Monthly Archives: March 2010

Loan Modifications Succeed by Increasing Borrower Entitlements

Loan modification programs are failing because borrowers are not willing to abandon their entitlements. The government will respond by allowing people to keep their discretionary spending on consumer goods, cars, vacations, massages and the like — and taxpayers will be asked to subsidize it.

Irvine Home Address … 33 TALL HEDGE Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price …… $1,299,900

{book1}

Just let it die

With no goodbyes

Details don't matter

We both paid the price

Tears in my eyes

You know sometimes

It'd be like that baby

Mariah Carey — Don't Forget About Us

Lenders really need to let go. They blew it. It's over. Just let it die. Both the lender and the borrower pay a price — or at least they are supposed to. Instead, we bail them out, and we pay the price. Don't forget about us who pay for their mistakes.

Part of the price we pay is obvious in the accounting for the various bailouts, but much of the price we pay is hidden in higher home prices, greater public indebtedness, and in the subsidized entitlements of borrowers everywhere.

Government backed loan modification attempts are ill-conceived because bailouts create moral hazard. However, the bailouts and the resulting moral hazard can be disguised inside the black box of obfuscation and paperwork of the HAMP program. If the banks and bureaucrats raise the standard of entitlement allowed under the loan modification program, more people will qualify — and more people will be sustaining their indulgences on your tax dollar.

If people are not forced to cut back discretionary spending before they obtain a government bailout, taxpayers are subsidizing their discretionary spending. The standards of what constitutes discretionary spending from essential spending depends greatly on the the spender's sense of entitlement.

Personally, I really like to play golf. (I am on the course today for "business.") I don't spend the $150 per week I would like to on golf because it isn't an entitlement, and I can't afford to treat it as one. However, if I owned a house loan, and if my sense of entitlement made it right, I could consider my weekly round of golf an essential. Since this entitlement creates a hardship for me, I can petition my lender for a break on my loan payments. After all, their loan payment is discretionary spending and the US taxpayer is picking up the cost.

Do you see the problem?

Everyone draws their own conclusions about what is essential and what is discretionary. The reviewers of the HAMP programs have broad guidelines and common sense, but they will succumb to the political pressure to get results and push people through the system. The HAMP program reviewers path of least resistance is allow petitioning borrowers their indulgences when borrowers ask for loan modifications. The HAMP program reviewers will achieve great results — at great taxpayer expense.

To understand what is causing this problem, let's review the HAMP program courtesy of Calculated Risk and his contributor Shnaps:

HAMP applicants tanned and juiced

CR Note: The following is from long time reader Shnaps. Shnaps has been working in the mortgage industry in various capacities "since people were extending the antennas on their mobile phones". Shnaps currently serves in a key role related to HAMP at one of the largest non-prime mortgage servicers in the Nation.

Shnaps writes:

One aspect of the Making Home Affordable loan modification program known as ‘HAMP’ is almost always taken for granted in its wide reporting – that the borrowers in fact need ‘help’. Moreover, it is generally taken for granted that those seeking modification under HAMP simply cannot afford their monthly mortgage payment. It is assumed that they have made great sacrifices, assumed they have already cut back drastically on discretionary expenses, assumed that they have already gone over their monthly budgets with a fine-toothed comb to eliminate all but the most necessary expenditures in an effort to keep their home. So prepare to be shocked – shocked! – as I share with you that I have seen first-hand that this assumption is oftentimes greatly, seriously flawed.

Since many frugal homeowners and renters, particularly the unemployed or underemployed, have no access to entitlements loan owners take for granted as part of their privileged lives, there is an assumption that the high fliers will have their wings trimmed back to the same standard of living as the workers who are paying the bills.

Since I don't send my child to a private school, I assume that if my tax dollars are going to subsidize a loan owner's mortgage, that loan owner would need to take their child out of private school before my subsidy kicks in.

Not so.

At least, not for long. The current standard does require borrowers to demonstrate they have abandoned their entitlements, and big surprise, they are not willing to cut back! People want their loan modification in order to maintain their entitled lives.

Let me begin with a word to the wise for HAMP applicants: unless you believe Snooki is now in charge of approving HAMP applications, it might be a good idea to cut back a bit on some of the creature comforts to which you have become accustomed at least a month before submitting your HAMP modification application.

Allow me to explain. The guidelines for servicers participating in HAMP stipulate that the borrower must submit a “hardship affidavit”. This, ostensibly, is to serve as their sworn testimony that they have been driven into default due to some particular hardship they encountered, and despite making every possible sacrifice, they can no longer “maintain payment on the mortgage and cover basic living expenses at the same time". (see HAMP Directive)

To demonstrate this, applicants are required to submit recent paystubs and bank statements. The statements are to help further corroborate the income they report (lest they forget to include all of their paystubs) and also to demonstrate that their monthly expenses are as described on their application. Which is to say that they have already ‘cut back to the bone’ and STILL are unable to make ends meet.

So how do these look in practice? The very first ‘HAMPlication’ that your correspondent pulled up recently showed a wanton disregard for minimizing spending. On the contrary, it looked like “cutting back” for this applicant does not involve such Draconian cuts as eliminating:

• visits to the tanning salon

• the nail spa

• some kind of gourmet produce market (have you seen the price of arugula?)

• various liquor stores

• A DirecTV bill that must involve some serious premium programming or pay-per-view events (or both?).

• And over $1,700 in retail purchases, including: Best Buy, Baby Gap, Brookstone, Old Navy, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Home Depot, Macy’s, Pac Sun, Urban Behavior, Sears, Staples, and Footlocker.

And that was just in one month! They were seeking to reduce a $1,880 mortgage payment that had just gotten to be a real cramp to their ability to keep a roof over their heads.

This woman could stock Mariah Carey's closet….

I have documented hundreds of cases of HELOC abuse and borrower entitlement. We know many people took on Option ARMs as a way to reduce their housing cost below rental parity, and most of these people would take out another if they were still offered. Between the payment savings and the HELOC abuse, many borrowers built lives of luxury and entitlement that they don't want to give up. They are owed it; it is their borrower's birthright.

I’d like to say this is the exception, but it’s much closer to the norm. Many people who request HAMP modifications submit bank statements that demonstrate little if any “belt-tightening” going on.

Somehow, we now expect the same people who asked for ‘liar’s loans’ to be truthful on when it comes to ‘hardship affidavits’?

I discussed that phenomenon in Reverse Liar Loans. The incentive to lie is huge, and now it is on the other side of the ledger.

Success of HAMP depends on expanding entitlement

The success if HAMP is hampered by the standard of entitlement. The only way to increase the effectiveness of HAMP is to increase the lifestyle entitlement allowed under the system; otherwise, borrowers are going to walk away.

Let's say the woman in the above example told the lender, "No, I refuse to give up the spending. If you don't modify my mortgage, I will continue to squat until you foreclose." Some borrowers are using attorneys to send this message right now. The banks are too overwhelmed with foreclosures to bargain so they amend-pretend-extend until such time they can force the borrowers out.

HAMP must succeed

In any negotiation, you must know your next-best alternative to a negotiated agreement. For lenders, they have two options: (1) allow the borrower to squat in the home, or (2) foreclose and take the losses. Option one is appealing if they can get the borrower to agree to repay later — empty though that promise may be. Borrowers know this, so they use it to game the system. Option two used to be unavailable because of depleted capital ratios and government moratoria. It is still not desirable, but now lenders are strong enough to foreclose if they determine the borrower is truly a deadbeat.

I reported Monday that Bank of America to Increase Foreclosure Rate by 600% in 2010. If you assume straight-line increase in the foreclosure rate, they will foreclose on less than 300,000 borrowers. They currently have 1,200,000 in default, and that number is growing daily.

7,500 — January, 2010

10,375 — February, 2010

13,250 — March, 2010

16,125 — April, 2010

19,000 — May, 2010

21,875 — June, 2010

24,750 — July, 2010

27,625 — August, 2010

30,500 — September, 2010

33,375 — October, 2010

36,250 — November, 2010

42,000 — December, 2010

282,625 — Total 2010 BofA foreclosures

When you consider the math, Bank of America — and this goes for the other lenders who are all in the same difficult spot — must have the HAMP program succeed. If they have to foreclose on all their delinquent borrowers, prices will be crushed — along with the entitled dreams of their owners.

This is particularly true in the yet-to-be-deflated markets like Orange County or the Bay area. Prices in those markets were inflated by debt, and they will be deflated by its removal. By delaying the removal, lenders hope to keep prices high and prevent the downward spiral of strategic defaults sure to accompany a price collapse.

Making HAMP work

Making HAMP succeed requires one simple thing: allow borrowers to keep more of their entitlements. Fewer borrowers qualify when the program qualifications are onerous, and the only way to reduce the burden on borrowers and qualify more for the program is to let borrowers keep their lifestyles.

We are establishing a multi-year entitlement for over-extended homeowners paid for by frugal homeowners and renters. You won't see it — except maybe here — because the terms will be buried in some obscure HAMP agreement we needed to save the us from the second Great Depression, right?

We will let the woman in the example above keep her $1,700 a month for buying consumer goods because it stimulates the economy. We will continue to let loan owners send their children to private schools and take big vacations — live an entitled life well beyond the people who are actually working to pay for it — to stimulate the economy or some other bullshit reason.

The moral hazard we are creating is huge. Lenders know they can do whatever they want, and now borrowers know they can overextend themselves and the government will bail them out too. What incentive is there for prudent lending and restrained borrowing? None.

The rich bankers get richer; the entitled loan owners keep their indulgences; the frugal who might want to have the same lifestyles are being burdened with taxes and debt to pay for the entitled, and in paying, they deny themselves the very things the government bailouts are providing to others.

I think that is wrong.

I also think that is how this problem gets resolved.

Squatting Irvine Style

Last weekend, I featured a property squatter living in Newport Coast. On Friday, I have a post coming out on one in Laguna Beach. Today, I want to look at a stylish squatter in our own back yard.

  • This property was purchased on 1/28/2005 for $1,638,500. The owner used a $1,000,000 first mortgage, a $473,300 second mortgage, and a $165,200 down payment.
  • On 9/15/2005 he refinanced with a $1,323,000 Option ARM with a 1% teaser rate. Steward Financial made the loan. Great stewards of money, right?
  • On 9/15/2005 he also obtained a stand-alone second for $245,700 also from the good stewards.
  • On 2/28/2006 he obtained a HELOC for $357,396. It is unclear whether or not the second mortgage was rolled into the HELOC.
  • Total property debt is at least $1,680,396 plus negative amortization and many months of squatting.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $207,096. Not bad for a near-peak purchase.

