financial and emotional costs of the inevitable price crash are just too great. Everyone pays a price. Renters who chose not to participate are forced to wait to obtain the security of home ownership at an affordable price, and buyers who endure the crash… well, their pain is obvious.


[xv] Todd Sinai in his paper, The Inequity of Subprime Mortgage Relief Programs (Sinai, 2008), documented the moral hazards involved with the various programs in the public forum of the time. He accurately characterized the problem as follows, “These programs may help some borrowers, but they do not bestow these benefits equitably. Some reward those who made riskier decisions over those who made prudent decisions, exclude those who live in states that experienced an early economic downturn, benefit those with high incomes at the expense of others, and spread the costs of the program among all taxpayers or future borrowers – regardless of whether they benefit from the proposals.”

[xvi] The Hope Now Alliance website address is http://www.hopenow.com/.

[xvii] The Hope for Homeowners Act of 2008 was built on 5 principals: 1. Long-term affordability. The program is built on the idea, expressed by Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, that creating new equity for troubled homeowners is likely to be a more effective way to avoid foreclosures. New loans will be based on a family’s ability to repay the loan, ensuring affordability and sustainable homeownership. 2. No investor or lender bailout. Investors and/or lenders will have to take significant losses in order to benefit from the proceeds of the loans refinanced with government insurance. However, these losses would be less than the losses associated with foreclosure. 3. No windfall for borrowers. Borrowers will share their new equity and future appreciation equally with FHA. Borrowers will pay for the FHA insurance. 4. Voluntary participation. This will be a voluntary program. No lenders, servicers, or investors will be compelled to participate. 5. Restore confidence, liquidity, and transparency. Credit markets are fearful and frozen in part because banks and other financial institutions do not know what their subprime mortgages and related securities are worth. The uncertainty is forcing lenders to hoard capital and stop the lending necessary for economic growth. This program will help restore confidence and get markets flowing again.

[xviii] (Capra, 1946)

IHB News 4-24-2010

Is eight your lucky number? The seller of today's featured property certainly hopes so.

Irvine Home Address … 89 CANYON Crk Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price …… $8,888,888

{book1}

Look at the stars

Look how they shine for you

And everything you do

Yeah, they were all yellow

I came along

I wrote a song for you

And all the things you do

And it was called "Yellow"

So then I took my turn

Oh what a thing to have done

And it was all "Yellow"

Coldplay — Yellow

The Writer's Corner

The Cause Shoppe

Today, I want to introduce you to one of my heroes, Romney Snyder. I first met Romney five years ago with her first son (pictured right). Her generosity of heart is very special. I admire who she is and how she lives. She is an ordinary hero you might never hear about. I think that makes her extraordinary.

A single mom to two special needs boys – one with Down syndrome and the other with neurological and behavioral issues – Romney’s adventure in motherhood began with her first son’s 2004 adoption and only got more exciting with the second adoption in 2007. An open advocate for adoption (of both the child and canine varieties) she also plays mom to two rescued Pit Bulls and a Malti-poo mix. Earning a reputation as a “volunteeraholic,” Romney has been following her heart and involved with a variety of nonprofits since her high school days. Originally raising Guide Dog puppies in high school, Romney continued her charitable involvement beyond her college years, serving as a volunteer wish granter with the Make-A-Wish Foundation and an emergency disaster responder with the American Red Cross, which she is still involved with today. While she’ll admit that nothing compares to the adventure of being a parent to her two boys, her professional endeavors have come close. Working since she was 14, highlights include recurring extra work with Mighty Morphin Power Rangers (mentioned only at the insistence of Brooke) and nightclub management (where she started as a bouncer). A certified interpreter for the deaf with a strong background in Public Relations and communications, Romney believes these fields are the crux of where her talents lie and has achieved extensive local and national publicity for her clients, even taking one all the way to the White House where his accomplishments were recognized by the President. Today, Romney is the Program Director for ABILITY Awareness, a nonprofit organization dedicated to building a world of inclusion for people with disabilities, running her boutique brand management company Dilliant!, and loving the process of launching a company that is supporting amazing causes and providing an outlet for her entrepreneurial interests.

Romney's favorite charities are: ABILITY Awareness, the ASPCA, The Heart Gallery of America, The Injured Marine Semper Fi Fund, and Neigh Savers

Romney and her business partner Brooke Fessler operate the online store, The Cause Shoppe:

The Cause Shoppe is a socially-conscious online shop that helps everyday consumers become philanthropists. We connect people with products and services that inspire awareness while supporting our local and global communities. In these trying economic times, buying PhilGoods™ offers opportunities for shoppers' purchases to have a greater purpose — supporting charities making vital change in our world. The site was officially launched December 2009 by founding partners Brooke Fessler and Romney Snyder with a few hundred favorite products and a promise to become the premier online site featuring PhilGoods™.

Go buy something from her store, The Cause Shoppe. You will pheel good about it.

Map presentation of income and housing data

I stumbled upon an interesting site, The H+T Affordability Index. They have custom, map-driven data analysis. Orange County is HERE. You can zoom in to Irvine.

The data shows income statistics and housing costs on a block-by-block basis. The data is very fine grained. For instance, the apartement complexes along Alton in Woodbridge show up as separate demographic neighborhoods where incomes and housing costs are quite low relative to the rest of town. The income desparity going across the loop is apparent too. The detail of the data is fantastic.

The areas still inflated to bubble price levels is apparent. The apartments on the Alton-Barranca corridor show the aggregate DTI renters are paying to live here. The numbers are quite high relative to national norms (look around the maps). The areas that have not deflated in value stand out too. The upper middle class is really getting a huge break by the banks refusing to foreclose. Plenty of squatting and sustained inflated values.

The disparity between renters and owners costs jumps out between these two graphics. Owners were putting 15% or more of their income toward housing than were renters in the same area. The owners DTIs are crushing. I wonder how many owners we are subsidizing with a loan modification?

There is so much to be learned from this information. I will talk to Zovall about exploring what we can do to work with this data at the IHB.

Check out your neighborhood.

