Login
Subscribe
Recent Comments
- Lee Campbell on Uncovering the History of the Secret Garden
- Kelja on Uncovering the History of the Secret Garden
- Sylvia Walker on Irvine Housing by the Numbers - May 2012 Update
- Casual Observer on Irvine Housing by the Numbers - May 2012 Update
- Astute As It Comes on Open House Review: 35 Bella Rosa
- Sylvia Walker on Open House Review: 35 Bella Rosa
- Darin on Open House Review: 35 Bella Rosa
- Sylvia Walker on Investors Are Busy in Irvine's Low-End Housing Market
- Casual Observer on Investors Are Busy in Irvine's Low-End Housing Market
- irvine_home_owner on Tustin, but Irvine Schools
Recent Posts
- Uncovering the History of the Secret Garden
- Closed Sales from 5/10/2012-5/16/2012
- Open House Review: 52 Secret Garden
- Irvine Housing by the Numbers - May 2012 Update
- Paired Living with Privacy in Woodbridge
- Beige Ruth Sisters
- Closed Sales from 5/3/2012 to 5/9/2012
- Open House Review: 35 Bella Rosa
- Investors Are Busy in Irvine’s Low-End Housing Market
- Artist in Residence: Turtle Rock Glen Townhome
Categories
- Community Profile
- HELOC Abuse
- House Flips
- IHB Property Listing
- Investment Property
- Library
- Mortgage Fraud
- New Homes
- News
- Price Rollback
- Property Rental
- Real Estate Analysis
- Real Estate Owned
- Schools
- Short Sale
- Special Essays
- Special Irvine Homes
- Uncategorized
- WTF
Archives
- May 2012
- April 2012
- March 2012
- February 2012
- January 2012
- December 2011
- November 2011
- October 2011
- September 2011
- August 2011
- July 2011
- June 2011
- Rest of archives
Browse Homes
Irvine Homes
- Airport Area Homes
- El Camino Real Homes
- Northpark Homes
- Northwood Homes
- Oak Creek Homes
- Orangetree Homes
- Portola Springs Homes
- Quaill Hill Homes
- Rancho San Joaquin Homes
- Turtle Ridge Homes
- Turtle Rock Homes
- University Park
- University Town Center Homes
- West Irvine Homes
- Westpark Homes
- Woodbridge Homes
- Woodbury Homes
Newport Beach Homes
- Newport Coast Homes
- Crystal Cove Homes
- Corona Del Mar / Spyglass
- East Bluff / Harbor View Homes
- Lower Newport Bay / Balboa Island
- Balboa Peninsula Homes
- West Bay / Santa Ana Heights
- West Newport / Lido Homes
Other Cities
- Aliso Viejo Homes
- Anaheim Hills Homes
- Brea Homes
- Costa Mesa Homes
- Coto de Caza Homes
- Dana Point Homes
- Huntington Beach Homes
- Ladera Ranch Homes
- Laguna Beach Homes
- Laguna Hills Homes
- Laguna Niguel Homes
- Lake Forest Homes
- Mission Viejo Homes
- Orange Homes
- Rancho Santa Margarita Homes
- San Clemente Homes
- San Juan Capistrano Homes
- Santa Ana Homes
- Tustin Homes
- Villa Park Homes
- Yorba Linda Homes
Contact
.(JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address)
Foreclosures
Housing
- Talk Irvine
- IHB Forum Archive
- OC Housing News
- Coto Housing Blog
- Housing Kaboom
- Patrick.net
- Housing Chronicles
- Housing Doom
- Dr. Housing Bubble
- Manhattan Beach Confidential
- Burbed
- SoCal RE Bubble Crash
- Professor Piggington
- Real C'ville
- Westside Bubble
- Bubble Meter
- Portland Housing Blog
- Sacramento Land(ing)
- OC Register Blog
Econ/Finance/Other
- Calculated Risk
- The Big Picture
- Economist's View
- Mish's Blog
- Matrix
- Bakers' Stock
- ML-Implode
- Eschaton
- Best Mortgage Rates
- Crackerjack Finance
Latest REOs
- $199,900 :: 3125 Watermarke Pl, Irvine CA, 92612
- $349,900 :: 10 Greenleaf 16, Irvine CA, 92604
- $439,900 :: 61 Olivehurst, Irvine CA, 92602
- $889,900 :: 14 Upland, Irvine CA, 92602
- $429,900 :: 56 Great Lawn, Irvine CA, 92620
- $465,000 :: 212 Garden Gate Ln, Irvine CA, 92620
- $329,000 :: 1006 Terra Bella, Irvine CA, 92602
- $579,900 :: 8 Star Thistle, Irvine CA, 92604
- $458,500 :: 3 Ultimo Dr, Irvine CA, 92620
- $398,900 :: 191 Lockford, Irvine CA, 92602
“A 22% cure rate is abysmal.”