Remember, my numbers may be $357,396 too low.

And, as Paul Harvey used to say, here is "the rest of the story."

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 11/23/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 08/19/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 06/30/2009

Document Type: Notice of Rescission

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 01/23/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

This debtor has not made a consistent payment since September 2008 at the earliest. He has been squatting for at least a year and a half and likely much longer.

Do you think he has had any good parties?

Squatting in luxury like this would be great!

I want to kick back with a Margarita, enjoy the view, and watch the proletariat go to work to pay for me to relax and enjoy Margaritas. Who says it's bad to be a debt slave?

Irvine Home Address … 33 TALL HEDGE Irvine, CA 92603

Resale Home Price … $1,299,900

Home Purchase Price … $1,638,500

Home Purchase Date …. 1/28/2005

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(416,594)

Percent Change ………. -20.7%

Annual Appreciation … -4.4%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$1,299,900 ………. Asking Price

$259,980 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.11% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$1,039,920 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$272,538 ………. Income Requirement

$5,653 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$1127 ………. Property Tax

$375 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$108 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$350 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$7,613 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$1508 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$1224 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$521 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$162 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$5,564 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$12,999 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$12,999 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$10,399 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$259,980 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$296,377 ………. Total Cash Costs

$85,200 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$381,577 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 33 TALL HEDGE Irvine, CA 92603

——————————————————————————

Beds:: 3

Baths:: 0004

Sq. Ft.:: 2863

$0,454

Lot Size:: 4,912 Sq. Ft.

Year Built:: 2004

On Redfin:: 209 days

MLS#:: S587843

Property Type:: Residential, Single Family

Community:: Turtle Ridge

——————————————————————————

Very nice 2 level detached home in Turtle Ridge. This offers a gourmet kitchen with granite countertops and travertine floors, master bedroom with retreat and spa like master bath, solid wood staircase, tumbled marble in baths, incredible views and much, much more.

Perhaps, I am not over it

Someone recently quipped in the comments that I do not appear to be over the housing bubble. They are probably right.

I am over the fact that we created a housing bubble, and I have come to accept the greed, incompetence and willful ignorance that overcame everyone involved; however, our government's response to the collapse of the housing bubble still pisses me off.

It is wrong.

Someone needs to speak out against what they are doing, and rather than look to someone else, I am doing it.

Perhaps if the powers-that-be stopped creating moral hazard with an array of bailouts and market props, I might fade into the Internet and go away — but that isn't what they are doing! I will continue to point out the problems they create until they stop doing it. I wish it didn't make me so angry. Fortunately, I am good at expressing it and letting it go… at least until I read the next news story about some stupid bailout, and I get angry all over again….

Bankster Bailouts Did NOT Save Us from the Second Great Depression

It is a widely held belief that the bailout of the banking system prevented the second Great Depression. This belief is wrong.

Today's featured high-end property is scheduled for auction on April 28th. Will the short sale be approved in time?

Irvine Home Address … 7 BUELLTON Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price …… $1,224,800

{book1}

Monday finds you like a bomb

That's been left ticking there too long

You're bleeding

Some days there's nothing left to learn

From the point of no return

You're leaving

Hey hey, I saved the world today

And everybody's happy now

The bad thing's gone away

And everybody's happy now

The good thing's here to stay

Please let it stay

Eurythmics — I Saved The World Today

Did our brilliant politicians and the cool heads at the Federal Reserve save the world? Popular public opinion says yes. Me and many other astute observors say no. The only thing our collective actions has accomplished is to stop a group of greedy and ignorant fools from experiencing the consequences of their actions. Instead, the consequences have been passed on to us in the form of huge government bailouts and locally inflated house prices.

Blame It on the Bubble

Dean Baker

Politicians and the media continue to refer to the economic downturn as being the result of a financial crisis. This is wrong. We have 15 million people out of work because the housing bubble that drove the economy since the last recession finally burst. The financial crisis may have been good entertainment for those who like to see huge banks collapse, but it was a sidebar. The real story was the rise and demise of the housing bubble.

Those who claim that the real problem was the financial system and its faulty regulation can be disproved with a single word: Spain. Spain is noteworthy because it now has an unemployment rate of more than 19%, the highest rate in any of the wealthy countries. Spain did not have a financial crisis. In fact, its well-regulated financial system is often held up as model for the United States.

Spain did have a horrific housing bubble. As a result, the share of construction in the economy rose from less than 8% of GDP at the end of the 90s to 12.3% in 2007. By comparison, it is typically less than 6% of GDP in non-bubble years in the United States. This rapid rate of construction led to enormous overbuilding, which meant that a collapse was inevitable with construction falling to far below normal levels.

The run-up in house prices also had the predictable effect on consumption. Because people believe that the run-up in house prices is based on fundamentals, homeowners assume that their newly created housing wealth is real and they spend accordingly. Spain's saving rate fell from just under 6% in 2000 to 3% in 2007. When the housing wealth created by the bubble disappeared people naturally cut back their consumption.

This is Spain's crisis. According to the IMF, housing starts in Spain fell by 80% from the peak of the boom. While total construction has not fallen as much (repairs and non-residential construction did not decline nearly as much), if construction in Spain fell by 50%, this would imply a loss in annual demand of more than 6% of GDP. That would translate into a drop in demand of more than $800bn in the United States.

Similarly the loss of housing wealth reverses the housing wealth effect. If consumption fell enough to return the savings rate to its pre-bubble level, then this would imply a loss in annual consumption demand of more than three percentage points of disposable income. In the US this would amount to more than $300bn in lost annual consumption.

There is no easy mechanism to replace more than $1tn in lost demand. This is why Spain's economy is in a severe slump right now. Note that just about all analysts agree, Spain's financial system was well regulated and it had none of the loony loans and outright corruption that pervades Wall Street and the US financial system. Yet, it is suffering from this economic downturn even more than the United States.

The moral of this story is that the problem is not first and foremost a financial crisis. It might be fun to watch the Wall Street and government boys sweat as they stay up late trying to keep the big banks from drowning in the cesspools they created. But this is all a sideshow. No one saved us from a "second Great Depression," they just saved the jobs and wealth of the Wall Street crew.

The economy's real problem is simply the loss of demand created by collapse of the bubble. Throwing even more money at the banks is a way to ensure that they don't suffer from the consequence of their own greed and stupidity. It is not a way to restore the economy to health.

Restoring the economy to health is about finding a replacement for the demand lost as a result of the collapse of the bubble. In the short-term, this means increased government spending and tax cuts. Deficits put money in the economy, and using the old-fashioned view that people work for money, we can determine how much money we need to spend for the government to get the economy back towards full employment levels of output.

In the longer term, we need to move towards more balanced trade, with higher exports and fewer imports making up for the demand lost due to collapse of the housing bubble. This will require a lower-valued dollar – everything else in the trade picture is just for show.

We do need financial reform. We have an incredibly wasteful and reckless financial industry. But bad financial regulation by itself did not give us 10% unemployment, nor would good regulation have been sufficient to prevent it. Just ask the workers in Spain.

I have profiled hundreds of cases of HELOC abuse (or use depending on your point of view). This was an enormous economic stimulus that is now gone, and it isn't coming back. Our current economic woes are largely caused by the loss of HELOC demand and the unemployment caused by laying off most of the building industry and much of the finance industry. We still don't know how to replace that demand. We probably won't.

Why did we bail out the banks? We could have wiped out all the equity and bond holders, recapitalized with taxpayer funds, then sold the public interest later. Sweden did this in the mid 90s, and it worked well. The only reason we did not do this is because the equity and bond holders like Goldman Sachs control our government and knew they could pass the losses off to us.

Carte Blanche for the Banksters

Mike Whitney: fergiewhitney@msn.com

Housing is still on the rocks and prices are headed lower. Master illusionist Ben Bernanke has managed to engineer a modest 7-month uptick in sales, but the fairydust is set to wear off later this month when the Fed stops purchasing mortgage-backed securities (MBS). When the program ends, long-term interest rates will creep higher and sales will begin to flag. The objective of Bernanke's $1.25 trillion quantitative easing program was to transfer the banks’ toxic assets onto the Fed's balance sheet. Having achieved that goal, Bernanke will now have to find a way to unload those same assets onto the public. Freddie and Fannie, which have already been used as a government-backed off-balance-sheet dumping ground, appear to be the most likely candidates.

Bernanke's liquidity injections have helped to buoy stock prices and stabilize housing, but the economy is still weak. There's just too much inventory and too few buyers. Now that the Fed is withdrawing its support, matters will only get worse.

Of course, that hasn't stopped the folks at Bloomberg News from cheerleading the "nascent" housing rebound. Here's a clip from Monday's column:

"The U.S. housing market is poised to withstand the removal of government and Federal Reserve stimulus programs and rebound later in the year, contributing to annual economic growth for the first time since 2006. Increases in jobs, credit and affordable homes will help offset the end of the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities this month and the expiration of a federal homebuyer tax credit in April. ‘The underlying trend is turning positive,’ said Bruce Kasman, chief economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co. in New York."

Just for the record; there have been no "increases in jobs". Unemployment is stuck at 9.7 percent with underemployment checking in at 16.8 percent. There's no chance of housing rebound until payrolls start to rise. Jobless people cannot afford to buy homes.

I discussed the lag between the peak in unemployment and the bottom of house prices in UCLA Anderson Forecast 2010 with a chart from Calculated Risk:

The lag is caused by the foreclosure excess from the bubble that preceeded the recession. House prices really could turn up in 2010 if we were not facing a five-year overhang of foreclosures and distressed property owners who will sell at breakeven when given the chance.

Also, while it is true that the federal homebuyer tax credit did cause a spike in home purchases its effect has been short-lived and sales are gradually returning to normal. It's generally believed that "cash for clunker-type" programs (like the homebuyer tax credit) merely move demand forward and have no meaningful long-term impact.