Housing Bubble News from Patrick.net

Decline in FL property values will be steeper than expected (tampabay.com)

The Real State of the Housing Market (counterpunch.org)

Las Vegas property values at 2000 levels (lvrj.com)

The great property scam is back to rip us off again (independent.ie)

Shiller: "Mini-bubble" in Stock and Housing Markets (calculatedriskblog.com)

Hamptons House Prices Surge From Wall Street Bailouts (bloomberg.com)

The American people can't afford God's work anymore (theautomaticearth.blogspot.com)

Does Goldman Sachs case tarnish Cassandras of the crash? (app.com)

Lippmann, Mortgage Trader, Steps Down (dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com)

Bring Criminal Charges Against Originators of Stated-Income Mortgages (newobservations.net)

Yes, There Was a Housing Bubble (cjr.org)

Asking a Better Question About Who to Blame for the Financial Crisis (timiacono.com)

Mortgage Market Meltdown reprinted (greatdepression2006.blogspot.com)

Shifting mindset to one of non-payment revolt (mybudget360.com)

Japan Tries to Face Up to Growing Poverty Problem (nytimes.com)

Jon Stewart on Goldman Sachs (timiacono.com)

Obama to Nominate Jesus Christ to Supreme Court (readersupportednews.org)

Patrick speaking at Google (video – patrick.net)

Foreclosures moving to mid-to-high end (calculatedriskblog.com)

Bank of Canada Signals G-7s First Interest Rate Increases (bloomberg.com)

Fannie Mae Moving on Property in Mid-tier Markets (doctorhousingbubble.com)

City of Oakland placing liens for profit? (auditoaklandceda.com)

Los Angeles Among Forbes' Top 10 U.S Cities In Freefall (huffingtonpost.com)

California: The Beholden State (city-journal.org)

Anaheim businessman collects rent on Southern California houses (ocregister.com)

'Strategic Defaulters' Skip Mortgage Payments as House Values Tumble (pbs.org)

Former head of KB Home builder guilty on stock option backdating charges (latimes.com)

America's Economic Recovery Is a Rotten Sham (marketoracle.co.uk)

Geithner and NY Fed Accused of Willfully Ignoring Fraud (Mish)

AIG Said to Insure Goldman's Board Against Investor Suits (preview.bloomberg.com)

Hope rises for real financial reform (washingtonpost.com)

Why Government Regulation Fails (online.wsj.com)

401k Balances Remain 11% Lower Than in 2007 (bloomberg.com)

As Markets Fizzle, Buying May Cost Less Than Renting (also may not!) (nytimes.com)

NY luxury condos turn into halfway house for drug addicts run by paroled felon (nydailynews.com)

West Palm Beach condo unit sees 85% price cut (blogs.palmbeachpost.com)

23% unemployed at least a year (economy.freedomblogging.com)

A Fresh Approach To Measuring The Economy (npr.org)

Why Texas is doing so much better economically than the rest of the nation (slate.com)

Senior Goldman Executives Approved the Paulson Deal (Mish)

Abacus Deal: As Bad as They Come (online.wsj.com)

New York Lawmakers Rank Highest in Goldman Donations (bloomberg.com)

Goldman Fraud Is Not Goldman's Alone (citypaper.com)

Goldman Sachs toil, Chinese bubble stirring up double trouble? (vancouversun.com)

Fed's Secret Loans To Favored Banks (bloomberg.com)

How We Get Ahead Now: Gaming the System (Charles Hugh Smith)

Former L.A. firefighter pleads no contest in real-estate scheme (latimesblogs.latimes.com)

New Canadian mortgage rules take effect (cbc.ca)

10 Scariest Charts Of The Recession (huffingtonpost.com)

The Future of U.S. Housing (mybudget360.com)

Moody's fears social unrest as AAA states implement austerity plans (telegraph.co.uk)

Fannie: House Buying Credit Failed (theatlantic.com)

Fannie Mae owns patent on residential 'cap and trade' exchange (washingtonexaminer.com)

Recent CFTC Hearing and the Future of Precious Metals Markets (thedailybell.com)

U.S. property plunge – how low will it go? (theglobeandmail.com)

Selling O.C. mansion? Wait 3 years! (lansner.freedomblogging.com)

Extreme HELOC Abuse from Extreme Makeover House Owners (irvinehousingblog.com)

Wealth was not "lost". Sellers and banks took it. (snl.com)

Commercial Real Estate Prices Decline 2.6% in February (calculatedriskblog.com)

Patrick Needs Data (patrick.net)

Top Goldman Leaders Said to Have Overseen Mortgage Unit (finance.yahoo.com)

Goldman Sachs Fraud Roundup; The Story Has Just Begun (Mish)

SEC Charges against Goldman Sachs Send Shivers through Wall Street (rismedia.com)

Did the SEC plant a Goldman bomb? (theautomaticearth.blogspot.com)

How Goldman exploited the information gap (money.cnn.com)

Top Goldman Leaders Said to Have Overseen Mortgage Unit (nytimes.com)

Congress too weak and fearful to break up biggest banks (washingtontimes.com)

Financial Markets — Open Yale Courses (oyc.yale.edu)

5 Celebs Hit Hard By Foreclosure (thepittsburghchannel.com)

In Debt We Trust (long video – google.com)

Yuan Gains May Help China Vault Past Japan to Be No. 2 Economy (bloomberg.com)

China To Overtake U.S. As World's Biggest Asshole By 2020 (theonion.com)

Baja California luxury developments go from boom to bust (articles.latimes.com)

South Florida's condo crisis: Prices at seven-year lows (palmbeachpost.com)

Lure of easy real-estate money sinks couple (ajc.com)

Maui foreclosure outlook excellent (for frugal buyers) (honoluluadvertiser.com)

U.S. foreclosure filings up in first quarter (marketwatch.com)

National foreclosure rates rise to highest quarterly total ever (newjerseynewsroom.com)

Here Come The Foreclosures (housing-kaboom.blogspot.com)

Just in time for spring, next wave of foreclosure crisis gets rolling (boston.com)

Foreclosures will be the wrecking ball for the American economy (theautomaticearth)

Five Reasons House Prices May Slump For Years (politicallore.com)

U.S. Housing Market Crash Update: There's A World of Pain Ahead (marketoracle.co.uk)

Housing and the Collapse of Upward Mobility (Charles Hugh Smith)

The Renter's Manifesto (thelibertyguardian.com)

Our Pecora Moment: Fraud is the Heart of Wall Street (baselinescenario.com)

Goldman Sachs fraud case stunning in its indictment of Wall Street culture (blogs.ajc.com)

S.E.C. Sues Goldman Over Housing Market Deal (nytimes.com)

Pointless deals line Wall Street pockets, Goldman Sachs suit shows (latimes.com)

Banks have even greater control of government since bailouts (pbs.org)

Measuring Wall Street Apologetics – Regret-o-Meter (nytimes.com)

Treasury seeks public comments on reform for housing-finance system (washingtonpost.com)

Irvine Home Address … 89 CANYON Crk Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price … $8,888,888

Home Purchase Price … $8,200,000

Home Purchase Date …. 12/11/2009

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $155,555

Percent Change ………. 8.4%

Annual Appreciation … 19.5%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$8,888,888 ………. Asking Price

$1,777,778 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.16% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$7,111,110 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$1,874,203 ………. Income Requirement

$38,872 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$7704 ………. Property Tax

$800 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$741 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$500 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$48,617 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$3361 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$8295 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$3615 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$1111 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$41,687 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$88,889 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$88,889 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$71,111 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$1,777,778 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$2,026,666 ………. Total Cash Costs

$639,000 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$2,665,666 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 89 CANYON Crk Irvine, CA 92603