And of that 22% that is supposedly cured, historically at least 65% of those will redefault and those that do not redefault will probably sell short. The figures showing homes saved through loan modifications is a farce.
Your assuming the goal is to keep people in their homes permanently. Most people don’t stay in a home permanently regardless of circumstance. The goal is simply to delay and extend the time in the home. All measures have been very successful. Rates resetting lower has been most successful and then of course fantasy equity values doesn’t hurt either.
Face facts, wall street won..
Exactly. If the stated goal is to modify to keep people in their homes permanently, the govt programs and mods are mostly a failure. However, if the goal were to “amend, pretend, extend” as Calculated Risk would say, then the programs are a success, allowing banks to pretend their loans are still good and pretend the bank is still solvent long enough for the govt to funnel money into the bank though all kinds of arcane means and long enough for money printing to cause enough secret inflation to make all the underwater borrowers above water again.
“secret inflation”, great term, you mean it’s not captured in the CPI LOL, that’s certainly the greater goal. Say that your goal is to limit inflation, make up a BS CPI calculation that doesn’t include food, oil, housing, or anything else people need to live; let the productive folk get salary increases while the poor eat sh!t, that pretty much summarizes the Feds MO
I was frankly amazed at the 22% cure rate, it seems very high. But then, I guess that’s more a case of modifications (taxpayer abuse) than the home-owers coming up with 3+ months of mortgage payments on their own.
I don’t have the cure rate of those who make up back payments, but you have to imagine that is very, very low. As awgee pointed out, most of these loans that “cure” only do so temporarily.
Just curious, in your cost of ownership analysis I don’t see any mention of PMI payment associated with <20% down. The PMI with FHA financing is going up 0.25% come early April. The last time I checked, PMI for FHA financing at 400k was around $300. Therefore, by early April that PMI associated with FHA financing will go higher.
I have not kept up with the changes in FHA financing costs. Over the next few weeks, I am working with a young MBA with a local lender to make our cost of ownership calculator more accurate. I will also update my spreadsheets for daily posts.
Right now, I have s simple toggle that flips between FHA and conventional financing at a certain price range. I did this to reflect the fact that most under-median purchases are FHA and most over-median are conventional. I will likely need to add a cost line for PMI that kicks in whenever FHA is used. I would make the change now, but I don’t know the formulas, so I would be exchanging one bad data point for another.
You mean the less than 1.6% of Irvine loans that are FHA financed? “Most” must be a small number to you.
I recently inquired about an FHA loan with Wells Fargo. They indeed confirmed two VERY large costs: a one-time 1% of the home price payment to secure the loan, and then at the moment 0.9% but very soon (sometime in April) going to 1.15% monthly mortgage insurance payment. So, for a $500,000 home, this means you have to pay $5,000 just to get the loan, and then almost $500 a month thereafter in insurance. That’s a HIGH cost!
So, I was a little surprised but also very glad to see banks strongly encouraging borrowers to put 20% down to avoid these high costs.
Also, the FHA MIP lasts for the first five years in a 30Y mortgage. i.e. If your loan principal were to decrease to below 78% of the home’s value in year three, you cannot get an appraisal and have FHA drop the MIP. FHA is trying to earn some money for the risk they’re taking.