So, it's likely that housing prices — particularly on the higher end — will continue to fall until they return to their historic trend. (probably 10 to 15 per cent lower) That means more trouble for the banks which are already using all kinds of accounting flim-flam ("mark-to-fiction") to conceal the wretched condition of their balance sheets. Despite the surge in stock prices, the banks are drowning in the losses from their non-performing loans and toxic assets. At the same time, they're about to get hit by the next wave of Option ARMs and Alt-As resets which will require another $1 trillion in financing.

I enjoy writers with a clear grasp of the situation.

So, let's summarize:

1–Bank bailout #1–$700 billion TARP which allowed the banks to continue operations after the repo and secondary markets froze-over from the putrid loans the banks were peddling to credulous investors.

2–Bank bailout #2–$1.25 trillion Quantitative Easing program which transferred banks toxic assets onto Fed's balance sheet (soon to be dumped on Fannie and Freddie) while rewarding the perpetrators of the biggest financial crackup in history.

3–Bank bailout #3–$1 trillion (or more) to cover all mortgage cramdowns, second liens, as well as any future liabilities including gym fees, energy drinks, double-tall nonfat mocha's, parking meters etc. ad infinitum. Basically, carte blanche for the banksters.

And as far as the banks taking "haircuts"? Forget about it! Banks don't take "haircuts". It looks bad on their quarterly reports and cuts into their bonuses. Taxpayers take haircuts, not banksters. Besides, that's what Geithner gets paid for–to make sure bigshot tycoons don't have to pay for their mistakes or bother with the niggling details of fleecing the little people.

It is hard to argue with the author's conclusions about the behavior of our government and the banksters. We have bailed them out and in the process provided them with the money to lobby and fight any real financial reform that might cut into their profits.

We have created moral hazard. Lenders know they can take unlimited risks an we will absorb the losses.

We are pwned. Our leaders have failed us.

“Gentlemen, I have had men watching you for a long time and I am convinced that you have used the funds of the bank to speculate in the breadstuffs of the country. When you won, you divided the profits amongst you, and when you lost, you charged it to the bank. You tell me that if I take the deposits from the bank and annul its charter, I shall ruin ten thousand families. That may be true, gentlemen, but that is your sin! Should I let you go on, you will ruin fifty thousand families, and that would be my sin! You are a den of vipers and thieves.” — Andrew Jackson

Featured Property

  • This property was purchased on 4/17/2006 for $1,580,000. The owner used a $1,000,000 first mortgage, a $580,000 down payment, and simultaneously opened a $422,000 HELOC which probably wasn't used as purchase money (there is no way to be sure).
  • On 1/16/2007 the owners refinanced the first mortgage for $1,268,000 and opened a stand-alone second for $158,000.
  • Total property debt is $1,426,000

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 10/27/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale (aka Notice of Trustee's Sale)

Click here to get Foreclosure Report.

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 07/22/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

The owners must feel good about the refinance that pulled their cash out of the property. They are stil going to lose $150,000 to $200,000, but they are passing much of the loss on to the lender.

Gazumping Short Sales

Have you heard the term gazumping? According to Wikipedia,

"Gazumping" is to refuse to formalise a property sale agreement at the last minute usually in order to accept a higher offer.

This phenomenon is not common here in the United States as it is in England because our purchase and sale agreements are binding; however, gazumping is alive and well in today's market with short sales and trustee sales.

Most short sales go to auction. When they do, all short sale offers are void because the previous owner is no longer in control of the property. Now that we can help people transact in the trustee market, we can gazump short sale offers. If you are in a back-up position — or even primary for that matter — if you want to ensure you get the property, you should be sending us to the aution just to make sure.

Irvine Home Address … 7 BUELLTON Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price … $1,224,800

Home Purchase Price … $1,580,000

Home Purchase Date …. 4/17/2006

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $(428,688)

Percent Change ………. -22.5%

Annual Appreciation … -6.3%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$1,224,800 ………. Asking Price

$244,960 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.11% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$979,840 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$256,792 ………. Income Requirement

$5,326 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$1061 ………. Property Tax

$333 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$102 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$145 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$6,968 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$1466 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$1154 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$491 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$153 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$4,993 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$12,248 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$12,248 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$9,798 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$244,960 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$279,254 ………. Total Cash Costs

$76,500 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$355,754 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 7 BUELLTON Irvine, CA 92602

——————————————————————————

Beds: 5

Baths: 3 full 1 part baths

Home size: 3,627 sq ft

($338 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 7,617 sq ft

Year Built: 2002

Days on Market: 271

MLS Number: S580023

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: Northpark

Tract: Hunt

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

Excellent interior deep cul-de-sac location, huge pool size lot, impressive curb appeal with flagstone/brick walkway, main floor bedroom/bath plus den/office, elegant entry w/cathedral ceiling/travertine floor, formal living/dining rooms w/wrought iron, gourmet kitchen w/sit-up center island, granite countertops, upgraded cabinets w/glass display, stainless appliance package, five burner cooktop, butler's pantry w/dual wine compartments, work desk, fireplace w/custom mantel, built-in media center, surround sound, decorator paint, crown moulding, shutters, ceiling fans, high baseboards, inside laundry w/sink, master suite extends to lavish bath w/travertine floor, separate shower, deep oval soaking tub w/marble surround, twin china sinks, individual vanity, professionally designed front/backyards w/patio cover, built-in counter space, fountain, garage w/epoxy floor, resort life-style amenities: pools, parks, spas,meandering greenbelts, clubhouse, tennis/sports courts

/w is annoying. Reading through slashes is very difficult.

Prior to decorating this house, the owners must have taken a trip to Italy and toured the great Italian Villas and the Sistine Chapel.

Can you picture Michelangelo lying on his back on a scaffold painting this ceiling?

Do you like the view of the grounds of your Italian Villa?

I like this property. I think that means I have no taste….

Bank of America to Increase Foreclosure Rate by 600% in 2010

Bank of America made headlines with its principal forgiveness program. The real news is that they are preparing to blast debtors out of their bunkers of entitlement.

Today's featured property is another epic HELOC abuser. Should these people qualify for principal reduction?

Irvine Home Address … 17 CARRIAGE Dr Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price …… $715,000

{book1}

The more I know, the less I understand

All the things I thought I knew, I'm learning again

I've been tryin' to get down

to the heart of the matter

But my will gets weak

and my thoughts seem to scatter

But I think it's about…forgiveness

Forgiveness

Even if, even if you don't PAY me anymore

Don Henley — The Heart of the Matter

Lenders are trying to figure out how their massive Ponzi Scheme collapsed. They are relearning lending again because everything they thought they knew was wrong. When you get down to the heart of the matter, borrowers are carrying too much debt which is killing them financially and emotionally. It is about forgiveness. Even if it means debtors don't pay anymore.

Forgiveness never comes easy, and in lending it never comes cheap. These debts will be forgiven, and the toxic loans that spawned them will be cleansed from the system — mostly through foreclosure. Home debtors are hoping for principal forgiveness without consequence. That isn't going to happen. Lenders only forgive as a last resort, and there are consequences for the borrower. When it's done, lenders turn to the US taxpayer to make them whole again.

A 600% increase in foreclosures

I attended a local Building Industry Association conference on Friday 26 March 2010. The west coast manager of real estate owned, Senior Vice President Ken Gaitan, stated that Bank of America, which currently forecloses on 7,500 homes a month nationally, will increase that number to 45,000 homes per month by December of 2010.

After his surprising statement, two questioners from the audience asked questions to verify the numbers.

Bank of America is projecting a 600% increase in its already large number of monthly foreclosures.

This isn't unsubstantiated rumor; this comes straight from one of the most powerful men in Bank of America's OREO department (yes, that really is what they call it). It appears they have too many properties already.

Perhaps this is a good time to start a Trustee Sale service…. One of the panelists who works for a building company said he was flipping houses with his personal money. He noted that in some markets, he can buy a house at auction for less money than builders are paying for finished lots. That is a bit crazy.

There was encouraging news from some in the reality-based community at the conference. Builders are buying up projects in Southern California, so the land market has found a bottom. Prices are still speculative, but the builders are buying to have buildable inventory, so in select markets real demand exists for finished lots and properties with partial improvements.

There was a certain amount of positive spin at the event, which is natural given the beleaguered stated of the Southern California building industry. Jeff Collins at the OC Register covered the more bullish opinions.

It is still not enough

Last week I noted that Lenders Start More Foreclosures to Catch Up with Delinquencies. Consider the size of the problem: 1.2 million Bank of America homeowners are in default. Even if they forclosed on 45,000 a month for a full year, that is only 540,000 foreclosures. What about the other 660,000 people in default? I think their number — large as it may seem — is actually wishful thinking. It is worse than that. (thanks jules)

Principal reductions are a public relations diversion

Everyone is abuzz with the news that Bank of America is forgiving principal. As you might imagine, many will apply and few will be helped. Moral hazard dictates that irresponsible borrowing that results in free money will cause more irresponsible borrowing; after all, it isn't borrowing, it's a gift. If banks start giving away money, everyone will do whatever is necessary to obtain it.

I contend the principal reduction program is a public relations diversion. Let's look at the numbers. By Bank of America's own admission, the program will assist 45,000 customers — a sum equal to the monthly foreclosure rates they are anticipating by the end of the year. If they are foreclosing on more people each month than would be helped by the principal reduction program, then the program is merely a pleasant facade intended to divert attention from the huge volume of foreclosures they will push through.

Bank of America to Reduce Mortgage Balances

Published: March 24, 2010

Bank of America said on Wednesday that it would begin forgiving some mortgage debt in an effort to keep distressed borrowers from losing their homes.

The program, while limited in scope and available by invitation only, signals a significant shift in efforts to deal with the millions of homeowners who are facing foreclosure. It comes as banks are being urged by the White House, members of Congress and community groups to do more to stem the tide.

The Obama administration is also studying whether to provide more help to people who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth.

Bank of America’s program may increase the pressure on other big banks to offer more help for delinquent borrowers, while potentially angering homeowners who have kept up their payments and are not getting such aid.

You think? Responsible borrowers should be pissed. The more irresponsible and foolish borrowers were, the greater their principal forgiveness.

As the housing market shows signs of possibly entering another downturn, worries about foreclosure are growing. With the volume of sales falling, prices are sliding again. When the gap increases between the size of a mortgage and the value that the home could fetch in a sale, owners tend to give up.