——————————————————————————

Beds: 9

Baths: 9 full 2 part baths

Home size: 13,500 sq ft

($658 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 27,852 sq ft

Year Built: 2008

Days on Market: 30

MLS Number: P727695

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: Turtle Rock

Tract: Shdc

——————————————————————————

Fabulous Santa Barbara Estate located in the exclusive golf community of Shady Canyon! This is your perfect home for entertaining! This home is light, bright and has 9 bedroom suites, 11 bathrooms and the 9 car garage has its own dedicated kitchen and it can be used as a ballroom for 100 people! The home is built around a center courtyard atrium with a 3 story waterfall. There is a total of 3 full kitchens, 1 butler's kitchen, 2 kitchenettes and 1 outdoor kitchen all with top of the line Viking Professional appliances. Huge game room, multiple bars, karaoke stage, pool table, theater, exercise room (with its own spa-sauna, jacuzzi, steam room, shower), wine room, dedicated laundry room, elevator, security system (wired for indoor and outdoor surveillance cameras), surround sound (wired for multi-media and Ipod docking stations), whole house purified drinking water system and much more.

I don't know that I have every seen a pool or snooker table quite so long and narrow. What is that? And check out the garage:

The Ethics and Morality of Borrowing and Lending During the Great Housing Bubble

Borrowers and lenders behaved badly during the bubble. Some were unethical and some were immoral. Today we examine these distinctions to see what we can learn from their mistakes.

Irvine Home Address … 14522 MANGO Ave Irvine, CA 92606

Resale Home Price …… $649,000

{book1}

And it used to be for a while

That the river flowed right to my door

Making me just a little too free

But now the river doesn't seem to stop here anymore

Carly Simon — The Right Thing to Do

Did anyone who participated in the Great Housing Bubble stop to consider what was the right thing to do? As long as the money flowed in a river to homeowner's doors, few cared. The river of free money isn't flowing any more, and now we have to examine why this happened, or we risk doing it again.

In yesterday's post on Walking Away from a Mortgage to Secure Their Children’s Future, I presented the argument that people should walk away from their mortgages if they are facing the choice between defaulting or paying on an underwater mortgage when renting is less expensive. The astute observations from that post are among the most interesting in recent memory at the IHB. Today, I want to recap some of the arguments made and delve deeper into this contentious issue.

Ethics and Morality

Finding a good definition of ethics or morals is difficult because the terms have different meanings in different contexts. For purposes of the discussion today, I will define morality as the individual's sense of right and wrong, and ethics as the code of conduct as defined by a group of people for common benefit. Ethics can change with the group and the circumstances whereas morality is consistent for the individual.

Also, consider this definition:

The difference between ethics and morals can seem somewhat arbitrary to many, but there is a basic, albeit subtle, difference. Morals define personal character, while ethics stress a social system in which those morals are applied. In other words, ethics point to standards or codes of behavior expected by the group to which the individual belongs. … So while a person’s moral code is usually unchanging, the ethics he or she practices can be other-dependent.

When considering the difference between ethics and morals, it may be helpful to consider a criminal defense lawyer. Though the lawyer’s personal moral code likely finds murder immoral and reprehensible, ethics demand the accused client be defended as vigorously as possible, even when the lawyer knows the party is guilty and that a freed defendant would potentially lead to more crime. Legal ethics must override personal morals for the greater good of upholding a justice system in which the accused are given a fair trial and the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecution and court must also deal with the difference between ethics and morals. In some cases past actions of the accused might resonate with the current charge, but are kept out of evidence so as not to prejudice the jury. In a sense, the prosecutor “lies by omission” in representing the case, never revealing the prejudicial evidence. The same prosecutor, however, would likely find it reprehensible to fail to tell a friend if her date had a potentially dangerous or suspect history.

Another area in which ethics and morals can clash is at the workplace where company ethics can play against personal morality. Corporate greed that blurs its own ethical lines coupled with unreasonable demands on time can lead to having to chose between a stressful, demanding and consuming work ethic, and family obligations seen as moral obligations to spouse and children. Conversely, people lose jobs every day because of poor personal morals, employee theft being a common reason for dismissal.

As a society, when we pass laws, we make moral statements. We prohibit certain behaviors and permit others. Often we draw lines somewhere in the ethical shades of gray. There are a great many unethical behaviors that are not illegal or immoral. IMO, all consumer lending is inherently immoral, but society has stated is it not illegal, so it goes on.

Ethics and Morality in Lending

Lending has its own code of ethics. Lenders underwrite loans based on the representations from buyers that they will repay the money. If borrowers do repay, they are considered an ethical borrower, and they are extended easy credit. If borrowers do not repay, they are considered unethical borrowers, and they are not extended easy credit.

Lenders spend much time and effort trying to accurately measure borrower ethics. This measurement system is encapsulated in the FICO score. Those borrowers that pay their bills on time and in full have very high FICO scores. Those borrowers that do not pay on time have very low FICO scores. I consider this in the realm of ethics because it is nothing more than a measurement of how likely a borrower is to play by the rules of the game. FICO scores have nothing to do with morality.

Lending between friends and family members generally does carry a moral obligation. Friends loan money because they are friends, not because it is a carefully considered, arm’s-length business transaction. The friend is not motivated by profit, and they are not weighing the risks involved. They are relying on the borrower's moral duty to repay, and the borrower is appealing to that moral duty. The friendship is the basis for the loan and the moral obligation. (This is also why you should never loan friends or family money.)

Banks and businesses loan money to make a profit. They are supposed to consider the risks and set the interest rate to obtain an appropriate level of profit. Lenders are also aware of their contractual fallback positions or legal action, repossession and so on. If a borrower fails to pay back a loan, lenders will exercise their legal, contractual rights and try to get repaid. Lenders will also warn other lenders of the borrower behavior through credit reporting. This is lender ethics. Morality does not enter into the equation.

Breaking the ethical rules of lending may or may not be immoral. Most people who do not repay loans are unable to repay. Their ethics as measured by FICO would be lowered, but this does not diminish the character and morality of the borrower. If the intent was to repay, the borrower may have sterling character and still be considered unethical because they defaulted on a loan, particularly if the reason the borrower cannot repay is because the lender loaned them too much money under terms the borrower did not understand. (That defense is used too often, but in rare cases, it is accurate.)

Ethics Versus Morality: Strategic Default

Strategic default is a conscious choice by a borrower to behave unethically by the rules of the lending agreement, and the borrower is going to suffer the consequences through a lower FICO score and diminished access to credit in the future. In yesterday's post, I argued that his behavior is not immoral because the borrower has other moral obligations that outweigh their ethical concerns. Strategic default is unethical, but it is not immoral.

Strategic defaulters have to make a choice: do they fulfill their ethical duty to repay the loan, or do they fulfill their moral duty to provide for their family? These people will pay a price for their decision to walk: they will lose their homes, and they will have limited access to credit in the future. IMO, it is still the right choice for the family because their moral obligation is greater than their ethical one.