Also, if you can swing a 15Y mortgage, the FHA MIP would be 25 bps if the LTV is > 90% and there’s no MIP if the LTV is <= 90%.
Mattman,
You are correct in regards to the costs associated with FHA financing. However, like all things in life there is a risk reward tradeoff and FHA does a decent job balancing the two. It’s important to remember that the core function of FHA financing is to allow qualified borrower to obtain financing needed to obtain homeownership when that individual would normally not qualify under conventional guidelines.
I would like to begin by agreeing with you in regards to putting down 20% or more to avoid costs but I hope this shows the true cost of FHA vs. conventional.
If not able to put down 20%, FHA is by far the best alternative available. Anyone who can afford to put 20% normally would not consider FHA financing unless the opportunity cost of the additional down payment would out weight the increase in monthly payment or the individual would like to use as much leverage possible.
FHA vs. Conventional (purchase transaction, SFR, $500,000 purchase price, 720 FICO, sufficient income)
Option 1: $500,000 purchase price at 80% loan to value (20% down) would give you a loan amount of $400,000. You could expect to receive a rate of 4.75% giving you a principle and interest payment of $2,086.58 (I am using par pricing and excluding any lender fees in order to simplify this comparison). If you took out the additional $82,500 from a 2.42% bond (www.bankrate.com/cd.aspx) you would have lost an additional 166.37 per month making your total payment $2,252.95
Option 2: Let assume we are going to do a conventional first for 80% at $400,000 and were able to find a lender to do a second mortgage up to 96.5% - I couldn’t find anyone anywhere to do this. I did find that Wells Fargo can do a HELOC second up to 80% loan to value at 7.865%. Let’s just use that number even though it would not be possible as out second loan rate. A first of $400,000 at 4.75% would give you a payment of $2,086.58 plus an interest only second of $82,500 at 7.865% would give you a payment of $540.71 giving you a total payment of $2,627.29 - however, you will find difficulty obtaining this type of financing.
Option 3: Doing a conventional first of $475,000 at 90% Loan to value. Your rate would be 5% which would give you a monthly payment of $2,415.69 and your monthly mortgage insurance premium would be $356.25 per month (720 fico minimum to qualify for private MI up to 90%ltv – www.mgic.com) Your total payment would be $2,771.94 plus the additional $65.54 you would have lost from your bond income by needing to put 10% down instead of only 3.5% brings your total to $2,837.48.
Option 4: Doing an FHA first of $482,500 at 4.625% with a payment of $2,481 plus your monthly mortgage insurance premium of $361.87 (.9% of loan amount – April 18th this will change to 1.15%) will give you a total payment of $2,842.87. You will have to pay an upfront mortgage insurance premium of 1% but that can be negotiated so that the seller can pay it as well as up to 6% of your closing costs.
Although FHA financing seems expensive there is really no better alternative which is why it has grown in popularity in the last few years. Other factors which have made FHA financing more attractive are that the credit qualifying criteria for a borrower is not as strict as conventional financing. Also, a borrower using FHA financing allows the 3.5% down payment to come from a qualified family member which if you can negotiate having the seller contribute towards your closing costs you can purchase a home with $0 down. The monthly mortgage insurance premium will expire either after 5 years or if you reach a loan to value of 78% or less.
FHA also allows borrowers with “credit problems” to still qualify since not only are the guidelines not as strict but the underwriters that review the loans use a common sense approach to underwriting each and every file. Other reasons why FHA financing is attractive is because current FHA borrowers may streamline their loan into a new lower rate loan with no additional closing costs added to the loans. Also qualifying for a streamline is considerably easier than refinancing, especially in the value of the property has come down and you would like to take advantage of the new lower rates. As long as you have had the current loan for 6 months and are current on the mortgage you can do the streamline refinance as many times you wish. Something that may really benefit current borrowers is the assume ability of FHA loans, if you purchase at today’s rates and in the future if rates increase, the buyer, subject to qualifying, can purchase your home according to the terms of your current loan.