Cutting the size of the debt over a period of years, however, might encourage people to stick around. That could save homes from foreclosure and stabilize neighborhoods.

“Banks are willing to take some losses now to avoid much greater losses later if the housing market continues to spiral, and that’s a sea change from where they were a year ago,” said Howard Glaser, a housing consultant in Washington and former government regulator.

The threat of a stick may be helping banks to realize that principal write-downs are in their ultimate self-interest. The Bank of America program was announced simultaneously with the news that the lender had reached a settlement with the state of Massachusetts over claims of predatory lending.

The program is aimed at borrowers who received subprime or other high-risk loans from Countrywide Financial, the biggest and one of the most aggressive lenders during the housing boom. Bank of America bought Countrywide in 2008.

Bank of America is trying this principal reduction program with Option ARM holders because they know these people are all going to default. Anything they can do to minimize the losses on these properties, including delaying foreclosure and hoping for appreciation, is preferred to absorbing these losses when prices are very low. Of course, it will not work, but it it worth a shot. They have little to lose by trying.

Borrowers have nothing to lose either. The Bank of America program is an attempt to stop the hopelessly underwater from strategically defaulting. It is their only hope.

The devil is in the details

Bank of America officials said the maximum reduction would be 30 percent of the value of the loan.

Those people who are more than 30% underwater are considered the walking dead. They should default. If you don't qualify for this program because you are too far underwater, what hope do you have?

I heard recently that Hemet, California, has a significant number of borrowers more than 50% underwater. Back in 2006-2007, I was involved with the Valley Economic Development Corporation working to bring business to Hemet and San Jacinto. I remember a brochure we created touting the relative affordability of local housing. At the time, the median income was $45,000 per year, and the median home price was $405,000.

Most who paid $405,000 for a house back then used Option ARMs because they could leverage nine-times their income to obtain a property. Now that the median home price is around $175,000 — which is close to four-times income — many residents owe more than double what their house is worth.

They said the program would work this way: A borrower might owe, say, $250,000 on a house whose value has fallen to $200,000. Fifty thousand dollars of that balance would be moved into a special interest-free account.

As long as the owner continued to make payments on the $200,000, $10,000 in the special account would be forgiven each year until either the balance was zero or the housing market had recovered and the borrower once again had positive equity.

Let's see how a Southern California borrower would be effected by this program. Let's assume a $500,000 house price and a $400,000 first mortgage with a $100,000 second. The second is not subject to this agreement, so we already have our first major hurdle to overcome. When Bank of America lowers the value of its first mortgage, are they taking into account the indebtedness of the second? If they don't, payments are still not affordable.

Assume the borrower received $200,000 in potential principal reduction. Now they are paying on a $200,000 first and a $100,000 second which brings their combined loan-to-value under 100%. The $200,000 of deferred principal gets reduced by $10,000 a year until values increase. Absent appreciation, it will take 20 years to dig out. That is a long time to rent their home from the bank with zero equity.

Here is where it gets fuzzy — on purpose I'm sure — Let's say the borrower stays with the program for ten years. The deferred principal is now $100,000, and the total indebtedness is $400,000 minus amortization. Let's further assume that prices have appreciated, and the property is now worth $400,000. What happens?

  1. Does the principal forgiveness end and the account with the principal deferment is permanently fixed at the point of crossover? How do we know when this occurs? Is Bank of America going to order yearly appraisals just prior to forgiving the debt to make sure the owner is still underwater?
  2. Once Bank of America discovers the borrower is no longer underwater, can they recapture forgiven principal if the borrower continues to live in the property? In short, does the bank get the appreciation to recover the forgiven debt, or does the borrower get to keep it?
  3. How is this deferred principal paid off? Is this a permanent zero-interest loan paid off when the property is sold? Does the deferred principal get added back to the original mortgage once the borrower is no longer underwater? What happens to the borrower's payment?

If those questions are resolved in favor of borrowers, I would be surprised. To the degree that the borrower benefits is the degree to which moral hazard is encouraged.

Too little too late

Bank of America said its new program would initially help about 45,000 Countrywide borrowers — a fraction of the 1.2 million Bank of America homeowners who are in default. The total amount of principal reduced, it estimated, would be $3 billion.

The bank said it would reach out to delinquent borrowers whose mortgage balance was at least 20 percent greater than the value of the house. These people would then have to demonstrate a hardship like a loss of income.

These requirements will, the bank hopes, restrain any notion that it is offering easy bailouts to those who might otherwise be able to pay. “The customers who will get this offer really can’t afford their mortgage,” Mr. Schakett said.

LOL! Every borrower in Bank of America's books is going to seek a bailout. That is moral hazard! That is why you don't bail people out. The only way to discourage this is to create a program nobody qualifies for… I guess they did that, didn't they?

But Steve Walsh, a mortgage broker [LOL!] in Scottsdale, Ariz., who said he had just abandoned his house and several rental properties, called the program “another Band-Aid. It probably would not have prevented me from walking away.”

That is the other problem Bank of America must contend with. Many of the people who took out these loans were speculators who are going to walk no matter the terms because their speculative venture did not turn out as planned.

Reducing principal is widely endorsed, in theory, as a cure for foreclosures. The trouble is, no one wants to absorb the costs. [No kidding?]

When the administration announced a housing assistance program in the five hardest-hit states last month, officials explicitly opened the door to principal forgiveness. Despite reservations expressed by the Treasury, the White House and Housing and Urban Development officials have continued to study debt forgiveness in areas with lots of so-called underwater homes, according to two people with knowledge of the matter.

"Continued study" is code for "we are not going to do anything, but we want you to think that we might." It is part of the dangling-carrot policy designed only to keep debtors paying.

On a national scale, such a program risks a political firestorm if the banks are unable to finance all the losses themselves. Regulators like the comptroller of the currency and the Federal Reserve have been focused on maintaining the banks’ capital levels, which could be hurt by large-scale debt forgiveness.

You have to be very careful not to design a program that would change people’s fundamental behavior across the country in a destabilizing way or would be widely perceived as unfair to people who are continuing to pay,” Michael S. Barr, an assistant secretary of the Treasury, said early this year.

Moral Hazard can't be avoided

No program exists, nor can one be designed, that does not create moral hazard and gross unfairness. That is why this issue is so difficult.

This process must be allowed to run its course. Bank of America will manage its public relations and try to look like they are working to prevent foreclosures.

In reality, Bank of America is gearing up to remove the loan owners and squatters. Expect to see a steady increase in foreclosures all year continuing for the foreseeable future.

Should we give HELOC abusers principal reductions?

The owner of today's featured property would likely qualify under the terms of the Bank of America agreement. Let's take a careful look at the behavior of these borrowers and see if this is something we should encourage with bailouts and handouts.

  • This property was purchased on 7/30/199 for $348,500. The owners used a $313,350 first mortgage and a $35,150 down payment.
  • On 10/14/1999 they obtained a HELOC for $30,000 which allowed them to withdraw their down payment.
  • On 3/7/2002 they opened a HELOC for $50,000.
  • On 3/28/2003 they refinanced their first mortgage for $322,000.
  • On 3/17/2004 they obtained a HELOC for $120,000.
  • On 10/26/2004 they refinanced their first mortgage for $462,750.
  • On 10/12/2006 they refinanced their first mortgage for $625,000.
  • On 11/14/2006 they obtained a HELOC for $100,000.
  • Total property debt is $725,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $436,650 including their down payment.

It is obvious from the photos these people did not spend this money on property improvements. Where did it all go?

We all know this money went to conspicuous consumption and keeping up with the Joneses just like it did for everyone else. Do you want to see them get a principal reduction to pay for it?

I don't.

Irvine Home Address … 17 CARRIAGE Dr Irvine, CA 92602

Resale Home Price … $715,000

Home Purchase Price … $348,500

Home Purchase Date …. 6/30/1999

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $323,600

Percent Change ………. 105.2%

Annual Appreciation … 6.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$715,000 ………. Asking Price

$143,000 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.11% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$572,000 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$149,907 ………. Income Requirement

$3,109 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$620 ………. Property Tax

$50 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$60 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$0 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$3,838 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$764 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$673 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$287 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$89 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$2,777 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$7,150 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$7,150 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$5,720 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$143,000 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$163,020 ………. Total Cash Costs

$42,500 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$205,520 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 17 CARRIAGE Dr Irvine, CA 92602

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 2 full 1 part baths

Home size: 2,250 sq ft

($318 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 4,912 sq ft

Year Built: 1999

Days on Market: 4

MLS Number: P727630

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: West Irvine

Tract: Ambw

——————————————————————————

According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

This beautiful Fieldstone home, tucked nicely away at the end of a long driveway, has a really functional floorplan with a big living room, a great family room with built-in bookcases that opens directly into the kitchen with center island, and a private, peaceful backyard. Upstairs bedrooms are roomy, and the vast master bedroom has a bathroom with double sinks, separate tub & shower, and a HUGE walk-in closet. One of the upstairs bedrooms has a giant alcove perfect as a retreat or home office. Even the walk-in pantry located off the kitchen is really big! Located in an award-winning school district, and with NO association dues, this happy home will be the site of many great neighborhood parties for years to come!

I get the impression that the man of the house was not responsible for its decoration….

I want to thank my wife for not making me sleep in a room like that one.

BTW, I highly recommend reading Squatting Newport Coast Style, the post from Saturday. It will make your blood boil:

  1. $2,500,000+ in HELOC abuse.
  2. Delusional seller who has chased the market down more than 50%.
  3. Gaming the system to squat in luxury for a year and a half.

Bubble Market Psychology – Part 1

Bubble Market Psychology

Financial markets are driven by fear and greed: two basic human emotions. Rationality and careful analysis are not responsible for, or predictive of, current or future price levels in markets exhibiting bubble pricing as the emotions of buyers and sellers takes over. [1] The psychology of speculation drives bubble markets, and because of the nature of fear and greed, most speculators are doomed to lose their money. In contrast, true investors are not subject to the emotional cycles of the speculator, and they are more able to make rational decisions based on fundamental valuations. Of course, many investors also miss the excitement of a runaway price rally in a speculative bubble. The Great Housing Bubble was inflated by people trading houses. Residential real estate took on the character of a commodity, and it became subject to the same chaotic price gyrations as a speculative commodities market. This behavior was caused by lenders who provided the financing terms which enabled speculators to use mortgages as option contracts with the risk of loss being transferred to the lenders.