The people facing the ethics versus morality decision are not responsible for what happens to banks or the US taxpayer who is being compelled to pay for the loss. The banks should be allowed to go under, and the US taxpayer should not be responsible for paying the bill. That travesty of justice has nothing to do with the decisions of individual borrowers to walk away from their loans. It does piss me off that I have to pay for it, but I can’t call the defaulter’s immoral for doing what is best for their families. I can and do fault the lenders for creating this situation and the government for allowing it to happen, but what is done is done.

Immoral Lending

When lenders loan too much money to borrowers, they are behaving immorally. Lenders create the circumstances where borrowers are hopelessly in debt, then they churn them with fees and usurious interest rates and keep them in perpetual servitude. That is immoral. The borrower benefits in no way from this arrangement.

Lenders want borrowers to believe they have a moral obligation to repay them. To the degree that lenders convince borrowers they have a moral obligation to repay debts is the degree to which lenders exploit borrowers. If lenders knew their loans might not be repaid, they would loan less money, particularly for unsecured consumer goods. That would be a good thing. Prudent lending should always be secured by assets, and if that asset declines in value (like a car) then the loan should amortize faster than the depreciation.

When lenders do not face the consequences for foolish and immoral lending, they do more of it. That is moral hazard. In our current circumstances, lenders are being spared the pain of their foolishness because of misplaced borrower morality and a variety of government bailouts.

Ethics and Morality in Borrowing

When I wrote, HELOC Abuse Grading System, I discussed the fine line between gaming the system out of ignorance or out of malice. Intent matters, and those who knowingly gamed the system were immoral. All were unethical.

The borrowers were told they would never have to repay this debt because the house would pay for it. Either the borrowers would be offered serial refinancing with endless teaser rate payments, or some other borrower would pay off their debts when they moved to their next cash cow house. If these borrowers had believed they were going to have to pay these loans back from their wage income—something very few of them considered—then they were ignoring their obligation to their family; however, since borrowers never thought they would have to pay back these debts—a belief lenders fostered—then the immorality is really in the behavior of the lenders.

The end result of HELOC abuse is theft. Those that did it in ignorance—which was most of them—acted as thieves, but most of them did not set out to steal. At some level they thought somebody would come along, buy their overpriced house, and pay off the debt. A few of them knowingly took the money with malicious intent, and those people are immoral, the rest were just really stupid and they were enabled by really stupid lenders.

The borrowers were thieves. But the lenders encouraged them to steal in every way. Both parties were in the wrong, and now all of us who did not participate are having to pay the bills.

The whole cast of characters who participated in the housing bubble were unseemly. it is easy to create cartoons about these people because they were all unethical and immoral in one way or another. No matter how I represent them, if it is negative, it will resonate. The lenders, investors, realtors, mortgage brokers, borrowers, HELOC abusers, government regulators, the Federal Reserve, the Treasury department, everyone who was involved indirectly conspired to steal wealth from savers, renters and prudent homeowners who did not participate in the madness. Some were immoral, most were unethical, and all have benefited from their deeds at the expense of those who had nothing to do with it.

The Big Lie

The bankster bailouts did NOT save us from the second Great Depression. We could have wiped out all the equity and bond holders, recapitalized with taxpayer funds, then sold the public interest later. Sweden did this in the mid 90s, and it worked well. At the time the bailouts were engineered, there was no international treaty or procedure for discharging debt across international lines. The US Government could not force a foreign government to drop its claim to the foreign interests of an American bank in bankruptcy. Rather than try to figure out how to make that work, we decided to pay the bills of too-big-to-fail when it failed. Of course, now that the crisis has past, lenders are lobbying to prevent financial reform that may diminish their paychecks.

Our government is participating in a mockery of the principles of fairness and morality this country was founded on. We now have an out-of-control financial sector sucking in the resources of the nation while providing little in return. In the years leading up to the 2008 crisis, the financial industry accounted for a third of total domestic profits — about twice its share two decades earlier.

I hope the government gets financial reform right. It is our only hope to counteract the moral hazard created by everything else the government has done….

Government reform is our only hope?

We're doomed.

Irvine Home Address … 14522 MANGO Ave Irvine, CA 92606

Resale Home Price … $649,000

Home Purchase Price … $590,000

Home Purchase Date …. 11/15/2004

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $20,060

Percent Change ………. 10.0%

Annual Appreciation … 1.7%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$649,000 ………. Asking Price

$129,800 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.16% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$519,200 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$136,840 ………. Income Requirement

$2,838 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$562 ………. Property Tax

$0 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$54 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$43 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,498 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$489 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$606 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$264 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$81 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$2,748 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$6,490 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$6,490 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,192 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$129,800 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$147,972 ………. Total Cash Costs

$42,100 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$190,072 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 14522 MANGO Ave Irvine, CA 92606

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 2 full 1 part baths

Home size: 2,210 sq ft

($294 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 6,650 sq ft

Year Built: 1974

Days on Market: 8

MLS Number: S613431

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: Walnut

Tract: Cp

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

PREMIUM cul de sac location on large lot with fully enclosed SUPERESIZED BACKYARD!! Soaring vaulted ceilings, upgraded laminate flooring and full bedroom and bath on FIRST LEVEL!! Spacious family room with sit-up bar and master bedroom with balcony. Shopping & schools nearby. Compare to other sales and you'll know why this one will sell FAST.

The dumbest loan ever made

This property was purchased on 11/14/2004 for $590,000. The owner used a $472,000 first mortgage and a $118,000 down payment. The owner did not HELOC the property.

On 11/17/2007 — several months after the credit crunch took hold in August of 2007 — World Savings bank give this guy an Option ARM for $595,000. WTF were they thinking?

When you consider the timing and the general state of the mortgage and real estate markets when this loan was made, it makes you wonder if the borrower knowingly gamed the system to get his down payment back. I have given him a D, but a case can be made for an F.

I hope you have enjoyed this week, and thank you for reading the Irvine Housing Blog: astutely observing the Irvine home market and combating California Kool-Aid since 2006.

Have a great weekend,

Irvine Renter

Walking Away from a Mortgage to Secure Their Children's Future

Like yelling "fire" in a crowded theater, borrowers will run to the exits when they realize their moral obligation to their family outweighs their false moral obligation to repay their mortgage debt. Lenders are praying this does not happen.

Irvine Home Address … 28 ERICSON AISLE Irvine, CA 92620

Resale Home Price …… $469,000

{book1}

It's got me under pressure,

It's got me under pressure.

I'm gonna give her a message,

here's what I'm gonna say:

It's all over.

She might get out a nightstick

and hurt me real real bad

by the roadside in a ditch.

it's got me under pressure.