Disclosure: Of all the purchase money transactions we did last year 47% were FHA, 51% were conventional and 2% were VA. Rates were based on the optima blue pricing engine on 4/1/11 and were quoted at par, meaning no origination fees needed to obtain that rate.
I am crazy to create blog same as you. Is it possible for me? Give me some tips.
I would start by participating in blogs rather than spamming them.
$100 million paid for private residence, a French Chateau in Silicon Valley
Link is http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704530204576233170859101198.html?mod=WSJ_hps_RIGHTTopCarousel_1
Question about O-ARMs:
Since ‘08 I’ve been hearing how all the OARM loans are going to destroy the real estate landscape once they recast/reset. Considering OARMs have been around since the last 90s and most of them recast/reset after 5 years, hasn’t the impact not been as bad as once thought because of the low interest rates, loan mods and refis?
I have a buddy who refi’ed into a OARM loan back in the mid 2000s for his house in LA. End of 08, when the stock market dropped and credit got tight, scared of rising rates, he tried to refi into a fixed but since he was close to upside down he couldn’t. He asked for a mod, but they said he had to be delinquent first before they would consider him and he couldn’t bring himself to miss mortgage payments so he just stuck with it. Today, his payments are lower than the first few years of his loan and he’s able to pay off some deferred interest. Had rates risen, this would probably have a different outcome but because rates are so low now, it seems OARMs aren’t the ELE people thought they would be.
This also goes for HELOCs, since most were based on prime rate plus or minus a margin, people who were paying 7%-8% interest during the bubble are now only paying about 3%.
If his payments are lower now than the first few years of the loan, he wasn’t paying the minimum like many oarm borrowers. The real reason for the lack of an option-arm wave of defaults isn’t people like your friend, it’s the fact that people have already defaulted on those loans. You can pick one loan that’s current, but in mid 2009, 40% of those loans were in default.
Right now, about 22% are delinquent, excluding foreclosure. Add in the 20% in foreclosure and you’re back to the 40% number. I don’t know what they use for the denominator, original option-arms, or loans currently outstanding (not paid off or extinguished by foreclosure).
“If his payments are lower now than the first few years of the loan, he wasn’t paying the minimum like many oarm borrowers.”
Not necessarily. What some people don’t realize is the interest rate on an OARM isn’t directly tied to mortgage rates, it’s tied to different indexes like the LIBOR, CODI or COSI (COSI was very popular in Glendale/World’s/Wacho/Wells loans). Back in mid 2000s, that rate was 3 to 4.5 percent and usually teasers for the 1st year were 2-3 points below the prevailing fixed rate so that by the 3rd year you were on par (that usually coincided with your index). So if we assume that his teaser payments were 4%/5%/6% for the first 3 years (6-7% was the 30-year fixed at that time), that’s probably an index of 2 to 3 on top of his margin rate.
What is the COSI now? 2.22 percent. It’s been there since the start of 2010. So let’s say his index was 2.5%, he’s paying 4.72% which is lower than what his year 2 and 3 payments were.
Now again… I’m not saying that everyone’s case is like this and that OARMs are not a problem… I’m just theorizing that the record low indexes now (not just mortgage rates) are mitigating the payment shock that was supposed to happen so the damage predicted by the explosion of OARMs may not be as bad.
Golden West’s minimum op-arm rate, in 2006, from what 10 minutes of google tells me, was 1.5%.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_37/b4000001.htm
If he can afford a 5% rate now, than he wasn’t one of the problem op-arm borrowers to begin with. The problem was with people who needed the 1.5-3% teasers to make the payments, on homes with inflated prices, when the rates went to even 5%, and adding in principal, they’d be sunk. Often times these would be investors and the low rates were needed because there wasn’t cash-flow covering the payments. Those would bail well before recast because there’s no reason to even pay the 2% teaser in that case.
If you said oarms are not a problem, you’d be wrong. The 40-50% default + foreclosure rate is by definition a problem. Might more oarms default if their linked indices rose? Of course. The expected explosion, judging from the data, has really just been a pre-explosion.
You may want to Google some more.