With any loss, an individual must go through a grieving process. Since markets are the collective actions of these individuals, markets experience the same psychological stages which are apparent in the price action. Efficient markets theory attempts to explain market price action through the collective action of rational market participants. This theory fails to explain the irrational behavior exhibited in bubble markets. Behavioral finance theory seeks to explain irrational exuberance. The price action in a bubble has other impacts on the beliefs and behaviors of individuals and society as a whole. These beliefs and behaviors may become pathological in nature leading to suffering and social problems. As with any form of mass hardship, there are calls for government action which lead to proposals for bailouts and false hopes among the populace.

Speculation or Investment?

Owner-occupied residential real estate is viewed by many people as a good investment. [ii] Realtors often use this idea as part of their sales pitch. As mentioned previously, this view is fallacious and it is one of the beliefs responsible for creating an asset price bubble. To understand why houses are not a great investment in most circumstances, one needs to understand the difference between investment and speculation.

An investment is an asset purchased to obtain a predictable and consistent cashflow. This would include things such as bonds and rental properties or even cash in a savings account. The value of the asset is based on the cashflow, and this value can be determined in a number of ways. For a “point in time” analysis simple division will yield the rate of return (return = income / investment). Risk is evaluated by comparing the rate of return of the investment to the safe return one can obtain in a savings account or government bonds. For more complex financial structures the value can be determined by a process known as discounted cashflow analysis. The sales price at the time of disposition is often not a major factor in the investment decision, particularly if the eventual disposition is many years in the future. In fact, true investments need never be sold to be profitable. As Warren Buffet noted, “I buy on the assumption that they could close the market the next day and not reopen it for five years.” [iii] In contrast to investment, speculation is the purchase of an asset to sell at a later date at a higher price (Actually, you can also speculate by selling first and buying later in a process known as “selling short”). Speculative assets are not valued based on cashflow but instead are valued based on the perceived probability of selling later for a profit. Houses can be purchased as an investment at the right price, but most often when people purchase a property they are engaging in speculation based on the belief they will be able to sell the house for a profit at a later date.

Since 1890 houses have appreciated at 0.7% over the general rate of inflation. Over the long term house values are tied to incomes because most people buy houses with mortgages for which they must qualify based on their income. Inflation keeps pace with wage growth because people will bid up the prices of goods and services with their available income. Therefore, over the long term house prices, wages and inflation all move in concert. There are short-term fluctuations in this relationship due to variations in financing terms, migration patterns, employment, local limits on construction and irrational exuberance, but any such deviations from the mean will be corrected over time by market forces. As an investment, houses serve as a hedge against the corrosive effect of inflation, but over the long term appreciation much in excess of the general rate of inflation is not possible. In this regard, houses are little better than savings accounts as an asset class, and they are inferior to stocks or bonds in the long term.

Leverage and Debt

As a speculative investment, residential real estate has the potential to make or lose vast sums of money due to the impact of financial leverage (debt). Houses are typically leveraged at 80% of their value. During the Great Housing Bubble, this leverage was often provided at 100% by various lenders. Leverage is a powerful ally when prices increase, but leverage works just as strongly against the speculator when prices decrease. For example, if a house is leveraged 80% and it increases in value 5% in one year, the return to the investor is actually 25% due to the 5 times multiplier created by leverage. With the effect of leverage, speculation on housing can far exceed any competing investment strategy. However, the inverse is also true. If a house is leveraged 80% and it decreases in value 5% in one year, the loss to the investor is 25% of her downpayment, not just the 5% the house declined in value. Leverage magnifies both the return and the risk of any speculative venture.

One of the worst mistakes lenders made during the Great Housing Bubble was to allow 100% financing and negative amortization loans. This was a boon for speculators because it allowed them to participate in the market without any of their own capital and it allowed them to hold the speculative assets with a minimal debt service expense. Plus, there was the implicit idea that they would simply default if the deal did not go in their favor (which of course many did). Combine these facts with the near elimination of loan underwriting standards allowing anyone to participate, and the conditions were perfect for rampant speculation, a wild increase in prices and so much speculative demand that many new and existing home purchases would remain vacant.

Why Speculators Fail

Despite the huge price spike in the final two years of the bubble caused by wild speculation, most speculators will lose a great deal of money. The causes are rooted in basic human emotions that work against making the proper decisions to profit in a speculative market. The moment a speculative asset is purchased and the speculator has taken a position in the market, emotions are immediately in play. If the potential resale price in the market is rising, the natural reaction is to want more. Greed takes over and the asset is strongly coveted by the speculator. If possible, the speculator will purchase more of the asset in question. This was common in the bubble when people would take the equity from one property and purchase even more residential real estate. The problem with this natural emotional reaction is that it prevents the speculator from selling the asset and taking profits when they are available. People who successfully make a living participating in speculative markets have learned to override this natural instinct and sell when their emotions are telling them to buy more. The average residential real estate speculator does not have this discipline or awareness. He will hold the asset through the good times.

When prices begin to fall in a speculative market, most speculators immediately lapse into denial. They were so emotionally rewarded by purchasing and holding the asset, they see no reason to believe the first signs of a declining market are anything other than a temporary aberration. As prices continue to fall, the emotions change: fear begins to creep in, and the battle between denial and fear goes on well past the breakeven point where the speculator could have closed the position without losing any money. [iv] As prices fall further, the fear begins to take an emotional toll and the speculator starts to feel pain. As prices drop further, more pain is inflicted on the speculator. What is the natural reaction to pain? Push it away. As a speculative investment becomes painful, the natural reaction is to want to get rid of it. This prompts the speculator to sell the asset–only after he has lost money. Speculator’s emotions always work against them. When the asset is rising in price they want more of it, and when it is falling in price they want less. This is a natural reaction, and it is a primary cause of losses in speculative markets. This is why most speculators fail.

Figure 31: Speculator Emotional Cycle

Two Kinds of Real Estate Investors

There are two types of true real estate investors: Rent Savers and Cashflow Investors. These two groups will enter a real estate market without regard to future appreciation because either the cash savings or the positive cashflow warrant the purchase price of the asset. These people are largely immune to the emotional pratfalls of speculators because the value of the investment to them is not dependent upon a profit to be garnered when the asset is sold. They will hold the asset through any price declines because they are not feeling any pain when prices drop. Since these investors will purchase houses even if prices are declining, they are the ones who move in to create a bottom and end the cycle of declining prices.

In a declining market, a market where by definition there is more must-sell inventory than there are buyers to absorb it, it takes an influx of new buyers to restore balance. Since it is foolish to buy with the expectation of appreciation in a declining market, the buyers who were frantically bidding up the values of properties in the rally are notably absent from the market. With the exception of the occasional knife-catcher, these potential buyers simply do not buy. This absence of buyers perpetuates the decline once it starts. Add to that the inevitable foreclosures in a price decline, and the result is an unending downward spiral. It takes Rent Savers and Cashflow Investors entering the market to provide support, break the cycle and create a bottom.

Rent Savers are buyers who enter the market when it is less expensive to own than to rent. It does not matter to these people what houses will trade for in the market in the future. They are not buying with fantasies of appreciation. They just know they are saving money over renting, and that is good enough for them. Cashflow Investors have a different agenda; they want to turn a monthly profit from ownership. For them, the cost of ownership must be less than prevailing rent for them to make a return on their equity investment. Cashflow Investors form a durable bottom. If prices drop low enough for this group to get into the market, the influx of investment capital can be extraordinary.

Buyer Support Levels

When do Rent Savers and Cashflow Investors move in to a market and create a bottom? When comparative rents come into alignment with the total cost of ownership, Rent Savers enter the market and begin purchasing real estate. It makes sense for them to do so because ownership becomes a savings over renting (hence the term Rent Saver). The "return" on the investment is the hedge against inflation the Rent Saver obtains by locking in the cost of housing with a 30-year, fixed-rate, fully-amortized mortgage. As rents in the area continue to increase, these costs are not borne by the Rent Saver. Utilizing the price-to-rent concept, the Rent Savers will enter the market when this ratio falls to 154 (based on financing terms available in 2007). There will be some buyers who enter at higher prices, but there will not be enough of them to stabilize the market. It takes a decline in prices to where it is less expensive to own than to rent before enough new buyers enter the market to create a bottom. However, there are some properties that Rent Savers will not purchase because they really do not want to live in them. This includes transitory housing like apartments or small apartment-like condominiums. Prices on these properties will generally drop below the 154 price-to-rent breakeven for owner occupants until they reach price levels where Cashflow Investors will purchase them as rental properties. Since these investors do not want to merely break even, the price must be low enough for the rental rate to exceed the cost of ownership by enough to provide a return on the investor's capital. Historically, price-to-rent ratios from 100-120 are required to create the conditions necessary to attract Cashflow Investors’ capital.

When it comes time to consider purchasing a house, each person should evaluate if their motivation is one of an investor or one of a speculator. Investment in real estate requires an accurate assessment of the revenue (or savings) and the costs associated with the property. If the cashflow from the property warrants the purchase of the investment–without regard to future asset value–then it is a true investment, and the risks of ownership are much reduced. If the property’s asset resale value were to decline, the investment value would still be there, and the investor would feel no pain and no pressure to sell. In contrast, speculation is a loser’s game, and if the motivation is to capture a windfall from future appreciation, there is a good chance it may not work out as planned because the emotions of a speculator will cause a sale at the worst possible time. A few can put their emotions aside and properly evaluate the market and trade the asset, but most who profit from speculation simply sell at the right time due to life’s circumstances. In short, they get lucky. The people who bought late in the rally and are holding on to the asset while they drift further and further underwater–they are not so lucky.

Trading Houses

During the Great Housing Bubble, many speculators tried to make money through trading houses. The vast majority of these traders were not professionals but amateurs who thought they could be professionals. Most amateurs ended up losing money because they did not understand what it takes to be successful in a speculative market. [v] The first and most obvious difference in the investment strategy between professional traders and the amateurs in the general public is their holding time. Traders buy with the intent to sell for a profit at a later date. Traders know why they are entering a trade, and they have a well thought out exit strategy. The general public adopts a “buy and hold” mentality where assets are accumulated with a supposed eye to the long term. Everyone wants to be the next Warren Buffet. In reality this buy-and-hold strategy is often a “buy and hope” strategy–a greed-induced, emotional purchase without proper analysis or any exit plan. Since they have no exit strategy, and since they are ruled by their emotions, they will end up selling only when the pain of loss compels them to. In short, it is an investment method guaranteed to be a disaster.