ZZ Top — Got Me Under Pressure

Lenders are pressuring owners to repay their underwater loans by appealing to morality. As people strategically default and their lives improve, they tell their friends which triggers the next wave of strategic defaults. The pressure of morality gets less and less effective, particularly when borrowers realize the false morality to lenders is superseding their real moral obligations to their families.

Homeowners Who 'Strategically Default' Are Under Moral Pressure

By Charlotte Cuthbertson

Walking away from a mortgage seemed like a crazy idea to Chris Schreur, a financial adviser, and his wife Valerie thought he had gone mad when he mentioned it. It wasn’t just the financial hit, but the shame of defaulting.

“I think it is the number one reason, by far, that more people aren’t doing this,” Chris Schreur said.

If that is truly why people are not defaulting, then we are going to see more and more strategic default as people realizing their morality is misplaced.

After buying a house during the boom of the mid-2000s, many homeowners are now finding themselves underwater; meaning they owe more than their homes are worth. More than 11.3 million, or 24 percent, of homeowners were underwater by the end of 2009, according to a report by First American CoreLogic.

Finding themselves more than $130,000 underwater on their mortgage, the Schreurs chose to stop making their payments, even though they could afford it. “It was completely crazy to keep throwing good money after bad,” Mr. Schreur said. Their credit score was in the 800s and they had never been late on any payments before then. They owed $430,000 on their California home.

“Objectively the hardest part was the hit to the credit rating,” he said. “Defaulting on a debt is the hardest thing to accept.”

Schreur did some research and found he could get more house for less money by renting.

“My degree is economics, so I understand that you don’t keep putting money into a losing proposition just because you already put money in,” he said.

But it was his child’s future that made the decision clear and helped ease the shame factor.

“I think of it as a choice between either defaulting and writing the debt off now, and potentially not being able to send our daughter to college in 12 years,” he said.

That realization by that borrower, once spread around the country, will cause a stampede toward the exit door.

A borrower's family should be more important than the ego of the head of the household. When borrower's take what they consider to be the moral high road, the only people who are going to know or care will be the borrower's family. The people at the bank couldn't care less about why someone pays their mortgage. Borrowers are nothing more than a number to them. It is the borrower's family that pays the price so that the borrower can hold his head high and believe that other people think he is behaving morally. In truth, nobody else really cares. The borrower's pride and ego hurts their family.

Continuing to pay a bloated mortgage is not a matter of morality. The borrower and the lender have a contractual arrangement, and if this conflicts with the needs of a borrower's family, the borrower has a contractual right to get out of the onerous payments and divert those resources back to the family unit. In fact, the only moral imperative in this situation is the one between the head of household and the family members within it. The right thing to do when hopelessly underwater and paying far more than rent is to walk away.

When excessive housing payments burden the borrower's family members — the people the borrower's really do have a moral obligation toward — then the borrower making the financial decisions is putting the needs of the bank above the needs of their family. If there is any moral imperative, it is to get out from under the crushing debt while there is still time to save the family's future. The house can be replaced; the family members' education cannot.

…The threats and stigma of defaulting seems to be the coercion banks are using to stop them from defaulting, said Schreur. “So the [banks think] it’s better to go that route than it is to just renegotiate with the people who, all things being equal, would rather stay in their homes.

“I think a lot of people feel stuck,” he said. “You do have choices. Staying in your house is a choice, walking away is a choice.”

The Schreurs are renting a home a mile away from their foreclosed place for $1,000 less per month than their mortgage payments.

Borrowers who are not underwater and who have payments at or below rental parity don't walk away. They don't need to, and they don't benefit from it. If walking away results in a higher monthly payment, people won't do it. And properties with positive cashflow rarely decline in value because financially prudent buyers would see the value and support pricing. The entire walkaway phenomenon is a direct result of the false appreciation created by lenders who are being burned by the walkaways. Lenders are getting what they deserve.

Jodi Romanello walked away from the Florida home she and her husband planned to retire in. … After approaching the bank and being turned down for a refinance or lower payments, the Romanellos chose to strategically default and their last payment was in November 2008. …

As with the Schreurs, the shame and moral factor was the biggest stumbling block for the Romanellos.

“The banks are making it sound like a moral issue, like you’re defaulting on something you promised,” Romanello said. “And I’m very angry about it, because first they’re taking taxpayer’s money; and they don’t try to work with you at all.

People should be pissed. Lenders inflated a massive Ponzi Scheme, and when it collapsed, they have the nerve to accept government bailouts and cajole people with morality. Lender's displayed no morality whatsoever, so why should borrowers?

I predict that by the end of 2010, when someone in lending suggests that is it wrong to stop payment, borrowers are going to laugh at them. The Great Housing Bubble will eliminate any pretense about the morality of repaying bank debt.

… Despite homeowners increasingly walking away from their mortgages, most homeowners continue to make their payments even when they are significantly underwater. A study by Brent T. White, associate professor of Law at Arizona University, examined why.

“Most homeowners choose not to strategically default as a result of two emotional forces,” the study concludes. The first is the desire to avoid the shame and guilt of foreclosure; and the second is exaggerated anxiety over foreclosure’s perceived consequences.

These emotional constraints are “actively cultivated” by the government and other social control agents to encourage homeowners to keep paying their mortgages; “and to ignore market and legal norms under which strategic default might be both viable and the wisest financial decision,” the study said.

The study, “Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis” was released in February.

I recently wondered Why Do Struggling Homeowners Keep Paying Their Mortgages? Dr. White's study is an attempt to answer that question. His conclusions are difficult to argue with. Once borrowers stop thinking default is wrong, and once they realize the consequences are not as dire as they imagine, many more underwater homeowners are going to walk away.

The only thing keeping debtors in place is kool aid intoxication and the false belief that they will get their money back soon. realtors are already talking up the market as they always do, but look for more kool aid from lenders and the government as both parties are now deeply involved in this Ponzi Scheme.

Jon Maddux, CEO of You Walk Away, said they get a lot of inquiries from people who think that they have to file for bankruptcy—which they don’t.

“It’s a blip on their credit,” he said, adding that most people can apply for a loan in three years after foreclosure.

“It’s important that people understand it’s not the end of the world; it’s not something that will financially destroy them,” Maddux said.

The company has helped about 4,000 people walk away from their mortgages and gets thousands of inquiries per month. Of their clients, 90 to 95 percent have tried to work things out with their lender first, Maddux said.

“The nature of the act of walking away has always been associated with being a deadbeat, a failure, etc,” he said. “But it is now seen as a business decision.”

Strategic default is the natural response to the situation. Once strategic default becomes the norm, the market will truly be entering the capitulation stage of the decline.

A microcosm of the bubble

Today's featured property illustrates many of the problems of the bubble and its aftermath. This property was purchased for $637,000 in September of 2005. The owner used a $509,600 Option ARM with a 1% teaser rate, a $63,700 stand-alone second, and a $63,700 downpayment.