I remember refi offers back then, and I don’t recall any loan with a prolonged 1.5% teaser… at most they were 2 or 3 points below the fixed rate. Anything with that low of a teaser jumped up within months not years (your linked article even states that one couple went from 1% to 7.68% in less than a year).
I think that ultra-low rate was the exception, not the rule. I’m surprised more people who read this blog don’t chime in on what their personal recollection of OARM teasers were.
I also found it interesting that in that article, circa 9/2006, that the people they profiled had fixed mortgages of 5.1% and 5.5% and switched to OARMs… that fixed rate is pretty low for that time period.
The Bernanke kept the interest low not only for the banks, but for the ARM people as well. or maybe it was just a bonus?...
I don’t see much of an out for these people unless they have big savings or financial help from family. Most of them will default, squat and then either foreclose or try to short sell. Otherwise they’ll be forced to wait it out and continue paying on their underwater homes or sell at a loss. The low rates won’t help them recoup if the demand’s overwhelmed by distressed inventory.
Good morning. We are somewhat puzzled by your ARM reset chart. While it does show that many have been converted by the Banksters over into fixed rate loans - green on your chart, it also suggests that there is currently a huge number of ARMs added to the re-set volume - red on your chart.
That does not correspond to other reports that suggest more than 85% of all the Bad ARMS & subprime RE loans made between 03-07 were in trouble - seriously delinquent, deeply underwater OR in foreclosure or already through foreclosure & bankruptcy.
There argument is that MOST, if not all, the sand state ARM reset loans no longer exist.
Where did your numbers and/or the chart come from? What evidence do they/you have that those reset ARMs still exist?
Since you are “a Californicator”, as opposed to we Arid-Zone-Ah-ians, that might be true, for you; but from what we see here, tis not, anymore.
Great article/post & charts, thanks.
Unfortunately, this all only stays bad or gets worse for as far as you can see….a decade or more. Rates are rising and inflation is brewing. Everything from cotton to coffee and of course gas is rising. The massive shadow inventory is one thing but, what about the huge fraction of home owners - I mean loan owners who are under water?? Sooner or later they will either stop paying or sell into any type of small rally in prices.
The housing ponzi scheme and resultant crises has done unbelievable damage to people. We have likely lost a generation’s worth of net wealth!
We will easily have 30 year fixed rates 3+ points higher in the next 5-10 years. Each point of increase reduces purchasing powere by 10%! And that is if we didn’t have shadow inventory and millions of people underwater.
Long ugly grind sideways at best and lower probably. Hope is not a strategy…
BD
BD: Rates are rising and inflation is brewing.
I don’t think you understand what inflation would do to home prices. Inflation would be VERY helpful to all the underwater homeowners, because it would inflate the nominal value of their property. (That doesn’t mean they could afford it, but at least they wouldn’t be underwater and might be able to do a standard equity sale and move on.) When prices for gas, clothes, and bread go up, so generally do RE prices.
Rising mortgage interest rates, otoh, are NOT the same as price inflation, and they will have a negative impact on RE prices, because they will make the cost of borrowing money more expensive.
-Darth
Thanks for the article and analysis. You write:
“We are going to see many more distressed sales over the next several years. I question whether lenders can maintain current pricing and liquidate inventories in a reasonable timeframe.”
“Lenders will not want to hold this property forever, and as a society, we don’t want them to. The only real question is how orderly will the liquidation be? “
I reply, the Seigniorage, that is the moneyness of the US Federal Reserve failed February 22, 2011, when the value of distressed securities, traded by the mutual fund FAGIX, turned lower, which turned stocks, ACWI, lower.
The Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke Free To Choose Economic Regime, known as Neoliberalism failed. We as a society are transitioning from an age of Leverage into an Age of Deleveraging. And from an age of Freedom into State Capitalism.
Society will not be making the decisions on home pricing, rather stake holders from government and banking will be making the decisions and most likely they will be leasing to selected individuals.
Sorry Irvine Renter, but all past assumptions, and analyses are being taken off the table, as we are entering an age of Austerity and Control.
Thanks again for all your articles.