There is evidence that houses were used as a speculative commodity during the Great Housing Bubble. Since the cost of ownership greatly exceeded the cashflow from the property if used as a rental, the property was not purchased for positive cashflow, and by definition, it was a speculative purchase. Confirming evidence for speculative activity comes from the unusual and significant increase in vacant houses in the residential real estate market.

If markets had not been gripped by speculative fervor, vacancy rates would not have risen so far above historic norms. If houses had been purchased for investment purposes to make money from rental income, the houses would have been occupied after purchase and vacancy rates would not have gone up. A rise in vacancy rates would have resulted in downward pressure on rents, and the investment opportunity–if it had existed initially (which it did not)–would have disappeared with the declining rent. There is only one reasonable explanation for increasing house prices and increasing rents during a period when house vacancy rates increased 64%: people were purchasing houses for speculative gains and leaving them unoccupied while the owners waited for prices to rise. [vi]

Figure 32: National Homeowner Vacancy Rate, 1986-2007

When house prices stopped their dizzying ascent, many speculators found themselves with large monthly debt service costs and no income to offset expenses. Many chose to quit paying their mortgage obligations and allowed the property to be auctioned at foreclosure. Many chose to rent the properties to reduce their monthly cashflow drain, and they became accidental landlords. In the vernacular of the time, they became floplords–flippers turned landlords.

Becoming a floplord was fraught with problems. First, they were not covering their monthly expenses, so the losses on the “investment” continued to mount. For houses purchased near the peak in 2006, rent only covered half the cost of ownership unless the speculator used an Option ARM with a very low teaser rate (which many did). Becoming a floplord was a convenient form of denial for losing speculators because they believed they were buying themselves time until prices rose again, allowing them to sell later either at breakeven or for a profit. Since they bought in a speculative mania, prices were not going to recover quickly and the denial soon evolved into fear, anger and finally acceptance of their fate. Another problem floplords faced was their own inexperience at managing rental properties. Most had never owned or managed a rental property, and none of them purchased the property with this contingency in mind. They often found poor tenants who did not reliably pay the rent or properly care for the property. This created even more financial distress and greater loss of property value as the property deteriorated through misuse.

The problems of renting were not confined to the floplords. Sometimes innocent renters were the ones who suffered. Many floplords collected large security deposits and monthly rent checks from tenants and yet failed to pay their mortgage obligations. This situation is called “rent skimming,” and it is illegal in most jurisdictions, but this crime is seldom prosecuted. Most of the time, the first indication a renter had that their rent was being skimmed was finding a foreclosure notice on their front door. By the time of notification, several months of rental payments were gone and the renters were evicted soon after the foreclosure. Renters seldom recovered their security deposits.

Houses as Commodities

Commodities are items of value and uniform quality produced in large quantities and sold in an open market. Although every residential real estate property is unique, these properties became uniformly desired by investors because all real estate prices rose during the Great Housing Bubble. The commoditization of real estate and the active, open-market trading it inspires caused houses to lose their identity as places to live and call home. Houses became tradable stucco boxes similar to baseball playing cards where buying and selling had nothing to do with possession and use and everything to do with making money in the transaction. [vii]

In a commodities or securities market, rallies unsupported by valuation measures fall back to fundamental values. It is very clear the rally in house prices was not caused by a rally in the fundamental valuation measures of rent or income. Many people forgot the primary purpose of a house is to provide shelter–something which can be obtained without ownership by renting. Ownership ceased to be about providing shelter and instead became a way to access one of the world’s largest and most highly leveraged commodity markets: residential real estate.

Commodities markets are notoriously volatile. In fact, this volatility is the primary draw of commodities trading. If market prices did not move significantly, traders would not be interested in the market, and liquidity would not be present. Without this liquidity, hedgers could not sell futures contracts and transfer their risk to other parties, and the whole market would cease to function. Commodities markets exist to transfer risk from a party that does not want it to a party who is willing to assume this risk for the potential to profit from it. The commodities exchange controls the volatility of the market through the regulation of leverage. It is the exchange that sets the amount of a particular commodity that is controlled by a futures contract. They can raise or lower the amount of leverage to create a degree of volatility attractive to traders. If they create too much leverage, the accounts of traders can be wiped out by small market price movements. If they create too little leverage, traders lose interest.

The same principles of leverage that govern commodities markets also work to influence the behavior of speculators in residential real estate markets. If leverage is very low (large downpayments or low CLTV limits,) then speculators have to use large amounts of their own money to capture what become relatively small price movements. If leverage is very high (small downpayments or high CLTV limits,) then speculators do not have to put up much money to capture what become relatively large price movements. The more leverage (debt) that can be applied to residential real estate, the greater the degree of speculative activity that market will see. Also, the smaller the amount of money required to speculate in a given market, the more people will be able to do so because more people will have the funds necessary to participate. When lenders began to offer 100% financing, it was an open invitation to rampant speculation. This makes the return on investment infinite because no investment is required by the speculator, and it eliminates all barriers to entry to the speculative market. In a regulated commodities market, the trader is responsible for all losses in the account. In a mortgage market dominated by non-recourse purchase money mortgages, lenders end up assuming liability for losses in the speculative residential real estate market.

Mortgages as Options

An option contract provides the contract holder the option to force the contract writer to either buy or sell a particular asset at a given price. A typical option contract has an expiration date, and if the contract holder does not exercise his contract rights by a given date, he loses his contractual right to do so. An option giving the holder the right to buy is a “call” option, and the option giving the holder the right to sell is a “put” option. Writers of option contracts typically obtain a price premium for taking on the risk that prices may move against their position and the contract holder may exercise his right. The holder of an options contract willingly pays this premium to limit his losses to the premium paid if the investment does not go as planned. Most options expire worthless.

Mortgages took on the characteristics of options contracts in the Great Housing Bubble. Speculators utilized 100% financing and Option ARMs with low teaser rates to minimize the acquisition and holding costs of a particular property. The small amount they were paying was the “call premium” they were providing the lender. If prices went up, the speculator got to keep all the gains from appreciation, and if prices went down, the speculator could simply walk away from the mortgage and only lose the cost of the payments made, particularly when this debt was a non-recourse, purchase-money mortgage. Another method speculators and homeowners alike used was the “put” option refinance. [viii] Late in the bubble when prices were near their peak, many homeowners refinanced their properties and took out 100% of the equity in their homes. In the process, they were buying a “put” from the lender: if prices went down (which they did,) they already had the sales proceeds as if they had actually sold the property at the peak; if prices went up, they got to keep those profits as well. The only price for this “put” option was the small increase in monthly payments they had to make on the large sum they refinanced. In fact, on a relative cost basis, the premium charged to these speculators and homeowners was a small fraction of the premiums similar options cost on stocks. Of course, mortgages are not option contracts, and lenders did not view themselves as selling option premiums to profit from the premium payments; however, speculators certainly did view mortgages in this manner and treated them accordingly.

The "put" and "call" option features of mortgages during the bubble are the direct result of 100% financing. Speculators and homeowners have too little to lose to behave responsibly when 100% financing is available. Without increasing the cost to speculators through downpayments or a loan-to-value limit on refinances, speculators are going to utilize these mortgage products in ways they were not intended. There are many expensive lessons learned by lenders concerning 100% financing during the Great Housing Bubble.

The Stages of Grief

Markets are the collective actions of individuals, and the psychology of the markets can be broken down to the psychology of the individual participants who make it up. When price levels in a financial market collapse, most people lose money. Any loss has a psychological impact on the individual causing her to experience grief. The grieving process is generally divided into several overlapping stages: denial, anger, bargaining, and acceptance. These stages are also apparent in the mass psychology of the market.

When prices first drop, the individual market participants feel confusion and attempt to avoid the truth. They feel denial. This is motivated by fear (or truth) they may have been wrong to purchase when they did, and they might lose money. They seek ways to quell these fears. Rather than attempt to objectively review facts to ascertain whether or not the unexpected market behavior is the beginning of a new trend, most market participants will seek out data consistent with their original assessment. Denial is a natural reaction, but it is a very costly one when applied to a financial market.

When the initial price drops in the market begin to show the signs of a new trend, market participants become fearful. They work to maintain their denial, but there are moments when the awful truth cannot be contained. The little, fearful voice inside of each buyer gets louder and louder. This boils over into anger, frustration, and anxiety. The individual desperately is seeking ways to maintain denial, but reality becomes stronger than denial. She imagines the possibility that the reality she is trying to deny is the truth. This leads to depression and detachment as reality is too painful to accept. The sadness of the imagined loss is often suppressed or glossed over with a veneer of anger.

Finally, “as the going gets tough, the tough get going,” and the individual seeks ways to get out of the problem through emotional bargaining. This behavior often takes the form of a negotiation with Fate or the market. One amusing example of this behavior is the purchase of a St. Joseph statue. [ix] Burying this statue in the yard is supposed to secure God’s blessing and ensure a quick sale. Some will take more productive action. Perhaps it is lowering an asking price, or taking the property off the market and doing some renovations to “add value.” Some will not take action, and they lapse back into denial because the market is “coming back soon.” Those owners who chose to lower their price as part of their bargaining may get out with minimal losses (assuming they lower it enough to actually sell). Those that choose other courses of action, lose much more money.

In past market declines each individual reached acceptance of the market reality. Some chose to continue making payments on their “investment” and wait out the bear market. In the aftermath of the coastal bubble of the early 90s, many sellers accepted the market was a buyer’s market, and many sellers chose to keep making their payments and keep their properties. Those that chose to keep their property in the Great Housing Bubble did not have the ability to make these payments, and the property became a forced sale at a foreclosure auction. Some individuals reached acceptance and chose to sell their property on their own.