The buyer could never afford this property. Since the buyer had some of money in the deal, they held out longer than others.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 06/11/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 03/05/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

The property was purchased at Trustee Sale by Aurora Loan Services. This property has been held off the market by the service sine 7/9/2009.

How many other bank-owned properties are out there in hiding waiting for a little uptick in prices before they get dumped?

Irvine Home Address … 28 ERICSON AISLE Irvine, CA 92620

Resale Home Price … $469,000

Home Purchase Price … $637,000

Home Purchase Date …. 9/29/2005

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(196,140)

Percent Change ………. -26.4%

Annual Appreciation … -6.4%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$469,000 ………. Asking Price

$16,415 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

5.24% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$452,585 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$99,782 ………. Income Requirement

$2,496 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$406 ………. Property Tax

$10 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$39 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$140 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,092 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$417 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$520 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$34 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$59 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$2,248 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$4,690 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$4,690 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$4,526 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$16,415 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$30,321 ………. Total Cash Costs

$34,400 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$64,721 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 28 ERICSON AISLE Irvine, CA 92620

——————————————————————————

Beds: 3

Baths: 2 baths

Home size: 1,760 sq ft

($266 / sq ft)

Lot Size: n/a

Year Built: 1989

Days on Market: 3

MLS Number: P731539

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Community: Northwood

Tract: Othr

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing is a bank owned (foreclosed) property.

FANTASIC 2 STORY CONDO IN IRVINE IN GREAT LOCATION. CATHEDRAL CEILINGS. COZY FIREPLACE IN LIVING ROOM. SEPARATE LAUNDRY ROOM. BEDDROOMS WITH MIRRORED CLOSET DOORS. LARGE MASTER BEDROOM AND BATH WITH SKYLIGHT. SPACIOUS AND OPEN FLOOR PLAN. PRIVATE BACKYARD PATIO AREA. LOW MONTHLY HOA DUES. ASSOCIATION POOL AND SPA. HURRY OR MISS THIS FANTASTIC DEAL. **BUYERS TO SATISFY THEMSELVES WITH PERMITS**MUST SEE AGENT REMARKS**

Doesn't the thought of buyer's satisfying themselves seem rather undignified?

.

Buying a Rental at Trustee Sale

Buying a rental property at trustee sale is not as risky and as speculative as many believe. With proper analysis and an accurate estimation of value, this can be a relatively low-risk way to obtain stable cashflow.

Irvine Home Address … 203 Briarwood, Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price …… $299,000

{book1}

Opportunity

Came to my door

When I was down on my luck

In the shape

Of an old friend

With a plan, guaranteed

He showed me the papers

As he walked me to his car

His shoes

Finest leather

He said

You could wear this style

If you follow my advice

Bobby McFerrin — Opportunity

The common perception of me is that of a housing bear. It is true that I believe resale prices will fall as foreclosures wash though the market, but I also see good reasons to own real estate — I mean really own it when you don't have any debt. It isn't necessary to time the bottom tick of the real estate market to invest wisely and profitably. Your goal should be to obtain the most cashflow for the money regardless of resale price. If prices drop further, that creates additional opportunity to get even greater returns.

The people buying with an eye toward positive cashflow are the ones who stabilize the market. They always are because they are the only ones who will buy when prices are going down.

The fake appreciation engineered by the Federal Reserve and our various tax incentive programs has created a low-volume plateau that is about to crumble under the weight of higher interest rates, high unemployment and large numbers of foreclosures. When the public stops believing HELOC riches are right around the corner, the bubble will continue to deflate until cashflow investors set a durable bottom.

There are abundant opportunities to acquire cashflow properties in many markets, and trustee sales offer a unique opportunity to obtain a solid portfolio of properties pruned of weeds that do not perform as expected.

Back in January, I went through the basics of Trustee Sales:

Foreclosure 101: Vesting Title

Foreclosure 101: Non-Judicial Foreclosure

Foreclosure 101: Mechanics of a Trustee Sale

Over the next couple of weeks, we are going to explore the various ways you can participate in the clean up from the Great Housing Bubble:

Foreclosure 201: Buying a Trustee Sale Property as a Primary Residence

Foreclosure 201: Buying a Rental at Trustee Sale

Foreclosure 201: Flipping Trustee Sale Houses on Speculation

Foreclosure 201: Flipping Trustee Sale Houses to a Buyer in Escrow

Foreclosure 201: Buying Trustee Sale Properties Using Conventional Financing

Investment portfolio real estate

Diversification protects investors from price volatility in any one asset class. Real Estate is typically the largest portion of a retirees net worth, and in many cases, it is the only asset they have. Mortgage equity withdrawal is particularly problematic for those approaching retirement because it allows consumption of what used to be a forced-savings account. Californians emptied their housing piggy banks, and they are broke. Foolish borrowers cannot easily access their IRAs and 401Ks for spending money leaving these investment vehicles as the only retirement savings reservoir outside of Social Security most retirees have — assuming borrowers did not deplete their retirement accounts attempting to save their homes.

Working-class owners should diversify into stocks, bonds and other investment classes before looking to acquire cashflow-positive real estate. However, once equity in the family home represents less than a third of total net worth, families should diversify into cashflow investment properties to maintain a real estate exposure between 25% an 50% of total investments. Note that real estate investment trusts, which are a security like stocks, provide real estate exposure and cashflow and these holdings should be considered the same as holding real estate directly.

The size of the portfolio and the allocation to real estate establish an investment budget. The next task is to determine how and where to deploy capital in a way that balances risk and return.

Capitalization rates and opportunity costs

Investors review of the risks and returns of any asset class, and savvy investors realize that every investment creates an opportunity cost because the capital deployed in one investment could have gone to another. Opportunity costs drive all current investment choices; when asset prices are high and returns are low, investors seek other assets where prices are low and returns are high. During the bubble disciplined cashflow investors were not adding to their portfolio of real estate, and many investors liquidated when prices were too high. Now that prices are softening, cashflow investors are finding opportunities once again.

I described cashflow investment in greater depth in the post IHB Investor Reports:

One key concept for Investment Value of Residential Real Estate is capitalization rate. The Capitalization (cap) Rate is the (yearly) Net Operating Income divided by Asking Price (assumed purchase price). It is the simplest measure of an investment’s financial performance, and it provides a convenient comparison to competing investment alternatives. A cap rate is like an interest rate on a checking account, a mutual fund return, or a bond yield. Cap rates change over time to reflect the perception of risk in real estate as compared to other investments.

The cap rate is inversely related to price; in other words, high cap rates are synonymous with low prices and visa versa. The cap rate an investor will accept varies from person to person. There is no single appropriate rate to apply to value.

Historically, cap rates on investment real estate are 10% to 12%, but in our era of cheap money and sub-5% interest rates, cap rates of 5%-6% are common today. The spread premium between real estate cashflow and savings account interest compensates holders of real estate for the additional risk. The current spread is very small, which reflects a lack of viable alternative investments and residual kool aid intoxication (people are overpaying).