Efficient Markets Theory

Figure 33: Efficient Markets Theory

The efficient markets theory is the idea that speculative asset prices always incorporate the best information about fundamental values and that prices change only because new information enters the market and investors act in an appropriate, rational manner with regards to this information. [x] This idea dominated academic fields in the early 1970s. Efficient markets theory is an elegant attempt to tether asset prices to fundamentals through the common-sense notion that people would not behave in irrational ways with their money in financial markets. This theory is encapsulated by the “value investment” paradigm prevalent in much of the investment community.

In an efficient market, prices are tethered to perceived fundamental valuations. If prices fall below the market’s perception of fundamental value, then buyers will enter the market and purchase the asset until prices reach their perceived value. If prices rise above the market’s perception of fundamental value, then sellers will enter the market to sell the asset at inflated prices. Efficient markets theory explains the majority of market behavior, but it has one major flaw which renders it inoperable as a forecasting tool: it does not explain those instances when prices become very volatile and detach from their fundamental valuations. This becomes painfully obvious when adherents to the theory postulate new metrics to justify fundamental valuations that later prove to be completely erroneous. [xi] The failed attempts to explain anomalies with the efficient markets theory lead to a new paradigm: behavioral finance theory.

Behavioral Finance Theory

Figure 34: Behavioral Finance Theory

Behavioral Finance abandoned the quest of the efficient markets theory to find a rational, mathematical model to explain fluctuations in asset prices. Instead, behavioral finance looked to psychology to explain asset valuation and why prices rise and fall. The primary representation of market behavior postulated by behavioral finance is the price-to-price feedback model: prices go up because prices have been going up, and prices go down because prices have been going down. If investors are making money because asset prices increase, other investors take note of the profits being made, and they want to capture those profits as well. They buy the asset, and prices continue to rise. The higher prices rise and the longer it goes on, the more attention is brought to the positive price changes and the more investors want to get involved. These investors are not buying because they think the asset is fairly valued, they are buying because the value is going up. They assume other rational investors must be bidding prices higher, and in their minds they “borrow” the collective expertise of the market. [xii] In reality, they are just following the herd. This herd-following has long been a valid investment technique employed by traders known as “momentum” investing. [xiii] It is not investing by any conventional definition because it relies completely on capturing speculative price changes. Success or failure often hinges on knowing when to sell. It is not a “buy and hold” strategy.

The efficient markets theory does explain the behavior of asset prices in a typical market, but when price change begins to feedback on itself, behavioral finance is the only theory that explains this phenomenon. There is often a precipitating factor causing the break with the normal pattern and releasing the tether from fundamental valuations. During the Great Housing Bubble, the primary precipitating factor was the lowering of interest rates. The precipitating factor simply acts as a catalyst to get prices moving. Once a directional bias is in place, then price-to-price feedback can take over. The perception of fundamental valuation is based solely on the expectation of future price increases, and the asset is always perceived to be undervalued. There are often brave and foolhardy attempts to justify these valuations and provide a rationalization for irrational behavior. Many witnessing the event assume the “smart money” must know something, and there is a widespread belief prices could not rise so much without a good reason. Herd mentality takes over.


[1] Social psychology is an important factor in the transmission of booms and speculative mania; however, the perception of this fact by market participants is not common. Most individuals attribute price increases to some fundamental factor whereas the actual price movements are driven mostly by mass psychology. (Case & Shiller, The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom and Post-Boom Markets, 1988)

[ii] Karl Case and Robert Shiller noted (Case & Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market, 2004) 90% or more of households expected house prices to increase in the following year during price rallies. It is the expectation of 10-year appreciation that is most striking. Market participants in the coastal bubble markets expected a 10-year average annual increase of near 15%. This would mean a tripling of prices over a 10-year period.

[iii] (Miles, 2004)

[iv] In the paper Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998), the authors document that investors have two biases which negatively impact their financial decisions: first, they have an overreliance on private information and analysis with regards to asset prices, and they have a biased self-attribution or belief in themselves that causes them to be overconfident in their investment outcomes. In short, people go into denial because they are overconfident about the direction of the trade.

[v] The best books for understanding the mindset of a professional trader are the books by author Mark Douglas (Douglas, The Disciplined Trader, Developing Winning Attitudes, 1990) and (Douglas, Trading in the Zone, 2000). He lays out the emotional issues of trading in great detail.

[vi] (Mints, 2006) According to Victor Mints in his study of the Moscow housing market, the number of vacant houses held for sale by speculators showed the same pattern as the United States.

[vii] In their paper Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision under Risk (Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 1979), the authors note a tendency of people to overweight low probability events which contributes to the attractiveness of insurance and gambling. Toward the end of the rally of the Great Housing Bubble when prices stopped rising, it became apparent that a resurgent rally was not very likely; however, many still bought in anticipation of this rally because 100% financing was available and they tended to overweight the probability of a rally.

[viii] In the paper Moral Hazard in Home Equity Conversion (Shiller & N.Weiss, Moral Hazard in Home Equity Conversion, 1998), Robert J. Shiller and Allan N.Weiss document the moral hazard issues in cash-out refinancing as follows “Home equity conversion as presently constituted or proposed usually does not deal well with the potential problem of moral hazard. Once homeowners know that the risk of poor market performance of their homes is borne by investors, they have an incentive to neglect to take steps to maintain the homes’ values. They may thus create serious future losses for the investors.” They miss the most serious problem resulting in lender losses, the predatory “put” exercised by borrowers. There are clearly moral hazards in cash-out refinancing; they are even more severe than the ones documented in this paper.

[ix] The author has a difficult time believing that a God would intervene in a financial market based on the purchase of an idol. It is not surprising a superstition like this one would spring up once houses started to be traded more frequently. There are myths about the practice going back hundreds of years, but references to the practice only go back to the early 1980s – a time corresponding to the slump after the first California real estate bubble. http://www.snopes.com/luck/stjoseph.asp

[x] Much of the history of the Efficient Markets theory is outlined in Robert Shiller’s paper (Shiller, From Efficient Market Theory to Behavioral Finance, 2002), “The efficient markets theory reached the height of its dominance in academic circles around the 1970s. Faith in this theory was eroded by a succession of discoveries of anomalies, many in the 1980s, and of evidence of excess volatility of returns. Finance literature in this decade and after suggests a more nuanced view of the value of the efficient markets theory, and, starting in the 1990s, a blossoming of research on behavioral finance. Some important developments in the 1990s and recently include feedback theories, models of the interaction of smart money with ordinary investors, and evidence on obstacles to smart money.” One of the groundbreaking papers of the early 1990s that influenced the change in economics thinking from efficient markets to behavioral finance was the work by David Porter and Vernon Smith (Porter & Smith, 1992) on Price Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets with Futures Contracting. In this paper, the authors demonstrated the volatility of returns was excessive as prices detached greatly from fundamental values and stayed detached for extended periods of time.

[xi] In the paper Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 1991), the authors, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, begin to lay the foundations for behavioral finance theory by documenting the many anomalies the efficient markets theory could not explain, “Economics can be distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those preferences in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical result qualifies as an anomaly if' it is difficult to "rationalize," or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm.”

[xii] In the paper Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1998), the authors, Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch, describe the phenomenon of herd behavior and observational learning. Much of human learning is accomplished through observation and imitation of others. This valuable survival skill results in the herd behavior observed in financial markets. It is the driving force behind the price-to-price feedback loop responsible for irrational exuberance.

[xiii] In House Prices, Fundamentals and Bubbles (Black, Fraser, & Hoesli, 2006), the behavior of momentum investors is characterized as evidence against rationality in the marketplace. For the typical amateur speculator this is certainly true, but for momentum traders who have learned how to buy and sell to profit from the momentum, it is a rational and profitable method of speculation.

Squatting Newport Coast Style

Inspired by last year's series on HELOC abuse, I started looking for upcoming trustee sales to see who has been squatting in luxury. Today's featured property is one of many I found.

Irvine Home Address … 5 LONGBOAT Newport Coast, CA 92657

Resale Home Price …… $2,988,900

{book1}

She calls out to the man on the street

"Sir, can you help me?

It's cold and I've nowhere to sleep,

Is there somewhere you can tell me?"

He walks on, doesn't look back

He pretends he can't hear her

Starts to whistle as he crosses the street

Seems embarrassed to be there

Oh

Think twice

'Cause it's another day for you and me in paradise

Phil Collins — Another Day In Paradise

Last year we looked at $3,367,500 HELOC Abuse from Hollywood, $5,000,000 HELOC abuse from Laguna Beach, $7,000,000 HELOC abuse in Newport Coast, 18 different properties in Huntington Beach, and several properties in San Clemente. Everyone was rightfully outraged, but that was not the end of the madness. Many HELOC abusers who cannot make their payments are now staying on in these properties squatting on your tax dollars.

While renters and the other "little people" suffer during the Great Recession, the entitled rich squat in their luxury homes and enjoy another day in paradise.

Today's featured property has it all:

  1. $2,500,000+ in HELOC abuse.
  2. Delusional seller who has chased the market down more than 50%.
  3. Gaming the system to squat in luxury for a year and a half.

HELOC Abuse

The original sales price is not clear from my records, but it looks as if the buyers paid about $1,200,000 in 1997. There was a $900,000 loan which I assume was 80% of the total purchase price. The original owners were a couple, and after the point where only the wife is on title in 2004 — presumably after a divorce — the HELOC abuse became truly remarkable.

  • On 3/11/2004 the wife appears alone on title, and the first mortgage is $999,800.
  • On 8/30/2004 she refinanced with a $1,000,000 first mortgage.
  • On 12/28/2005 she refinanced with a $2,170,000 first mortgage.
  • On 2/1/2006 she got a HELOC for $250,000.
  • On 8/22/2006 she refinanced with an Option ARM for $2,500,000.
  • On 11/15/2006 she opened a HELOC for $490,000.
  • On 8/1/2007 she refinanced with another Option ARM for $3,225,000.
  • On 10/22/2007 she opened a HELOC for $500,000.
  • Total property debt is $3,725,000.
  • Total mortgage equity withdrawal is $2,725,200 during a four-year stretch.

That is $681,300 per year in cash to spend to enjoy this beautiful property for doing nothing. Great gig if you can get it.

Delusional market chasing

This listing price history speaks for itself:

Property History for 5 LONGBOAT

Date Event Price
Mar 20, 2010 Relisted
Mar 08, 2010 Delisted
Feb 04, 2010 Relisted
Feb 02, 2010 Delisted
Jan 20, 2010 Price Changed $2,988,900
Sep 22, 2009 Price Changed $3,900,000
Aug 26, 2009 Price Changed $4,900,000
Sep 02, 2008 Price Changed $5,300,000
Aug 21, 2008 Price Changed $5,700,000
Jun 26, 2008 Price Changed $5,998,800
Jun 10, 2008 Listed $6,100,000

A 300% markup followed by a 50% reduction. Is that delusion, ignorance, or stupidity?

Gaming the system

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 07/23/2009

Document Type: Notice of Sale

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 04/27/2009

Document Type: Notice of Rescission

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 04/21/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 03/23/2009

Document Type: Notice of Rescission

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 03/18/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

Foreclosure Record

Recording Date: 03/17/2009

Document Type: Notice of Default

To be in default on 3/17/2009, the borrower has missed payments since at least December 2008 and likely much earlier.

Where did you live for the last 16 months? Did you live this well? Did you pay for it?

These loans are above the conforming limit, so perhaps we will not pay for it, but somehow I imagine lenders will find a way to take bailout money for these losses. You are probably going to pay for Washington Mutual's loss on this property with your tax money as part of the backstop agreement when Chase took WAMU over. Your tax money is supporting a HELOC abusing squatter living in luxury in Newport Coast… Just so you know….

IHB News

As you noticed last week, we are now able to buy at trustee sale and sell to families that require financing. I intend to write a series of posts to detail everything soon. This will be a slow rollout. I would rather under-promise and over-deliver.

Housing Bubble News from Patrick.net

Los Angeles Area Rent/Buy Ratios (patrick.net)

Housing market's upswing at risk of collapsing (chron.com)

Mortgage delinquencies rise to nearly 14 percent (finance.yahoo.com)

Households Facing Foreclosure Rose in 4th Quarter (nytimes.com)

Housing's big "shadow" up to 10M more houses could be for sale (finance.yahoo.com)

Half of U.S. House Loan Modifications Default Again (bloomberg.com)

House loan modification program oversold: watchdog (reuters.com)

Obama Loan-Modification Effort Failed Miserably (businessweek.com)

Treasury defends houseowner assistance plan (reuters.com)

Treasury, Ahem, Clarifies Goals for the Mortgage Mod Program (propublica.org)

Underwater "Owners" Will Never Surface Again (centralvalleybusinesstimes.com)

James K. Galbraith: Oh Please, Greenspan (huffingtonpost.com)

Real Estate ETFs Face Uphill Battle (minyanville.com)

Existing house sales dip in Panama City, FL (newsherald.com)

Man convicted on 160 counts of realty fraud (signonsandiego.com)

Realtor suspected in foreclosure theft (columbiatribune.com)

US new house sales hit record low (news.bbc.co.uk)

Sales of New U.S. Houses Dropped to Lowest on Record (bloomberg.com)

Sun Belt Loses Its Shine in Migration Data (online.wsj.com)

Arizona Officials Apportion Bailout Funds and Wrestle with Moral Hazard (irvinehousingblog.com)

California has 1.7 Million Additional Houses priced under $249,000 (financemymoney.com)

What if It Was ALL Just a Big Bubble? (timiacono.com)

Positive cash flow in rental properties (johntreed.com)

Obama Loan Program May Extend Foreclosure Crisis (bloomberg.com)

The Housing Crisis and the Resentment Zone (economix.blogs.nytimes.com)

BofA to start reducing mortgage principal (finance.yahoo.com)

U.S. banks pay lip service to second mortgages (blogs.reuters.com)

Treasury Takes First Steps to Reshape Fannie and Freddie (nytimes.com)

Kansas City Fed's Hoenig Endorses Volcker, Blasts "Too Big To Fail" (Mish)

High-End Repo Man Takes Back Toys From the Over-Leveraged Rich (online.wsj.com)

Why political futures markets got the health care bill so wrong (slate.com)

Toll road operator files for Chapter 11 (signonsandiego.com)

The Rising Cost of Public Higher Education (phdcomics.com)

The Case for Ending the Mortgage Deduction (nytimes.com)

Noe Valley "Dreamhouse": One raffle you might not want to win? (sfgate.com)

Renting Can Be A Smart Investment (PDF)

HAMP applicants who don't really need the money (calculatedriskblog.com)

Fannie, Freddie messy government tie tough to cut (reuters.com)

Why Fannie and Freddie Continue to Cost Taxpayers Billions (huffpostfund.org)

Will Misrepresented Mortgage-Backed Bonds Come Home to Roost? (seekingalpha.com)

Bernanke Wants to End Bank Reserve Requirements Completely: Does it Matter? (Mish)

AIG Increases Pay for Most Top Managers Who Remained (businessweek.com)

How Middle Class Evaporated in Last 40 Years (mybudget360.com)

Global Housing Prices: More Room to Fall? (imf.org)

Influx of listings set to cool Canadian housing market (theglobeandmail.com)

German pensioners guilty of abducting financial adviser (news.bbc.co.uk)

San Francisco Bay Area Rent/Buy Ratios (patrick.net)

New round of foreclosures threatens housing market (washingtonpost.com)

Defaults and foreclosures bounce up (nctimes.com)

Notices of default up 24% in San Diego county (signonsandiego.com)

Microcosm of the Housing Crisis on an Arizona Street (nytimes.com)

A Florida Sprawl Development's Road to Foreclosure (eyeonmiami.blogspot.com)

In Metro Detroit, 47 percent of properties are under water (detnews.com)

In Boston, a Lender Steps in After Foreclosures (dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com)

Finding in Foreclosure a Beginning, Not an End (nytimes.com)

House Builders Can't Compete With Foreclosures (forbes.com)

America's most underwater housing markets (finance.yahoo.com)

Poll Shows Little Confidence in Housing Recovery (fastpitchnetworking.com)

Five Financial Trends Keeping California Home Prices Depressed (doctorhousingbubble.com)

Reply to NYT article claiming that paying off your mortgage is bad idea (slycapital.wordpress.com)

More troubles coming for Portland commercial real estate (blog.oregonlive.com)

The Incredible Lightness of the SP 500 (theautomaticearth.blogspot.com)

Inflation? Where? (Mish)

Contrarian Trade of the Decade: the U.S. Dollar (Charles Hugh Smith)

Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Will Spark New Crisis (bloomberg.com)

House Call: To Buy or Not to Buy (smartmoney.com)

More Ugly Housing Data (safehaven.com)

Supply of Foreclosed Houses Increases (calculatedriskblog.com)

Option ARMs pose threat to housing market (latimes.com)

Loan Spread Points to Limits on U.S. Housing (bloomberg.com)

CA Housing is Double-Dipping Right Now! (mhanson.com)

House values in Phoenix may fall again because of 'shadow inventory' (azcentral.com)

Many South Florida house sellers still asking too much (miamiherald.com)

Some homedebtors facing prospect of repeated foreclosures (latimes.com)

Credit scores can drop after getting loan help (finance.yahoo.com)

Why On Earth Would I Attempt A Short Sale? (housingstorm.com)

Should You Buy or Rent? (realestate.yahoo.com)

Renters' advantage (thenewstribune.com)

US Headed For Commercial Real Estate Crash Of Unprecedented Magnitude? (beforeitsnews.com)

Sale Fraud, Squatter Stimulus, and Buying Before Foreclosing (mybudget360.com)

Trust, Underwater (nytimes.com)

The Misinformed Tea Party Movement (forbes.com)

Irvine Home Address … 5 LONGBOAT Newport Coast, CA 92657

Resale Home Price … $2,988,900

Home Purchase Price … $1,125,000

Home Purchase Date …. 11/19/1997

Net Gain (Loss) ………. $1,684,566

Percent Change ………. 165.7%

Annual Appreciation … 7.8%

Cost of Ownership

————————————————-

$2,988,900 ………. Asking Price

$597,780 ………. 20% Down Conventional

5.11% …………… Mortgage Interest Rate

$2,391,120 ………. 30-Year Mortgage

$626,654 ………. Income Requirement

$12,997 ………. Monthly Mortgage Payment

$2590 ………. Property Tax

$250 ………. Special Taxes and Levies (Mello Roos)

$249 ………. Homeowners Insurance

$600 ………. Homeowners Association Fees

============================================

$16,687 ………. Monthly Cash Outlays

-$1918 ………. Tax Savings (% of Interest and Property Tax)

-$2815 ………. Equity Hidden in Payment

$1199 ………. Lost Income to Down Payment (net of taxes)

$374 ………. Maintenance and Replacement Reserves

============================================

$13,526 ………. Monthly Cost of Ownership

Cash Acquisition Demands

——————————————————————————

$29,889 ………. Furnishing and Move In @1%

$29,889 ………. Closing Costs @1%

$23,911 ………… Interest Points @1% of Loan

$597,780 ………. Down Payment

============================================

$681,469 ………. Total Cash Costs

$207,300 ………… Emergency Cash Reserves

============================================

$888,769 ………. Total Savings Needed

Property Details for 5 LONGBOAT Newport Coast, CA 92657

——————————————————————————

Beds: 4

Baths: 4 full 1 part baths

Home size: 5,300 sq ft

($564 / sq ft)

Lot Size: 10,508 sq ft

Year Built: 1994

Days on Market: 656

MLS Number: U8002650

Property Type: Single Family, Residential

Community: Newport Coast

Tract: Esor

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According to the listing agent, this listing may be a pre-foreclosure or short sale.

COMPLETELY REMODELED IN 2008: NEW PAINT AND CARPET, GRANITE TOPS, AND KITCHEN CABINETS. THIS SPECTACULAR MEDITERRANEAN CUSTOM ESTATE OFFERS BREATHTAKING VIEWS OF OCEAN AND CITY LIGHTS. FROM THE LUXURIOUS AND ELEGANT INTERIOR TO THE BEAUTIFUL YARD WITH ROCK POOL, WATERFALLS, SPA AND OUTDOOR BUILT-IN BARBEQUE, THIS HOME IS PERFECT FOR ENTERTAINMENT. HOME OFFICE LIBRARY AND SURROUND SOUD SYSTEM ARE JUST A FEW EXTRA THINGS THIS HOME HAS TO OFFER. LOCATED IN THE PRESTIGIOUS GUARD-GATED COMMUNITY OF PELICAN RIDGE AND BUILT BY BRIAN FOSTER.