Cash-on-cash returns and leverage

The cash-on-cash return is of greater interest to the typical leveraged investor as described in IHB Investor Reports:

The Cash-On-Cash Return is similar to a capitalization rate in that it shows a return on investment, but it is measured by comparing the Total Profit and Loss after Expenses, Debt and Taxes to the Total Cash Costs. This is the important rate of return for investors who are not purchasing with all cash. As long as debt is less expensive than the cap rate, the cash-on-cash returns can be magnified by increasing debt. This is an appropriate use of leverage to increase investment returns—to a point.

The over-use of leverage is biggest mistake made by speculators who think they are investors. Leverage (debt) magnifies the capitalization rate. For example, if a property had a 10% cap rate, the application of 5% debt results in a cash-on-cash return much greater than 10%. For this reason, many naively assume that more leverage must be better; on paper it certainly looks that way. However, leverage cuts both ways, and if rents or property values decline, the magic of leverage can drive stellar returns into a black hole.

Judicious use of leverage can increase returns, but the investment goal is to eliminate debt and own cashflow properties with no debt at all, particularly for retirement. Retirees gain little benefit from assets that fail to deliver cashflow.

Cashflow investing versus speculation

Many people who label themselves investors are really speculators. I detailed many of the differences in the post Speculation or Investment. Speculators and investors differ greatly on their use of debt.

Speculators are only interested in assuming a position in a financial market with hope they can exit that position later at a higher price and make a profit. Speculators will maximize debt and minimize debt-service payments because debt is merely a means to the end of taking a position in the market. Resale price is everything to a speculator.

Investors also take positions in a financial market, but they look for low prices which increase their rate of return on a cashflow basis. Investors will minimize debt and maximize debt-service payments in order to retire debt and maximize investment cashflow. Resale price is irrelevant to an investor who need never sell to obtain maximum value from the investment.

To further illustrate the investment style of allocating money, read the posts Accelerated Amortization and Time to Payoff.


Note: take a moment to watch this informative video. Take special note of the cashflow return on investment Bruce Norris is getting in Riverside County (about 40 seconds in).

Advantages of trustee sale purchases

Trustee sale purchases represent the best method for sophisticated investors to acquire cashflow real estate. The first advantage is obvious; the property is acquired at a lower price, which increases the cap rate, and if low-cost debt is used, the lower price increases the cash-on-cash return. The second advantage is not so obvious; if the property does not perform as projected, if purchased properly it can be sold for a profit, and capital is released to pursue other investments.

These two advantages suggest a method for acquiring, evaluating, and operating a rental property portfolio that retains only the best performing properties.

Procedure for acquiring, evaluating, and operating rental property

The procedure Ideal Home Brokers recommends is as follows:

  1. Establish ownership parameters and scan for targets.
  2. Select and bid on best candidates.
  3. Acquire property at trustee sale.
  4. Prepare property for occupancy.
  5. Offer for rent at rate consistent with financial projections for market rents for 30 days.
  6. After 30 days, offer for rent at the proforma price and for sale at a decreasing price until it is rented or sold.
  7. If rented, place new debt on the property (this may require "seasoning" the property by holding for 90 days) if this fits within a larger strategy and only if the interest rate is lower than the capitalization rate.

The first four steps are similar for any acquisition, but steps five, six and seven are unique to this opportunity. Since the property is generally acquired at auction for a price below resale, if the property does not perform as expected, there is little reason to keep it. The property should be offered for rent at or slightly above the projected rental rate, and if it fails to rent for that amount in a timely manner, the property should be disposed of.

Current returns favor flipping

Cashflow properties rarely offer investors rates of return exceeding 20%, and in today's market, 5% is far more common. So why not flip the property and make more than 5% in 120 days? Why not take that capital and flip in and out of two or three properties a year and make more than a 20% rate of return?

The only reason is lack of opportunity, and for the next three to five years, there will be no shortage of flip opportunities as California turns over a significant percentage of its housing stock. Perhaps after this debacle is truly behind us and we have mopped up the foreclosures, keeping money tied up in long-term hold properties is warranted, but until the foreclosure wave recedes, investors with the cash to play in this market should consider doing so.

Flipping houses is the subject for next week.

IHB Property Evaluation Reports

To help buyers and investors, we designed the IHB Fundamental Value Reports, to have some consistency in format and information. The differences in the reports are primarily in the information they present because different audiences have different needs and wants. They all pull from the same basic data. Everything is transaparent. The report for Trustee Sales used as rentals is the most complex of the group, so bear with me as we delve into the details.

The cover page has pictures if they are available. The vast majority of foreclosures never hit the MLS, and often all we can get is a picture of the front elevation and perhaps a floorplan. We advise owners to budget for complete renovations. If they do not need to spend the renovation money, they should consider it a savings.

The basic property information is present: address, beds, baths, and so on. The scheduled date of the Trustee Sale (subject to postponement), and the published opening bid are presented for reference; however, the published bid is often meaningless as these bids are frequently dropped at the last minute.

The maximum bid amount is our recommended amount. The financial performance of the investment is calculated based on this price. If we obtain price improvement at auction, the performance of the investment is improved.

Of course, this brings up the key conflict of interest between investors and the IHB as service providers. Investors want to get the best possible deal — which means bidding less — and we do not want to research hundreds of properties and go to countless auctions and not buy anything. Our solution is standardization. The maximum bid price is set to an amount that allows the investor to get out unscathed (and usually make a profit) if the investment does not cashflow as planned. If an investor wants to guarantee price improvement by lowering the maximum bid amount, then we charge a fee to attend the auction.

The most important items are bold faced: the final bid decision deadline and the sale day cash requirement. If a buyer is interested in a property, we don't want to wait until the last minute to finalize our research and and gather the necessary cashier's checks. In an investor missed the deadline or fails to come up with the cash, they missed the deal.

We provide our opinion of the likelihood of success given the foreclosure market comps, and we provide a breakdown of the total cost as well as the equity obtained on auction day.

The next two numbers are the net income and the capitalization rate. The net income is annualized from the positive cashflow detailed on page two. When this annualized net income is divided by the total trustee sale cost (also detailed on page 2), the result is the capitalization rate.

The final three numbers are of great interest to cashflow investors who plan to obtain cash-out refinancing to free up capital to acquire other properties. This spreadsheet calculates the maximum cashflow-positive loan the property will support (within other limits). The remainder is capital investment after financing. The cashflow after financing is divided by the capital required to obtain that cashflow to measure the cash-on-cash return.

Let me be clear: this is still an all-cash deal to get the property at auction. The cash-out refinancing comes later, probably after three to six months of seasoning.

I recognize this sounds antithetical to my mantra of eliminating debt, but debt does have its uses. Debt is very dangerous if too much is used, or if it is considered a permanent part of the plan. Debt used in acquisition, which this debt is indirectly used for, is not an inherently bad use of debt. As long as there is a plan for consistent reduction and final elimination of this debt, it is useful. As long as the investor keeps debt elimination as the goal, using debt to obtain cashflow-positive property is beneficial, and for many would-be landlords, essential.

Page 2

The second page provides the detail for the summary numbers on page 1. The sale day cash requirement is the sum of the maximum bid amount and the trustee sale fees. The total trustee sale cost includes renovation and improvements, property taxes (both back and current), an allowance for tenant move out and cash-for-keys if necessary, and transer taxes due. The cost of ownership includes the standard costs minus any financing costs as this is an all-cash deal.

The rental income is derived from comparables found in the MLS. An allowance for vacancy and collection loss is provided. Realistically, tenant turnover will cause the loss of one month's rent once every two years or so. In fringe markets, this number may be higher. Wise landlords set aside this money in a cash account to cover the missing payment when it occurs. The net monthly rental income is the gross rent minus the vacancy and collection loss.

The operating expenses are typical of a rental including a property management fee. These fees can be as low as 3% and as high as 12% depending on where the property is located. Six percent is relatively common in Southern California.

Net Operating Income is the monthly cash expenses is subtracted from monthly rental income. This is the stable cashflow capable of covering a mortgage payment. This is where the magic of this spreadsheet comes in.

Jump ahead to lines 28 and 29. These are the two limiting factors when considering cash-out refinancing. Line 28 has the maximum loan amount the lender will allow. In the example above, it is assumed the most a lender will allow on a cash-out refinance is 80%. During the bubble — and during the Saving and Loan disaster — lenders were willing to go much higher than 80%. This number is totally dependent upon lender standards.

Line 29 is the maximum cashflow positive loan the property will support. In Irvine, it is very rare to get properties where the cashflow justifies a loan greater than 80% loan-to-value. If I were to model the property Bruce Norris bought in the video above, the maximum cashflow positive loan would likely exceed 100%.


Note: The Savings and Loan fiasco of the late 80s and early 90s was caused by the phenomenon illustrated here. Lenders in the S&L era would provide cash-out refinancing in excess of 100% for nothing more than an aggressive proforma. Basically, you could walk into an S&L loan department with a spreadsheet like mine that projected a cashflow that justified loan of 120% of the development cost, and the lender would give you the money. There were deal makers all over California and Texas drawing up proformas and walking out of banks with millions of dollars. As one might imagine, there was fraud and theft on a grand scale. It has only since been eclipsed by the Great Housing Bubble.


On most properties in Irvine, the actual monthly cashflow will be zeroed out by the loan. The actual profit and loss is captured in the amortization on the loan. This is a viable way to acquire and pay off real estate.

The financing section details how the maximum loan is calculated and the remaining capital the investor must leave in the property to remain cashflow neutral.

Page 3

Page three shows the various comparable ranges and cashflow values with a summary chart.

Page 4 has comparables and notes.

When people think about buying foreclosures at auction, the whole activity seems extremely risky and speculative. I hope I have demonstrated today that investing in this market with limited risk is easier than most imagine.

The most important part of this process is selecting the right comparables. The spreadsheet will do the math quickly and accurately, but if the data is bad, or if the proper adjustments to the data are not made, the whole deal falls apart. If the comps are too high, there is a chance the investor will overpay. If the comps are too low, the investor will be outbid.

For instance, when I ran the report for this property, my maximum bid amount was under the amount the buyer ultimately paid. Based on his current asking price and the previous reductions, it appears this buyer was too aggressive in his valuations, and he overpaid. That is the random nature of this market. There is no way to know if someone with aggressive assumptions is going to compete with you at auction, and that includes the lenders and their willingness to drop bids.

Knowing the market where you are buying is the key. Many of the investors that have contacted us are already expert in the valuations and rents in a given market area. These are the clients most likely to have a positive result. We assist in the research, analysis and acquisition, but ultimately it is the investor who must decide if the deal is right for them.

Irvine Home Address … 203 Briarwood, Irvine, CA 92604

Resale Home Price … $299,000

Home Purchase Price … $257,800

Home Purchase Date …. 1/12/2010

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $23,260

Percent Change ………. 16.0%

Annual Appreciation … 45.3%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$299,000 ………. Asking Price

$10,465 ………. 3.5% Down FHA Financing

5.19% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$288,535 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$63,257 ………. Income Requirement

$1,583 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$259 ………. Property Tax

$12 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$25 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$328 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

=============================================

$2,206 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$151 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$335 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$21 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$37 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

=============================================

$1,780 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————–

$2,990 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$2,990 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$2,885 ………… Interest Points

$10,465 ………. Down Payment

=============================================

$19,330 ………. Total Cash Costs

$27,200 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

=============================================

$46,530 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 203 Briarwood, Irvine, CA 92604

——————————————————————————–

Beds: 2

Baths: 1 bath

Home size: 1,000 sq ft

($299 / sq ft)

Lot Size: n/a

Year Built: 1978

Days on Market: 74

MLS Number: P720337

Property Type: Condominium, Residential

Community: Woodbridge

Tract: Vg

——————————————————————————–

==== PRICE REDUCED FOR QUICK SALE ==== Private end unit overlooking greenbelt in beautiful, peaceful neighborhood of Irvine. This unit has been renovated with new paint throughout, new carpet, new baseboards around all rooms and brand new kitchen appliances. Tile entry opens to spacious living room. There is also a separate room for laundry.

Property History for 203 BRIARWOOD

Date Event Price
Mar 20, 2010 Price Changed $299,000
Mar 15, 2010 Price Changed $306,000
Feb 23, 2010 Price Changed $309,000
Feb 22, 2010 Price Changed $314,900
Feb 12, 2010 Price Changed $319,000
Feb 03, 2010 Listed $324,900
Jan 27, 2010 Sold (Public Records) $258,000

One percent price reductions really don't seem like enough, do they?

Former Owner

The former owner of today's featured property was an ordinary HELOC abuser. She bought the place in 2003, and by 2006 she was in an Option ARM that finally blew up. There is no way to tell how long she was delinquent before they issued the notice of default, but the lender wasted no time in the foreclosure process:

Prior Transfer

Recording Date: 01/27/2010

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 12/23/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 09/18/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

IHB Trustee Sale Services

The cleanup of this mess has been delayed 12 to 18 months by the various moratoria and lender delays, but they are finally moving to clean up this mess. This clean up will create opportunities everywhere.

There is no reason the prudent readers of this blog who carefully saved their money should not step in to profitably clean up the mess from the mass stupidity of lenders and borrowers. I will feel good about being an active part of the solution. Someone has to come forward and buy these properties. Those buyers will be compensated with steep discounts (otherwise they wouldn't bother).

Our service gives you this opportunity. Seize it.

sales@idealhomebrokers.com